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SUMMARY
This dissertation Is concerned with ideas about property presented 
in British political theory between 1750-1850. It focuses not only 
on the major traditions of Utilitarianism and Natural R.icrhts, but, also, 
since there is an obvious qap in the literature, on those ideas about 
property implicit in classical political economy. The study begins with the 
theory of property advanced by Adam Smith, concentrating on the relationship 
between property and the stadial thesis, observing that this latter thesis 
represents a referential framework for Smith's ideas on orooertv, with 
property differentiation a defining characteristic of each stage. Next we 
examine the links between labour, value, and distribution in Smith's economics, 
concluding that the ambiguities within Smithian value and distribution 
theory provide both impetus and material for the Ricardians' conception < 
of value and distribution. We then examine the Ricardians' views on value 
and distribution, concluding that both represent emplrlcal/explanatory 
theories, founded upon the assumed legitimacy of the prevailing property 
structure. This discussion is followed by an account of the Utilitarian 
theory of property, centring on the connections between security and 
equality. It is the same concern with security found in the Utilitarian 
thought, we conclude, that underlies classical political economy, and not 
notions derived from Locke as frequently asserted. Thomas Hodgskin's natural 
rights theory of property provides the substance of the next chanter. Here 
we illuminate the various senses with which Hodqskin invests the term 
"natural", and consider the tension between those Smithian and Lockean 
elements incorporated into Hodgskin's theory. The theories of just 
appropriation advanced by the antl-Ricardians, and their links with 
"exploitation", the exchange mechanism, and monopoly ownership of the 
means of production, are our next concern. Finally, we consider the 
various plans designed by the auiti-Rlcardians to reconcile labour with 
its product, which include am artisamal model, three communitarian schemes, 
and two proposals for monetary reform.
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Introduction
<
The principal aim of this dissertation is a consideration of the 
place of ideas about property, in British political theory, between 
1750—1850, focusing on two specific areas: namely, the relationship 
between property, labour, and value; and secondly the issue of the 
distribution of wealth between classes. The choice of the word "ideas", 
in the title, is no accident. We are concerned in this thesis, not 
only with fully articulated theories of the origin and nature of 
property derivation, such as Hodgskin's natural rights theory, but 
also with the question of the assumptions about both the origin and 
distribution of property, which underlie many of the more strictly 
economic works dealt with herein. It is our contention, for example, < 
that it is impossible to understand completely the social ramifications 
of the Ricardian theory of distribution without some comprehension of 
the utilitarian conception of the balance between security and equality, 
in the allocation of property, which informs that theory. Whilst it 
is true that Ricardo did not enunciate a justificatory theory of 
property, it is also true that for his notion of the distribution of 
wealth between classes to function, and to be validated, he must have 
assumed certain things about the prevailing pattern of property.* 
Similarly, and relatedly, the whole foundation of capitalism, which 
it was the aim of the classical political economists to defend in the 
course of their enunciations about its workings, implies a certain 
conception of the nature and function of property rights; for capitalism 
is grounded in an individualistic, right of private property, and in 
the correlative notion that such individualism will probably, and
2justifiably, entail the existence of an unequal distribution of wealth.
(1) See below, chapters 3 and 4.
\
(2) Cf., Hodgson, Geoff, Capitalism, Value and Exploitation: A  Radical 
Theory. (Oxford, Martin Robertson, 1952), pp 1Ô8-116'.--------------
2In addition to the fact that we are interested in ideas about 
property, as opposed simply to theories of entitlement generally, is 
also tbs fact that the ideas with which we are concerned, and which 
were prevalent in the period in question, are necessarily disparate.
We are not dealing uniquely, therefore, with the notion of private 
property, but also with the conception of communal ownership, and 
social property.
The general scope of this dissertation is, thus, defined by an
interest in ideas about property, which ideas may, or may not, form
part of a fully-fledged justificatory theory of entitlement. In more
specific terms, this thesis is concerned with the relationship of
those ideas about property to a number of other themes. One of those
themes is the somewhat familiar notion of the connection between labour
and property. Within the context of this study, that relationship
refers to both the way in which the expenditure of labour may be seen
to generate a right of property, both as a universally operative
paradigm of just appropriation,^ and as an historically specific 
2paradigm; and to the way in which the application of labour to nature, 
for example, may simultaneously determine value, which may, or may hot, 
have appropriative repercussions. The reasons for this concern with 
the links between labour, property, and value, are manifold. 
Traditionally, a connection has often been made between the expenditure 
of labour in the process of acquisition, and the related creation of 
value. Thus, for example, Locke, in the course of his defence of the 
individuation of land from the common, observes that the very act of 
labouring which is necessary to appropriation gives value to the land 
in cultivation, reinforcing, perhaps, the strength of the labourer's
(1) See, for example, the pronouncements of Thomas Hodgskin, William 
Thompson, John Gray and John Francis Bray, below chapters 6 and 7.
(2) See, for example, Adam Smith, below, chapters 1 and 2.
3claim to that land. In this instance, the question of value determination 
is supportive of appropriative claims.^
The connection between labour, value, and property, is also of 
note for the development of the theories of value and distribution
2expounded by the classical political economists in the 1820's and 1830's. 
One particularly salient characteristic of the writings of these men 
is the absence of any attempt to explain, or justify, unequal property 
holdings on the grounds of entitlement. Rather, the argument is
shifted to the somewhat technical/empirical domain of value deter-
. . 3ruination and measurement.
The final way in which the relationship between labour, value, 
and property, is of moment for this dissertation, relates to the 
question of exploitation, which,for the authors dealt with in this 
study,means the expropriation by land and capital of the rightful 
product of labour. How that exploitation is actually perpetrated, and 
how it can be measured, forms one of the central issues of the later 
chapters.
As well as considering the link between labour, value and property, 
as outlined above, another central theme of this thesis refers to 
conceptions of the principles regulating the distribution of wealth 
between classes. The need for this additional organisational point 
relates to the central concern of classical political economy, which 
was to explain the natural laws underlying capitalist distribution.
The theories of distribution expounded differ from justificatory '
explanations of property derivation for, whilst the latter is an
(1) Locke, John, An Essay Concerning the True Original, Extent, and 
End of Civil Government (1689).chapter V, passim.
(2) By the classical political economists, I am referring, specifically 
in this dissertation, to a limited group of writers, viz., David 
Ricardo, James Mill, John Ramsay McCulloch, Thomas Robert Malthus, 
and Col. Robert Torrens. The reason for the somewhat unconventional 
exclusion of Smith from this group is dictated by reasons of literary 
clarity, and is not meant as a comment upon Smith's membership of^that
(3) See below, chapter 3, section 1,
4inherently normative pursuit, finding the legitimate bases of 
appropriation, the question of distribution forms a largely 
empirical pursuit, focusing not upon the question of the origin of the 
right to a particular type of factorial income, in the first place, but 
upon the principles governing the actual rate of that factorial return, 
assuming as data the division of society into three classes, defined 
by reference to their ownership of one of the three factors requisite 
to production, viz., land, labour, and capital.
The thematic parameters of this thesis have obviously been set 
by the choice of authors. In chronological order, we begin with Adam 
Smith. The problems bequeathed by Smith, in his political economy 
especially, identified the next relevant group of authors, the classical 
political economists mentioned above, for the substantive content of 
many of their compositions derived directly from an attempt to address, 
and solve, those issues unsatisfactorily elucidated by Smith, particularly 
in the fields of value, and distribution. Similarly, it was the un­
satisfactory explanation of the workings of industrial capitalism, as 
espoused by the classical political economists, that led a group of 
writers - Thomas Hodgskin, John Gray, John Francis Bray and William 
Thompson - to demonstrate the claim of labour to the entire fruits of 
its endeavour. This group of writers, henceforth denominated the 
"anti-Ricardians" , were of interest not only for their championship 
of labour's claim to property but also for the development, by some of , 
their number, of ideas about the communal ownership of property.
(1) The reason for the adoption of this terminology will be explained 
in the introduction to chapter 7 below.
(2) See below, chapter 8.
5The only other author considered in this thesis, in any substantial 
sense, is Jeremy Bentham, whose inclusion was determined by two factors: 
firstly, and most importantly, by the fact that it is my contention 
that it is the theory of property propounded by the Utilitarians that 
forms the basic conceptual framework for the views of the classical 
political economists on the question of distribution, that is the 
concern with security over equality: and secondly, by the fact that 
this doctrine from utility, as conservatively rendered by Bentham and 
Mill, receives an egalitarian rehearsal in the work of Uilliam Thompson.*
Having defined the authors dealt with in this study, the next 
question we have to eonsider is the issue of methodology. Our concern
J 1
with the history of a particular idea has, to some extent, predetermined 
our method. The composition of this thesis has, therefore, been based 
principally upon a process of textual exegesis. Rather than proceed 
by a simple author-by-author exposition of ideas, the material examined 
has been arranged along broadly thematic lines, with some concession 
to chronology. There has been some inevitable consideration of the 
degree of influence between authors, though this is not the primary aim 
of the thesis. Instead, the focus upon the examination of a particular 
idea - property - has meant that the analytical procedure adopted has 
required a largely comparative approach, with the academic value of 
this research defined by its attempt to contribute to the existing 
debate on the history of that idea.
In more detailed terms, the arrangement of material in this 
/  thesis is as follows: in Chapter 1 we will examine the relationship
y
between Adam Smith's conception of the origin and evolution of property, 
and the role of the four-stages theory in that conception, focusing 
upon four questions: the nature of the connection between justice and
(1) See below Chapter 7, section l(ii)
6property; the status of ideas about property in the differentiation of 
the four stages; the issue of entitlement; and the question of the 
relationship between property differentiation, government and authority, 
demonstrating that the four-stages thesis forms simply the referential 
framework within which such ideas are deployed, with stages differentiated 
largely according to conceptions of property.
*/
In chapter 2, it is the relationship between Adam Smith's con­
ceptions of labour, value and distribution that form the substantive 
basis of the chapter. The chapter will commence with an examination of 
the "paradox of commercial society", before moving on to a consideration 
of value theory, beginning with a review of the conceptual pre-requisites 
of that theory, then discussing the relationship between value and 
utility, the labour command hypothesis, and finally, the link between 
Smith's labour cost thesis and cost-of-production hypotheses. It will 
be our objective here to show (i) that the labour command thesis can 
only be understood as attempt to address the problem of the measurement 
of value; and (ii) that Smith, unwittingly, in the shift from a labour 
cost to a cost of production explanation of price, suggested, to the 
anti-Ricardians, the process by which the coincidence between labour 
expenditure and labour reward was broken. Finally, in this chapter, 
we will examine Smith's theory of distribution, considering separately 
the questions of the determination of wages, profit and rent.
In chapter 3, the main subject matter comprises an examination of 
the relationship between value and property in classical economics. The 
chapter commences with an attempt to explain the rationale behind the 
shift away from a justificatory theory of entitlement to the issue of 
valuation as the basis of distribution. It is followed by an appraisal 
of the value theories of David Ricardo, John Ramsay McCulloch and James
7Mill, with the problems and parameters of the theory of the former 
being determined largely by the unresolved issues illuminated by Adam 
Smith, and of the latter two, by an attempt to build upon and extend 
the views of Ricardo. One notion of particular interest in this chapter 
is the question of the problem of time in value determination which led 
to a conceptual shift in the use of the term "labour" which had 
potentially enormous ramifications for the problem of just desert.
In chapter 4, it is the theory of distribution espoused by the 
classical economists that is examined. The chapter opens with a 
discussion of the connection between distribution and ideas about 
property, before continuing with a review of the question of rent, 
concentrating specifically on the elucidation of the theory of 
differential rent. This is followed by an examination of the question 
of wage theory, bifurcated into an examination of the doctrine of 
subsistence wages, and an examination of the concept of wage-fund theory. 
The chapter ends with a discussion on the source, derivation, and 
determination of the rate of profit. The principal claim of this 
chapter is that the classical economists shifted the issue of distribution 
from a normative concern with just entitlement, to an empirical concern 
with the principles regulating the actual rate of returns to factorial 
income, assuming as legitimate the proprietary base of those returns.
Chapter 5 is concerned with the Utilitarians, and their emphasis 
upon the relationship between security and equality in terms of the •
definition of property rights. The major focus of this chapter is 
provided by an elucidation of the theory propounded by Jeremy Bentham, 
which regards law as constitutive of property rights, and which operates 
as a conservative defence of existing property arrangements. This
8theory is of especial interest since it seems to accord no special status 
to labour in the generation of prooertv rights, a position of great 
implication for the stance adopted by the Ricardian school of classical 
economy. This is followed by an assessment of James Mill's views on 
the relationship between security, property, and government, concentrating 
on the ambiguity surrounding the status of labour, and desert, within 
that thesis. The chapter concludes with a review of the classical 
political economists’ concern with security of property as a basic 
pre-requisite for the efficient functioning of the economy, a concern 
which, as we propose to demonstrate, reinforces the claim that it is 
the conceptual framework provided by Utilitarian theory that underlies 
the economic pronouncements of the classical political economists. >
In chapter 6, we will contemplate Thomas Hodgskin's theory of a 
natural right of property. This chapter will concentrate on the 
elucidation of three general questions: the philosophical basis of the 
natural rights argument; the problem of the relationship between the 
natural and artificial rights of property in land, the former subject 
to the "use" proviso outlined by Locke, and formulated in terms of the 
four-stages thesis of Smith, and the latter defined by an argument 
locating the basis of the actual property distribution of current 
society, in the Norman Conquest of Europe, with implications for the 
origin of rent; and finally, the notion that the natural right of 
property has both the capacity to, and ultimately will, in fact, 
undermine the artificial right of prooertv. The main textual base for this 
chapter is provided by Hodgskin's The Natural and Artificial Right of 
Property Contrasted1. Hodgskin's consideration of the illegitimate found­
ations of the returns to capital, and his critique of the prevailing 
economic system, have been deferred to the next chapter, because , since
(1) (London, Steil, 1832)
9the exposition of the natural rights thesis, is not, ipso facto, concerned 
with the problem of capitalism, but with the normative bases of legitimate 
acquisition, such a division of material was thought preferable.
In chapter 7, we are primarily interested in the anti-Ricardians, 
and their critiques of the distributive implications of the system of 
industrial capitalism, and the claim that labour alone is entitled to 
the full produce of its industry. Material in this chapter is arranged 
around three principle issues: the just bases of entitlement; the 
refutations of the claims of land and capital; and the problem of 
exploitation discussed in terms of the monopoly ownership of the means 
of production, value determination and the mechanism of unequal exchanges. 
It is the main contention of this chapter that the anti-Ricardians 
located the source of exploitation in the abrogation of the natural ' 
law of appropriation through the monopoly ownership of the means of 
production and the means of an inegalitarian system of exchange.
The final chapter of this dissertation again focuses on the anti- 
Ricardians, but is here concerned with the schemes developed by those 
authors to reconcile labour with its product. The chapter will be 
separated into three main areas: in the first, we will examine Hodgskin's 
thesis that this reconciliation is contingent upon the removal of 
positive regulations governing property; in the second, we will examine 
the system of communitarianism bequeathed by Robert Owen, and adopted 
by John Francis Bray and William Thompson, as a means of effecting the 
reconciliation of labour with its product; and in the third area we 
will focus upon the plans for the rationalisation of exchange, and 
monetary reform devised by John Gray, and imitated in part by John 
Francis Bray.
We shall begin , then, with a consideration of the relationship 
between Adam Smith's conception of the origin and evolution of 
property, and the four-stages theorv of historical development.
lo
Chapter 1. Property and Societal Evolution in Adam Smith
Upon this subject he followed the plan that 
seems to be suggested by Montesquieu; endeavouring 
to trace the gradual progress of jurisprudence, 
both public and private, from the rudest to the 
most refined ages, and to point out the effects 
of those arts which contribute to subsistence, 
and to the accumulation of property, in 
producing correspondent improvements, or 
alterations in law and government.1
Scottish legal theory in the eighteenth century was largely 
dominated by two approaches: the "institutional" approach, bequeathed 
by such writers as Stair and Erskine, who conceived of law as the
dictate of reason and which falls, broadly speaking, into the general
2tradition of rationalistic natural law; and the "moral'' approach,
associated with Karnes, Smith and Millar, which views law as originating
in the circumstances of society, and which may, therefore, be regarded
as a broadly sociological approach akin to that developed by Montesquieu
3
in De L'Espirt des Lois (1748). As Duncan Forbes has pointed out, 
whilst Montesquieu's treatment of law was sociological, it was also 
essentially static, whereas the principal innovation of these "moral" 123
(1) Stewart, Dugald, Account of the Life and Writings of Adam
Smith, LL.D, ed. Ross, I. S. in Smith, Adam, Essays on Philosophical 
Subjects (EPS), eds., Nightman, W. P. D. and Bryce, J. C.,
Glasgow Edition of the Works and Correspondence of Adam Smith,
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980), 1.19.
(2) See, Stein, Peter, "Legal thought in eighteenth century Scotland",
Juridical Review, 1957, pp 1-20; "The general notions of contract 
and property in eighteenth century Scottish thought". Juridical 
Review, 1963, pp 1-13; "Law and Society in Eighteenth-Century 
Thought", in Phillipson, N. T., and Mitchison, Rosalind (eds.), .
Scotland in the Age of Improvement, (Edinburgh, Edinburgh U.P.,
1970), pp 148-68; MacCormick, Neil, "Law and Enlightenment", in 
Campbell, R.H., and Skinner, A.S., (eds.) The Origins and Nature
of the Scottish Enlightenment. (Edinburgh. John Donald Publishers, 
T W f , - pp 150-166; and Horne, Thomas A., "Moral and Economic 
Improvement: Francis Hutcheson on Property". History of Political 
Thought (HPT). vol VII, 1986, pp 115-130.
(3) This distinction between "institutional” and "moral" writers is 
borrowed from Stein, ops.cit. See also, Bryson, Gladys, "Some 
Eighteenth-Century Conceptions of Society", The Sociological Review, 
vol.31, 1939, pp 410-421, where she considers the fact that the moral 
philosophers were principally engaged in an examination of the "life of 
man in society", and were concerned as such, with "the origin and 
constitution of man, the origin and functioning of his institutions, 
and the progress man had made", p. 405.
11
writers seems to have been the incorporation into this framework of a 
dynamic element in the form of the four stages theory of societal 
development.^ Changes in the law could, as it were, then be traced to and 
be explained by reference to processes in the evolution of society, 
though as we shall see with Adam Smith, the influence is not always 
one way.
The principal aim of this chapter will be to consider the relation­
ship between Smith's conception of the origin and evolution of property 
and the role of the four-stages thesis within that conception,both in 
the Lectures on Jurisprudence, and the Wealth of Nations.
Since most of the pronouncements made by the author on the subject 
of property are found within his treatment of natural jurisprudence, 
section one will consider the connection between justice and property.
In section two, we will examine the role of the four—stages thesis, and 
the place of ideas about property within that thesis. In section three, 
we will focus on Smith's attempt to illuminate the ways in which a 
legitimate title to property may be generated; whilst in section four, 
we will examine the relationship between property differentiation, 
government, and authority. 1
(1) Forbes, Duncan "'Scientific' Whiggism: Adam Smith and John 
Millar", Cambridge Journal. 1954, p. 646.
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Section 1: The General Framework of Smith's Theory of Property.
As the epigraph at the outset of this chapter suggests Smith's 
conception of justice and his notion of the nature and evolution of 
property were closely related. In fact, in the Wealth of Nations, he 
even goes as far as to identify the 'bxact administration of justice" 
specifically with the preservation of property,^ a view which echoes 
the earlier sentiment expressed in The Theory of Moral Sentiments that 
justice is "the main pillar that upholds the social edifice (which) ...
if removed, the great, the immense fabric of human society ... must in
2a moment crumble into atoms".
The question is, therefore, what did Smith understand by the 
notion of justice, and how exactly does it relate to the preservation 
of property?
Justice has two dimensions in Smithian theory: it may be commutative 
or distributive. Commutative justice relates to perfect rights, defined
by Smith as those "which we have a title to demand and if refused to
3
compel another to perform". Perfect rights are characterized, therefore, 
by their enforceability. Distributive justice, by contrast, refers to 
imperfect rights, delineated as "those which ought to be performed to us 
by others but which we have no title to compel them to perform".^
Imperfect rights are, therefore, moral obligations or duties, worthy of 
social approbation but incapable of legal enforcement. 1
(1) WN. V. i. b. 1-2.
(2) TMS.II.3.4.
(3) LJ(A).i.14. Smith compares this, in TMS, to the Grotian concept 
of justitia expletrix, or expletive justice. TMS.Vll.ii.I.lo.
(4) LJ(A).i.l5. This is compared, in TMS, to the Grotian concept of
justitia attributrix, or attributive justice. TMS.VII.ii.1.10.
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Since Smith characterizes property as a perfect right the species 
of justice with which we are concerned is commutative justice.^
Justice is represented as both "security from injury", and as the
2"foundation of civil government". It is, as it were, a negative virtue; 
it is because injustice causes positive harm that it is made the subject 
of prohibitory rules. The rules of justice define men's rights by
enunciating which actions may be conceived as constituting injuries
. 3 .against them. What is actually recognised as an injury at any point
in time depends upon the judgement of Smith's "impartial spectator",
thus injuries may be regarded as historically specific, only definitive
at that very point in time, of the rights and laws of a particular
. 4 'society. The rules of justice, however, are "accurate in the highest
degree, and admit of no exceptions or modifications", resembling as they 
do the rules of grammar, "precise, accurate, and indispensable".^ This 
aspect of universality relates not to the actual contents of the adminis­
tration of justice, but to the procedures for arriving at those contents.
It is an intrinsic feature of human psychological make-up that 
pain is regarded as a "more pungent sensation than pleasure", and that 
in consequence, "our sympathy with pain ... is generally a more lively 
and distinct perception than our sympathy with pleasure".^ The infliction 1
(1) Henceforth, we will designate commutative justice as "justice" 
and distributive justice as "beneficence" following Smith’s 
normal usage.
(2) LJ(B) .5.
(3) Haakonssen, Knud, The Science of a Legislators The Natural Juris­
prudence of David Hume and Adam Smith (Cambridge, CUP, 19fll^  p.100. 
cf Hont^ 1st van, and Ignatieff, Michael, "Needs and Justice in the 
Wealth of Nations; an introductory essay", in Hont and Ignatieff 
(eds.) Wealth and Virtue, The Shaping of Political Economy in the 
Scottish Enlightenment^ «¡Cambridge, CUP, 1983) pp. 24-25.
(4) c£, Haakonssen, op.cit.. pp.100-101.
(5) TMS.III.6.10; TMS.III.6.11.
(6) TMS.I.iii.2.3.
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of pain and injury necessarily elicits sentiments of resentment, resent­
ment which Smith regards as a natural defence mechanism*, and which 
provides the foundation for punishment and the attribution of respons­
ibility. Punishment is, he declares, "the natural consequence of 
2resentment". If the impartial spectator - the viewpoint from which 
moral and juridical decisions are taken - can sympathize with the 
feelings of injury, then the contents of the rules of justice can be 
defined.^
In section three we will consider the question of property and 
justice in terms of the legitimate basis for the generation of property 
rights. For the moment, however, wa will focus on the issue of Smith's 
conceptualization of the right of property in the Lectures on Jurisprudence.
Property, for Smith, constituted a "perfect right", which it is 
the express end of justice to maintain. Within the general framework of 
commutative justice, Smith's treatment of the development of property as 
a legal convention falls within his analysis of private law, which 
covers those injuries sustained by man qua man, in respect of his person, 
his reputation and his estate. Property rights are subsumed under
man's rights of estate. Estate is broadly defined by the
author as :
What he has in his immediate possession, not only
what he has about his own person as his cloaths,
etc., but whatever he has a claim to and can take
possession of in whatever place or condition he
finds it. A man has a real right to whatever vindicari
potest a quocunque possessore. Or secondly, what is
due to him either by loan or by contract of whatever
sort, as sales, etc. The first we call real rights
or a right to a particular thing. The second is called ^
a personal right or a right against a particular person. 1
(1) TMS.II.ii.1.4.
(2) TMS.II.ii.1.5.
(3) TMS. passim.
(4) LJ (A) . i. 16.
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Property forms only part of the conception of estate envisaged 
by Smith. Indeed, the Roman law concept of a full right of property 
(dominium) employed by the author comprises only one, albeit the most 
important, of the real rights held by man.
Dominium is delimited by Smith in the following way:
By this a man has the sole claim to a subject, 
exclusive of all others, but can use it himself 
as he thinks fit, and if he pleases abuse or 
destroy it. By this right, if any subject be 
lost or abstracted from the right owner he can 
claim it from any possessor ... Property is to 
be considered as an exclusive right by which we can 
hinder any other person from us|ng in any shape 
what we possess in this manner.
A principal characteristic of the real right of property is, < 
therefore, the notion of exclusivity, that is, the capacity to prevent 
others from using what we own. It is the notion of an exclusive 
privilege that forms the foundation of Smith's other categories of 
real right.
In addition to categorising rights as real or personal, Smith 
also discriminates between those real rights which are "natural" and 
those which are "adventitious".
The rights which a man has to the preservation of his body and 
reputation from injury are unambiguously denoted natural rights. The 
question of a man's rights of property is, however, more problematic. 
There is no axiomatic reason why "anything which may suit another as
well or perhaps better than it does me, should belong to me exclusively
2of all others barely because I have got it into my power". For Smith 
property is not a natural right - but an adventitious right requiring 
justification. 12
(1) LJ(A).i.16
(2) LJ (A) . i. 25
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The case for such juscif¿cation is rendered more urgent by the 
fact that men could, alleges Smith, live together with some "tolerable 
degree of security" in the absence of a civil magistrate to administer 
justice were it not for the development of property. "Prudential 
considerations" alone would normally be sufficient to restrain men from 
injuring one another in body and reputation.^ With property, however, 
the case is different. Whereas in the former case the commission of 
injury confers no tangible benefit on the malpractor, in the instance 
of infringements of the right of property "the benefit of the person
2who does the injury is often equal to the loss of him who suffers it." 
Man has, as it were, a substantial incentive to abrogate the right of 
property. And so, the avarice and ambition of the rich, together with 
the "hatred of labour and love of present ease and enjoyment" of the
poor, "are the passions which prompt to invade property", passions which
. . 3are both steady in their operation and universal in their influence.
In order to prevent depradations on property, therefore, an
established system of justice is required - one which both defines the
legitimate bases of property acquisition, and provides for the redress
of grievances. Thus, Smith concludes:
Property and civil government very much depend 
on one another. The preservation of property 
and the inequality of possession first formed it, 
and the state of property must always vary with 
the form of government. 4
It is at this point that Smith specifies the ways in which a 
right of property may be acquired, the traditions being occupation, 
accession, prescription, succession and voluntary transfer, each of 1
(1) WN.V.i.b.2.
(2) WN.V.i.b.2.
(3) WN.V.i.b.2.
(4) LJ(B).11.
17
which affects both the extent of the powers of the property-holder and 
the extensiveness of the operation of the right of property vis-a-vis 
prospective objects of property. It is also in this context that Smith 
first introduces us to his version of the stadial thesis much employed 
by the writers of the Scottish Enlightenment. This thesis is founded 
on the assumption that society may normally be expected to progress 
through four separate and identifiable stages defined in terms of the 
prevailing mode of subsistence.^ Before going on to examine the way 
in which the right of property is alleged to have evolved, weintend in 
the next section to consider briefly the significance attached to the 
four stages hypothesis, and to assess its purpose within Smithian theory. 1
(1) The literature on the four-stages thesis, and Smith's conception of 
history in general, is extensive: c.f., Pascal, Roy, "Property 
and Society: The Scottish Historical School of the Eighteenth 
Century", Modern Quarterly, 1938, vol 1, pp. 167-179; Meek,R.L.,
"The Scottish Contribution to Marxist Sociology", in Economics 
and Ideology, (London, Chapman and Hall Ltd., 1967) pp.34-50 
"Smith, Turgot and the 'Four-Stages Theory'", History of Political 
Economy (HOPE) 1971, vol 3, pp. 9-27, "New Light on Adam Smith's 
Glasgow lectures on Jurisprudence", HOPE, 1976, vol 8, pp. 439-477, 
Social Science and the Ignoble Savage^ (Cambridge, CUP, 1976); 
Skinner, A. S., ‘'Economics and History - The Scottish Enlightenment", 
Scottish Journal of Political Economy, (SJPE) . 1965, pp.1-22,
MAdam Smith: an Economic Interpretation of History", in Skinner,
A.S., and Wilson, T., (eds.), Essays on Adam Smith, (Oxford,
Clarendon Press, 1975), pp.154-178, A System of Social Science.
Papers relating to Adam Smith, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1979) 
pp.68-103, ''A Scottish Contribution to Marxist Sociology?" 
in Bradley, Ian and Howard, Michael (eds.), Classical and Marxian 
political economy, essays in honour of Ronald L. Meek. (London. 
Macmillan, 1982) pp.79-114; Forbes, Duncan, "'Scientific'
Whiggism"; "Sceptical Whiggism, Commerce and Liberty", in Skinner 
and Wilson (eds.), op.cit.. pp.179-201; Hollander, Samuel, '
"Historical Dimension of the Wealth of Nations", in O'Driscoll 
Jr., G. P. (ed.), Adam Smith and Modern Political Economy. 
Bicentennial Essay?- on the Wealth of Nations, (Iowa. Iowa State 
U.P., 1979) pp.71-84.
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Section 2: Property Differentiation, A Defining Characteristic of the 
Stadlal Hypothesis.
Ronald Meek, In the article, "New Light on Adam Smith's Glasgow
lectures on Jurisorudence", suggests that:
At the time of the Anderson notes1 Smith was 
still using his stadial theory more or less 
exclusively in connection with the nroblem of 
changes in the state of orooerty, and had not 
yet fully succeeded In seoarating the mode-of- 
subsistence "basis" from the state-of-oronerty 
"superstructure". As his ideas develooed, we 
may ... surmise, this distinction was more 
clearly made. 2
It will be the intention of this section to show that Meek is, 
in fact, mistaken, and that Smith continued to emoloy the stadial thesis 
as a referential framework for his views on oronerty. It will also be 
argued that Smith did not seoarate out ideas about the so-called "state- 
of-prooerty" from ideas about the nature of the stages identified by 
him, and that to some extent he actually considered the nature of the 
prevailing system of prooerty as definitive of the nature of .the stage 
itself.
The major Droblem in isolating Smith's ouroose in delineating the 
four stages theorem is that his initial oostulation of that theorem 
avoids reference to any factors other than the means of acquiring 
subsistence.
Smith, in line with the other members of the''Scottish historical 
M 3school, identified four stages of societal develooment, namely. 123
(1) A set of lecture notes purportedly recounting lectures delivered by 
Smith at the University of Glascrow during the session 1751-2, or 
175 2-3. The dating is Meek's. See art.clt., oo.454-461 esoecially.
(2) ibid., p.466.
(3) The phrase derives from Rov Pascal, "Prooerty and Society" op 167-179. 
Pascal identifies amongst the members of this school, Adam Smith,Adam 
Ferguson, John Millar, William Robertson, and a number of Scottish 
dignatories of the time, such as Lord Karnes, Hugh Blair and Jeunes Dunbar
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"hunting, pasturage, farming, and commerce"/ with the first two normally 
exemplified by the paradigmatic North American Indian, and Tartar and 
Arabian tribes respectively.
"If", Smith surmises, "a number of persons were shipwrecked on a
desart island their firatsustenance would be from the fruits which the
2soil naturaly produced, and the wild beasts which they could kill."
But, as population increased, and the spontaneous products of 
nature were insufficient to support the burgeoning population, recourse 
would be had to the domestication of animals. Likewise, when population 
again outstripped the capacity of the prevailing mode of subsistence to 
maintain it, recourse would again be had to an alternative method, this 
time agriculture.
When a society becomes numerous they would find 
a difficulty in supporting themselves by herds and 
flocks. Then they would naturally turn themselves 
to the cultivation of land ... and by this means 
they would gradually advance in to the age of 
agriculture. 3
Up to this point Smith suggests that it is the growth of population, 
and the concomitant incapacity of the prevailing means of subsistence 
to cope with that growth, that spurs man on to develop alternative means 
of support.^ Scarcity provides, therefore, the contingent necessity for 
evolution. It is a contingent necessity for the simple reason that 
there is always the possibility that such conditions of scarcity may 
never arise. In such a case society may be locked into one particular 1
(1) LJ (B) . 149.
(2) LJ(B).149.
(3) LJ (A) .i. 30.
(4) The interaction of population and the means of subsistence was to 
become a major preoccupation of classical political economy from the 
time of Malthus on. See Chapter 4.
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scage indefinitely.
The move to commercial society is not explicated in terms of 
scarcity at all. Commerce does not follow on from agriculture because 
the latter cannot sustain human life. Rather the growth of commerce 
originates in the development of the division of labour, conceived at 
this stage in the Lectures as basic specialisation of employment. Smith's 
conception of the division of labour is important since it is utilised 
by him, as we shall see in the next chapter, to justify, or legitimate 
the gross disparities in the distribution of wealth typical of civilised 
societies, on the grounds that the standard of living of the poorest
inhabitants of commercial societies is considerably better than that of
2their counterparts in the ruder ages of society.
Initially exchange would be confined to swapping the surplus 
produce of labour. Gradually this would be extended to international 
exchange, at which point the age of commerce can be regarded as well and 
truly established.
This movement through the four stages of hunting, pasturage,
agriculture and commerce represents for Smith the normal full pattern
. 3of evolution. This brings us to an interesting question concerning 
the function and role of the four-stages hypothesis within Smithian 
theory. Ronald Meek in a review of David Reisman's book, Adam Smith's 
Sociological Economics, commenting on the alleged* ubiquity in Smith's 
work of a causal link between the economic base and the social super­
structure, observes that: 123
(1) The Tartars, Smith argued, were locked in the shepherd stage 
because of their geography.
(2) See Chapter 2, section 1 , pp. 78-83.
(3) Smith did acknowledge exceptions to this pattern. Thus the North 
American Indians, the paradigm hunters, whilst having no conception 
of pasturage, did have some notions of agriculture, albeit limited 
and unsophisticated notions. Cf,,LJ(A).i.29. and LJ(B).150.
21
Those of us who have noticed the importance 
of these elements in Smith's work, but have 
hesitated about committing ourselves to a 
term as extreme as economic determinism, need 
hesitate no longer. 1.
Taken together with the view expressed in his book Social Science
and the Ignoble Savage.,that Smith actually emphasizes "the process
2whereby society moves from one stage to the next", we are led to the
conclusion that Meek regards Smith's utilisation of the stadial theorem
3as an explanation for the process of development, and that it is 
changes in the economic base that determine changes in the socio­
politico-legal superstructure.^
Whilst it is clear that Smith was interested in the problem of 
historical development; and whilst the foregoing discussion appears to 
imply that Smith regarded the economic factor(scarcity)as the motor of 
change, it is out contention that the four-stages theory does not actually 
explain societal development. Rather, following Skinner's "comparative 
statics " argument, it is our view that the four-stage theory evolved as 
a comparative taxonomic structure.^
The argument from economic determinism fails to take account of a 
number of factors considered equally influential in historical develop­
ment. Firstly, Smith recognised that factors such as geography or 
climate could prevent a society progressing beyond any particular stage, 
thus the Arabs and Tartars are locked in the age of pasture/* Secondly, 
law and government, and indeed politics per se, are rendered epiphenomenal, 1
(1) Cited in Skinner, "A Scottish Contribution to Marxist Sociology?"p.86.
(2) Meek, op.cit., p. 118
(3) cf., Skinner, "A Scottish Contribution to Marxist Sociology?", pp.90-99.
(4) cf., Hollander, "Historical Dimension of the Wealth", p. 73, who 
declares the prevailing mode of subsistence "determines the legal 
and institutional framework".
Skinner, art.cit.. p.87. 
c£., LJ(A).iv.53 and LJ(B).30.
(5)
(6)
to economic forces. As Donald Winch notes, the "further one goes 
towards determinism the smaller the scope allowed for autonomous 
political action",* and as we shall see in Section 4(ii) when we consider 
the evolution of primogeniture and entail, it was acts of political 
expediency and historical accident that generated these laws of property, 
not economic factors.
Thirdly, it is also of note that where Smith discusses the origins
of societal change - as, for example, in his analysis of the emergence 
. . 2of commercial society in Modern Europe - his account is always within a
specific, and actual historical context - in this instance, the context
3
of the "origins and nature of the present establishments in Europe" —
I
and not within the framework of the intellectual construct of the four- 
stages thesis. Thus a distinction can be made between the picture of
actual historical events supplied by Smith, and his statement of the
4four-stages thesis.
The utility of this periodisation model can best be understood 
in terms of a means of delineating all the characteristics broadly con­
stitutive of each stage of development - including the nature and 
concepts of property prevalent therein - in order to compare and contrast 
the types of socio-economic structure in existence at any point in time.^ 1
(1) Winch, Donald, Adam Smith's Politics; An Essay in Historiographic 
Revision, (Cambridge, CUP, 1978), p. 20.
(2) See especially, WN.III. *
(3) Skinner, "A Scottish Contribution to Marxist Sociology?" p. 93.
(4) cf_. ibid., pp. 87, 93, 99.
(5) This is,generally speaking, what Skinner means by the technique 
of "comparative statics". Reference is made to the factors deter­
mining the ’'equilibrium" position, but not to the process of 
adjustment by which such a position is reached, cf ., ibid., pp . 79 ff.
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Thus, as Skinner observes in his article, "Adam Smith: an
Economic Interpretation of History",
Smith's use of the economic stages which 
are offered as general categories in terms 
of which the experience of different peoples 
can be interpreted rather than as templates 
to which that experience must be made to 
conform. 1 .
The four-stages thesis operates as a broadly referential frame­
work, therefore. Since this study is primarily concerned with ideas 
about property, it is to the specific relationship of those ideas about 
property to the stadial theorem that we now turn.
As we noted at the outset of this section, Ronald Meek alleged 
that ideas about property are somehow separable from ideas about the 
nature of the prevailing mode of subsistence. One question this part­
icular chapter will address, therefore, is whether or not it is possible 
to identify and typify each of those various stages without reference 
to the forms of property discernible therein. It is our conclusion that 
it is not possible to so do. Rather, it will be argued, the main value 
of the four-stages thesis, as a comparative taxonomic framework, lies 
in its capacity to illuminate a number of questions relating to the 
origin and evolution of the institution of property.
The four-stages thesis is significant to Smith's conception of 
property in three ways which will be treated in separate sections of 
the present chapter.
In the remainder of this section we intend to focus on the notion 
that the differentiation of types and forms of property constitutes a 
principal determinant of the nature of the prevailing stage of development. 1
(1) ibid., p 175
24
In Section 3,we will consider the way in which modes of acquiring
property are conceived as stadially specific in origin and operation,
whilst in section 4,we will examine the nature of the connection between
the differentiated private property structure, and the origin and
evolution of the institutions of law and government, and the prevailing
2authority/dependency structure.
As man progresses, more or less uniformly through the stages 
outlined by Smith, so the types of property relations and modes of 
acquiring property typical of those stages vary. It is the aim of the 
rest of this section to demonstrate that it is the manner in which 
property is actually differentiated that constitutes a principal 
defining characteristic of each stage of development.
Hunting society is characterised essentially by the absence of 
property. What is called property amongst hunters is conceived to "end 
as well as begin with possession". Hunters have reputedly no idea of 
"any thing as their own which is not about their own bodies", that is, 
their notions of property are delimited by their clothing, and the 
instruments necessary to their labour.^ Once an object ceases to be in 234
(2) The idea that Smith explicitly links the differentiation of private
property, the origin of government and authority relations is, of 
course, not new. See for example, the writings of Andrew Skinner 
cited throughout this chapter. See also Neil MacCormick, "Law and 
Enlightenment", in R.H. Campbell and A.S. Skinner (eds.), The •
Origins and Nature of the Scottish Enlightenment,(Edinburgh. John 
Donald Publishers Ltd., 1982,)pp.150-166. MacCormick notes that:
"It is common among Adam Ferguson, Adam Smith, and John Millar that 
the development of a pastoral economy (replacing the most primitive 
human form, that of Smith's ’nations of hunters and fishermen’) 
first leads to a differentiation of private property, which in turn 
requires forms of government and coercive law-enforcement, to protect 
the haves from the have-nots, and that always forms of economic 
change and development interrelate with development in private and 
public law as well as in manners and morals." (p.160)
(3) LJ(A).i.41
(4) LJ(B).150.
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their actual physical possession, they no longer regard it"proprietor- 
ially*. As such their lack of regard for theft means that jurispru­
dential regulations concerning the acquisition and administration of 
property are practically non-existent. Occupation constitutes the only 
legitimate mode of acquiring property.*-
It is in the age of shepherds that a right of property is conceived 
to begin. Thus it is the move from the age of hunters to the age of 
shepherds that forms the constitutive move in the development of a right 
of property. This forms "of all others the greatest in the progression 
of society", for the simple reason that "by it the notion of property is
2extended beyond possession to which it was in the former state confined".
The transition to the appropriation of herds, and consequently their 
removal from the common, carries with it an extension in ideas about 
property, both in terms of the types of object capable of acquisition,
viz., animals, and of the powers invested in the property-holder.
/
In the age of hunters, proprietary notions required the
object in questiontobe in the actual possession of the agent; in the age 
of shepherds, this is no longer necessary. Men not only consider the 
things they carry about them as their own, but also "what they have 
deposited in their hovels". Likewise, since any proprietor of a largish 
flock "could not have all those animals about him he had tamed", the 
idea of property was initially extended to encompass all those animals 
who"retain'd the habit of returning into his power at certain times",* 
and ultimately after the "generality of beasts are occupied", it was 
extended to include all those animals previously appropriated whether 
they continued to return or not 1234
(1) cf., section 3(1), pp.31-35 of this chapter for an analysis of occupation.
(2) LJ(A).ii.97.
(3) LJ(A).1.45.
(4) LJ(A).1.46. (5) LJ(B).151.
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The shepherd age is differentiated in part, therefore, by the 
evolution of the notion of property in animals, and in part, and perhaps 
more significantly, by the development of a generally-recognised right 
of property. The need for a general recognition of this right is 
generated by the conflictsarising franthe uneasy initial co-existence of 
two contrary and ultimately antipathetic modes of acquiring subsistence 
namely, hunting and pasturage. The livelihood of the hunter is 
contingent upon the commonality of the beasts he hunts, whereas the 
existence of the shepherd is dependent on the very individuation of 
those beasts. Societal recognition of a right of property in animals 
sounds to some extent the death-knell of the age of hunters, a theme 
implicit throughout the Lectures.* The general decline of hunting as.
the prevailing mode of subsistence is further hastened by the evolution
2of property by accession. The immediate attribution of the young of 
the herd,to the owner of the herd, compounds the problems attendant on 
hunting, and as we shall see shortly, assists in the generation of
inequality of possessions, leading to inequality in the distribution
- 3of power.
The extension of the concept of property to include animals 
contains within it the seed of the origin of land as an item of property 
Smith observes that, "When this is once established, (it) is a matter of 
no great difficulty to extend this from one subject to another, from 
herds and flocks to the land itself” . 4
Despite this assertion, however, in the age of shepherds, ideas 
about property would not have been extended to the land. Although the 
life of the shepherd meant frequent changes of location, he had only 1234
(1) ££_• LJ(A) .pas8imanti LJ(B); and Haakonssen, op.cit., pp 157-159.
(2) See Section 3(ii), pp. 35-37.
(3) See section 4(ii) pp. 54-57.
(4) LJ (A) .ii .97.
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temporary use-rights over the land. Indeed shepherds would not, Smith 
assures us somewhat contradictorily, "easily conceive a subject of such 
extent as land is, should belong to an object so little as a single 
nan."^ Rather, it would more likely be regarded as the province of the 
entire nation. This suggests that Smith envisaged some kind of tribal 
division of the land, but again the concept of property in land is 
“conceived to continue no longer in a private person than he actually 
possessed the subject. A field that has been pastured on by one man
2would be considered to be his no longer than he actually staid on it."
This reinforces the view that an individual has an individuated 
use-right only whilst he is pasturing his herds there, and that at the 
very moment that he ceases, any newcomer may occupy the field, and 
exercise the same right.
The inauguration of private property in land would normally 
proceed with the advent of agriculture, though the existence of 
individual, exclusive and absolute property rights in the land will 
probably in fact commence some time after the beginning of farming as 
the primary mode of subsistence. "Property received its greatest
. . 3extension from agriculture", the author declares.
Initially the cultivation of the land would not entail its appro­
priation. The entire community would cultivate a piece of ground, 
usually that contiguous to their hovels. Land would be held in common, 
with the produce of that land divided amongst all those concerned, 
either according to the numbers in each family, with considerations of
(1) U  (A) . i. 49.
(2) LJ(A) . i.49-50
(3) LJ(B).151.
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rank borne in mind*, or equally, as stated in the 1766 version of the 
2lectures.
'"The inclination of any single person would not be sufficient to
constitute his property in any parcel of land ... the rest of the
community would cry out against him as incroaching on and appropriating
3to himself what ought to be in common amongst them all".
The ultimate decision to parcel out land is linked by Smith with 
the development of fixed habitations and the growth of cities. Since 
the land men cultivate would normally be that lying next to their fixed 
abodes, they would probably determine, no doubt in the interests of 
utility, that it would be easier to "make a division of the land once for 
all, rather than be put to the unnecessary trouble of dividing the product 
every year",^ and thus private property in land originates in a conscious 
decision of the principal persons in a community to divide the land up, 
and is posterior to its initial cultivation.^
Whilst it appears that "moveable property may be occupied from 
the first beginnings of society ... lands cannot be occupied without an 
actual division.
The evolution of rights of property in the land has, as we shall 
see in the section on the relationship of property to law and government, 
far-reaching implications for the kind of authority/subordination 
relations operating in society. 1
(1) LJ(A).i.50.
(2) LJ(B).151.
(3) LJ(A).i.50.
(4) LJ (A) . i. 51.
(5) This explanation of the conjectured origin of property in land 
is distinct from the picture of the actual evolution of landed 
property described by Smith regarding Europe. See section 4(ii) .
(6) LJ(B) . 150.
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The commercial age is the most problematic for us in terms of 
the type of property regarded as differentiating it from earlier stages.
In the Lectures. Smith spends comparatively little time delineating 
the kinds of property discernible within this type of society. However, 
it is possible to surmise that the commercial age was envisaged as one 
in which both the objects capable of appropriation, and the rights 
subsumed under the general heading of property rights»may be deemed to 
have proliferated. Thus, Smith suggests, "in the age of commerce as the 
subjects, of property are. greatly increased the laws must, be proDortionally 
multiplied."*
It may also be conjectured that the number of property owners 
may in fact be greater than at any other period, since most men will 
live, in one way or another, via the process of exchange. Given also 
that the division of labour is supposed not only to lead to greater prod­
uctivity but also to greater diversification and invention, it also seems 
likely that the number of objects available for acquisition will be at 
its greatest.
As MacCormick points out, the cocxnercial society is founded
essentially upon "manufacture for exchange in a market economy", and as
such a more "sophisticated law of contract as well as of property" will
2presumably be generated.
Similarly, since much production will be devoted to the manufacture 
of luxury goods, and since in consequence the expenditure of much wealth 
will be directed to the purchase of such goods, the replacement of the 
service nexus^typical of earlier ages, by a cash nexus»will also ensure 
that the power conferred by wealth will be less concentrated or absolute 
than previously. 12
(1) LJ(A).i.34-5.
(2) MacCormick, art, cit.. p.160.
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It has been the purpose of this section to show that the kinds of 
property discernible within each stage of societal development vary in 
form. Thus Smith typifies the hunting age by property in a few personal 
goods; the shepherd age by property in herds and flocks; the age of 
agriculture by property in land; and the age of commerce by the emergence 
of manufacturing and luxury goods. In this way society sees a progressive 
extension in the range of goods capable of appropriation.
In addition to this, Smith also utilises the notion of an extension 
in the nature of property to refer to alterations in the right of 
property. So the hunting age is characterized by possession, whilst the 
age of shepherds is typified by the beginnings of a generally recognized 
right of property. It will be the aim of the next section to examine
(i) the successive development throughout societal advancement of 
alternative modes of acquiring property; and (ii) the gradual emergence 
of the full right of property referred to at the start of this chapter.
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Section 3. Modes of Acquiring Property
In this section it will be our aim to elucidate Smith's conception 
of the means by which property can be acquired. Although much of the 
substantive interest in this area derives from his depiction of actual 
historical developments, we intend, as far as possible, only to focus 
on the analytical framework underlying that depiction. In the Lectures'- 
Adam Smith isolates five separate traditions of entitlement: occupation, 
accession, prescription, succession, and voluntary transfer, of whichonly the 
first- - occupation - generates an original title to property,
each of the others creating contingent rights . It is to
occupation that we now turn.
(i) Occupation
Occupation is defined by Smith as the "taking possession of what
2formerly belonged to nobody". It is, as it were, original possession;
and is regarded by the author as the original mode of acquiring property,
the root of all other property rights. But, Smith inquires, how does the
"bare possession of a subject" generate an exclusive right of property to
that subject? Why is it that:
a man by pulling an apple should be imagined 
to have a right to that apple and a power of 
excluding all others from it - and that an 
injury should be conceived to be done when ^
such a subject is taken for (sic) the possessor?
In answering these queries Smith has recourse, as we have seen, to
an argument postulated principally in The Theory of Moral Sentiments
. , .  Aconcerning justice, and the concept of the "impartial spectator." 1
(1) This is the only place where Smith examines in any depth the 
issue of property independent of considerations of government and 
authority.. £f, LJ(A).i.25-ii.l3 and LJ(B).149-171.
(2) LJ (B) . 149
(3) LJ(A).i.35. "For" presumably means "from".
(4) TMS.II.ii.1.5.
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The impartial spectator represents the viewpoint from which moral
and juridical judgements are made. In this instance the spectator must
determine what comprises grounds for both legitimating the "first
possessor in defending and even avenging himself when injured",* and
thus enunciate what represents an injury in respect of a right of
property. In other words, the spectator must determine the just basis for
a title to property. Since spectator approval forms the basis of a
just right, occupation, for example, will only be deemed well-founded
if "the spectator can go along with my possession of the object and
2approve me when I defend my possession by force". If the spectator 
can sympathize with the possessor, then the title will be considered 
legitimate. The only basis for such sympathy is the notion of 
"reasonable expectation”.
"The reasonable expectation therefore which the first possessor 
furnishes is the ground on which the right of property is acquired by 
occupation".^
Reasonable expectation forms the basis not only of occupation-based
rights, but in various guises, that of other rights of property
4dealt with by Smith, which suggests that the criteria on which it is 
based are historically variable, though it may be assumed that one 
universal attribute of such criteria is that they operate antecedent to 
the legitimation of the relevant property right. In the case of Smith's 
treatment of occupation in the Lectures, the expenditure of labour appears 
to furnish the basis of such expectation, for the author notes: 1
(1) U(A) .i.36.
(2) LJ(B).150.
(3) LJ(A).i.37.
(4) See especially the sections 
succession, pp.40-44.
on prescription, pp^7-4Q and legal
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You may ask indeed, as this apple is as 
fit for your use as it is for mine, what 
title have I to detain it from you. You 
may go to the forest (says one to me) and 
pull another. You may go as well as I, 
replied I. And besides it is more reasonable 
that you should, as I have gone already and 
bestowed my time and pains in procuring the 
fruit. 1 .
This intimation that it is the disutility of labour that generates 
a reasonable expectation of use to the object so acquired both echoes 
the view previously advanced by Smith in the Anderson notes that, "To 
deprive a man of the beast or fish he has caught, or of the fruit he has
gathered, is depriving him of what cost him labour and so giving him
. 2 pain, and is contrary to the laws of the rudest society", and that
. . 3later explicated in the Wealth. It is because man has incurred the 
disutility incumbent on the expenditure of labour that he ought to be 
secured in the possession of the object so acquired, and supported in 
any attempt to rebutt incursions upon that property.
To this argument from labour, Smith also adds one from psychology,
namely the notion of "attachment". Labour not only generates a title to
property, but also leads to the formation of an attachment to that
property, the intensity of which is proportioned directly to the
intensity and duration of the labour requisite to the individuation of
that property. This argument clearly has implications for the question
of injury. Thus, "one does not form such an attachment to a thing he
has possessed for a short time ... and acquired by little labour as he
4does to what he has got by great pains and industry." 1
(1) LJ(A).i.37.
(2) Anderson Notes, 1. See Haakonssen, Science of a Legislator, p.107, 
and Meek, "New Light on Adam Smith's Glasgow lectures", HOPE, p.467.
(3) cf. WN.V.i.b.2-3.
(4) LJ(A) .i.60
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The Injury experienced by a oossessor in the latter circumstances 
upon the loss of his property would be necessarily greater than that in 
the former case. Thus it is the frustration of a reasonable exDectation, 
by causing positive harm, that is regarded as the basis of an infringement 
of the right of prooerty. That what constitutes an actual reasonable 
expectation varies,according to circumstances, is imolicit within Smith's 
formulation of his theory of orooerty within the stadial framework. However, 
the notion of "reasonable exoectation" in an abstract, non-soecific sense, 
renders coherent Smith's view of Drooerty by orovidinq it with a universal 
criterion against which just (and unjust)actions can be measured.''
Occuoation, for Smith, means first oossession, and it is clear that
in the absence of laws regulating orooerty, which arise only in the
shepherd stage, there must be some other defining characteristic of
possession, or the relation of orooerty in the hunter stage, and this is
2provided by Smith's use of the Humean conceot of possession. Hume
defines possession in terms of causation - to oossess something is to
have power over it.^ The utilisation of this conceot enables both Hume
and Smith to differentiate between oossession and prooerty. Possession
requires that the possessor is in a Dosition to exercise cower over an
4object - the animal in the chase - whereas oroperty allows that some­
thing belongs to one whether it is in one's oossession (and cower) or 
not. And so the age of hunters is characterized by the fact that ideas 
about oroperty extended no further than oossession. "Prooerty was”, 1
(1) See Haakonssen, Science of a Legislator, on .105-6. He views this 
notion of reasonable exDectation as rendering coherent man's view 
of right and wrong.
(2) This concept is significant also for Smith's treatment of 
prescription. See d o . 37-40.
(3) Harrison, Jonathan, Hum<js theory of justice (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1981) p.82.
(4) Smith illustrates his argument by reference to the argument between 
rival Roman juristic schools concerning the point in time at which 
property in an animal hunted in a chase may be seen to begin. Cfc, e.g.} 
LJ(A).1,38-44.
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Smith notes, "conceived to end as well as to begin with possession."^
Occupation constitutes the original means of acquiring 
property, and as we shall see in the following sub-sections, all other 
modes are, in some sense, derivative.
(ii) Accession
The second method of acquiring property is through the process
2of accession or "the right to own one thiqgin conseqience of another."
It is founded upon the supposition of a relationship of some kind between 
something already held as property, and another object.
Accession is interesting for a number of reasons. Initially,
accession is a derivative right - it depends upon the pre-existence of
a right of property based upon occupation. It is, therefore, historically
absent from the hunting stage, appearing only in the age of shepherds,
when a right of property, as opposed to possession, is viewed as 
3originating. Secondly, accession as a means of acquiring property 
extends the powers of the property-holder beyond those conferred by 
occupation, by affecting the range of objects to which it can apply.^ 
Thirdly, the significance of the right is rendered most clearly by its 
influence in the agricultural stage.^ 1
(1) LJ(A).i.41. cf. LJ(B).150.
(2) LJ (B) .149.
(3) LJ (A) . i .64.
(4) LJ(A) . i.64; LJ(B).152.
(5) LJ(A).1.66; LJ(B).152.
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The right of accession is again legitimated in terms of the 
sympathy of the impartial spectator. The argument employed this time 
refers to propriety. It would be improper, Smith asserts, to sever the 
connection between an item of property and another object on which it has 
a dependence. And so, in the age of shepherds, the milk and young of 
the animals of a herd are ascribed to "the person who had tamed the 
animal."* Similarly in the age of agriculture,the division of land for 
cultivation makes sense only if this private right of property carries
2with it "a right to whatever it produces, trees, fruit, minerals, etc."
The proprietary right generated by accession thus reinforces the 
strength of the original claim to the object from which the accession 
springs, reaffirming the present pattern of distribution. Accession td 
young animals strengthens the position of the present proprietor by 
precluding other claims to those young, and thus solidifying the basis 
of his power - the size of his herd.
Ths most important accessions, however, are those relating to 
3land. The manner in which landed property is distributed, and the 
relations of dependence generated by the exclusive individuation of that 
land and its produce have important ramifications for the system of
4authority prevalent at any one time.
A right of property to the land that failed to carry with it a 
right to the produce of that land would be comparatively meaningless, 
whilst a right to the land that necessarily implies a right to its 
produce is of much greater significance, depending on the manner in 
which that land was parcelled out.
(1) LJ(A).i.64.
(2) LJ(B).152-3.
(3) LJ(B) .152.
(A) See section 4(ii), pp59-67 of this chapter.
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Land is the primary source of subsistence, and thus access to it 
or its produce is vital to existence. In Smith's view, the original 
division of the land was simply an expedient agreed upon to obviate the 
need for a mass share-out of the annual crop at harvest-time. Whilst 
the holdings of land are fairly small, and most people have access to 
some land, disparities in wealth and power will be fairly small.
However, with the advent of great proprietors, it is clear that the 
number dependent upon the landowner for a share of his crop will be great, 
and since man gives nothing for nothing, something must be exchanged for 
that share, investing the landowner potentially with great wealth, great 
power, or both. The implications of the argument from accession in 
relation to land, though somewhat tendentious, are significant for < 
Smith's views on property, authority and power.*
Like occupation, therefore, accession is grounded in the sympathy 
of the impartial spectator. Unlike occupation, however, there is no 
labour-disutility/attachment dimension to accession-based rightsof 
property.
(iii) Prescription
Like accession, the right of prescription is contingent upon the 
prior existence of occupation-based rights of property. However, where 
accession extends the rights of the existing de jure holder over his 
property, prescription is concerned with issues of long-term de facto 
possession of property by someone other than the 'rightful' owner, and 
thus with the establishment of the conditions under which such possession 1
(1) Smith also considers those accessions below the soil which may
be said to accrue to the owner of the land, treating, in passing, 
the problem of the rivalry between feudal and allodial law on 
this issue. Cf. LJ(A).i.6 6-6 8 .
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may be considered sufficient to transfer the legitimate title away from 
its legal owner - even in the face of the absence of any express 
derelinquishment of that title - to the actual possessor of long-standing.
Prescriptive claims appear once ideas about property extend beyond 
the conception of physical possession, to ideas of absentee ownership.
Once property need no longer be in the "power" of its owner, the problem 
of occupation (qua possession) by non-owners arises. Thus:
After property was extended beyond possession, 
and goods were thought to remain in the 
property of the former possessor longer after 
they were out of his power, it was found 
necessary that some length of possession 
should transfer the right of property, that 
the possessor might be assured he had then
a full right to the goods; otherwise property >
would always be uncertain. 1 .
Maintenance of order and stability within the property system
. . 2 require, therefore, some kind of flexibility over distributive claims.
The title of the legitimate property-holder, and the expectation of
continued enjoyment of the present occupant,must somehow be reconciled.
Smith is seeking to elucidate how, and according to what principles ,
prescription may be deemed to create a right of property, and his answer
is once more formulated in terms of the sympathetic reaction of the
impartial spectator.
Prescription is founded on the "supposed attachment of the possessor 
to what he has long been possessed of, and the supposed detachment of
3»affection in the old possessor to what has long been out of his possession".
Smith is employing the same concept of "attachment" as he did in 
his elucidation of the principles guiding occupation. Just as the 
spectator enters into the expectation of the first occupant that he has 1
(1) LJ(B).149. Çf also LJ(A).i.87.
(2) Haakonssen, op.cit., makes a similar claim, pp.108-9
(3) LJ(B).154.
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a legitimate claim to use, enjoy and defend his acquisitions, so the 
right of prescription is validated by the concurrence of the spectator 
that!
The possessor of a long standing has a just 
expectation that he may use what has been 
thus possessed, and that the former proprietor 
...has so far lost all right to it, has no 
expectation of using it, as that it would 
appear injurious in him to deprive the present 
possessor. 1 .
The formation of attachment - perhaps again proportioned to labour 
expenditure, particularly vis-à-vis land, the most important of all 
items acquired in this way - provides the referential framework for the 
reaction - validating or otherwise - of the impartial spectator. The 
form of the rules laid down by any legislative body to establish pres­
cription are, of course, historically specific. Currently, however, 
they are four-fold: firstly, the existence of bona fides - the possessor 
must believe that he is the "lawful proprietor of the subject". ;
secondly, justus titulus - the present occupant must have acquired the
3property in some lawful manner, as, for example, through purchase; 
thirdly, possession must be uninterrupted, for "if the property have 
often been claimed of him the former possessor has not derelinquished
4his right" ; and finally, that time i-3 to be considered only when "there 
was a person to claim the property, and therefore the longest uninterr­
upted possession when the proprietor was a minor, a lunatic, or in 
banishment can give no right."^ 1
(1) LJ(A) .i. 77.
(2) LJ(A).1.77
(3) Cf.LJ(A).i.78 and LJ(A).i.8 6. This condition is especially 
important with respect to prescription-based claims to the land.
(4) LJ(B).154.
(5) LJ(B).154-155
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Just as the legal rules and procedures delineating prescription 
are historically variable, so too is the period of time which must 
necessarily elapse before a title can be conferred. Nature does not fix 
a precise time for the operation of prescription,^ and in fact, practices
vary according to the object claimed - land is more difficult to acquire
2in this way than moveables -and according to the stability of property 
3in a country. Thus, "in the first periods of the Roman state, when 
society had made no great advances, and property was very uncertain, the
composers of the 12 Tables thought a year sufficient time for prescription
. . 4of moveables and two years m  immoveables'.'
However, where property is more stable - that is, where the 
number and complexity of proprietary titles are greater - prescription 
must endure for a longer period. Again the exact criteria for the 
establishment of a right are situationally specific, though the general 
parameters are drawn by the operation of the system of sympathy outlined 
in the Theory of Moral Sentiments.
(iv) Succession
The fourth mode of acquiring property is succession which may be 
of two kinds - legal or testamentary. Smith’s first task in this part 
of the Lectures is to establish the priority of legal over testamentary 
succession.
In contradistinction to Grotius and Pufendorf,^ Smith denies that 
the basis of legal succession is the presumption that the law merely
(1) LJ(A).i.80; LJ(B).155.
(2) LJ(A).i.78; LJ(A).i.8 6.
(3) LJ(B) . 155.
(4) LJ (A) . i. 80.
(5) See LJ(A).i.90-91; LJ(B).155-156.
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distributes the goods of the deceased to those whom it might be 
supposed he would have nominated in a testament had he made one, declaring 
that such a state of affairs requires a degree of sophistication in 
ideas pertaining to property unknown amongst men in the early stages of 
societal development.
In a rude period a man had scarce the full right 
of property of his goods during his lifetime, 
and therefore it cannot be supposed then that he 
should have had a power to dispose of them after 
his death. 1 .
And so it is that amongst hunters where ideas about property 
extend no further than possession, the notion of succession is non­
existent, such personal possesions as had been accumulated being
I
interred along with the dead. However, once a right of property was 
established in the shepherd stage, notions of intergenerational rights 
began to develop.
Since legal succession cannot be explicated in terms of the
2"supposed will of the deceased" as previously alleged, Smith posits an 
alternative explanation for the origin of the legal right based upon 
labour expenditure and community of goods.
In the early stages of society succession is,
More founded on the connection of goods than 
persons. As fathers and sons^ lived together 
and were joint acquirers of any property they 
had, when the father died the children had a 
joint right to the goods not so much on account 
of their relation to the father as on account ^ 
of the labour they had bestowed on acquiring them. 1
(1) LJ(B).156. Similarly the Tartars currently whilst practising 
succession have no idea about testaments. LJ(A).i.l91.
(2) Cf.. Haakonssen, op.cit., p. 110.
(3) U(A) has the "whole family" here. LJ(A).i.93.
(4) LJ(B).156. _Cf. LJ(A).i.93; and Anderson notes.4 "Children succeed to
the goods of their intestate father, not on account of the parental 
relation, but on account of their connection with his goods, etc., i.e. 
they succeed by the 2nd principle".namely the labour-based,spectator- 
annroved nrinciole cited previouslv.Cf.Haakonssen.op.cit.,p.llO, n.58.
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These goods, supporting the entire family during the lifetime of 
the head of the family,form their natural patrimony on his death. Thus 
it is the co-operation in labour of the family that creates a latent 
title, amongst all the members taken individually, to the produce of 
that labour. All those members of the family living outside this co-operative 
unit forfeit their claim to a share in the inheritance, on the grounds 
that "they ceased to co-operate with the rest in acquiring the goods.
The implications of this so-called "natural law of succession"
2are of note in a number of ways.
Description of the basis of legal succession avoids reference to 
the impartial spectator, though it may be possible to surmise that Smith 
conceived of the labour expended by the family as providing the foundation 
for a reasonable expectation of use sufficient to excite the sympathy of 
the impartial spectator, and to secure the family in their continued 
enjoyment of the fund from which they drew their sustenance.
The statement of this doctrine of a "natural law of succession",
given the absence of reference to the theoretical framework of the Theory of
Moral Sentiments
appears TO "be redolent of Locke's delineation of the natural right of
inheritance in the Two Treatises of Government. Simply stated, Locke
argued that each child has, according to nature, an equal right to
nourishment and maintenance, and as such a claim on the property of its
parents both during their lifetime - in the sense that it may expect to
receive adequate sustenance and comfort - and on their death - when each '
3child may expect to receive an equal share of its father's estate. 1
(1) LJ(B).156-7. Those omitted include emancipated, captive or exiled 
sons; sons given for adoption; and married daughters.
(2) WN.III.ii.3.
(3) The Second Treatise of Government. An Essay Concerning the True Original 
Extent, and End of Civil Government (1689) I.i 8 8 .
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There are, however, a number of differences between the two 
statements. Smith founds his natural law of succession upon labour 
expenditure, whilst Locke argues that the natural right of inheritance 
originates in the duty mankind has to "preserve what they have begotten",* 
a duty which continues even after death. Thus "God Planted in Men a 
strong desire also of propagating their kind, and continuing themselves 
in their Posterity, and this gives Children a Title, to share in the
2Property of their Parents, and a Right to Inherit their Possessions".
Also Smith limited the right of inheritance to those continuing 
to live and work en famille, whereas Locke applies his natural right 
equally to all progeny.
Common to both explanations, however, is an unresolved, and largely 
unexplored, tension between the unrestricted right of property invested in 
the owner of that property - in this instance the head of the family 
empowered to alienate or dispose of that property at will during his
lifetime - and the family's expectation of maintenance from such property
3during the self-same period. Claims of the family are subservient 
to the rights of the patriarch throughout the lifetime of the latter.
One further point concerning the operation of Smith's "natural
law of succession" refers to its situational character. Only in the
. . .  . 4most primitive of societies will such an egalitarian principle of 
inheritance operate. As society evolves factors such as the changing 
status of women,”* the influence of religious attitudes,** and the operation
(1) Two Treatises, I.&8 8.
(2) ibid., 1.^88. (Original emphasis)
(3) cf., Parry, Geraint, John Locke (London, George Allen & Unwin,1978)p.118.
(4) Definitely prior to the advent of testamentary bequests.
(5) cf.,LJ(A) .i.90-148; LJ(B) . 155-164, passim.
( 6 ) LJ(A).i.90-148; LJ(B).155-164, passim
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of political factors all seem to modify, and ultimately to undermine,the 
application of the labour-based community of goods principle. One of 
the most significant actual historical developments within this context 
was the ancient practice of primogeniture. However, since the
evolution of this convention has such close links with the theme of 
government, and authority relations, it has been deemed more pertinent 
to discuss it within that context.^
As we have seen the explanation of legal succession derives from
2a combined labour-spectator theory of property designed to invalidate 
the claim that legal succession is based upon the supposed will of the 
deceased; and to demonstrate that testamentary succession is subsequent 
to legal succession. So "the right of succession ex testamento is one
of the greatest extentions (sic.) of property we can conceive, and con-
3sequently would not be early introduced into society."
Accepting that during his lifetime a man has absolute dominium over 
his property, which he may dispose of at will, Smith inquires into the 
rationale behind extending this unlimited right beyond a man's own life­
time, since testamentary succession implies the power of man "to dispose 
of a right when properly speaking he can have none himself".^ Why is 
it that a community feels obliged to observe the directions of the 
deceased?
Pufendorf, Smith recounts, had justified such obligation in terms 
of the immortality of the soul. Smith, however, cannot concur. Rather, 
he returns, yet again, to the fundamental concept of spectator sympathy, 
noting that our respect for the wishes of the dead arises, from "our 1
(1) See section 4(ii) pp, 64-67.
(2) Cf, Haakonssen, op.cit., p 110.
(3) LJ(A).i.92. Cf LJ(B).164. "There is no extension of property 
so great as this, and therefore, it was long before it could be 
introduced."
(4) LJ(B).164
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lodging, if I may be allowed to say so, our own living souls in their 
inanimated bodies."
(W)e enter as it were into his dead body, 
and conceive what our living souls would 
feel if they were joined with his body, and 
how much we would be distressed to see our 
last injunctions not performed. Such senti­
ments naturally enclined men to extend 
property a little farther than a man's life­
time. 2
Thus, it is not so much what is actually willed that is important, 
but man's imagined sympathy with the reaction of the deceased "if he 
should look up from the grave and see things going contrary to what he
3had enjoined." It is the imagined pain, contingent upon the disappoint­
ment of expectations, generated by the human capacity for empathy, that
. . .  4leads to the legitimation of testamentary bequests.
This piety for the dead is, however, a considerable refinement in 
humanity, and would be absent from rude nations, suggesting that testa­
ments originate later than other forms of s u c c e ssion.In addition to 
this, however, the duration of that piety would be naturally circumscribed, 
extending only as far as bequests to immediate successors. "A man who 
died 10 0 years ago, his will is no more regarded than if he had never 
live d . I n i t i a l l y ,  therefore, the sympathy of the spectator endures 
only for the original inheritance - once a man has died, and his heirs 
succeed to their bequest, it is assumed that the same power of disposing 
of this property is transmitted with the property from the testator 1
(1) TMS.I.i.1.13.
(2) LJ(B).165.
(3) LJ(A).i.151.
(4) Cf. LJ(B).165; and LJ(A) .i.150-151.
(5) Cf LJ(A).i .153.
(6) LJ(A).i.154.
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Co Che CesCaCee. The problem of cime arises wich Che origin of enCail -
"Che greaCesC of all exCensions of property"*", since ic endows Che
original CesCaCor wich Che power Co dispose of his goods seemingly "to
2Che end of Che world".
EnCail, as we shall see in seccion 4(ii), originaCes as a naCural
3consequence of primogenicure. As a pracCice ic is concerned wich Che 
preservacion, in cacC, of an esCaCe wichin a parCicular family from 
generacion Co generaCion. Based on Che conCingency of Che indivisibilicy 
of Che said esCaCe, enCail operaCes by circumscribing Che powers of
each successive heir - denominated in advance - in order Co prevenC him from
. . . . 4selling, alienating, devising, or in any way reducing the entailed estate.
For Smith the problem arises that, whilst enCail may be initially 
required by considerations of security"’, it is in actuality founded 
upon "the most absurd of all suppositions, the supposition Chat every 
successive generacion of men have not an equal right Co the earth, 1
(1) LJ (B) . 106.
(2) LJ(B).106. Smith's treatment of Che historical origin of enCail 
is decidedly ambiguous. In LJ(A) and (B) entail is seen Co 
derive from the Roman law convention of fideicommissum, represented 
by Smith as a kind of marriage settlement, or trusts system, 
devised to protect the property of women, and simply reintroduced 
into modern European law by the clergy. In WN, however, Smith 
explicitly denies both the practice of anything akin to entail 
amongst the Romans, and the similarity between fideicommissum and 
entail. Cf LJ(A).i.155-161; LJ(B) ,167,-WN. I H . i n T I
(3) See Section 4(ii), p. 65.
(4) Cf, Spring, Eileen, "The Settlement of Land in Nineteenth-Century 
England", The American Journal of Legal History, voi 8, 1964,
pp 209-223; Miller, William L, "Primogeniture,entails and endow­
ments in English classical economics", HOPE, voi 12, 1980, pp 558- 
81; Holdsworth, William, A History of English Law, 17 vols, (London 
Methuen, 1972),voi l/l; Simp son, A. W. B., An Introduction to the 
History of Land Law, (Oxford, Oxford UP, 196l),
(5) See Section 4(ii), pp,65-67 and WN.III.ii.5-6.
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and all that it possesses."^ Perpetual entail functions by binding 
posterity. As a practice it also means that the heir to an entailed estate
2is unable to bequeath that estate by testament.
Since Smith assumes that the piety of the impartial spectator
for the will of the dead covers only bequests to those alive at the time
of the testator's death, as such people alone can be thought to have
excited the affection of the testator, he concludes that the right of
perpetual entail is founded upon a misunderstanding of the duration of
3
the rights of the dead. Limited entail may be permissible, perpetual 
entail is not so.
In the previous four sub-sections we have seen that the concept 
of the sympathy of the impartial spectator provides the basic cohering 
framework for Smith's largely historical analysis of the means by which 
a right of property may be generated. In terms of his final appropriative 
mode, voluntary transfer, however, the case is much less clear.
(v) Voluntary Transfer
Voluntary transfer, or the transmission of property inter vivos, 
is explicated by Smith principally in terms of actual legal convention, 
with little attention paid to the question of the principles upon which 
such convention is based.
Smith stipulates two conditions which must be fulfilled if a real 
right of property is to be created to the object in question: namely,
"a declaration of the intention both of the person who transfers (sic) 1
(1) LJ(A).i.165-166; LJ(B).168-169.
(2) WN.III.ii.6.
(3) Cf„ LJ(B) . 168.
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and of him to whom it is transferr'd",* and secondly, ’’tradition", or 
the actual or symbolic delivery of the property specified.
Satisfaction of the first condition alone is insufficient to 
generate a real right of property, operable a quocunque possessore, 
conveying simply a personal right against the proprietor in respect of 
the item. It signals the creation of a contract or promise.
If I buy a horse from a man and before delivery 
he sell him to a third person, I cannot demand 
the horse from the possessor but only from the 
person who sold him. But if he has been delivered 
I can claim him from any person. 2
Property rights are acquired, therefore, only where the declar­
ation of intention is accompanied by tradition. '
Tradition relates to the notion of occupation as involving 
actual possession - initially at least
(A)s occupation, by which property is 
originally acquired, cannot take place 
unless the subject has been brought once 
at least into the power of the occupant, 
and becomes by that means seperated from 
the common ones, so a thing that is the 
property of a certain person can not become 
the property of another unless it be given 
into his power. 3
The purpose of tradition which derives from the Roman law concept that
property is transferred by delivery is quite simply to accommodate the idea 
that occupation involves possession, even if only on one occasion.
The rest of Smith's treatment gives a potted history of variations 
on the legal rulings guiding voluntary transfer at different points in
4
time and is, as such, of no interest to this thesis. 1
(1) LJ(B).169.
(2) LJ(B).169-170.
(3) LJ(A).ii.2.
(4) LJ(A).ii.4-13; LJ(B).170-171.
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In this section we have been concerned to elucidate the various 
mechanisms by which a right of property may be generated, and we have 
noted that the universal dimension in this procedure is provided by the 
concept of spectator sympathy whilst the actual pattern of property 
evolution is stadially.specific. In the next section we intend to 
examine the relationship between stadially-specific property differ­
entiation and the nature and evolution of government and authority 
relations. 1
(1) Voluntary transfer does not, however, fall into this category.
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Section 4: Property Differentiation, Government and Authority.
"Property and civil government", Smith 
announced, "very much depend on one another.
The preservation of property and the inequality 
of possession first formed it, and the state of 
property must always vary with the form of 
government." 1.
As Donald Winch notes this relationship between property and
civil government was to form one of the central themes of Smith's
2historical account of progress. Underlying this account, however, is 
an examination of the concept of political obligation, which it is our 
intention first to explore.
(i) Political Obligation: The Bases
Contradistinguishing himself from social contract theory Smith 
isolates two principles operating antecedent to the inauguration of 
government which induce men to enter civil society, and which form the 
foundation of political obligation, namely the principles of authority
3
and utility.
Authority, the principle emphasized by Smith, can derive from any 
of four sources - personal qualifications, such as strength, beauty, 
agility or virtue; age; superior wealth, or birth.
Treating each in turn Smith surmises that personal qualifications, 
as essentially "invisible qualities", are "always disputable, and
4
generally disputed", and though whilst perhaps conferring a measure of 
personal authority can never form the basis of political obligation. 1
(1) LJ(B).8.
(2) Winch, Donald, Adam Smith's Politics, p. 51.
(3) Smith is here following Hume. Cf, Winch, op.cit., p. 52.
Cf also LJ(A) .v.H9ff; LJW.l'Jff; WN.V.i . 6 .4ff.
(4) WN.V.i.b.5.
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Age however, "a plain and palpable quality which admits of no 
dispute", is an important source of rank and distinction in both rude 
and civilized nations, and as such, a more significant source of authority 
than personal attributes.^
But it is the third source of authority - superior wealth, —
which is of most significance. Wealth, "more than any of these qualities
contributes to confer authority", and it does this in one of two ways:
principally through the existence of a natural disposition in mankind to
3admire and respect wealth, and thence the wealthy; and secondly, from
the circumstance that in particular stages of societal development the
possession of wealth confers an inordinate degree of power on the holders
4of it, via the extensive dependency relations generated thereby.
The final source of authority relates to antiquity of family. An 
ancient family - usually by association with ancient wealth "always 
generates greater respect than "upstart greatness", compelling Smith to 
conclude that "Birth and fortune are evidently the two circumstances 
which principally set one man above another",^ creating thereby the 
distinction of ranks.
In addition to authority, political obligation is also founded 
upon the principle of utility.** The willingness to submit to regular 
government, and to the dictates of the civil magistrate arises from the 1
(1) WN.V.i.b.6.
(2) LJ (B) . 12.
(3) Cf. LJ(B).12; TMS.I.iii.2.3; TMS.VI.il.1.20. See also, Skinner,
A. S. A System of Social Science, p. 70.
(4) Since this is properly the topic of the next section, discussion 
of it will be confined thereto.
(5) WN.V.i.b.11. Cf, LJ(B).13; WN.V.i.b.8-10; TMS.VI.ii.1.20.
(6) Interestingly enough WN omits all reference to utility in the 
section on property and justice, focussing exclusively on authority. 
Cf. WN.V.i.b.
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fact that ‘'everyone is sensible of the necessity of this principle 
to preserve justice and peace in the society."* Without support for 
government, and the civil magistrate, property would be insecure, and 
the injuries of man - rich or poor - incapable of redress. Usually,
Smith concludes, in the Lectures, both authority and utility combine in
2forming respect for government.
As stated at the outset of this section, Smith was deliberately
rejecting the social contract explanation of the origin of political
3obligation and government as evinced by Locke.
According to Smith, social contract theory is founded upon the 
proposition that obligation originates in a voluntary contract in which 
the people yield their sovereign power to another body, and promise 
obedience and submission to this power. Government is based upon consent 
and trust.^
However, he declares, such a thesis can be disparaged on three 
counts. The social contract doctrine is undermined, allegedly, by its 
parochialism: it is, Smith suggests a doctrine peculiar to Great Britain! 
and "yet government takes place where it is never thought of."^ 1
(1) LJ(B).14. Çf LJ(A).v.120.
(2) e.g.,LJ.(B).14.
(3) It is interesting to note that both Locke and Smith regard the 
institution of government as prompted by considerations from the 
preservation of property.
(4) LJ(A).v.ll4. "The power of the sovereign is in this case a trust 
reposed in him by the people".
(5) LJ (B) . 15
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It is also undermined by the fact that the people obey the sovereign
without any cognizance of the concept of contract.
Ask a common porter or day labourer why he 
obeys the civil magistrate, he will tell 
you that it is right to do so, that he sees 
others do it, that he would be punished if 
he refused to do it, or perhaps that it is 
a sin against God not to do it. But you 
will never hear him mention a contract as 
the foundation of his obedience. 1
Finally, even assuming that the inauguration of government, and 
its powers, was initially founded on a contract, "this cannot be the
2case with their posterity; they have entered into no such contract".
Since posterity are unconscious of the original contract, they
cannot be bound by it, Smith surmises. Lockean theory endeavoured to
resolve this problem of intergenerational rights and duties by employing
the notion of "tacit consent". An individual demonstrates his acceptance
of an arrangement by acting in such a way as to bind himself in obligation
to it. For Locke this principally consisted in remaining within the 
. 3country in question. On the assumption that there exists an alternative 
locale, beyond the sphere of political obligation, to which an individual 
can displace himself, to choose to remain suggests consent.
In one sense Smith is prepared reluctantly to acknowledge that 
such an action might signify consent. However, he immediately notes that 
since man has no choice over the locale of his birth, and since he 
frequently lacks the resources to dislocate himself, even given obedience 
to government, this cannot be viewed as evidence of consent.
The fallaciousness of the social compact is further demonstrated 
by the position of aliens. Aliens moving to a country, in preference to 
all others give a "most express consent to it",^ and yet far from being 1
(1) LJ(B).15. Çf LJ(A).v.115-116. (2) LJ(A).v.ll6.
(3) Locke, Civil Government, II.4$119ff. (4) LJ (B) . 17
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viewed as willing parties to the social contract, they are treated 
with suspicion on the grounds of supposed loyalty to their mother 
country, and thus held in less regard than indigent inhabitants.
Unsurprisingly, therefore, Smith concludes that contract is not 
the basis of political obligation,^ although his own treatment is far 
from satisfactory as it stands.
The real significance of Smith's treatment of the evolution of 
government emanates from the purported relationship identified by the 
author— between the nature and form of the prevailing system of property 
and the nature and form of government.
(ii) The Origin of Government
The theory outlined by Smith to account for the inauguration of
civil government is located firmly within the framework of his stadial
explanation of property development, and it is the initial differentiation
of private property, emergent in the age of shepherds, which necessitates
the institution of government, and the development of various forms of
2coercive law enforcement. The influence is not, however, unilinear.
Whilst inequality of possessions generates the need for government in
the first instance, Smith is quite emphatic that "the state of property
3
must always vary with the form of government".
In addition to this, Smith declares that government, "is in
reality instituted for the defence of the rich against the poor, of those
. 4who have some property against those who have none at alii Thus the 1
(1) Cf LJ(A).v.119 and LJ(B).18.
(2) According to MacCormick ("Law and Enlightenment", p.160) this 
explanation of governmental origins was common to eighteenth 
century Scottish legal theory.
(3) LJ(B).II.
(4) WN.V.l.b.12; Cf., also, LJ(A) .iv.22-3; LJ(B).20.
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explanation offered by the author serves not only to adumbrate the 
process of governmental evolution, but also to illuminate the relation­
ship between property and authority. Indeed it is ourcontention that it 
is possible to review Smith's account of the origins of government as an 
account of the authority relations conferred by the possession of 
property or wealth.
"Till there be property there can be no government", Smith 
observes,* and since hunting society is characterised by the very absence 
of the concept of property, its notions extending only as far as 
possession, it can also be classified according to both the absence of
regular or organized government, and the general lack of an authority
2structure.
Hunting society as a generalized ideal-type would usually consist 
of a small community of independent families co-habiting for their mutual 
safety.
As "there is scarce any property, or at least none that exceeds
the value of two or three day's labour, so there is seldom any established
3
magistrate or any regular administration of justice." Property, "the 
grand fund of all dispute is not then known".^
The little order that is preserved within this community is 
effected democratically, through the intervention of the whole community 
to settle disputes as and when they arise. Such 'government' as exists is 
is, therefore, both irregular and weak. 1
(1) LJ(B).20.
(2) Cf.,LJ(A) .iv.4; LJ(B).19. The little authority that is acknowledged 
Ts" conferred by age and personal qualities only.
(3) Wf.Y.i.b.2. Cf, LJ(A).iv.22.
(4) LJ(A).iv.l9. Cf.Haakonssen, op.cit.. pp.155— 157; and Skinner,
A System of Social Science, p*72.
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Once ideas about property extend beyond the limited concept of 
possession to the idea of property in animala however, the potential 
for dispute and the need for permanent regulatory mechanism arise.
Disputes over property arise because an object previously held 
in common - those animals most adapted for human use - becomes indivi­
duated. One ramification of this move is to render hunting a precarious 
occupation, as what was previously open to any taker is now privately 
owned.
More significantly than this, however, the inauguration of private 
property in the prevailing mode of subsistence (flocks and herds) gives 
rise to gross inequality of fortune, to rich and poor, and leads 
ultimately to a ’regular administration of justice'.
When once it has been agreed that a cow or 
sheep shall belong to a certain person not 
only when actually in his possession but 
where ever it may have strayed, it is 
absolutely necessary that the hand of 
government should be continually held up 
and the community assert their power to 
preserve the property of individuals. 1 .
Shepherd society sees, therefore, some sort of rationalization 
of the conditions regulating the acquisition of property, and the 
maintenance of it. The "laws" generated in this age are not formal or
2
written laws however, these being "a very great refinement of government'1, 
but rather the law of the pastoral age, definitive of both the right of 
property, and the punishments consequent upon its abrogation, would be 
some sort of convention, "very short and (with) ... few distinctions in
3
it,so that every man would understand it." Failure to submit to it
4
would result in the delinquent's expulsion from the community. 1
(1) LJ(A).iv.21. (My emphasis). Cfc, LJ(A).iv.22.
(2) LJ (A) . iv. 37.
(3) LJ(A).iv.35.
(4) LJ(A).iv.24.
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The absence of written law means, of course, that disputes over 
property are still relatively circumscribed. The greater the complexity 
of the law, the greater the contentions over its application. Thus the 
very historical specificity of wills and testaments, marriage settlements, 
and voluntary contracts ensures that property is relatively settled in 
the age of shepherds where such written conventions are non-existent.
More than this differentiation of private property signalling the 
beginning of rules and procedures governing security of property, the 
shepherd age is also typified by the development away from the funda­
mentally, though indigenously egalitarian and democratic society of the 
hunters, to a society characterized by gross disparities in wealth, and 
by the existence of a rigidly stratified social structure, and by a 
hierarchy of authority/subordination relations.
Since the appropriation of flocks and herds renders what once 
provided the common resource for the subsistence of mankind the private 
property of a few individuals, through the gradual, "step-wise1'
acceptance by society of that process of individuation,^ the propertyless
. . . . 2 are compelled to acquire their subsistence from the rich, Each property
. 3owner will come to acquire, therefore, a number of retainers. This 
dependency nexus is necessarily reinforced by the fact that those owning 
the means of subsistence have no alternative means of expending their 
vast fortunes in the absence of manufacturing or luxury arts, beyond the 
maintenance of such dependants. So the acquisition of vast wealth in 
the shepherd age naturally carries with it the prize of great authority. 123
(1) Cf., Haakonssen, op.cit.. p.157.
(2) Cf., LJ(A).iv.7 and LJ(B).20.
(3) Cf„ LJ(A).iv.41-47 and LJ(B).20-22.
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In fact Smith remarks that, "in this period of society ... inequality of
fortunes makes a greater odds in the power and influence of the rich
over the poor than in any other";^ there is "no period accordingly in
2
which authority and subordination are more perfectly established."
What begins as an essentially democratic stage, with the whole 
. 3society intervening in disputes, develops into a kind of hereditary 
aristocracy, for the very reason that outlets for the dissipation of 
wealth are non-existent.
Just as inequality of fortune bestows authority on the few, so 
the entrenchment of that wealth in the hands of the few, coupled with 
the generation of a mechanism for transmitting property from generation 
to generation, tends to consolidate the bases of autlnrity within the 
same families. Antiquity of family becomes, together with wealth,the 
foundation of the authority structure typical of shepherd society.
As Smith declared in the Wealth, "there are no nations among whom4
wealth is likely to continue longer in the same families", reinforcing 
the claim in the Lectures that "in the age of shepherds descent gives 
one more respect and authority than perhaps in any other stage of society 
whatever".'’
The class bias of this picture of the property relations discernible 
in shepherd society is not obscured by Smith at all. "Laws and government?’, 
he announces, "may be considered in this and in every case as a combination 1
(1) LJ(A) .iv. 8 . Cf.,LJ(B) .21; and WN.V:b.7.
(2) WN.V.i.b.7. "The authority of an Arabian scherif is very
great; that of a Tartar khan altogether despotical."
(3) See LJ(A).iv.24.
(4) WN.V.i.b.10.
(5) LJ(A).iv.43. Cf.,Skinner, op.cit., p.72; Haakonssen, op.cit., p.158.
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of the rich to oppress the poor",^ and the means of defence of "those
2
who have some property against those who have none at all". In this
circumstance the only choice the poor have is either to continue poor,
or to endeavour to acquire property in the same manner as their wealthy
3counterparts have done.
We have seen therefore that where there is no property there is 
no need for regular government; that where property is introduced 
regular government becomes necessary to protect that property from the 
depradations of the propertyless ; and that the very protection of 
property in the hands of its claimants gives rise to a particular pattern 
of social stratification, but that balanced against this, the lack of !
outlets for the expenditure of wealth ensures a reciprocity in the 
relationship between rich and poor. As the poor combine to secure the 
rich in their superior wealth, in order to gain subsistence, so too the 
rich will defend the poorer members of their itinerant society in the 
possession of theirs.^
Smith's treatment of the relationship between government and 
property in the agricultural stage is by far the most complex aspect of 
this area of his work, reflecting as it does the fluidity of his ideal- 
type-four-stages theory, and the historical and circumstantial specificity 
of particular legal developments and conventions. His treatment is also 
particularly illustrative of the reciprocal nature of the relationship 
between institutions and concepts of property, and the nature of the 1
(1) LJ(A).iv.22-3. Çf^ LJ(B).20.
(2) WN.V.i.b.12.
(3) LJ(A).iv.23.
(A) WN.V.i.b.12.
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prevailing governmental and authority structure. As we shall see shortly, 
the intermingling of conceptions of property drawn from differing, 
though co-existent» stages of development gives rise to a particular kind 
of authority structure, which in turn leads to the evolution of new 
conceptions of property.
The main framework for Smith's examination of the connection
between government and property in this period is provided by an analysis
of the historical evolution of modern Europe.*' According to the natural
order of events within an expanding economy, capital would usually be
directed initially towards agricultural improvement, then to manufacturing
development, and finally towards the extension of foreign trade. In (
actuality, the pattern of European evolutionwas somewhat inverted.
Manufacturing was extended as a consequence of the growth of the foreign
trade of the cities, and the major agricultural improvements took place
. 2as a result of the growth of both foreign commerce and manufacturing.
3
The reason for this "unnatural and retrograde order", is identified by 
Smith in terms of the clash of two societies at different points of 
stadial development, viz, the commercially developing Roman empire, and
4
the militarily formidable German and Scythian shepherd nations. It 
was the superior military might of the latter that enabled them to 
conquer the more sophisticated, but weaker,Roman empire, and to destroy 
its commercial bases, in consequence subverting the "natural progress of 
opulence". 1
(1) Although Smith does utilise examples culled from other ages — 
particularly ancient Rome and Greece, Cf.,LJ(A) .passim,LJ(B)r>a«aini
(2) UN.III.i.1-9.
(3) UN.III.i.9.
(4) WN.III.ii.l. Cf, LJ(A).ii.97; LJ(A).iii.12; LJ(B).184; WN.V.i.a.2.
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The effect which the clash of these two different cultures had on the
prevailing system of property is particularly important for the present
study. The shepherd age, as we have seen previously, is usually
differentiated by the idea of property in animals, and indeed the
ideas of the Tartars, Smith's paradigmatic shepherd tribe, are
said to extend no further than this. To his pastoral conquerors,
however, Smith attributes "better notions of property".* They, he avers,
2had some "knowledge of agriculture and property in land". The implic­
ations of this for the future development of Europe were of great 
import. Applying their embryonic conceptions of property in land to 
the prevailing scenario the initial act of these conquering shepherd 
chieftains was to share out all the land they had usurped so that '
"no part of them, whether cultivated or uncultivated was left without
a proprietor. All of them were engrossed, and the greater part by a
3few great proprietors", who in turn subdivided the land further, by 
sharing it out amongst a number of cultivators, who in token of their 
dependence paid a small rent to the landlord. One significant ramifi­
cation of this division, for authority, was to consolidate the ownership 
or non-ownership of the means of subsistence - in this instance land - 
as the basis of class stratification. In addition to this, as in the 
previous stage, the absence of an exchange economy, compounded by the 
need of the propertyless to gain access to subsistence, reinforced 
property ownership as the basis of power, which leads Smith to argue that 123
(1) LJ(B).50.
(2) LJ(A).iv.ll4.
(3) WN.Ill.ii.2.
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A great proprietor having nothing for which 
he can exchange the greater part of the produce 
of his lands which is over and above the 
maintenance of cultivators, consumes the whole 
in rustic hospitality at home. He is at all 
times, therefore, surrounded by a multitude 
of retainers and dependents, who,having no 
equivalent to give in return for their mainte­
nance, but being fed entirely at his bounty, 
must obey him, for the same reason that soldiers 
must obey the prince who pays them. 1
Since the landed proprietor has no alternative means of dissi-
pating his wealth other than the provision of 'hospitality', and since
thus, "it will be evident", the author surmises, that "the balance of
far greater superiority in power than the same share of property will
Each of the landed estates spawned by the conquest is regarded
by Smith as a kind of "principality". "Every great landlord", he asserts 
'Vas a sort of petty prince. His tenants were his subjects. He was 
their judge, and in some respects their legislator in peace, and their
his own principality. Throughout the entire allodial system, however, 
chaos and disorder reigned. The King, conceived of simply as the greatest 
proprietor in the land, had no authority to intervene in disputes 
between contending lords. The problem for the lord, or "petty prince1',
(1 ) WN.III.iv.5.
(2) Cf., Skinner, A System of Social Science, p.73. Skinner noted the 
distinction within Smithian thought, between retainers and 
cultivators (pp,78-9).
(3) LJ(A).i.116.
(4) WN.III.ii.3.
. . 2 the propertyless require subsistence, a service-nexus evolves. And
power will make those who are possessed of it /i.e. have a
give one in a more refined (sic) and cultivated age."3
leader in war"/ Each lord had, it seems, absolute jurisdiction within
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was one of security". Though providing his retainers with subsistence 
on the assumption of the provision of service, he needed to be certain 
of their support in time of conflict, and so out of the need for security 
in allodial times, emerged a particular pattern of landholding and 
service, namely, feudalism. Initially holdings of land were granted for 
a year, then developing to life as either munera (tenures revocable at 
will), or benefica (tenures continuing during the life of the tenant but 
returning to the lord at his death), becoming ultimately hereditary 
tenures or feuda. This hereditary land right was, however, contingent
upon the performance of "a long train of services and duties", including,
2inter alia, military service, homage, fealty and wardship. For some 
time, however, feudal and allodial land holdings continued to coexist:?
Just as considerations from security motivated the landed classes 
to grant feudal tenures to their dependents, so also they were themselves 
compelled to agree to hold their land feudally of a superior, that is, 
greater lord, in order to guarantee their own protection. This change 
in the pattern of land-holding .historically characteristic of the
agricultural stage in modern Europe, permeates not only downwards from
. 4lord to tenant, but also upwards from lord ultlmatelv to the king. Far 
from extending the power of the lords, however, feudal law actually leads 
to a curtailment of that power? Indeed the essence of feudalism for 
Smith was its purported tendency to ensure the protection of the weak by 
the strong, an ethos upon which the entire hierarchical structure of «
society was founded. 1
(1) Cf.. Skinner. "Economic Interpretation of History", pp.158-162» A 
System of Social Science, pp,78-81» Haakonssen, oo.clt., pp.165-171.
(2) Cf„ LJ(A) .11.127» LJ (A) .iv.127—9» LB(B).53-4» WN.III.iv.9
(3) Allodial tenancies were free from service.
(4) Cf., Haakonssen, op.clt., pp.165-66» Skinner, "Economic Interpretation 
of History", p.161. Cf., LJ(A).iv.124-141» WN.III.il.1-3» WN.IV.5-9.
(5) WN.III.lv.9
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The transition to feudalism, occasioned by the disputatious 
nature of the age, necessitated, therefore, an alteration in the manner 
in which land was held. It also occasioned a fundamental alteration in 
the nature of the right of property, an alteration which Smith condemns 
as "contrary to nature, to reason, and to justice."^
Just as considerations of present security directed the landlord 
to develop a particular (feudal) pattern of landholding, so concerns 
for future society led him to develop a particular pattern of property 
transmission, namely primogeniture.
When land was conceived of simply as a means of subsistence and
enjoyment, the natural law of succession, as outlined in section 3:iv,'
dictated its equal partitition amongst all the qualifying members of
2the family. However, once land was conceived of as a means of power
and protection, such partitition ceased to be feasible.
The security of a landed estate, therefore, 
the protection which its owner could afford 
to those who dwelt on it, depended upon its 
greatness. To divide it was to ruin it, and 
to expose every part of it to be oppressed 
and swallowed by the incursions of its 
neighbours. 3.
Gradually, therefore, indivisible transmission of estates became
established from considerations of power and security, with the eldest
4preferred to the youngest, and the male sex to the female. 1
(1) LJ (A) . i . 116.
(2) See section 3 (iv), pp. 42-43.
(3) WN.III.ii.3.
(4) Cf., WN.III.ii.3. LJ (A) .i. 134-146; LJ(B) .161.
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As a natural consequence of primogeniture, Smith argues in the 
Wealth, another convention concerning the intergenerational transmission 
of landed property also evolved, namely the testamentary practice of 
entail. The reason for this development again derives from considerations 
of security. Thus, the practice of entails might ‘'frequently hinder the 
security of thousands from being endangered by the caprice or extravagance 
of one man". * It constitutes, therefore, a means of protecting the many 
from the few; and preserving linear succession, reinforcing the familial 
and proprietary bases of power and authority. For, as we noted earlier, 
government and law function, for Smith, in favour of the propertied 
against the propertyless; and thus '‘the laws relating to land ... were
2
all calculated for what they supposed the interest of the proprietor,)*
a view further developed by Thomas Hodgskin in The Natural and Artificial
3Right of Property Contrasted as we shall see in chapter 6 .
The problem, according to Smith, is that, of course, the interest 
of the proprietor necessarily changes. "Laws", he declares, "frequently 
continue in force long after the circumstances which first gave occasion 
to them, and which could alone render them reasonable are no more".
Thus primogeniture and entail initially developed as a means of securing 
large estates in order that the might of such estates could continue to 
protect all who dwelt upon them. In a developing commercial society, 
however, such problems of security no longer exist, for then "small as 
well as great estates derive their security from the laws of their 
country".^ The evolution of written law invalidates, as it were, the 1
(1) WN.III.il.6 .(2) W N . I I I . i i . 1 6 .
(3) (London, Steil, 1832) pp.61-75 passim.(4) W N . I I I . i i . 4 .(5) W N . I I I . i i . 6 .
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conditional bases of primogeniture and entail. In addition to this, 
the retention of such outmoded legal practices has adverse effects upon 
the efficient functioning of the economy, circumscribing as it does the 
extent of the potential market in land, and constituting thereby one of 
the primary causes of bad husbandry.
Land, Smith declares, should be ''as much in commerce as any other 
good" . 1 Where land can freely change hands, the likelihood is that it 
will be better managed, that greater time and money will be invested in 
it, and that men of enterprise and scheme will come to characterise the 
landed classes. At present, however, the continuance of land within the 
hands of traditional landed classes, precludes such a possibility - on a 
large-scale at least. Entail and primogeniture militate against good 
husbandry in a number of ways: the landed classes tend to lack both the
, 2resources, and incentive to improve their land; those tenants actually
cultivating the land also have little incentive to develop programmes of
improvement subjected as they are to both the disincentive of rent
3payment, and uncertain tenancies; with the contingency of the indivis-
4ibility of such estates merely compounding the problem. The solution 
for Smith is two-fold: huge estates should be divided into a number of 
small-holdings, since Smith believes that the ownership of property leads 
to both personal independence, and greater improement, with small­
holders identified as "of all improvers the most industrious, the most 
intelligent, and the most successful",^ thus removing the problem of 1
(1) LJ(A).i.166.
(2) LJ(A).166-167; LJ(A).ii.l; LJ(B).169; WN.III.ii.7.
(3) LJ(A).166-167; LJ(A).ii.l; WN.III.ii.8 .
(4) LJ(B).163-4; WN.III.ii.7; WN.III.iv.19.
(5) WN.III.iv.19. Cf.,U(A).166-167; and Miller, "Primogeniture, 
entails, and endowments", p*56-7.
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tenant disincentive, and as much land as possible should be brought into
commerce, for at present "there are always more capitals to buy than
there is land to sell, so that what is sold always sells at a monopoly
p r i c e . I n  this way, therefore, the "unnatural right of primogeniture
and entails, supported (as it is) by nothing but the vanity of families",
2would gradually fall into disuse.
As we have seen the agricultural age for Smith is depicted as an 
age of great disparities in wealth and power. Property,unevenly dis­
tributed, continues to form the basis of power; and the impossibility of 
expending that property in pursuits other than 'rustic hospitality' 
ensures its long continuance in the same family - especially after the
I
advent of primogeniture and entail - reinforcing the tendency for 
wealth and antiquity of family to confer the greatest degree of authority 
in this age.
Just as the lack of an exchange economy consolidates power in the 
pre-commercial ages, so its very emergence leads to a diffusion of 
power and authority in commercial society. Not only does the development 
of luxury arts and manufactures provide the propertied man with different 
avenues for dissipating his wealth, it also substantially alters the 
nature of the relationship between the propertied and the propertyless.
The service nexus typical of the second and particularly third 
stages of society generated direct dependencies between property-owner 
and propertyless. In commercial society, this service nexus is replaced 
largely by a cash nexus. Although the wealth of the rich man still 
maintains the labourer, there is much greater independence in the relation­
ship. 12
(1) WN.III.iv.19
(2) LJ(A) .ii. 1.
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Firstly, the landed proprietor is able to command an equivalent 
for the surplus produce of his estate, thus freeing him from the com­
pulsion typical of the earlier ages of sharing this surplus with his 
tenants or retainers.^ Indeed, "all for ourselves and nothing for
other people seems ... to have been the vile maxim of the masters of 
2mankind" in commercial society.
Secondly, the development of commerce and the arts ensures that 
the retainer of a previous age is now able to command an equivalent in 
exchange for his labour. No longer dependent on one wealthy man "each 
tradesman or artificer derives his subsistence from the employment, not 
of one, but a hundred or a thousand different customers". Although hfe
is in a sense obliged to each of them for his maintenance, "he is not
3absolutely dependent upon any one of them".
Clearly, this means that the rigid stratification of earlier
times has to some degree been dissolved with the development of
commerce. This is not to say that inequality of fortune no longer
confers great authority for,as Smith notes, "the authority of fortune ...
A .is great even in an opulent and civilized society", still outweighing 
birth or personal qualities as a basis of authority. But now the 
necessary connection between wealth and family characteristic 
of the previous stage , is not guaranteed, for "in spite of the 
most violent regulations of law to prevent their dissipation, (riches) 
very seldom remain long in the same family" in commercial countries.^ 1
(1) Cf., WN.V.i.b.7.
(2) WN.III.iv.il.
(3) WN.III.iv.il.
(4) WN.V.i.b.7.
(5) WN.III.iv.
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Since man can now expend his entire fortune on his person, he has no 
need to bequeath it in its entirety to his progeny, particularly since 
the considerations from security previously operative no longer apply 
as all property, great or small, is protected by law,^ and thus "for 
the gratification of the most childish, the meanest and the most sordid
of all vanities, they gradually bartered their whole power and
2author!ty."
In addition to the possibility of the gradual, though perhaps
not widespread^diffusion of "old" wealth, the property generated by
commercial activity, or "new" wealth,is, as Skinner observes, more
likely to be more evenly distributed, and less likely to continue within
3the same family for generations. This is not to suggest, however, that 
commercial society will be any less inegalitarian than previous stages, 
simply that opportunities for the acquisition of property would 
presumably be more widely available, both in terms of the objects 
capable of appropriation as new forms of wealth are generated, and in 
terms of the number of people able to acquire those objects. Indeed, as 
we shall see in the next chapter, it was one of the paradoxes of commercial 
society that great inequities in property distribution were, in fact, 
compatible with the material well-being of the labourer; that even though 
"those who labour most get least",^ yet the "lowest and most despised 
member" of commercial society is better off than the most respected 
savage in a society wherein "every individual enjoys the whole of the 
produce of his own industry".'’ 1
(1) WN.IIl.ii.
(2) WN.III.iv.10.
(3) Skinner, A System of Social Science, p 74.
(4) Early draft of chapter 2 of the Wealth, ED.2. 5. See chapter 2,
Section 1, pp7®*8^below.
(5) ED.2.4- 6,
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Throughout his exposition of the relationship between the growth 
of property and government, Smith places great emphasis upon the fact 
that such a relationship is, in fact, a reciprocal one. Although 
proprietary considerations might be initially responsible for the 
establishment of a regular administration of justice, or government, it 
soon becomes clear that the form of government in existence has profound 
implications for the types of property rights generated, thus a 'govern­
ment' of landed conquerors led historically to the evolution of the 
practice of entail and primogeniture. In a like fashion, the types of 
property discernible at any stage of social evolution determine, to some 
degree, the basis of power and authority within a particular society, ,so 
that the authority of a shepherd chief may be seen to emanate directly 
from his possession of a great herd or flock. The foregoing again 
suggests that the four-stages thesis operates fundamentally as a 
referential framework for the evolution of property and government and 
not as a determinist theory of that evolution.
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Conclusion
It was the primary aim of this chapter to examine the relationship 
between Smith's conception of the nature, origin and evolution of 
property rights, and his formulation of the four-stages theory of 
societal advancement, defined as the hypothesis that society may 
normally be expected to progress through four separate consecutive 
stages of development. Observing that the bulk of Smith's pronouncements 
on property were deployed within the context of his treatment of justice - 
indeed he actually identified the main function of justice as the pre­
servation of property - the chapter began in section 1 with an elucidation 
of the connections between property and justice. Here we noted (i) that 
property was characterised by Smith as a "perfect" right, a right which 
we have a "title to demand, and if refused to compel another to perform";*
(ii) that property was, in addition, delimited as an "adventitious"
right, the foundation of which required explication, and hence justification;
(iii) that justice was defined principally in terms of the actions 
constitutive of injury; (iv) that such actions were delineated purely 
in terms of the judgement of the impartial spectator (an intellectual 
construct designed to signify the viewpoint, or procedure^rom which 
moral or juridical decisions were taken) ; and (v) that such judgements 
were historically specific, and that as such both rights and injuries 
were also historically specific. This analysis of the connection 
between property and justice complete, we turned, in section 2 , to an 
examination of the relationship between Smith's ideas about property 
and the four-stages theorem. 1
(1) LJ (A) . i . 14
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It was the central proposition of this section that the four-stages 
theorem represented, not an explanation of the process of societal 
evolution, with changes in the economic base determining changes in the 
socio-political superstructure (including the institution of property) 
as alleged by Meek, but rather that it formed the referential frame­
work within which Smith's ideas on property were deployed, with those 
ideas forming one of the primary differentiating features of each stage. 
Thus it was our conclusion, for example, that the hunting age was 
typified by possession of personal goods; the shepherd age by property 
in herds and flocks; the agricultural age by the emergence of property 
in land; and the commercial age by the development of alternative forms 
of wealth, in the form of manufacturing and luxury goods. In addition 
to the claim that it was possible to typify each stage according to the 
varying objects of property found therein, we also demonstrated that 
the nature of the rights invested in the property-holder altered from 
stage to stage. Thus, for example, the hunting age was characterised 
by possession; the shepherd age by the advent of a right of property 
per se; the age of agriculture by an extension in the rights of accession, 
and succession; and the age of commerce by the proliferation of laws 
of contract.
In section 3, we extended our discussion to consider the alternative 
ways in which Smith conceived a right of property to originate. Here 
we noted that Smith acknowledged five traditions of entitlement: 
occupation, accession, prescription, succession, and voluntary transfer, 
of which only the first generated an original title to property, all 
the others generating derivative titles based upon the pre-existence 
of a right of property. Recognising that Smith viewed the operation 
of each of these five modes of entitlement as varying both within and 
between stages, it was our contention that, with the exception of the
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tradition of voluntary transfer, the legitimacy of all the other modes 
derived from the sympathy of the impartial spectator, and the concept 
of the"reasonable expectation of use", so that, whilst Smith, unlike 
later writers such as Hodgskin or Thompson, did not enunciate a theory 
based upon a universally operative paradigm of appropriation, he did 
ground his account of the formation of property rights in a philosophy 
with universal applicability.
Our final endeavour in this chapter was to examine the relationship 
between property differentiation, the stadial thesis, government and 
authority. After a brief analysis of the anti-Lockean bases of political 
obligation identified by Smith, viz., personal qualities, age, wealth 
and birth, we focused upon the interaction of property and government, 
revealing that, although the inauguration of civil government was 
contingent upon the emergence of a right of property, the relationship 
between the state of property and the form of government was, in fact, 
reciprocal. Thus, for example, where a ’government' of landed conquerors 
led historically to the development of conventions of entail and primo­
geniture, so too the existence of property in herds and flocks led 
historically to the development of aristocratic government. He 
concluded, however, that even given the interdependence between govern­
ment and property acknowledged by Smith, his account of the origins 
and development of government was essentially an account of the stadially 
variable nature of the authority structure conferred by the possession 
of property and wealth.
Two concepts are of particular significance, therefore, in under­
standing Smith's theory of property: the first is the notion of sympathy, 
and the intellectual construct of the impartial spectator; and the 
second is the notion of a stadial theory of historical development. Now,
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it is noteworthy, that of all the authors studies in this dissertation, 
no one else grounds their theory of property in the concept of sympathy, 
and only two authors, McCulloch and Hodgskin, employ the referential 
framework of the four—stages theory at all.^ However, where the four- 
stages theorem was ubiquitous within Smith's account of the origins 
and development of property, as employed by McCulloch and Hodgskin, 
its function is somewhat different. As we shall demonstrate in chapter 
5, McCulloch utilises the stadial thesis not in the context of his 
examination of property at all, but rather as the framework for his 
hypothesis that the progressive improvements in living standards 
discernible throughout time emanate from improvements in the means of 
applying labour in production: a concern more Lockean than Smithian'in 
substance. Similarly, in chapter 6 , we aim to show that, whilst 
Hodgskin does employ Che stadial hypothesis in connection with ideas 
about property, that hypothesis does not provide the general referential 
framework for an account of the historical evolution of the institution 
of property a la Smith, but rather a limited organisational framework 
within which Hodgskin could deploy material concerning the relationship 
between the prevailing mode of subsistence, population growth and size 
of permissible land-holdings in the course of societal advancement. 
Again it will be our contention that the substance of the four-stages 
theory is dictated by concerns more Lockean than Smithian. 1
(1) It should be observed that, whilst the authors examined in 
this study tended not to utilise the four-stages theorem, it 
was a theory common to many of the works of the Scottish enligh­
tenment cf., for example, Ferguson, Adam, An Essay on the History 
of Civil Society (17$9); Principles of Moral and Political Science 
(1792); Principles of Moral and Political Science (1792); and 
Millar, John, The Origin of the Distinction of Ranks (1771). 
cf., Meek, Social Science and the Ignoble Savage, passim; and 
Pascal, "Property and Society", pp.167-179.
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Having focused in this chanter uoon the connections between 
property and the stadial thesis in the works of Adam Smith, we intend, 
in the next chapter, to broaden our discussion of Smith's ideas about 
property, by considering his analysis of the relationship between 
labour, value and distribution, so influential in the development of 
both political and economic thought, including that of the Earlv 
English Socialists.
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Chapter 2. Labour, Value, and Distribution In Adam Smith's Economics
In the last chapter, we endeavoured to explicate the relationship 
between Smith's theory of property and his conception of the stadlal 
development of society, focusing on three particular areas: property 
differentiation as one of the defining characteristics of each stage of 
social evolution; the variations In the modes of acquiring property 
throughout the stages; and the relationship between property, government, 
and authority/subordlnatlon relations. We concluded that the four-stages 
hypothesis represented simply the referential framework within which 
Smith's ideas about property were deployed, and observed that such unity 
as was to be found in his pronouncements upon entitlement derived from 
his conception of spectator approval.
In this chapter, we hope to extend the discussion of Smith's ideas 
about property, by focusing upon the more strictly economic aspect of 
his thought, endeavouring to illuminate the connections, both implicit and 
explicit, between labour, value and distribution in commercial society. 
This chapter will commence with a discussion, in section 1, of Smith's 
treatment of the "paradox of commercial society", or the contention that 
the fundamentally inegalitarian distributive practices of the age of 
commerce are still able to ensure a higher level of welfare to all members 
of society than the more egalitarian practices of earlier ages.
In section 2, we will approach the issue of value theory, beginning 
with an appraisal of the conceptual pre-requisites of a theory of value 
per se, (2 :i); moving on to a consideration of the relationship between 
value and utility (2 :li); then to the topic of the labour command
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measure of value (2 :1 1 1 ) ; before concluding this section with an 
examination of Smith's theories of value determination, which comprise 
both a simple labour cost (or quantity) model tenable in primitive 
conditions, and a cost-of-productlon explanation of price applicable 
in complex commercial society (2 :iv).
In section 3, we will address Smith's theory of distribution, 
starting with a review of his theory of wage determination, and considering 
in the course of our review the doctrine of "net advantage" (3:i) ; 
then, contemplating his treatment of profit, centring on the question of 
whether or not profit comorises an addition to, or a deduction from 
the produce of labour (3:ii) ; before ending this section, and the chapter, 
with an examination of his theory of rent (3:iii) .
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Section 1: The Paradox of Commercial Societyi Property and the 
Division of Labour.
"It cannot be very difficult", Smith writes In the early draft of 
Chapter 2 of the Wealth of Nations,
... to explain how It comes about that the rich and 
the powerful should, in a civilized society, be 
better provided with the conveniences and necessaries 
of life than It is possible, for any person to provide 
himself in a savage and solitary state. It is very 
easy to conceive that a person who can at all times 
direct the labours of thousands to his own purpose, 
should be better provided with whatever he has occasion 
for than he who depends upon his own industry only.
But how it comes about that the labourer and the peasant 
should likewise be better provided is not perhaps so 
easily understood. 1
Smith is Interested, therefore, in elucidating the so-called
2paradox of commercial society", or the reason why, in spite of the 
existence of gross inequalities in property distribution, particularly 
in terms of land and capital, and the existence of a numerous non-productive 12
(1) ED. 2. 3-4
(2) The phrase and definition of the "paradox" derive substantially, 
though not exclusively, from the article, 'Needs and Justice in the 
Wealth of Nations: an introductory essay', by Istvan Hont and Michael 
Ignatieff, in Hont and Ignatieff (eds.), Wealth and Virtue: The 
Shaping of Political Economy in the Scottish Enlightenment, (Cambridge 
CUP, 1983) , pp.1-44. Their thesis is that Adam Smith, following in
an ancient jurisprudential tradition concerned with reconciling the 
subsistence needs of the poor with the property rights of the rich, 
Innovates by shifting the argument from the language of rights to 
the language of markets and that this shift represents a constitutive 
move in the making of political economy. See also Winch, Donald,
Adam Smith's Politics: An Essay in Historiographic Revision, 
(Cambridge, CUP, 1978), p.90.
*
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class, the material well-being of even the "lowest and most despised 
member" is more prosperous in commercial society than In any savage 
society where proprietary reward is commensurate with industrious 
effort.^" In other words, he is concerned to explicate the conundrum 
that:
... the accommodation of a European prince 
does not always so much exceed that of an 
industrious and frugal peasant, as the 
accommodation of the latter exceeds that of 
many an African king, the absolute master of 
the lives and liberties of ten thousand naked 
savages. 2
In order to illuminate and explain this paradox, Smith's exposition 
concentrates on comparing the conditions prevalent in savage society 
with those typical of commercial society.
As we saw in the last chapter,^ Smith categorised savage nations as 
those in which property beyond "the value of two or three days labour"  ^
cannot exist, and in which, as a consequence, "universal poverty there 
establishes universal equality". 5 In such nations, every individual 
capable of work is "more or less employed in useful labour", endeavouring 
to procure by his own "unassisted labour" all the necessaries and
(1) ED. 2.6.
(2) WN.I.i.ll. Çf, ED. 2.1» LJ(A)• vi. 21, 23» LJ(B). 212. Çf, also,
Locke, John, The Second Treatise of Government. An Essay Concerning 
the True Original, Extent, and End of Civil Government, (1689), 5.341.
(3) See above pp
(4) WN. V.i. b .2
(5) WN. V.i. b.7
\
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conveniences requisite for life. 1 Yet despite the fact that "in a
2savage nation every one enjoys the whole fruit of his own labour" 
the indigence of the savage is far greater than that of "the meanest 
citizen of any thing that deserves the name of a civilised nation" . 3 
Not only is the savage incapable of providing himself with "such food,
4such cloaths, and such lodging" as would satisfy the lowliest member 
of civilised society, but as Smith observes in the published edition 
of the Wealth, the members of savage nations are frequently "so 
miserably poor", that from want they are often under the compulsion of 
"sometimes directly destroying, and sometimes of abandoning their infants, 
their old people, and those afflicted with lingering diseases", ^
t
By comparison,within civilised and thriving nations, however, a 
great number do not labour at all-and yet manage to consume, through 
their ownership of the means of production, a greater proportion of the 
produce of labour than those who do labour. Thus:
The landlord is maintained .in idleness and luxury 
by the labour of his tenants, who cultivate the 
land for him as well as for themselves. The 
moneyd man is supported by his exactions from 
the industrious merchant and the needy who are 
obliged to support him in ease by a return for 
the use of his money. 6 6
(1 ) WN. Introd. 4; 
labour". Cf_ , 
"unproductive"
ED.2.1. "Useful labour" for Smith is productive 
section 3 (i) below on Smith's distinction between 
and "productive" labour, pp. 117-118.
(2 ) LJ(B). 212.
(3) LJ(A). vi.26. _£f., ED. 2.4.
U ) ED. 2.1.
(5) WN. Introd. 4.
(6) LJ(A).vi.26
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So It is that the "labour and time of the poor is ... sacrificed 
to the maintaining the rich in ease and luxury" . 1 The reason why the 
industry of the wage-labourer can support "so much oppressive inequality"
derives from the division of labour, by which "every individual confines
2himself to a particular branch of business". This alone can account 
for the superior level of opulence discernible in civilised societies 
notwithstanding the inequality of property therein, for the division of 
labour enhances labour productivity, and as such increases the quantity of 
the goods obtained by labour, sufficient to both "gratify the slothful 
and oppressive profusion of the great", and to "abundantly ... supply the 
wants of the artizan and peasant". 1 23 Once the division of labour is I
established each man is enabled to perform "so great a quantity of that 
work which peculiarly belongs to him that he can afford something to
4those who do not labour at all". Although he is now denied the full
fruits of his endeavour, the wage-labourer is capable of both remunerating 
the landlord and capitalist for the use of their productive resources, 
and of procuring a greater quantity of life's requisites for himself 
than he could produce independently. He is, therefore, better off than 
under savage conditions. In an economy capable of sustaining growth,
(1) LJ(A).vi.26.
(2) ED. 2.6. Smith is here concerned with the "social'* division of labour 
his pin-making example shows his awareness of the "technical" division 
of labour. See WN. I. 1.3.
(3) ED. 2.10.
(4) ED. 2.10
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and improvement, the share of labour is likely to grow in absolute 
terms, but as Hont and Ignatieff perceive, "the oppression of the 
superior orders might /stilly prevent it from increasing in relative 
terms”. ^
The increase in productivity contingent upon an extension of 
specialisation is responsible, then, for an Increase in the level of 
universal opulence. Another repercussion of such an extension is to 
render labour dear and work cheap. This dearness of labour is, however, 
positively advantageous, Smith alleges, since it signals an improvement 
in living standards, and he insists, should not be regarded as inconvenient 
fori
No society can surely be flourishing and happy, 
of which the far greater part of the members are 
poor and miserable. It is but equity ... /therefore? 
that they who feed, cloathe and lodge the whole 
body of the people, should have such a share of the 
produce of their own labour as to be themselves 
tolerably well fed, cloathed and lodged. 2
The high price of labour represents, therefore,the essence and 
measure of public opulence.
Smith's treatment of the "paradox of commercial society" has been 
deployed in order to demonstrate that there is no inherent incompatibility 
between the gross inequalities in wealth distribution characteristic of 
commercial society, and the material well-being of the labourer. This 
concern with the problem of welfare is further extended in his theory of 
value where Smith sets out to develop a measure of value capable of 
assessing changes in welfare levels both intertemporally and interlocally.^ 123
(1) Hont and Ignatieff, op.clt.,p. 6 > C f ., Winch, op.clt.,p.5Q.
(2) WN. I.vili.36.
(3) See below, section 2 (iii) , pp. 02-l(V).
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Before considering his labour command hypothesis, however, it will be 
necessary first to outline the parameters of value theory generally, 
and then to consider the problem of the relationship between utility and 
value, since the perspective adopted by Smith on the question of utility is 
instructive of his conception of welfare.
84
Section 2: Value in the Wealth of Nations
d) Introduction: The Pre-requlsltes for a Theory of Value
The concept of value forms an integral part of the politico-economic 
framework within which ideas about property were deployed by many of the 
liters dealt with in this thesis, and whilst consideration of the 
implications of value theory - particularly labour theories of value - for 
ideas about property will be deferred until the next chapter, 1 a 
number of preliminary, directional points concerning the broad parameters 
of that theory will be made by way of a preface to the main subject-matter 
of this section, namely Adam Smith's theory of value.
A theory of value is, broadly speaking, concerned with the specification 
of those criteria or principles which determine the ratio at which goods 
exchange at a particular point in time. It aims to elucidate, therefore, 
the determinants of value. The focus of ideas concerning the cause of 
value is, however, logically distinct from the focus of ideas concerning 
the measure of value. In the latter instance the design is to explicate 
how the 'absolute' or 'real' value of commodities may be estimated, and 
then to assess how changes In those values over time may be quantified.
The search for a standard of value may be regarded, then, as the search 
for a unit of social accounting - which in Smith's case centres on the 
problem of designating an index number of welfare capable of estimating , 
the general (and variable) purchasing power of goods over time and constitutes, 12
(1) See Chapter 3, pp.149-153.
(2) See,for example, Blaug, Mark, Economic Theory in Retrospect, (Cambridge 
CUP, 1962), (4th ed.), p.49, and Gordon, Donald F, "What was the 
labour theory of value?", American Economic Review. Supplement, May,
1959, Vol.XLIX, pp.462-472, p.467. This introduction is based largely 
on the notions suggested by these two works.
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therefore, the broadly quantitative dimension of value theory referred 
to by Ronald L.Meek. ^
Both of these elements - the causative and the quantitative - are
to be found in classical value theory, though the distinction between
2the two is often blurred, largely because of a tendency on the part
of the classical economists to regard the discovery of a measure of value as a
preliminary to the explication of the cause of value.1 23 4 However, the two
concepts - real value and value in exchange - address different questions.
Having noted briefly the difference between the principles necessary
for a theory of value per se, and those principles requisite for the
determination of a measure of value, I now propose to adumbrate, briefly,
the conditions necessary for the formulation of a labour theory of value.
The reasons for this explication are two-fold: firstly, because of the
prominence of putative labour theories of value within the literature
examined by this thesis; and secondly, and more particularly, because it
is frequently alleged that Adam Smith posited not one but two,or indeed
4three, labour theories of value.
(1) Meek, Ronald, L., Studies in Labour Theory of Value (London, Lawrence 
and Wishart Ltd., 1973) , pp.62-3, passim. Meek argues that a value - 
principle should not only be capable of explicating why a particular 
article possesses the "power of purchasing other goods", ipso facto; 
but also why it possesses this power to the extent that it does, and 
concludes that this extent can only be gauged if a means of measuring 
that value is first acquired.
(2) Gunnar Myrdal notes that classical value theory usually consists of two 
layers, "the outer and visible layer is a theory of exchangeable value, 
and beneath there is a theory of real value". The Political Element in« 
the Development of Economic Theory, trans. P .Streeten (London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1961), p.61.
(3) Maurice Dobb makes a similar point. See Theories of Value and 
Distribution since Adam Smith: Ideology and Economic Theory (Q m h -»-<dge, 
CUP, 1973), p.47.
(4) See, for example, q-yuglas, Paul H., "Smith's Theory of Value and 
Distribution", in Spiegel, H.W.,(ed.), The Development of Economic 
Thought, (1961 ed.) (New York, J.Wiley and Sons, 1952),pp.113-143» 
and Schumpeter, J.A.,History of Economic Analysis, (Oxford OUP,1954) , 
pp.309-310.
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Given our earlier suggestion that a theory of value Is concerned 
with the establishment of the principles governing the exchange rate 
of different commodities, a labour theory of value can be viewed as 
the proposition that the exchange rate of commodities is proportioned 
to the quantity of labour utilised in their production, including the 
labour expended in creating the necessary capital, extending backwards, 
presumably, as Blaug notes, to time immemorial.^ Indeed it is the 
capacity to reduce capital to labour expenditure that forms the sine qua 
non of the labour theory of value.
This explanation of the determinants of value must, however, be 
differentiated from any theory proposing labour as the measure of valjue, 
be it a labour quantity, or a labour command theory. Labour in this 
context operates as a numeraire, or a yardstick, by which to measure the 
real value of a commodity over time. In other words, the labour theory 
of absolute or real value is based on the notion that an absolute number 
may be attached to an economic good, and that these absolute numbers
are either the labour time that the commodity purchases (commands) , or
2the labour time that it 'contains'.
Throughout this thesis, therefore, we will designate the former a 
labour theory of value, and the latter a labour theory of absolute or 
real value.
( 1)
(2)
See on this point, Blaug; op.clt.,p.39, and Gordon, art.clt.,p.462 
Gordon, art.clt.,pp.466-7.
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Smith outlines his purported intention to "investigate the 
principles which regulate the exchangeable value of commodities" in 
Book 1, chapter IV of the Wealth, at which point he isolates three 
particular areas of inquiry, each of which is to form the substance of 
a separate chapter.
First, he asks, What is the real measure of this 
exchangeable value; or, wherein consists the real 
price of all commodities.
Secondly, what are the different parts of which 
this real price is composed or made up.
And, lastly, what are the different circumstances 
which sometimes raise some or all of these different 
parts of the price above, and sometimes sink them 
below their natural or ordinary rate; or, what are 
the causes which sometimes hinder the market price, 
that is the actual price of commodities, from 
coinciding exactly with what may be called their 
natural price. 1
Whilst ostensibly discussing the question of exchangeable value, 
Smith is, of course, at this point, confounding the issue of how value 
is determined with that of how value may be quantified over time and 
place. In terms of the allocation of material between chapters, however, 
he separates out the issue of quantification (Chapter V, "of the real and 
nominal price of commodities, or their Price in Labour, and their Price 
in Money") from that of determination (Chapters VI, "Of the component 
parts of the Price of Commodities", and VII, "Of the natural and market 
Price of Commodities") . 1
(1) WN.I. iv. 15-17
88
Before dealing with his treatment of the quantification and 
determination of value respectively, however, we Intend to consider Smith's 
attempt to differentiate value in use from value in exchange and to 
assess his success in resolving the problematic "paradox of value".
Although the Wealth will provide the main source of material on this 
issue, some reference will be made to Smith's treatment of the paradox
in the Lectures on Jurisprudence
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(il) Value and Utility in the Wealth of Nations
Before beginning his exposition of the causes and measure of value, 
Smith differentiates between value in use and value in exchange.
The word value, he notes, has two different 
meanings, and sometimes expresses the utility 
of some particular object, and sometimes the 
power of purchasing other goods which the 
possession of that object conveys, the one 
may be called 'value in use', and the other 
'value in exchange'. The things which have 
the greatest value in use have frequently little 
or no value in exchange; and, on the contrary, 
those which have the greatest value in exchange 
frequently have little or no value in use. 1
Thus water, which is "useful'*, scarcely has any value in exchange, or 
purchasing power, whilst diamonds, with scarcely any "value in use“, 
have great value in exchange. This phenomenon represents the so-called 
"paradox of value" and forms the first point of controversy surrounding 
Smith's views on value.
Smith's presentation of the paradox has been interpreted by modern 
commentators as illustrative of the fact that classical analysis had not 
yet reached the point where it could distinguish marginal utility from 
total utility, and thus demonstrates the fact that prices are being
2calculated according to marginal utilities, and not total utilities. 12
(1 ) WN. I. iv.13.
(2) See Stephenson, Matthew, A, "The Paradox of Value; A Suggested 
Interpretation", HOPE, Vol.4, 1972, pp.127-139.
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In other words, Smith, It is alleged, fails to 'solve' the paradox 
of value, because he fails to recognise that it is the exchange ratios 
of individual units of a good that should be compared, and not the whole 
class of commodities. 1 This reputed failure to link relative scarcity 
and respective utility has even been regarded by a number of writers 
as responsible for diverting value theory from its true course for 
a number of years . 1 23
However, the claim that Smith failed to solve this paradox is 
unfair, for hls(albeit cursory) treatment of value in the Lectures 
actually focuses on the very question of the relationship between scarcity, 
utility and price. Thus he declares: "if the commodity be scarce, the
I
price is raised, but if the quantity be more than sufficient to supply
the demand, the price falls." So diamonds are expensive, whilst iron,
"which is much more useful", is cheaper, simply because diamonds are
scarcer. 3 Similarly the price of water to a rich merchant lost in the
4deserts of Arabia would be high - because of its scarcity. Smith
appears, therefore, to have already explained the paradox» and in fact 
his decision in the Wealth to ignore this area of value theory can 
probably be explained by a difference in intention between the Lectures 
and the Wealth. In the Lectures his analysis centres on the demand side of 
price determination, but in the Wealth he is much more interested in
(1) Douglas, art.clt.,p.115.
(2) Ibid.,p.116, Kauder, Emil, "Genesis of the Marginal Utility Theory", 
Economic Journal, Sept.1953, Vol. LXIII, pp.638-650.
(3) LJ(B), 227-228. See also LJ(A), vi. 70-75.
(4) LJ (B) 228
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explicating the supply side of the question.
A second criticism levelled at Smith's differentiation between 
use-value and value in exchange relates to the concept of utility 
employed. Specifically, it is asserted that he failed to recognise 
that utility is a necessary pre-requisite for the existence of value 
in exchange. Thus, H.M.Robertson and W.L.Taylor argue that Smith 
assumes "that 'utility' or 'value-in-use' is not a necessary ingredient 
of exchange value . " 1 Now this is only true if it is assumed that
Smith conceives of utility in the sense of desirability, or the capacity
2of an object to satisfy any human need want or desire, (good or bad).
In this sense utility would be a necessary pre-condition of exchangeable
/
value.
However, Smith uses the term 'utility' in a different sense, that 
is, in the sense of the capacity of a commodity to support human life. He 
is, broadly speaking, concerned with the physical properties of the 
necessaries of life - or what Hollander denominates the "biological" 
dimension of utility. 3 Water is useful because it is "absolutely
necessary for the support of mankind", whereas diamonds are of little
4use, indeed "one can hardly say what they serve for", because they have no 
capacity to support life. The utility of commodities may be graded,
(1 ) "Adam Smith's approach to the theory of va)ue", 
1957, Vol. LXVII, pp.181-197.
Economic Journal,June,
(2 ) Meek, op.cit.,p.72.
(3) Hollander, Samuel, The Economics of Adam Smith, 
of Toronto Press, 1973), pp.136-137, passim.
(Toronto,University
(4) LJ (A) . VI. 8
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therefore, according to their biological/physiological usefulness.
When he discounts utility as a condition of value in exchange then, 
Smith is not naively suggesting that goods will still be demanded which 
fail to satisfy any need or desire, simply that the capacity of a 
commodity to sustain life is not a direct determinant of its value in 
exchange. ^
Having briefly examined the ambiguities present in Smith's 
treatment of utility, we will now move on to consider his conception 
of real value and the problems consequent upon the formulation of the 
labour command thesis.
(iii) Real Value; The Labour Commanded Theory
2As we have already intimated , classical value theory was often 
bifurcated into a discussion of the source of value, and a discussion 
of the measure of value, and Adam Smith's theory was no exception.
This section is concerned, therefore, with Smith's treatment of the 
measure of value and the role of labour within that treatment. It will 
be my aim to show that Smith's conception of the labour command theory 
related not to the issue of value determination at all, but to the 
question of how intertemporal and interlocal comparisons of value may 12
(1) See Hollander, op.clt.,p,136> Bowley, Marian, Studies in History of 
Economic Theory before 1870, (London, Macmillan Press Ltd., 1973), 
pp.133-142» Stephenson, art.clt.,pp.130-132.
(2) See above section 2 (i), pp. 84-88.
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be estimated in order to gauge changes in welfare levels. In other 
words, Smith is interested in constructing a welfare index.1
That Adam Smith should embark on a quest for a means of measuring 
changes in the "real price" of commodities over time is hardly surprising 
given his interest in the links between welfare and the "nature and causes 
of the wealth of nations". Indeed, in the introduction to the Wealth of 
Nations, he specifies this concern by noting that depending on the magnitude 
of the supply of necessaries and conveniences, compared with the "number
of those who are to consume it, the nation will be better or worse supplied
2with all the necessaries and conveniences for which it has occasion".
He is concerned primarily with economic development and growth, and 
concentrates in Book One on the distributive implications of that growth 
particularly as it affects the labouring classes, arguing that whatever 
increases the quantity of wealth in a country has the potential to affect 
per capita welfare levels.^
The well-being of the individual, for Smith, is conceived in terms of 
his capacity to command "the necessaries, conveniences and amusements of life
(1) C£. ,for example, Blaug, op.clt.,pp.49-53; Bladen, Vincent, From Adam 
Smith to Maynard Keynes: the heritage of political economy, (Toronto, 
Toronto UP, 1974), p.20; Dobb, op.clt.,p.47; Gordon, art.clt.,pp.467f472
(2) WN.Introd.2.
(3) Cf.,WN.I. vlli. 36; and Bowley, op.clt.,pp.98.128,
(4) WN.I.v.l. "Necessaries" for Smith include not only those goods 
"indispensably necessary for the support of life" but also "whatever 
the custom of the country renders it indecent for creditable people, 
even of the lowest order, to be without". WN.V.ii,k.3. Cf, also 
WN.V. ii.k.15. Necessaries have both a biological/physiological and 
cultural dimension therefore.
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Man's welfare is,therefore, a "function of his command over consumer 
goods".1 Whatever increases that command increases the level of welfare
of an individual» thus, the power immediately and directly conferred by
2a fortune is the power of purchasing. Any attempt to measure welfare must 
measure this power of purchasing.
In primitive society this power is highly circumscribed, contingent
as it is upon the capacity of each man's labour to provide him with all
that he requires. Thus, as we have seen in section one, though wealth
is distributed according to work - the labourer receiving the full fruits
of his labour - life is precarious.
However, once the division of labour is established in any society,
"it is but a very small part of these with which a man's own labour can
supply him"»^ rather, he acquires all that he needs and wants by exchanging
that "surplus part of the produce of his own labour", for such parts of
the produce of the labour of others as he has occasion for. In such a
society every man lives by exchanging, and becomes in this way, "in some 
4measure a merchant". His wealth now depends upon the quantity of the 
labour of others that he cam command, as opposed to the quantity of goods 123
(1) Hollander, op.clt.,p,127.
(2) WN.I.v.3. Smith is here responding to Hobbes' claim that wealth is 
power.
(3) WN.I. v.l.
(4) WN.I.iv.l
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he cam produce himself. Before elucidating how labour represents the 
real measure of value, Smith makes an important distinction between the 
"real price'* of a commodity, and the 'real worth or value' of that 
self-same commodity.
The '-'real price of everything", or "what everything really costs 
to the man who wants to acquire it", Smith asserts, "is the toil and 
trouble of acquiring it".^ Labour, in this context, signifies some kind
of effort cost or disutility. It is synonymous with man's laying down of
2a "portion of his ease, his liberty, and his happiness". Thus the pain 
of labour comprises the basic cost or price of acquiring wealth. 3 Labour
is, as it were, "the first price, the original purchase - money that was 
paid for all things" . 4
In contrast, the real worth or value of a commodity presented for 
exchange, to the man who has acquired it, but does not wish to consume
it, is "the toil and trouble which it can save to himself, and which it 
cam impose upon other people". 5 What this suggests is that real value 
represents the flipside of disutility.
What is bought with money or other goods is purchased by labour,
Smith proclaims, just as much as what "we acquire by the toil of our
£
own body. That money or those goods ... save us this toil". In other 1
(1) WN.I.v.2. Douglas in his article mistakenly, I believe, gives this 
as am example of the labour "jelly" or labour quantity argument, 
art.clt.,p.123.
(2) WN.I.V.7.
(3) Cf.,Bowley, op.clt.,p.113.
(4) WN.I.v.2.
(5) WN.I.v.2.
(6) WN.I.v.2
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words, the real value of a commodity to its owner resides in its 
capacity to obviate his need to experience the disutility of labour 
requisite to the acquisition of the good he actually wants, and to 
impose, by virtue of that ownership, the disutility of that labour on 
others - hence Smith's designation of real value as command over labour.^- 
In his construction of a measure of value Smith opts for a labour 
unit. Since the author regards labour as disutility, the unit of 
measurement must, therefore, be a unit of disutility. This raises two 
issues: is the level of disutility incurred in different occupations 
identical, and if it is not, can such differences as exist be reduced to 
a common unit? And secondly, is the disutility expressed by the labour 
unit constant from time to time, and from place to place?
With regard to the first issue, Smith readily concedes the difficulty
2of ascertaining "the proportion between two different quantities of labour". 
The time spent in different occupations is not alone a sufficiently 
accurate measure of this proportion» account must also be taken of the 
different degrees of "hardship endured", and "ingenuity exercised", ^
Although the relative pain costs incurred by different employments 
are not constant, it may still be possible, however, to reduce these 123
(1) See Blaug, op.clt.,p,50. Here he notes that, whilst the extent of a 
man’s wealth is calculated by his command over other people's produce 
in commercial society, his actual pursuit of that wealth is inspired 
by a desire to save himself the disutility of labour,
(2) WN.I.v.4.
•
(3) By "ingenuity exercised", Smith apparently means the costs incurred in 
training, for he notes that: "There may be more labour ... in an 
hour's application to a trade which it costs ten years labour to learn, 
than in a month's industry at an ordinary and obvious employment" 
(WN.I.v.4.). Similarly, an hour's "hard work" may represent more 
labour (disutility) than "two hours easy business".
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differentials to a common (wage) unit. The 'higgling and bargaining 
of the market' will, it seems, establish such an approximate wage 
structure reflecting both differences in hardship and ingenuity. 1
That Smith should make only a tangential reference to the manner
in which "competition equalizes the monetary return to units of disutility
2of labour" is surprising, since he goes to greater lengths in Chapter X 
to demonstrate just this point, as we shall see shortly.^ Nevertheless, 
Smith has indicated at least, if not actually demonstrated fully, that 
the differences in pain cost experienced in different occupations can be 
satisfactorily accommodated in a labour (qua wage) unit.
Since it is an essential pre-requisite of a measure of value that
/
it be invariable in its own value, Smith's next task is to demonstrate
that the disutility expressed by his labour unit is constant from time
4to time, and from place to place.
Though common understanding might expect money to act as the 
measure of real value, since the value of commodities is normally estimated 
in money terms,  ^it is the very variability of the value of money which 
disqualifies it.
The quantity of labour which any particular 
quantity of them cam purchase or commamd ... 
depends always upon the fertility or barrenness 
of the mines which happen to be known about the 
time such exchanges are made. The discovery of 
the abundant mines of America reduced, in the 
sixteenth century, the value of gold and silver in g 
Europe to about a third of what it had been before.
(1 ) Blaug. op.cit.,pp.49-53» 
pp.114-116, and Douglas,
Hollander, og^clt. ,pp. 129-132» Bowley, og^cit. 
art.cit.,pp.117-122, all note this point.
(2 ) Blaug, op.cit.,pp.50-51.
(3) Section 3 (i), pp.
(4) See WN.I.v.7.
(5) See WN.I.v.6 .
(6) WN.I.v.7. See also WN.I. xi.f., where Smith discusses the reduction
in value of metals due to the discovery of the American mines.
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Labour, however, never varies in its own value, "Equal quantities 
of labour" are at all times and places "of equal value to the labourer". 
Thus Smith announces)
In his ordinary state of health, strength and 
spirits» in the ordinary degree of his skill 
and dexterity, he must always lay down the same 
portion of his ease, his liberty and his happiness.
The price which he pays must always be the saune, 
whatever may be the quantity of goods which he 
receives in return for it. 1
If the labourer receives a variable quantity of goods, for a 
constant amount of labour, Smith proclaims, it is the value of the 
goods that has fluctuated. The disutility (effort cost) associated with 
that quantity of labour remains constant. This identification of a « 
constant level of disutility with the performance of the saune amount of 
work re-emerges later with McCulloch who also asserts that equal quantities
of labour "must unavoidably occasion the same sacrifice to those by whom
2it is performed", although the purpose of McCulloch's argument is not to 
demonstrate the invariability of labour, but rather to illustrate that 
the value in exchange of any commodity accurately reflects the labour 
expended in its production, and that if the quantity of labour is 
constant, the value of the article so produced is also constant. 1 23
(1) W N . I . v . 7 .
(2) McCulloch, J.R.,Principles of Political Economy, henceforth PPE_, 1825, 
edition 1, p.117. See also pp.118 and 120-21. (Original emphasis).
(3) McCulloch's assumption that labour occasions constant disutility is ' 
problematic for his theory of value. If labour is understood as 
disutility, then wage payments in a cost of production theory must 
reflect a disutility schedule of some sort. However, McCulloch, 
whilst conceding something to the Smithian wage-disutility schedule, 
usually regards wages as principally reflecting the wage fund ratio, 
or subsistence level.
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On the supposition that the labourer always experiences constant 
disutility with the expenditure of a constant amount of labour, and 
that occupational differentials are adjusted by the 'higgling' of the 
market so that a common unit of labour (qua wages) may be identified,
Smith is able to adduce the invariability of labour, and thence to 
demonstrate its universal applicability, and hence suitability as a 
measure of value.
Labour, therefore, ... is the only universal
as well as the only accurate measure of value,
or ... standard by which we cam compare the
values of different commodities at all times
and at all places. 1  ,
From the preceding exposition of Smith's concept of 'real value', 
and the labour command theory, it should be apparent that he is 
concerned with the question of a measure of value, that is with formulating 
a unit of social accounting, and not with the issue of how relative price 
may be determined. He is not advancing a labour theory of value. Indeed, 
the labour command hypothesis as an explanation of value in exchange would 
be something of a tautology. To suggest that the exchange ratios of goods 
are regulated by the labour euid, by implication, the goods which they 
command in exchange, is simply to say that their exchange rate is regulated 
by their power of purchasing, which is, as Blaug points out, a nonsensical
statement since power of purchasing necessarily means command over
2commodities. Thus the assertion that Smith confounded the labour embodied 
in a commodity with the labour commanded by it seems to be unjustified. 12
(1) WN.I.v.17.
(2) Blaug, op.clt.,pp.52-53.
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Having discounted the labour commanded thesis as an explanation of 
value In exchange, our next step In this chapter is to examine the 
hypotheses actually advanced by Smith to explain the determination of 
such value, namely both the"labour quantity" and “cost of production'* 
theories.
(iv) Exchangeable Value: The Labour Quantity and Cost of Production 
Versions
The second aspect of Smith's treatment of the phenomenon of value 
relates to the manner in which exchanges are regulated, and comprises in 
Smith's account a labour cost model of relative price, tenable in 
primitive conditions only; a cost of production theory of relative price 
applicable in advanced society» and a consideration of the reasons for the 
divergence between natural and market price, which contains an exposition 
of the idea of resource allocation and market equilibrium. Whilst the 
last of these three is of particular note to historians of economic thought, 
it is of only limited relevance for this thesis, and will be dealt with 
only briefly. Our main concern here will be to explain the relationship 
between labour, value and property (or distribution).
The aim of this particular section, then, will be to elucidate the 
relationship between the two models, illuminating in our discussion
(i) the status of labour within Smithian value theory, since Smith is 
often proclaimed as the advocate of not one but two (or indeed three)
«
labour theories of value1, (ii) the suggestion that Smith formulated not
(1) Schumpeter, op.clt.,pp.309-310 identifies three "labour" elements
in Smith's theory of value» labour as a numeraire» a labour-disutility 
thesis» and a highly restricted labour quantity thesis.
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only a labour theory of value which he subsequently abandoned, but 
also a labour theory of appropriation - also abandoned - which appears 
to be potentially inconsistent with his pronouncements on the origins 
of property in the Lectures, 1 and (iil) the ramifications of Smith's 
rejection of a labour cost model of value, for a cost of production model.
We begin with Smith's attempt, in Chapter VI "Of the component 
parts of the Price of Commodities", to address the problem of how value 
is determined.
The chapter opens with the delineation of what appears to be a 
labour quantity theory of value. Thus:
In that early and rude state of society which 
precedes both the accumulation of stock and the 
appropriation of land, the proportion between 
the quantities of labour necessary for acquiring 
different objects seems to be the only circumstance 
which can afford any rule for exchanging them one 
for another. 2
In other words, where land is a free good, and capital non-existent, 
the comparative amounts of labour requisite to the production of 
different commodities regulates their exchange rate. Smith evidences 
this with his famous beaver-deer paradigm:
If among a nation of hunters, he asserts, it usually 
costs twice the labour to kill a beaver which it 
does to kill a deer, one beaver should naturally 
exchange for or be worth two deer. It is natural 
that what is usually the produce of two days or two 
hours labour should be worth double of what is usually 
the produce of one day’s or one hour's labour. 3 12
(1) See Chapter 1.
(2) WN.I.vi.l.
(3) WN.I.vi.l
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The natural rate of exchange appears, therefore, to be determined 
by the number of man hours necessary to the production or acquisition of a 
commodity. This assumption is, however, qualified slightly, for even in 
this “early and rude state" different tasks incur different degrees of 
disutility. Thus: "If the one species of labour should be more severe 
than the other, some allowance will naturally be made for this superior 
hardship". In this way "the produce of one hour's labour” may often 
exchange "for that of two hours (sic) labour in the other".^ Similarly
differences in 'dexterity and ingenuity' reflecting 'the time and labour'
2spent in acquiring particular skills, must also be compensated for.
Allowances are thus made in this natural rate of exchange for the 
differential characteristics of various employments» quantification of 
labour input would take account, therefore, of adjustments for differences 
in skill and hardship. 3 Smith is, however, curiously silent on how such 
adjustments would be made.
These few statements comprise Smith's labour quantity theory of value.
Since his exposition precludes the existence of capital, presumably as
the labourer always works with his bare hands, he manages to avoid the
problem of reducing the value of capital goods expended in production
4to labour utilised on their production in the past. Rather, he makes 
the special assumption that labour constitutes the only scarce productive 1
(1) WN.I vi.2
(2) WN.I. vl.2.
(3) WN.I.vi.3.
(4) Blaug, op.clt.,p.39. See below Chapter 3,pp4154-209,Ricardo,and the 
"Ricardians" deal with this problem with varying degrees of success.
factor. Clearly the applicability of such a theory in explicating 
the problem of exchange ratios is limited, and indeed once Smith allows 
for the utilisation of other scarce factors in production this 'labour' 
explanation is abandoned.
Also in this epoch, Smith declares, "the whole produce of labour 
belongs to the labourer" . 1  Now this statement is important in a number 
of ways. Initially, it suggests the operation of a labour principle of 
appropriation, temporally co-extensive with the operation of the natural 
(labour) rate of exchange, both being modified, or displaced, by the 
accumulation of stock and appropriation of land.
Secondly, this suggestion of a labour theory of entitlement when 
taken in conjunction with the later statement that "the property which
every man has in his labour, as it is the original foundation of all
2other property, so it is the most sacred and inviolable" might suggest 
that Smith's account of property in the Wealth is more redolent of Locke than 
it is of his own "spectator" treatment in the Lectures. This claim is, 
however, invalid.
With respect to the Lockean 'echo' discernible in Smith's latter 
pronouncement the context of its articulation is important. Smith is 12
(1) WN.l.vi.4. See also WN.I. viii.2. As we shall see in Chapters 6 and 
7, Smith's terminology is significant for the later socialist writers,
and is echoed in such phrases as Thomas Hodg9kin's demand that "the 
whole produce of labour ought to belong to the labourer". (Hodgskln, 
Thomas, Labour Defended against the Claims of Capital, 1825,Cole ed., 
1922, p.63). Consideration of the relationship of Smith to the so-called 
'Ricardian Socialists' is considered by, inter alios, Thompson, Noel, W., 
The People's Science (Cambridge, CUP, 1984)» Douglas art^it. ,pp,128-'>3 3 » 
King, J .E ., "Utopian or Scientific? A reconsideration of the Ricardian 
Socialists", h o p e , 15i3, 1983, pp.345-373» Hollander, Samuel, "The 
poSt-Ricardian dissension t a case-study in economics and ideology",
Oxford Economic Papers. 1980, n.s.32i pp.370-410.
(2) WN.I. x.c.12.
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discussing the impropriety of policies and practices which restrict 
the free employment of labour, such as apprenticeships. He is, as it 
were, concerned with the personal property of man - his labour - and 
his freedom to uae this property as he so desires - an admittedly 
Lockean notion - but one used for a particular purpose, viz, to advocate 
the abolition of artificial restrictions on the movement of labour.
"The patrimony of the poor man", he declares, "lies in the strength 
and dexterity of his hands". To hinder him from employing "this strength 
and dexterity in what manner he thinks proper without injury to his 
neighbour, is a plain violation of this most sacred property".^ Thus 
every man should be free to choose his own employment.
Clearly this is not a statement about the way in which rights to
property originate. As Donald Winch indicates, Smith's view of the
origin of property entails heavy emphasis on physical property as opposed
2to property in man's person; witness his tendency to list objects which 
may (or may not) be individual.
The earlier claim that in the 'early and rude state' of society,
"the labourer enjoyed the whole produce of his own labour" does, however, 
intimate a statement about the origins of property, and is, in fact, 
perfectly consistent with Smith's analysis in the Lectures. There he 
based property acquisition on the traditions of occupation, accession, 
prescription, succession and voluntary transfer. A title to property 
was legitimated by the approval (or sympathy) of the impartial spectator. 1
(1) WN.I.x.c.12.
Cf., Winch, op, clt., p.58, and Haakonssen, Knud, The Science of a 
Legislator: The Natural Jurisprudence of David Hume and Adam Smith, 
¿Cambridge, CUP, 1981), pp.116-117.
(2)
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As we know, modes of acquiring property vary between stages, and 
Smith does not argue for a universally operative method of individuation, 
but he does acknowledge that labour - conceived as disutility - might 
excite the sympathy of the spectator. Thus the spectator may prefer 
the claims of A over B to an object on the grounds that A has, via 
the expenditure of labour, acquired a "reasonable expectation of use", and that 
to deprive him of that object would be to cause him more hurt than it would 
to deprive B who has no such expectation.^ This is his argument for 
occupation-based rights. This view of Smith's is substantiated to some 
extent by a claim he advances in the Anderson Notes;
To deprive a man of the beast or fish
he has caught, or of the fruit he has
gathered, is depriving him of what cost
him labour and so giving him pain, and is
contrary to the laws of the rudest society. 2
His postulate that,prior to the accumulation of stock and inauguration 
of private property in land, the labourer receives the full fruits of 
his labour c a n  thus be regarded as a statement of historical "fact".
In other words, in this era, the expenditure of labour as a title to 
property was sufficient to invite the approval of the spectator. The 
very historical specificity of this mode of individuation in the Wealth 
can be seen to be defined by the time during which labour comprises the 
only productive factor expecting remuneration. Once the labour mode of 
individuation is supervened by claims to the product based on the provision' 
of other non-labour factors. Smith is compelled to find an alternative 
explanation for this problem. 12
(1) See above Chapter 1, sections 1 and 3(1) . See also LJ(A).i.37.
(2) Anderson Notes, i. See Haakonssen, op.cit.,p.lQ7.
His
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exposition concludes with another pregnant statement, namely
that«
.., the quantity of labour commonly employed 
in acquiring or producing any commodity, is 
the only circumstance which can regulate the 
quantity of labour which it ought commonly to 
purchase command or exchange for, 1
In primitive society labour input equals labour commanded. Thus 
the purchasing power of a commodity and its labour cost of production 
coincide. A mem is, as Blaug notes, "rich or poor according to the value 
of his own labour services or his purchasing power over other men's 
labour services, for the two are identical". But, as we shall see ’ 
shortly, Smith's abandonment of a labour quantity theory of value and 
its replacement by a cost of production hypothesis, also has the effect 
of breaking this coincidence between labour expenditure and purchasing 
power.
In the nineteenth century the 'Ricardian' socialists, it has been 
argued, concluded from this non-coincidence of labour cost and purchasing 
power that the fact that the labour expended on a product was no longer 
sufficient to buy that good demonstrated that the worker was being 
defrauded. 1 23 The market was denying him the full fruits of his labour by 
enhancing "natural" (labour embodied) price with profit and rent, and
(1) WN.I.vi.4.
(2) Blaug, op.cit.,p.5Q.
(3) Thompson, Noel, W., op.cit.,pp.86-96> King art.cit.,pp.349-355
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compelling him to pay a 'social' (l.e., enhanced) price. 1 Again Smith,
2unwittingly, points the way.
Having premised that in primitive society the comparative quantity 
of labour expended in production alone regulates the ratio of exchange 
of various commodities, Smith immediately revises this explication of 
value determination when dealing with (more) advanced society.
The simple labour cost model is founded on the special assumption 
that labour represents the only scarce factor of production. However, once 
it is acknowledged that additional factors - viz land and capital - may 
cooperate in the production of commodities, and as such require recompense, 
then the labour cost explanation of relative price is visibly undermined, 
argues Smith. For«
As soon as stock has accumulated in the hands of 
particular persons, some of them will naturally 
employ it in setting to work industrious people, 
whom they will supply with materials and subsistence, 
in order to make a profit by the sale of their work, 
or by what their labour adds to the value of the 
materials ... /In such circumstances/ The value 
which the workmen add to the materials, therefore, 
resolves itself in this case into two parts, of which 
the one pays their wages, the other the profits of 
their employer. 3 12
(1) This distinction between "natural" and "social" price is Hodgskin's.
See his Popular Political Economy, 1827, (Reprinted, New York,
Augustus M. Kelley, 1966), p.220.
(2) The extent of Smith's influence will be considered in Chapters 6 and 7.
(3) WN.I. vi.5
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In this state, "the whole produce of labour does not always 
belong to the labourer". 1 The product must normally be shared with the 
capitalist. The price of a commodity is now regulated by both wages and 
profit. Similarly«
As soon as the land of any country has all become 
private property, th’e landlords, like all other 
men, love to reap where they never sowed, and demand a 
rent even for its natural produce. The wood of the 
forest, the grass of the field, and all the natural 
fruits of the earth, which, when land was in common, 
cost the labourer only the trouble of gathering them, 
come even to him, to have an additional price fixed 
upon them. 2
Thus, once land is appropriated, the labourer must yield a part < 
of his produce to the landlord.
This portion, or what comes to the same thing, the 
price of this portion, constitutes the rent of 
land, and in the price of the greater part of 
commodities makes a third component part, 3
The emergence of rent and profit (or property income) has a number 
of far-reaching overtones for Smith's theories of distribution and value. 
Since profit and rent are due from the product of the combined operation 
of land, labour^and capital, labour expenditure alone does not create 
a sufficient title to property. The labour individuation hypothesis is
4undermined.
(1) WN.I. vi.7.
(2) WN.I. vl.8 .
(3) WN.I. vi.8.
(4) The idea of profit and rent as "deductions" from the entire produce 
of labour will be explored in the appropriate sections on profit 
and rent. See pp. 17S-34-ft po.134-130 resoeetivjBlv.
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Secondly, this very accumulation of capital and appropriation 
of land i£S^ fact^ Invalidates the labour cost model of value. Price, 
or relative worth in commercial society, is determined by adding together 
the payments due to each factor required in the production of a commodity. 
Smith defines this 'natural price' as that price which lsi
... neither more nor less than what is sufficient 
to pay the rent of the land, the wages of the 
labour, and the profits of stock employed in 
raising, preparing and bringing it ¿the commodity/ 
to market, according to their natural rates. 1
The final repercussion of Smith's alternative value theory concerns 
the way in which it serves to break the coincidence between labour cost 
and labour commanded, mentioned earlier. The real value of a commodity 
coincides in early society with labour cost. In more advanced society 
"the quantity of labour commonly employed in acquiring or producing any 
commodity", is no longer the only circumstance which can "regulate the
2quantity which it ought commonly to purchase, command, or exchange for". 
Now an "additional quantity" is due for profit and presumably rent. 12
(1) WN.I. vii.4. The "natural rates" of profit and wages are regulated 
"Partly by the general circumstances of the society ... and partly 
by the particular nature of each employment". (WN.I. vli.l.) and 
the "natural rate" of rent is determined "partly by the general 
circumstances of the society or neighbourhood in which the land is 
situated and partly by the natural or improved fertility and of the 
land" (WN.I.vii.2.). Each of these determinants will be considered 
in the relevant sections. In addition to this, natural price 
represents the price about which the market price - determined by "the ' 
proportion between the quantity which is actually brought to market, 
and the demand of those who are willing to pay the natural price
of the commodity" - gravitates. {WN.I. vii.8.)
(2) WN.I. vi.7.
n o
This suggests to Smith that in a civilised country:
... the annual produce of its labour will 
always be sufficient to purchase or command a 
much greater quantity of labour than what was 
employed in raising, preparing, and bringing 
that produce to market.
In other words, the real value of the annual produce of a country
will exceed the labour expended in its production by the amount of rent
2and profit included.
The difference between the labour embodied in a commodity and the 
labour commanded by that commodity represents for Smith,in contrast 
to the Ricardian socialists, not evidence of exploitation but a positive 
asset, that is, the potential for accumulation.
If the society was annually to employ all the 
labour which it can annually purchase, as the 
quantity of labour would increase greatly every 
year, so the produce of every succeeding year 
would be of vastly greater value them that of the 
foregoing. 3
Since the accumulation of stock, with Its tendency to foster the
division of labour, and enhance per se labour productivity leads
ultimately to an increase in the aggregate wealth of a nation, it isf
for Smith,something to be promoted, not avoided. 1
(1) WN.I. vi.24.
(2) See WM.I. vi.24.
(3) WN.I. vi.24.
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It can be seen from the foregoing that Smith's simple labour 
explication of value was of limited historical validity serving only 
to indicate the manner in which exchange value was regulated in a 
society characterised by the absence of stock, and by the community of 
land. Once society has progressed beyond that stage, value is regulated 
by different, cost of production, principles. The natural price of a 
commodity consists in a summation of all the amounts payable to all the 
factors cooperating in its production.
Rent, wages, and profit not only represent, individually, the 
component parts of price, however, but they each represent, also, a 
principal source of revenue or income. In this wayi
... (A) 11 ... the commodities which compose the whole
annual produce of the labour of every country, taken 
complexly, must resolve itself into the same three 
parts, and be parcelled out among different inhabitants 
of the country, either as the wages of their labour, the 
profits of their stock, or the rent of their land. The 
whole of what is annually either collected or produced 
by the labour of every society, or what comes to the 
same thing, the whole produce of it, is in the manner 
originally distributed among some of its different 
members. Wages, profit, and rent, are the three 
original sources of all revenue as well as all 
exchangeable value. 1  1
(1) WN.I. vi.17. Should anyone own more than one factor they would 
receive the income due to each, as the gardener owning his own 
garden and cultivating it with his own hands receives the rent 
of the landlord, profits of the farmer and wages of the labourer. 
(WN.I.vi.23.)
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It is the capacity, then, of each of the factors identified 
by Smith 1 to command a price that determines the distribution of 
income within society. It will, therefore, be the principal aim of 
the next part of this chapter to examine Smith's theory of distribution. 1
(1) Namely, land, labour and capital
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Section 3: Distribution in the Wealth of Mations
Distribution for the classical economists Is primarily concerned 
with the pricing of productive services, and with elucidating, therefore, 
how the returns to the several factors combining In production may be 
determined. 1 These factors are normally identified as three in number, 
land, labour and capital, to which conform three particular forms of 
income, rent, wages and profit, each of which devolves upon a particular 
specifiable and distinct social class, the class of landlords, labourers or 
capitalists. For Smith, his "cost-of-production" or "adding-up” thesis 
of price necessarily implies, and is implied by, his theory of distribution, 
since the price of any commodity is calculated by adding together the costs 
to land, labour and capital. The question of distribution is, therefore,I
largely an empirical question concerned with how such returns are 
calculated, ignoring on the whole the issue of the normative bases of such 
factorial returns. The assumption is that as the owners of productive 
property, the landlord, the capitalist and the labourer are entitled 
to returns on the very grounds of that ownership. How such a title originates
is not usually an issue addressed in distribution theorv. This is particularly
2true of the Ricardlans and Malthus; though with Smith is it possible to 
some degree to supply these normative bases by reference to his writings 
on entitlement in the Lectures on Jurisprudence and the later sections of 
the Wealth. ' 1 123
(1) Frank H.Knight, “The Ricardian Theory of Production and Distribution" 
and II, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 1935, 
Vol.I, pp.3-25, pp.171-196.
(2) That is, Ricardo, McCulloch and James Mill.
(3) See above chapter 1, pp.10-75.
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We will return to this question of the link between distribution and 
entitlement at the beginning of chapter 4 when we consider the theories 
of distribution advanced by the Ricardians et al.^
Having claimed that distribution theory is principally concerned 
with the pricing of productive factors, it is also necessary to
acknowledge that fully-fledged distribution theory also addresses the
2question of resource allocation. Whilst we do not propose to deal with 
this question to any degree in this thesis, it is significant that Smith, 
in contradistinction to his immediate successors, actually recognised 
the coincidence between costs of production and distributive payments, 
perceiving that it was possible to transfer resources from any of the
I
three sectors to alternative uses in order to restore market equilibrium, 
and thus to equalise returns in all competing fields. As Knight makes 
clear, this equilibrating process in the 11 Ricardian" schema was conceived 
exclusively as a function of capital flow, 1 23
This particular section on distribution will be divided into three 
sub-sections. The first will treat of Smith's conception of wages; 
the second his conception of profit; and the third his conception of rent. 
Whilst his actual pronouncements on the above areas leaves something to be 
desired, some consideration of the details of Smith's theory of distribution 
is necessary in order to understand the line of development pursued by his
(1) See below, chapter 4, op.216-219,
t
(2) Cf, Knight, art^cit^. ,p,6 .
(3) Ibid.,pp.173-5, Here Knight explores the limitations of the 
Ricardian scheme with regard to the allocative implications of 
distribution.
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successors.
(i) Wage Theory and the Doctrine of Net Advantages
Virtually all the Classical wage theories stem 
from the varied approaches to be found In Adam 
Smith's Book I, Chapter VIII. This contained 
elements of a wage-fund theory, a productivity 
theory, a residual theory (this stemmed from 
Natural Law - labour produced the whole product 
but had to submit to deductions In the form of 
profits and rent), a bargaining theory, and ... 
a subsistence theory. 1
Smith's theory of wages is far from consistent or systematic, 
as the above quotation recognises» instead it reads like a digest of
all the theories of wages later advanced by his successors, and Is of
2Importance to this thesis primarily for that reason.
"The produce of labour" Smith argues,"constitutes the natural 
recompence or wages of labour" , 3 and Indeed prior to the accumulation 
of stock and appropriation of land, the labourer would have received 
the whole produce of his labour. Had this state continued "the wages 
of labour would have augmented with all those Improvements In Its
4productive power to which the division of labour gives occasion".
(1) O'Brien , D.P., The Classical Economists (Oxford, Clarendon Press,
1975), p.lll.
(2) Where Smith's wage theory is of particular intrinsic, and innovative < 
value is in his development of Cantillon's theory of net advantages, 
which is largely outside the scope of this thesis. Cf. Blaug, op.clt.,p.47.
(3) WN.I. Viii.l
(4) WN.I. viil.4
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But, unfortunately for the labourer, it did not, "It was at an end ... 
long before the most considerable improvements were made in the productive 
powers of labour, 1
The first of the plethora of wage theories outlined above which we
2encounter is the residual-claimant theory. Once capital has accumulated 
and land becomes private property, payments to rent and profit are deducted 
from the produce of labour; rent as a kind of monopoly payment, and profit 
as the capitalist's just reward for the provision of materials and 
maintenance to the labourer.^ Wages consist, then, in the residue left after 
these deductions. This introduces us to the second of Smith's ideas - the 
wage-fund theorem.
I
It is implicit in his treatment of the origin of profit that capital 
comprises a pre-existing stock of goods. These goods are advanced to the 
labourer to support him throughout the productive process. Thus;
... a stock of goods of different kinds ...
must be stored up somewhere sufficient to
maintain him (the worker) and to supply him
with the materials and tools of his work till
such time, at least, as both these events
(l.e. the completion of production and sale of
the good) can be brought about. 4 1234
(1 ) WN'.I. vlli. 6.
(2) Blaug's term, op.cit.,p.44.
(3) The question of rent and profit as ’deductions" will be considered in the 
sections on Rent and Profit, pp.134-3° £ d d .125-34 respectively. '
(4) WN.Introd. 2. Although Smith Talks of a "stock of goods", he also 
refers to the money available to pay wages in a similar context. Cf. WN
I.viii., 54ff.
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Because the greater part of labourers require this advance of
material Smith Is able to assert that "the demand for those who live
by wages ... cannot but Increase In proportion to the Increase of the
funds which are destined for the payment of wages."1 Smith postulates,
therefore, a relationship between the magnitude of capital available for
wage payment and the demand for la hour, tlnfortunately, however, he falls
to explore the implications of this relationship.
What is of especial interest is the Idea that the "funds which are
destined for the payment of wages" are of two kinds, revenue, utilised In
the maintenance of unproductive labour - the menial servant, for example -
and stock, employed in the support of productive labour. This distinction
between productive and unproductive labour appears to turn on two
elements: firstly, the idea that the expenditure of productive labour
adds value to a subject, whilst the expenditure of unproductive labour does 
2not; and secondly, the concomitant notion that the labour of the
productive worker "fixes and realizes itself in some particular subject or
vendible commodity which lasts for some time at least after that labour
is past", and which is, as it were, "stocked and stored up to be employed,
if necessary, upon some other occasion",3 whilst the services of the
unproductive labourer, "generally perish in the instant of their performance,
and seldom leave any trace or value behind them, for which an equal quantity
4of service could afterwards be procured". 123
(1) WN.I.viii.18. Cf. Blaug, op.clt.,pp.44-46.
(2) WN,II. ill. I. Smith does not disparage the worth of unproductive 
labourers, acknowleding their usefulness, but denies that they contribute 
tangibly to the Increasing wealth of a nation.
(3) WN.II.iii.l.
(41. WN.II. ill.l
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Thus productive labour Is that which can result in capital 
accumulation, whilst unproductive labour, though rendering a service, 
cannot. On the assumption that the increasing wealth of a country is 
contingent upon its capacity to accumulate capital, the proportion 
of productive to unproductive labourers is important. Thus "a man", 
and presumably a nation, "grows rich by employing a multitude of 
manufacturers : He grows poor, by maintaining a multitude of menial 
servants". 1 It would be in a nation's interest, therefore, to increase 
the number of the former, and reduce the number of the latter.
As we have seen, Smith's conception of wage determination assumes 
inequality of property distribution; the labourer does not own the "stock" 
sufficient for his support or his employ, but must rely on its provision 
by another. Not only does the common wage of the labouring class depend 
upon the size of the wage-fund, but, in addition, it "depends every where
upon the contract usually made between those two parties, whose interests
2are by no means the same". The workers want as high wages as possible, the 
masters want to pay out as low wages as possible. The advantage in this 
bargaining situation lies with the employer. "The masters, being fewer in 
number, can combine much more easily." ^ Unlike the workmen, their 
combinations are not prohibited by law. Thus, masters "are always and 
everywhere in a sort of tacit, but constant and uniform combination, not to 123
(1) WN.III.ili.l. Smith's differentiation between productive and 
unproductive labour is obviously contingent. It is possible that • 
unproductive labour - e.g. teaching - may lead directly to productive 
labour - e.g. the construction of a new machine. Cf. Blaug, op.cit. 
p.55; and McCulloch, "Political Economy", Supplement to the Encylopaedia 
Britannica, 1824, pp.274-5.
(2 ) WN.I.vlii.ll.
(3) WN.I. vill.12
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raise the wages of labour a have their actual rate"
However, although the employer is in a position of advantage,
Smith argues, there is a "certain rate below which it seems impossible
to reduce, for any considerable time, the ordinary wages of even the
2lowest species of labour". The wages of labour must be at least
sufficient to maintain the labourer - and if necessary to enable him to
raise a family, in order to ensure a constant supply of labour. This is,
the "lowest rate which is consistent with common humanity” . 1 23 4 Underlying
the notion of a wage rate determined by a process of bargaining, therefore,
is the conception of a subsistence wage rate which forms the minimum
acceptable rate of remuneration for labour, with this minimum, as previously
observed, regulated according to both biological/physiologlcal and 
4cultural criteria. This notion of a subsistence theory of wages is
normally understood, therefore, as a long-term theory of constant costs. 5
(1) WN.I. viii.13.
(2) . WN.I.viii. 14.
(3) WN.I. viii.28. In Britain wages are above this minimum. This is 
evidenced by (1 ) distinction between summer and winter wages - summer 
wages are highest which is significant since expenditure (on fuel etc.) 
is greater in winter. (2) The fact that wages do not fluctuate with 
price of provisions. (3) The fact that wages of labour may vary 
greatly from place, whilst price of provisions is fairly uniform 
throughout the country. (4) "The variations with the price of labour 
not only do not correspond either in place or time with those in the 
price of provisions but they are frequently quite opposite". (See
WN.I.viii.28-35). It should be noted that whilst Smith makes no strict 
(and inevitable) correlation between the price of provisions and the wage 
rate, he does point out that the money price of labour is regulated 
by two circumstances - the demand for labour and the price of goods since 
the money price of labour is determined by the amount necessary to 
purchase whatever quantity of goods constitute the minimum wage payment 
for labour at a particular state of time. (See I.vlil,53ff).
(4) Cf., WN.V.ii .k.3, 15> see above section 2 (ill), pp, 92-100.
(5) Blaug, op.clt., p.45. See also WN.I, viii.39. "Every species of animals 
naturally multiplies in proportion to the means of their subsistence, and 
no species can ever multiply beyond it".Clearly, this is suggestive of 
Malthus' later thesis.
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There are, however, certain circumstances, Smith argues, in which 
the remuneration of the labouring classes will be in excess of this 
minimum rate. When the stock and revenue destined for the payment of 
labour are increasing. For example, the demand for labour will also 
increase. Thus wages depend upon the rate of change in the demand for 
labour, which is in itself contingent upon the rate of capital accumulation. 1
"It is not the greatness of national wealth, but Its continual increase,
2which occasions a rise in the wages of labour".
The wages of labour, and standard of living of the labouring class
are, therefore, affected by the rate of capital accumulation. Where
capital accumulation outstrips population size, 1 23 4 wages tend to be high,
since the demand for labour exceeds its supply - this is the progressive
state. Under such conditions "the scarcity of hands occasions a competition
4among masters who bid against one another, in order to get workmen", 
thus breaking their tacit combination.
Where capital accumulation is stationary, wages will not tend to be 
very high, though the demand for labour remains fairly constant, the slight 
tendency in its supply to increase means that wages are reduced, by
competition amongst the labouring classes to the "lowest rate which is
" 5consistent with common humanity. This is the stationary state.
(1 ) Dobb, op.cit.,p.51.
(2) WN.I. vlii.22.
(3) Presumably labouring population.
(4) WN.I. vili.17,
(5) WN.I. viii.24
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Where the demand for labour is actually diminishing, "want, famine, 
and mortality would Immediately prevail .,, till the number of 
Inhabitants in the country was reduced to what could easily be 
maintained by the revenue and stock" remaining in it, 1
As we mentioned earlier, "the liberal reward of labour" is both
the "necessary effect ... (and) the natural symptom of increasing
2national wealth", something to be encouraged not eschewed. Scanty 
provision is Indicative of stagnation, and starvation emblematic of 
degeneration. Hence;
"It deserves to be remarked" Smith proclaims,
"that it is in the progressive state, while the 
society is advancing to the further acquisition, 
rather than when it has acquired its full complement 
or riches, that the condition of the labouring poor, 
of the great body of the people, seems to be the 
happiest and the most comfortable. It is hard in 
the stationary, and misera lie in the declining state.
The progressive state is in reality the cheerful and the 
hearty state to all the different orders of the society.
The stationary is dull; the declining, melancholy." 3
The liberal reward of labour is to be promoted for a number of 
reasons; it encourages assiduity and industry, as it "increases the 
bodily strength of the labourer”, and his hope of bettering his condition;
4he has, as it were, an increased incentive to be productive. Piece-work 1234
(1) WN.I.viii.26.
(2) WN.I. viil 27. See above section I, pp. 78-83.
(3) WN,I.viii.43.
(4) WN.I. viii.44. Smith also notes that; "Where wages are high, 
accordingly, we shall always find the workmen more active, diligent, 
and expeditious, than where they are low."
122
however, is to be discouraged since it has the adverse effect of 
prompting men to over-work, and thus to deunage their health.^ The 
question of productivity raises an interesting problem for Smith's 
treatment of wages, since he declares that the greatest incentive to 
industry arises from the enjoyment of the full fruits of one's labour. 
Thus a "poor Independent workman will generally be more Industrious
than even a journey-man who works by the piece. The one enjoys the whole
2produce of his own industry» the other shares it with his master".
And, indeed, Smith notes that the independence of artisans is greatly 
preferable to the position of hired servants who are paid a flat rate 
irrespective of performance. 3 ,
It appears, therefore, that whilst the “ deductions" of rent and 
profit are "legitimate"» the greatest incentive to human productivity 
is the full enjoyment of the fruits of one's labour, a point that seems 
in part, at least, to conflict with Smith's prior comments about the 
division of labour.
Smith's greatest contribution to wage theory, however, consists in
4his treatment of relative wages. Since this is simply of indirect 
importance to this thesis, I propose only to consider his treatment in 
brief. 1234
(1) Cf. WN.I. vili,44.
(2) WN.I.vili.48.
(3) WN.I.vili.48.
(4) The so-called doctrine of "net advantages" derived from Cantillon.
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Smith is concerned to demonstrate that there is a natural equality 
between different forms of employment. The notion of equality is used in 
two senses: initially in terms of the equilibration of returns, so that 
an occupation which appeared to offer disproportionately advantageous 
rates of remuneration would attract a great number of candidates usually 
with the result that the rate of return would be reduced to that of an 
equality with other fields» 1  and, secondly, in the sense of the doctrine 
of "net advantages". With regard to this latter notion Smith observes 
that although the level of monetary return varies between different
occupations, the "net advantages" of those different occupations, both
2real and imaginary,is, in fact, equal.
I
There are five factors which may be isolated as the source of the 
differential monetary remuneration of varying employment, and which 
require accommodation in the wage scale, if the doctrine of "net advantages 
is to prevail, and these are! the "aggreeableness or disagreeableness" 
of the jobs themselvesi the "easiness and cheapness", or "difficulty 
and expense" 6f training; the "constancy or inconstancy" of employment 
in them; the degree of trust reposed in their executors, and finally, 
the chances of succeeding in the chosen field. 1 23
(1) Smith assumes that "perfect liberty" is operating, and that every 
man is able to choose his own employ.
(2) Cf., WN.I. x.b.39.
(3) WN.I. x.b.l.
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Each of these differential characteristics is analysed separately 
by Smith. The major assumption underlying his argument is that the 
greater the disutility involved in any occupation, the greater the 
remuneration. Higher wages compensate great disutility. Thus, the more 
dirty or disagreeable & job, the higher the remuneration - both to labour, 
and capital. 1  Similarly the greater the investment requisite to learn a 
skill or business, the greater the ultimate remuneration. Likewise, the 
hazards of seasonable employment also affect wage differentials. If constant 
employment cannot be guaranteed, men can usually command a higher rate of
remuneration than normal in order to compensate for their periods of
3unemployment.
I
In addition to this, the level of trust incumbent in a particular
occupation affects the relative wage structure. The argument employed
in support of this case is less obviously derived from considerations of
disutility. Indeed, it seems to be founded on a consideration from
security, as in the example of the jeweller, where additional remuneration
4forms a kind of insurance policy against theft. Smith also assumes a 
necessary link between responsibility, status and remuneration. In this 
way the reward of those in positions of trust "must be such ... as may 
give them that rank in the society which so important a trust requires. 5
(1 ) wN.i.x.b.:!-4.
(2 ) WN.I. x.b.,6 .
(3) See WN.I. x.b. 11-15
(4) Blaug, op,,cit. ,P.47
(5) WN.I. x b.,19.
His final source of wage-differential concerns the uncertainty 
of success in particular fields of employ. Where chance of success is 
low - perhaps from reasons of over-subscription - the remuneration 
received by the successful ought to cover "all that should have been 
gained by the unsuccessful" . 1  in actuality, however, it does not.
The purpose behind this discussion of the relative wage structure 
relates back to Smith's concern with the establishment of a measure of 
value, and his concern with estimating changes in levels of welfare over 
time. The construction of such a measure required that labour could be 
reduced to a common wage unit, and a wage scale be set. Smith's doctrine 
of "net advantage" is part of that attempt to establish such a common 
unit.
Having reviewed the multiplicity of ideas inherent in Smith's 
explanation of the determination of the wage-rate, it is time to consider 
his conception of profit, and to explore the issue of whether profit 
represented a deduction from or addition to the value of the commodity 
produced by labour.
(ii) Profit: Deduction or Addition?
2According to Mark Blaug in Economic Theory in Retrospect , Smith 
had "no theory of profit or pure Interest at all". Although this may
( 1)
( 2)
WN.I. x.b.22. C£., WN.I. x b.22-26
Blaug, op.clt.,p.39.
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Indeed be true, Smith's pronouncements, on the nature and source of 
profit particularly, provided the basis upon which many of the classical 
economists built.
In this section we will endeavour to elucidate three aspects of 
Smith's theory of profit: The nature of the profit reward, the source 
of that profit and reason for its existence, and the determination of its 
level,^
From the outset Smith distinguishes profits from the ’rages of
2management, a distinction adhered to by many of his successors.
"The profits of stock", he asserts, might be regarded as "a different
name for the wages of a particular sort of labour, the labour of inspection
and direction. They are, however, altogether different." 1 23 4 Rather profit
4represents a return on capital. It comprises interest plus a risk premium.
Thus, the capitalist only lends or advances his stock on the 
expectation of receiving "something more than was sufficient to replace 
his stock to him" . 5 Mot only will he not lend his stock "for less than 
the use of it is worth", but the debtor must also "pay him for the risk 
which he runs by accepting the full value of that use" . 6
(1) Categories used by O'Brien in his hook The Classical Economists, 
(Oxford, Clarendon Pres3 , 1975), p.119.
(2) Cf, McCulloch, for example; see Chapter 4, Section 3(ii)pp,285-288.
(3) WN.I.vi.6 .
(4) E,.g. WN.I.vi.6 . "They are regulated altogether by the value of the 
stock employed, and are greater or smaller in proportion to the extent 
of this stock,"
(5) WN.I.vl.5.
(6) WN.II.iv.14
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Smith's consideration of the nature of profit extends no further 
than this. His examination of the manner in which profit originates 
is, however, of more note. The interesting question in this area pertains 
to whether or not Smith regarded profit as a deduction from the product 
of labour, or an additional contribution to the value of that product.
Until stock accumulates "in the hands of particular persons", 
profit is not paid and the labourer continues to receive the entire fruits 
of his exertions.^- However, once capital has become the private property 
of a distinct class of capitalists, profit, initially represented as a
"deduction" from the product of labour, comes to be paid, apparently as a
2consequence of that appropriation.
The function of the owners of capital in Smith's advanced society, 
is to set to work industrious people, "whom they will supply with materials 
and subsistence" , 1 23 4 for "it seldom happens that the person who tills the 
ground has wherewithal to maintain himself till he reaps the harvest. His 
maintenance is generally advanced to him from the stock of a master"/
The necessity for the advance of such stock is not only confined to 
agriculture, however, but pervades "all arts and manufactures". Here, "the 
9reater part of the workmen stand in need of a master to advance them 
the materials of their work, and their wages and maintenance till it be 
completed" . 5 The worker depends, therefore, upon the pre-existence of a
(1) Cf. WN.I. Vi.5-7, WN.I.vlii.2,7-8.
(2) Smith did believe that independent artisans could exist - owning both ■ 
capital and labour - but he was interested in the workings of an economy 
where division of function is the norm.Eg. WN. i.viii.9 .
(3) WN.I.vl.5.
(4) WN.I.vili.7.
(5) WN.I.viii.8
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wage-fund. "Tn this state of things, the whole produce of labour 
does not always belong to the labourer. He must In most cases share it 
with the owner of the stock which employs him."^
Clearly, the fact that capital is owned by a class distinct from 
the labourers explains the origin of payment for its use, but it does
not, ipso facto, explain what motivates the capitalist to furnish such
2funds and materials.
Motivation for such provision undoubtedly lies in the capitalists
desire "to make a profit by the sale of their /the labourers^ work, or
by what their labour adds to the value of the materials" . 3 Thus, the only
incentive the capitalist has to employ a workman derives from the former's
expectation that he will receive "something more than what may be sufficient
4to replace his stock to him".
John Ramsay McCulloch, in the 1825 edition of the Principles of 
Political Economy makes a similar point, when noting that wage goods will 
never command the same quantity of labour required to produce them*
It will always exchange for more) and it is this 
excess that constitutes profits. No capitalist 
could have any motive to exchange the produce of a 
given quantity of labour already performed for the 
produce of the same quantity of labour to be performed. 
This would be to lend without receiving Interest on 
the loan. 5 12345
(1) WN.I.vi.7.
(2) Cf. Douglas, art.clt..p.132.
(3) WN.I.vi.5.
(4) WN.I.vi.5.
(5) . McCulloch, PPE. 1825, pp.119-20. Cf. Blaug, Mark, Ricardian
Economics, A Historical Study (New Haven and London, Yale UP, 1958), 
p.48.
The implications of both Smith's and McCulloch's assertions 
are of interest. The fact that the capitalist, because of his ownership 
of, and control over, capital is entitled to a share of the product of 
labour, allied with the notion that, in the early stages of society, the 
labourer did actually receive the entire produce of his labour, may 
indicate that profit derives from exploitation. In other words, it is 
the fact that the labourer, when dispossessed of capital (and land) 
is disabled from 'waiting', or maintaining himself throughout the 
productive process, that enables the capitalist to extract a profit,
(and the landlord his rent).^
However, although such am interpretation implies that Smith and ’
McCulloch, who also identifies the "earliest stages of society" as those
2in which "all the produce of labour" belongs to the labourer", are aware 
of the exploitative basis of profit, it is clear from a further consideration 
of their writings that both authors deliberately avoid this conclusion.
In fact even Smith's choice of the word "deduction" to represent profit 
cannot be viewed in an anti-capitalist light.
Implicit in those "exploitation" theories of profit developed by the 
so-called 'Ricardian Socialists' in the nineteenth century is the idea 
that capital-based income is illegitimate - and exploitative - because 12
(1) Blaug, op.clt.. (1958), pp.48-49.
(2) McCulloch, J.R., "Political Economy", in the Supplement to the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica, 6th ed., 1825, p.263.
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based on a violation of the natural law of appropriation which regards 
the expenditure of labour alone as a sufficient title to property» 
and since the productivity of capital derives exclusively from the 
application of labour, profit constitutes an illicit deduction from the 
rightful product of labour. 1
For Adam Smith, however, the question of capital productivity was
2answered differently. Capital is conceived of as a stock of products,
comprising both circulating capital, or the wage-goods necessary to support
the labourer throughout thetime-consumina process of production» and fixed
capital, or the machinery, buildings and so en, capable of increasing labour
productivity directly, through its capacity to "facilitate and abridge .labour" 1
and "to increase the productive powers of labour", so as "to enable the
4same number of labourers to perform a much greater quantity of work".
Taken in conjunction with the claim that capital supports the division 
of labour, thereby increasing labour productivity^ — "the quantity of 
industry, therefore, not only increases in every country with the increase 
of the stock which employs it", but also as a consequence, "the same 
quantity of industry produces a much greater quantity of work" 1 23456 -
(1) See below chapters 6 and 7, for a more detailed discussion of this 
topic.
(2) Cf.,e.g.WN.II. lntrod.2.
(3) WN.II. 14,16.
(4) . VJN.II.il.7.
(5) Cf. WN.II. Introd.3-4.
( 6) WN.II. Introd. 4
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it is clear that Smith envisaged capital as cooperating with labour 
in production in a very positive, and productive sense.
The question is, if capital in collaboration with labour in production 
allows for a greater product to be generated, why is it that Smith conceives 
of profit — the return on capital - as a "deduction* from the produce of 
labour?
The answer is simply that Smith is not making a statement about capital 
productivity at this point, but rather a statement about the ownership 
of that factor . 1 Profit represents a "deduction" by virtue of the fact 
that, if the labourer owned both capital and labour then he would reap
the whole (enhanced) value of the product, but as he does not, his reward
2is subject to the deduction of the return on capital. Although Smith pays 
scant attention to the manner in which capitalists acquire capital in the 
Wealth, he accepts that such productive property belongs only to a few, and 
that this ownership, as such, both enables and entitles them to make a charge 
for its use. ^
Such a charge would presumably be justified by Smith on two counts: firstly,
because he conceives security of property as integral to the continued 
4existence of society, and secondly because the right of property outlined in 1234
(1) Cf. Hollander, op.clt..p.151.
(2) Hodgskin dispels the myth that capital is productive by demonstrating 
that all its putative benefits may in fact be ascribed to co-existing 
labour, see his Labour Defended Against the Claims of Capital, 
(London, 1825), Cf., Chapter 7, pp.444-451.
(3) Cf_., Douglas, art.clt., p.134. This also applies to land as we shall 
see shortly, see Section 3 (iii) , pp.1 3 4 -1 3 9 .
(4) See above, Chapter 1, section l,pp.12-17.
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the Lectures, Includes the proposition that the owner of an object can 
"use it himself as he thinks fit", 1 which implies both the right to exclude 
others from its use, and the right to utilise that property in the derivation 
of income.
In addition to this, Smith would no doubt countenance the derivation of 
income from property, on the same grounds as he countenanced the Inequality 
of property distribution consequent upon the establishment of the division of 
labour: namely, that the labourer, although no longer rewarded with the entire 
fruits of his labour, is nevertheless better off than he would be in a 
situation in which he received the entire fruits of his industry,but was 
compelled to produce all that he required. Smith's consideration of the 
origin of rent follows a similar pattern. Moving on from the question of the 
origin of profit, Smith next addresses the issue of the determination of its 
rate.
In Chapter VII,"of the natural and market price of commodities”, Smith 
indicated that the natural rate of profit (like that of wages) was regulated 
"partly by the general circumstances of society, their riches or poverty,
their advancing, stationary or declining condition, and partly by the
2particular nature of each employment". However, although wages and profits 
are both dependent upon such factors, they are diversely affected by them. 
Thus, "the increase of stock, which raises wages, tends to lower profits", 
for the simple reason that "when the stocks of many rich merchants are turned 
into the same trade, their mutual competition naturally tends to lower its 
profit".^ When stock has increased similarly in all branches of trade within 123
(1) LJ (A) .1.17.
(2) WN.I.vlil.l.
(3) WN.I.ix.2.
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society, "the same competition must produce the same effect in them 
all",^ and profit will decline.
The reason for this decline is not divulged until Book II, when 
Smith notes thats
As capitals increase in any country, the profits 
which can be made by employing them necessarily 
diminish. It becomes gradually more and more 
difficult to find within the country a profitable 
method of employing any new capital. There arises 
in consequence a competition between different capitals, 
the owner of one endeavouring to get possession of 
that employment which is occupied by Mother. 2
In other words, as society progresses, the augmenting difficulty of 
finding profitable, and productive investment channels for capital leads 
to a fall in the profit rate. Although this fall in profit suggests a 
decline in trade, it is, in fact, "the natural effect of its prosperity, or 
of a greater stock being employed than before”. 3
In order to calculate the prevailing rate of profit all that is necessary, 
Smith contends, is to consult the market rate of interest at any time, since the
4trends of each are comparable. Following his own advice, he observes, 
from a review of the Interest rate since the time of Henry VIII, that “the 
wealth and revenue of the country have been continually advancing”, whilst,
M.in the greater part of the different branches of trade and manufactures 1234
(1) WN.I.ix.2. Cf_also I.x.c.26> and, II.iv.8 .
(2) WN.II.iv.8 .
(3) WN.I.ix.lO. Cf_. ,also WN. I.ix. 14.
(4) WN.I.ix.4. Cf., also WN.II.lv.1-17.
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the profits of stock have been diminishing" . 1  Thus, whilst the level of
economic development has been increasing - including the wage rate - the
2rate of interest has actually declined. An increasing wage and profit 
rate tend only to be found together in those new colonies understocked 
in proportion to the extent of their territory» and underpopulated relative 
to the extent of that stock, compared with other countries.'*
In an advancing state, wages tend, on the whole, to increase with the 
increase of stock, though profit may not be increasing; whereas, a diminution 
in the capital stock of a society tends to lower wages and to simultaneously 
increase profit, and thence interest. The rate of profit is determined, 
therefore, according to the availability of capital investment.
The final aspect of Smith's theory of distribution which we must 
examine is his concept of rent, to which we now turn.
(iii) Rent! Price - determined or price - determining?
A comparison of the views expounded by Smith on the subject of rent 
in chapters VI and VIII, and chapter XI,respectively, leads one to the 
inevitable conclusion that his treatment is far from consistent. In 
chapters VI and VIII, where he is concerned with the issue of price, or 
value in exchange, rent is regarded as price-determining, whereas in 
chapter XI, where he formally analyses rent as a distributive share, it 123
(1 ) WN.I.ix.6 .
(2) Blaug, Economic Theory, p.46.This, he argues, was "a familiar piece
of casual empiricism, 18th-century style". Cf., O'Brien, op.clt.,p,121.
(3) WN.I.ix.ll
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Is conceived to be price-determined.
with regard to this thesis, it is Smith's analysis of rent as an 
element of cost that is the most implicative for the ideas about property 
current at the time, and also for the development of socialist thought.
As soon as the land of any country has all 
become private property, the landlords, like 
all other men, love to reap where they never 
sowed, and demand a rent even for its natural 
produce. 1
2Rent comprises, therefore, the first 'deduction' from the produce of labour.
When land was held in common, the only cost the labourer had to 'pay' 
was the amount of labour requisite to acquire whichever of the "natural
I
fruits of the earth" he so desired. However, once land was individuated, 
this initial labour cost was enhanced by the addition of rent. The 
labourer must "pay for the licence" to gather even the natural fruits of 
the earth and "must give up to the landlord a portion of what his labour 
either collects or produces" . 3 Rent emerges, therefore, because land is 
privately held, and because the labourer must, in consequence, pay to use 
it. It becomes, as such, a necessary cost in the production of all those 
commodities derived from the land. It is, as it were price-determining.
The extent of this payment for the use of land is determined by the 
"highest (price) which the tenant can afford to pay in the actual circumstances
4
of the land". if someone can pay more for its use them the current tenant, 1234
(1) WN.I.vi.8 .
(2) WN.I. vlii.6 . The landlord'srent "makes the first deduction from the 
produce of the labour which is employed upon land". See Chapter 7,
Section 2 (i),pp.432-444.
(3) WN.I.vi.8 .
(4) WN.I.xi.a.l. Cf.,WN.I.xl.a.5.
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the land would, In all likelihood be turned over to them. Rent is, 
therefore, in Smith's term a "monopoly" price.
In his discussion of natural and market price Smith had averred 
that if rent falls below its natural rate - the rate regulated both 
by the level of economic development of a nation, and the differential 
fertility and locational attributes of that land 1- then "the interest
of the landlords will immediately prompt them to withdraw a part of their
2land". similarly if rent is above this natural rate, "the interests of 
all other landlords will naturally prompt them to prepare more land for 
the raising of this commodity".^ Obviously this indicates that land has 
alternative uses. The price the farmer must pay for the use of that land 
will be a competitive price. The price of each commodity is determined by 
the costs peculiar to its production, at whatever level they are set by the 
market. Any examination of value in exchange will automatically focus upon 
the relative costs of producing particular commodities, and will not be 
concerned with the aggregate product of industry. Distribution, however, 
focuses on the manner in which the annual produce of industry is divided 123
(1) WN.I.vii.2. Smith was of the conviction that rent varied with both 
differences in fertility and situation, with the land nearer a town, 
for example, always yielding a higher rent than equally fertile land 
at a greater distance, and he made the surplus generated as rent a 
function of these differences. (Cf.,WN.I.xi.b.4). This has obvious 
implications for the theory of rent developed by Ricardo et.al.,Cf. 
Blaug, op.cit.,p.49, and Hollander, op.clt.,pp.65-166. See below, 
chapter 4, section l(ii),pp.223-238 a section l(iii), pp.240-245.
(2) WN.I. vii.13.
(3) WN.I .vii.14.
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between rent, wages, and profit. 1 Rent as an element of cost Is 
distinct, therefore, from rent as the income of a particular class.
In the light of this distinction, D.H.Ruchanan has argued that the
inconsistency in Smithian rent theory derives from this tension between
2rent as a cost of production, and rent as a distributive share.
As a cost of production, as we have already seen, the amount of 
rent paid is regulated according to the competition for the use of land. 
If the rental payment could not be paid, the product would simply not be 
produced. However, as a form of class income rent is determined by the 
sale of the aggregate produce of land. Rent is, therefore, either paid 
or not paid according to this sale. 1 23 4
In the chapter on Rent, Smith declares that "High or Low wages and 
profit, are the causes of high or low price; high or low rent the effect
4of it". Rent is represented here as a price-determined surplus (or 
residuum) above the shares accruing to wages and profit.
Such parts only of the produce of land can 
commonly be brought to market of which the 
ordinary price is sufficient to replace the stock 
which must be employed in bringing them thither, 
together with its ordinary profits. If the ordinary 
price is more than this, the surplus part of it will 
naturally go to the rent of the land. If it is not 
more, though the commodity may be brought to market, 
it can afford no rent to the landlord. 5
(1) Cf., Buchanan, D.H.,"The Historical Approach to Rent and Price Theory", 
Economica, 1929, pp.123-155. See esp.pp.126-134. This article was 
particularly influential in the drafting of this section.
(2) Buchanan, art.clt.,p.129.
(3) Ibid.,pp.129-30.
(4) WN.I.xi.a.8 .
(5) WN.I.xi.a. 6
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It will either 
1
In the above quotation, Smith alleges that if capital and labour 
costs, plus profit,comprise the whole produce of land, then rent 
will not be paid. This clearly contradicts his earlier statement 
concerning the substitutability of land, for the Implication here is 
that land cannot be transferred to an alternative use. 
remain in production as it is, or be returned to nature."
It is possible to explain this apparent contradiction, Buchanan notes, 
by remembering that distribution is concerned with the division of the 
annual product of the nation» and thus rent, as a share, will be determined
by the division of the annual produce of agriculture, or with "raw produce”
2in a generic sense. Thus land is substitutable between different species 
of raw produce - for instance, c o m  and barley - but is specialised in 
terms of raw produce as a whole.
That Smith understood this distinction is indicated by his contention 
near the end of Chapter VI, that:
As the price or exchangeable value of every particular 
commodity, taken separately, resolves itself into some 
one or other or all of those three parts» so that of 
all the commodities which compose the whole annual 
produce of the labour of every country, taken complexly, 
must resolve itself into the same three parts, and be 
parcelled out among different inhabitants of the country, 
either as the wages of their labour, the profits of their 
stock, or the rent of their land. 3 123
(1) Cf., Buchanan, art.cit.,p.l3Q.
(2) Ibid., p. 131.
(3) WN.I.vi.17. (My emphasis). Cf., Buchanan, art.cit.,p,128> Hollander, 
op.clt. ,p. 167.
/
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However, that he did not always adhere to this distinction1  
reinforces the claim of Smith's inconsistency in his discussion of 
rent; and exolains, in part, his vacillation between a conception of 
rent as price-determined, and a conceotion of rent as price-determininq. 
In Chapter 4, section 1, we can see that this conundrum was resolved in 
the West-Malthus-Ricardo exolanation o* rent, a9 a price-determined, 
differentially-regulated surplus.
(1) E.q., WN.I. xi.a.8 .
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Conclusion
In this chapter we have been concerned principally with two closely 
related aspects of Smithian thouoht: value and distribution. Value, for .Smith, 
as we have demonstrated, required explication in a number of ways. Value 
in exchange had first to be contradistinguished from value in use, a process 
which led Smith to a highly restricted definition of utility as the capacity 
of goods to support human life. This definition enabled Smith to deny that 
utility was a necessary precondition of value in exchange, and served also 
to indicate the fundamentality of his concern with welfare in the Wealth.^
Secondly, the problem of value measurement had to be differentiated 
from the problem of value determination. Smith begins, therefore, with 
an examination of the conditions requisite to a measure of value. Here he 
is concerned with the question of measuring changes in intertemporal and 
interlocal welfare levels. This leads him to the enunciation of the labour 
command hypothesis. Some historians of economic thought have, on occasion, 
construed this thesis as an unsuccessful attempt at the formulation of a 
theory of exchangeable value. It has, we hope, been demonstrated in 
section 2 (ill), that this interpretation is, in fact, erroneous.
From this Smith moves on to an examination of the conditions necessary 
to the determination of value, offering two temporally specific explanations: 
a simple labour cost account operative in a society characterized by the 
absence of capital, and the free availability of land; and a cost-of- 
production, or adding-up thesis, explicative of value determination in 
economies in which land, labour, and capital all comprise scarce resources 
capable of commanding a price. 1
(1) See above, section 1, pp. 78-fll.
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These three aspects of Smith's theorv of value - the labour command, 
the labour cost, and the cost-of-oroductlon hypothesis - are important to 
this dissertation In a number of ways.
In chapter 3, we aim to show the Ricardian theory of value evolved 
out of an attempt to Illuminate the inconsistencies and ambiguities within 
Smithian value theory; that the Ricardian labour cost theory was formulated 
largely as a refutation of a number of putative propositions within Smithian 
value theory; and that In the area of value measurement, Smithian theory gave 
rise, somewhat accidentally, to two traditions of thought - the labour cost and 
the labour command theories of value, the former developed principally by 
Ricardo, and the latter by Malthus. 1
Following on from this,in chapter 7, we also propose to demonstrate 
that it was Smith's conception of the historical specificity of the labour 
cost model, in combination with his surmise that this model was legitimately 
supplanted. In the advancement of society, as the mode of determining value, 
by the adding-up thesis, that suggested to the anti-Ricardlans the foundations 
of their theories of exploitation. For, where Smith regarded the supervention 
of the labour cost model bv the cost of production model as legitimate, breaking 
as it did both the coincidence between labour expenditure and appropriation, and 
labour expenditure and value creation.
Just as his theory of value was influential in the evolution of both 
classical and dissenting conceptions of value, so too was Smith's treatment of 
distribution significant, providing as it did, the classical and dissenting 
writers with ample material for both criticism and development. 1
(1) Althouijh reference will be made to Malthus' labour command thesis, we 
do not intend to examine that thesis in any great depth, since our 
primary interest is in the labour theory of value determination, not 
value measurement. See below, chapter 3.
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It has been observed in this chapter that Smith's theory of wages 
was, In fact, not a theory at all, lacking both system and coherence.
Rather, Smith approached the question of the determination of the wage 
rate from five different angles: those of subsistence, the wage-fund, 
productivity, bargaining, and the residual-claimant notion, angles which 
cannot coherently co-exist within the framework of one theorv.
In chapter 4,we propose to establish that of these five options, 
classical economic analysis concentrated on only two. adopted,
and developed, the subsistence account of wage determination as the 
basis of its explanation of the natural wage rate; and the wage-fund 
theory as the basis of its exnlanation of the market wage rate. 1
In addition to Smith's explication of wages lacking a systematic or 
consistent theoretical framework, it was alleged, in this chapter, that 
the same criticism applied to his treatment of profit.
Profit, as we have seen, was a species of income distinguishable from 
the wages of management, representing a return on capital (deriving from 
ownership of that factor) comprising interest plus a risk premium. How 
that factorial return originated, and the explanation of the reasons for 
its payment,led Smith to view profit simultaneously as a ndeduction" from 
the produce of labour, and an "addition" to the value of the product.
It has been established that this dichotomy is, in fact, more apparent 
than real. In talking of profit as deduction, Smith is concerned with the 
question of ownership - if the labourer owned both capital and labour, he t 
would receive both profit and wages. In talking of profit as an 'addition*
(1) See below, chapter 4, section 2, pp.254-282.
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he is discussing the contribution of canltal in productivity terms - both 
fixed and circulating capital were regarded, by Smith, as caDable of 
enhancing productivity: fixed capital, by assisting labour directly» 
circulating capital by enabling the labourer to subsist throughout 
elongated production processes. The two comments are, therefore, 
compatible.
Smith's final point on profit concerned the means of determining 
its rate, which was regarded by him, as evidenced earlier, as directly 
related to availability of channels for capital investment. The fact 
that in societal advancement, the opportunity for such investment declines, 
leads Smith to the conclusion that the profit rate will also tend to fall.
Smith's theory of profit is basic to a number of themes developed 
in later chapters. In chanter 3, we aim to show that the role of capital, 
and the question of capital productivity - the profit as 'addition' 
theme - has interesting and potentially subversive implications for the labour 
theory of value, particularly for the attempts of John Ramsay McCulloch and 
James Mill to reduce profit to labour quantity.
In chapter 4, we propose to demonstrate, firstly, that the definition 
of the nature of the profit reward is largely that employed by all the 
later classical economists, most patently by McCulloch - the most 'Smithian' 
of those authors» and secondly, that although the Ricardians and Smith 
both conclude that there is a tendency for the rate of profit to fall as 
society progresses, that the reasons marshalled in support of that claim 
are, in actuality, very different.
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Finally, in chapter 7, it will become clear that Smith's conception 
of profit - and later rent - as 'deductions' is central to an understanding 
of the process by which the antl-Ricardians perceived the labourer to be 
deprived of the entire fruits of his labour.
The last area of Smithian distribution theory we examined was the 
author's explanation of the nature and origin of rent. Once again. Smith's 
treatment was ambiguous, for he viewed rent as both price-determining and 
price-determined. It was price-determining when regarded as a necessary 
payment in production; and price-determined, when viewed as a surplus 
devolving on the landlord after the shares to wages and profit had been 
paid. We observed, following Buchanan's suggestive lead, that this 
ambiguity may be explained in terms of the connotation accorded factorial 
substitutability in two contexts, When discussing rent as price-determining 
the choice is between different species of raw produce. When discussing 
rent as price-determined it is between the production, or non-production 
of raw produce in toto. However, difficulties do remain.
In terms of the genesis of rent theory, Smith's contribution is 
perhaps limited. Rent theory,as espoused by the classical economists, relied, 
as we shall notice in chapter 4, upon the notion of differential fertility, 
with rent as a price-determined surplus. Although Smith did acknowledge 
the impact of differences in location and fertility upon rental 
payment, making such payment, in part, a function of these differences, 
the idea is under-developed, and was probably of onlv minimal influence.
«
Smith's influence is more obvious in the development, already referred to, 
of anti-Ricardian analyses of non-labour claims to wealth, representing.
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the "deductions" theme underlying Smith's review of the origins of 
rent, as will be evidenced in chaoter 7.
Having outlined the links between Smith and his successors, it 
is now appropriate to turn to the problems of value theory as espoused 
by Ricardo, Mill and McCulloch.
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Chapter 3: The Classical Economists and the Labour Theory of Value
Adam Smith who so accurately defined the original source 
of exchangeable value and who was bound In consistency to 
maintain that all things become more or less valuable In 
proportion as more or less labour was bestowed on their 
production, has himself erected another standard of value ... 
the quantity of labour which it ¿a. g o o c a n  command in the 
market. 1
This (mistaken) contention, that Adam Smith had confounded two 
separate, and contradictory, principles of value regulation in his explanation 
of the determination of value in exchange, forms, as we shall demonstrate in 
this chapter, the theoretical starting-point for Ricardo's enunciation of a 
labour-cost explanation of value determination. Ricardo derives, albeit 
dialectially, his inspiration from a particular rendition of the Wealth of 
Nations. Whilst our primary focus in this chapter is with 
labour theories of value determination, it is important to recognise that
Smith's book also provided the theoretical base for Malthus' exposition
2of a labour command theory of absolute value, and,indeed, for Robert Torrens' 
elucidation of a capital theory of value regulation in a capitalist economy 12
(1) Ricardo, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, (London, 1821), 
Sraffa, Piero (ed.); The works and Correspondence of David Ricardo, 
(Cambridge, CUP, 1962), vol.I, pp.13-14.
(2) C£, Malthus, Thomas Robert, Principles of Political Economy Considered
with a view to their Practical Application, (London, Murray, 1820);
The Measure of Value Stated and Illustrated, (London, Murray, 1823); 
"Political Economy", Quarterly Review, XXX, (1824), pp.297-334; "On 
the Measure of the Conditions Necessary to the Supply of Commodities'*, 
Paper read at the Royal Society of Literature, May 4, 1825; Definitions 
of Political Economy, (London,, 1827); and "On the Meaning which is most 
usually and most correctly attached to the term 'Value of a Commodity'", 
Paper read at the Royal Society of Literature, Nov.7, 1827.
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after the individuation of land. 1 Although these theories are of 
Intrinsic Interest themselves, since they do not concern our examination 
of the links between labour, value, distribution and, where apposite, 
entitlement, we do not propose to consider them in anv depth.
As just mentioned, our primary focus In this chapter is the 
variety of labour cost explanations of value espoused by the classical 
economists, In this particular instance, Ricardo, McCulloch, and James Mill.
Chapter 3 will’begin, therefore, with a discussion of the relationship
2between labour expenditure, entitlement and value imputation, centering 
on the question of why the classical economists concentrated primarily 
upon the first and last factors in this relationship, and largely lqnored 
the second.
In section 2, we will proceed to an analysis of David Ricardo's 
labour theory of value, starting with an appraisal of the embryonic thesis 
posited in the Essay on Profits, before moving on to consider his 
treatment of value in the Principles of Political Economy and Taxation.
In the final part of this section, we will review the issue of value 
measurement in Ricardo's scheme. 12
(1) Cf., Torrens, Col. Robert, "Strictures on Mr.Ricardo's Doctrine 
Respecting Exchangeable Value" ¿signed "R'^ 7, Edinburgh Magazine,
Oct.1818, pp.335-8» and An Essav on the Production of Wealth, 
(London, Longmans, 1871).
(2) Ricardo, David, Essav on the Influence of a Low Price of C o m  on the 
Profits of Stock, (London, 1815).
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In section 3, we propose to examine the works of John Ramsay 
McCulloch, considering two particular questions. Firstly, the extent 
to which McCulloch could be denominated a "Ricardian" in his analysis of 
value; and, secondly, the implications of McCulloch's understanding of profit 
formation for his conception of labour and for our comprehension of classical 
economic ideas about property and entitlement.
The final section of this chapter will be devoted to an elucidation of 
James Mill's interpretation of the labour theory of value. As with McCulloch, 
our discussion will concentrate upon two areas of especial import: the 
extent to which Mill may be seen as a mere reiterator of Ricardian orthodoxy; 
and the problem of the relationship between profit and value, Mill's conception
I
of labour, and our understanding of the links between property, value and 
labour in the Elements of Political Economy.^
j. 1
(1) Mill, James, Elements of Political Economy, (London, ed.l, 1821; ed.2 
1823; ed.3, 1826, reprinted 1844).
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Section 1; Labour, Value and Property.
As the title of this dissertation suggests, one of Its primary aims 
Is to analyse the connection between ideas ahout property, and both labour 
and value. The principal aim of this section Is to make some preliminary 
remarks about the proprietary notions underlying the labour theory of value 
and the theory of distribution advanced by the Classical economists.
Throughout the history of the idea of property many writers have 
advanced theories of entitlement grounded in labour expenditure, to 
which some have added correlative labour theories of value.* Any hypothesis 
which takes the activity of labouring as forming the only just basis of 
entitlement obviously makes certain assumptions about the status of , 
activity. Thus, the juridical thesis of Locke or Hodgskln, for example, 
regards labour as an activity peculiar to the human species, in some ways 
akin to what Marx was later to denominate "species-activity". Whilst Nature 
is regarded as passive, man is seen to be active, capable of transforming 
the raw materials of nature via the process of appropriation. According 
to this conception, labour alone is productive in a positive sense. Although 
land and capital may be necessary to the production process, their role 
in that process is passive and malleable. In the light of this
conceptualisation of labour it is unsurprising that both Locke and Hodgskln
2should sometimes perceive it to be the only creator of value. 12
(1) Cf.,e.g.,Locke, Marx, Hodgskin, Thompson, et al.
(2) See below, chapters 6 and 7, for an examination of Hodgskln's views 
on labour, value and property.
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The labour theory of value utilised In conjunction with the 
labour theory of property outlined above, aDDears to be a causal 
theory of value; In other words, labour is seen to be unique in that 
It alone creates value. Although this causal theory might form the 
basis of an explanation of relative value, the two are not automatically 
developed in tandem.
The labour theory of value employed bv the classical economists is, 
however, differently formulated. It is a theory of exchangeable value, 
first and foremost, and is not associated inextricably with a labour 
theory of entitlement, although it is, in our ooinlon, founded upon 
certain proprietary assumotions. 1
According to the labour theory of value in exchange, the actual ' 
activity of labouring need not be accorded any soecial status. It is 
not, for example, necessarv that labour is seen as the unique cause of 
value, but it is apposite that the determination of relative value is 
explicable in terms of labour quantity. Value must be computable in
labour terms; thus, the input of capital must be reducible to labour
2quantity. In this way, factors other than the human activity of labouring 
can be accommodated in an explanation of value determination, and the 
establishment of the exchange ratio of commodities. Where the labour theory 
of entitlement is linked with a causal theory of value (on the whole) , 
the labour theory of value of the Classical economists represents an 12
(1) Cf.,chapter 5, section 3 particularly.
(2 ) land was removed from the value equation bv making it Drice-determined, 
not price-determining. See Chapter 4, section 1.
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explanatory theory of value determination.
Clearly, the conceptions of labour required by the theories outlined 
above are different. The labour theorv of entitlement accords special 
status to human labour, whilst the labour theory of value empties human 
labour of any special (proprietary) content. Indeed, a9 we shall 
see in sections 3 and 4 of this chapter, the concept of labour adopted 
by two of the Ricardians - James Mill and John Ramsay McCulloch - was a 
largely dehumanized concept. "Labour" was regarded simply as an umbrella 
term to cover all species of productive activity, including not only the 
work of man, but also that of animals, machinery, and, in the case of 
McCulloch, Nature. Obviously, such a conceptualization of labour has 
important implications for the issue of distribution, as we shall demonstrate
It is our contention in this dissertation that the labour theory of 
value expounded by the classical economists is underwritten not bv ideas 
about property derived from Locke, but by ideas about property derived
is a concern with the issue of the security of private property, regarded 
as a basic pre-requisite of growth, that dictates that both the labour 
theory of value, and the classical theory of distribution are largely 
empirical, non-nonnative theories. It is more important to both political 
economic and Utilitarian thinking that the prevailing pattern of property 12
(1) Cf.,sections 3 and 4 of this chapter.
(2) Schlatter, for example, claims that the classical economic theories 
of value and distribution reflect the Lockean labour theory of 
entitlement. Schlatter, Private Property, pp.160-161,184-185.
below. 1
from Utilitarian thought 2 More specifically, it is our claim that it
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distribution be orotected and oreserved, in order to ensure continued 
production, than that the legitimacy of the original title to such 
property be demonstrated, indeed, the belief amongst the Utilitarians, 
and the political economists that insecurity of propertv would generate 
a disincentive to continued production necessarily led them to defend 
the status quo, and to argue against redistributive practices designed 
to foster equality. 1 It is this argument from security which helps to 
explain the overall reticence of these authors with regard to the issue of 
foundations of the landlord's and capitalist's respective claims to a share 
in the produce of industrv.
Taking as our scenario the framework of a svstem of industrial 
capitalism, where the labourinq-capacltv of one group combines with the 
capital furnished by another group to produce a material output, the
2question arises as to how shares in the final product should be determined?
Adherents of the juridlcal/labour theory of entitlement must show 
that the claims of the capitalist, per se, are consistent (or, perhaps, 
inconsistent) with the general theorem that labour forms the only orlqinal 
and legitimate title to property. Exponents of the labour value thesis, 
and the classical theory of distribution are under no such obligation. 
Firstly, they accept the legitimacy of the prevailing property system. 1  
Secondly, they assume that security of property Includes the right of the 
property-holder to employ his property as he sees fit. Thirdly, their
theory of distribution rests on the claim that land, labour and capital 
_ ___ «
(1) See below, chapter 5.
(2) Hodgson, Capitalism, Value, and Exploitation, p.109.
(3) The reasons why will become clearer in chapter 5,section 3.
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each generate a distinct form of factorial income - rent, wanes, and 
profit. And finally, the exact proportion of the product falllno to 
each factor-owner is seen to depend upon non-normatlve issues, that is, 
upon such empirical concerns as comparative factor mixes and the marginal 
productivity of land.
To recapitulate briefly, therefore, it is our claim that the labour 
value thesis advanced by the classical economists falls to accord any 
special status to human labour; represents an explanatory (as opposed to 
causal) theory; and is based not upon a Lockean conception of property, 
but on an argument derived from Utilitarian philosophy - that the 
sacrosanctity of private property and the prevailing property system is
t
indispensable to the efficient functioning of the economy. In the rest 
of this chapter, we intend to concentrate on the labour theory of value 
as developed by David Ricardo, John Ramsay McCulloch, and James Mill 
respectively. We will reserve our analysis of the classical theory of 
distribution to chapter 4, and our exposition of the classical economists' 
conceptions of property to chapter 5.
154
Section 2: David Ricardo: A Labour Theory of "alue?
(1) "’he Esaav on Profits
The main ourpose of Ricardo's Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation, was to "determine the laws which regulate ... distribution"^
and to ascertain the ''natural", viz, changing course of that distribution
2through time.
In an earlier work,the "Essay on the Influence of a Low Price of Corn 
on the Profits of stock" (1815)5 Ricardo tendentiously set out to argue 
that in an economy where opportunities for agriculture-related technological 
improvement are closed off, that profit will tend to fall (perhaps leading
4ultimately to a stationary state) as population increases and recourse is 
had to the cultivation of less fertile, more remote lands; but that rent 
will tend to rise. 5 Applying similar logic to an economy whose opportunities 12345
(1) Ricardo, David, Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 3rd ed., 
1821, in Works and Correspondence a *  navld Ricardo, ed., Pierro Sraffa, 
Vol.I, p.5, (Cambridge, CUP, 1962). All subsequent references to the 
Principles are to this edition, unless otherwise indicated.
(2) Hence his later construction of a measure of value.
(3) Sraffa ed., Works, Vol.IV, pp.9-41. This essay is primarily a diatribe 
against the imposition of a protective tariff on the importation of 
corn, as specified by the Corn-Laws. See Chapter 4, Section1 (1J-) •
(4) That is, the point at which the rate of profit has declined so much — due 
to the increasing cost of producing food on successively less fertile 
lands as population inexorably burgeons - that motives for capital 
investment no longer exist. See Principles, pp.120-122. See also,
Berg, Maxine, The Machinery Question and the making of Political Economy', 
1815-1848 (Cambridge, CUP, 1980).
(5) The Model constructed by Ricardo is founded on four basic assumptions:
(1 ) that land is of limited supply; (2 ) that agricultural improvements 
are precluded; (3) that the rates of capital and population growth 
are commensurate; and (4) that, in consequence of (3) the real wages of 
labour are constant. Essay, p.12. See Chapter 4.
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for free trade in c o m  are similarly curtailed, Ricardo is able to show 
that the Corn Laws benefit only the landed classes, since thev alone 
prosper from the Inevitable rise in the price of producing corn. 1
In this Essav, Picardo is concerned to show how the increased cost 
of producing corn affects distribution - particularly between rent and 
profit, since wages are assumed to be fixed. Profits are made contingent
upon the cost of producing food - "profits then depend on the price, or
2rather on the value of food", - and rent is conceived as a transfer of the
revenue (viz, profits) previously obtained on the land, it is never a new
creation of revenue, but always cart of a revenue already created".^
Ricardo's specific aim in the Essav is to elucidate the nature of
the relationship between the rate of profit and the price of corn - on
the assumption that it is "the profits of the farmer that regulate the
4profits of all other trades". He is, therefore, interested in examining 
the Impact of a change in the price of corn on the profits of stock.
He is not interested in systematically demonstrating how that price is 123
(1 ) "... I shall greatly regret that considerations for anv particular class, 
are allowed to check the progress of the wealth and population of the 
country. If the interests of the landlord be of sufficient consequence, 
to determine us not to avail ourselves of all the benefits which would 
follow from Importing c o m  at a cheap price, they should also influence 
us in rejecting all improvements in agriculture, and in the implements 
of husbandry". Essav, p.41.
(2) Essay, p.26.
(3) Essay, p.18.
•
Picardo to Trower, 8 March 1814, Sraffa ed., Works, Vol.VI, p.lo4 
Malthus had been of the opinion that "the profits o *  stock no more 
regulate the profits of other trades, than the profits of other 
trades regulate the profits of the farmer".
(4)
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determined, 1 nor more generally, with the problem of how the prices 
of commodities are regulated throughout the economv as a whole. 
Concentrating only, therefore, on the production of the commoditv corn, 
Ricardo discusses distribution in physical oroduct terms. Corn becomes,
as Sraffa noted, the representative unit of both innut and cutout, with
2profit comprising a simóle oroduct-ratio to wanes. Distribution can,
it appears, be treated indeoendently of valuation.^ Ricardo focuses on
shares in the value of that outout. "’hus, as he wrote later, "the areat
questions of Rent, Wanes, and Profits must be explained bv the oroportlons
in which the whole produce is divided between landlords, capitalists, and 
4labourers", which are, essentiallv, independent of considerations of value. 
The benefit of such an approach is that it enables Ricardo to demonstrate 
in simple, thounh nraphic, terms the class nature of the C o m  Laws, for it 
makes obvious the fact that the rent of the landlords comes directlv out of 
share of the product falling to the capitalist. 123
(1) Except insofar as he notes that the orice or value of c o m  is proportioned 
to the difficulty or facility of its production.
(2) See Plerro Sraffa, Introduction to the Principles, Works, Vol.I. 
pp.xxxi-xxxiil. Sraffa concludes that Ricardo utilises this “corn-ratio 
theory" to illuminate the general theorem that profit is everywhere 
contingent upon the profits obtained in agriculture. Blaug argues, 
however, that the Imputation of such a rigid, and logicallv consistent 
model to Ricardo is a little unreal. Rather such a model is a modem 
"rational reconstruction" of ideas imolicit in Ricardian theorv. See 
Economic Theory, pp.91-2.
(3) Great controversy surrounds this allegation. Frank H.Knight, in "The 
Ricardian Theory of Production and Distribution", I and II, in Canadian 
Journal of Economics and Political Science, 1935, pp.3-25 and pp.l71-176-j 
and J.A.Schumpeter in the History of Economic Analysis, (Mew York,1954), 
pp.543n and 568n. claim that Ricardo did not envisage distribution as a 
problem of pricing. Per contra, Samuel Hollander, The Economics of David 
Ricardo. (Toronto, Heinemann Rooks, 1979), argues that Ricardo was 
interested in the problem as stated, but that essentially, he failed to 
solve it, pp.250-254.
(4) Ricardo to McCulloch, 13 June 1820, Sraffa, ed., Works, Voi.VIII,p.194
Although distribution is dealt with in the Essav without recourse to 
a theory of value, there are passages presaging his treatment of value in 
the Principles. For instance he declares that "the exchangeable value 
of all commodities rises as the difficulties of their production increase", 
with difficulty or facilitv of production conceived in terms of labour 
expenditure. Thus:
If then new difficulties occur in the production of 
corn, from more labour being necessarv, whilst no 
more labour is required to produce gold, silver, cloth, 
linen, etc., the exchangeable value of corn will necessarily 
rise, as compared with those things. 1
However, it is onlv in the Principles 
articulates a labour theorv of value, with 
bases his theory of distribution.
that Ricardo svstematicallv 
inherent problems, on which he
(il) The Principles
In the Principles, Ricardo is, as previously mentioned, interested in 
the question o f  how distributive shares vary over time. In order to gauge 
changes in distribution, some means of measuring changes in the value of 
commodities is necessary, hence Ricardo's construction of a measure of value. 
Whilst primarily concerned with delineating the requisite preconditions for
a measure of value, Ricardo also indicates the manner in which value in
2exchange is regulated. 12
(1) And vice versa. Essav, pp.19-20. '
(2) McCulloch, on the contrarv, is much less Interested in the ouestion of 
establishing a measure of value, and more concerned with the conditions 
determining value in exchange. John M.Cassells in his article HA 
Re-Interpretation of Ricardo on Value", Quarterly Journal oF Economics, 
Vol.49, 1935, po.518-32 seems to deny that Ricardo considers how value
in exchange is determined anvwhere in chanter one of the Principles (p.519).
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As indicated in the previous chanter, the thesis oresented bv 
Ricardo in this work developed lnitiallv out of a critique of Adam .Smith's 
purported views on value. Ricardo is specifically concerned to refute two 
tenets of Smith's theory. Pirstiv, he attacks the hypothesis that relative 
value is determined bv the remuneration received bv labour, arquinq 
incorrectly that Smith conceives the "quantity of labour bestowed on the 
production of any oblect", and "the quantity which it can command in the 
market", as "two equivalent exoressions";1 and secondly, Ricardo is concerned
to discredit the argument that "as soon as stock has accumulated in the hands
2of particular persons", and "as soon as the land of anv country has become 
private oronertv", ^the relative value o* all commodities is determined 
by adding together the costs of production, usually wages, profits and 
rent - with the correlative assumption that chances in the rate of remuneration 
of any of these factors will loso facto lead to an alteration in the relative 
value of the commodities in question.
Ricardo commences his analysis of value bv quoting Adam Smith's
4distinction between value in use and value in exchange, notinc that whilst 
utility, defined as the capacity of an obiect to "contribute to our 
gratification" is essential to the existence of value, it is not the 12345
(1) Principles, p.14. As we shall see shortly this view is mistaken. Smith
did not use the labour command hypothesis as an explanation of relative
value.
(2) Adam Smith, WN.I.vi.5.
(3) Adam Smith, WN.I.vl.8 .
(4) Ricardo substitutes gold for diamonds, in the paradox, but the rationale 
is the same, though the definition of utility is different.
(5) Ricardo deviates here from the Smithian conception of utility as 
supportive of life, to a broader notion of utility as the capacity to 
gratify. Principles, p.ll.
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measure of value in exchange. Rather, value in exchange derives from 
one of two sources; either ^rom scarcity - thus, those goods which are In 
limited supply and which cannot, therefore, he *reelv reoroduced derive their
value from "the varying wealth and Inclinations of those who are desirous to
1 2 possess them", - or, from the "quantity of labour reouired to obtain them",
for those articles capable of being freely reoroduced under conditions of
perfect competition.
Following Smith, Ricardo notes that "in the earlv stages of society, 
the exchangeable value of these commodities ... depends almost exclusively on 
the comparative quantity of labour expended on each" , 1 23 and cites a number 
of other passages from the Wealth supportive of this view-point, indicating, 
almost in passing, that should the ouantitv of labour "realized" in a 
commodity increase, its value would be augmented, and should that ouantity
4decrease, its value would be diminished.
(1) Ibid.,p,12.
(2) Ibid.,p.12.
(3) ibid.,0 .1 2 . Editions one and two had "depends solely". The above 
passage is of particular note since it contains one of a number of 
amendments made by Ricardo to his treatment of value between editions. 
Controversy has always surrounded the status of these amendments. Did 
they herald a gradual retreat from a labour theory of value as indicated 
by Cassells, for example, (art.clt.,pp.524ff)? or, did they represent 
clariflcatory modifications designed to strengthen Ricardo's claim that 
the evolution of capital, and private property in land did not ipso facto 
alter the way in which value is regulated, as suggested bv Pierro Sraffa, 
(Tntro. Principles, Works, Vol.I, pp.xxxvli-xlix)? In the light of the 
epistolary evidence, it appears that Sraffa's view is the most plausible.
Ibid p .13.C4)
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Almost Immediately, however, Ricardo abstracts from the question of 
how value is determined, to criticise Smith's choice of an actual measure 
of value, condemninq it on the qrounds of its variability. Ricardo's 
condemnation of Smith is based, however, upon two confusions: firstly, 
Ricardo fails to comnrehend the sense in which Smith conceived of labour 
as invariable in its own value; and secondly, Ricardo imputes to Smith an 
explanation of relative value which is, in fact, an explanation of how 
intertemporal and Interlocal conroarIsons o* value mav be estimated.
With reqard to the first point, Ricardo arques that Smith's choice of 
the labour a commodltv will command as the standard of value is Invalid, 
since such a standard is liable to as manv fluctuations in value as the 
commodities compared with it. In other words the value of labour, reflected 
in the wage-rate, is inconstant.
"is not', Ricardo asks, "the value of labour equallv 
variable; being not only affected, as all other 
thinas are, by the prooortion between the suoplv and 
demand, which uniformly varies with every chanqe in 
the condition of the community, but also bv the varying 
price of food and other necessaries, on which the wages 
of labour are expended? “ 1
One obvious problem here is that Ricardo fails to recognize that Smith 
viewed labour as invariable in its own value in disutility terms. Smith, 
as we observed previously, felt that the same amount of labour always - 
both from time to time, and from place to place - inflicted the same degree 
of ‘toil and trouble'* upon its executor, and that if labour's remuneration 
altered, this reflected a change in the value o p the goods comprising the 1
(1) Ibid. ,p.l5
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wage-basket, and not a change in the value of labour itsel^ . 1 Ricardo
appears to want to argue that Smith viewed labour as invariable almost In
physical product terms; that is, that the invariability of labour might be
established by virtue of the ^act that the wage-basket is of aooroximately
the same constitution throughout time, and thus, bv the fact that the same
goods will always command the same quantity of labour. Such a position
involves Ricardo in the attribution to Smith of a fairly well-defined
concept of subsistence wages, which is, as he noted in chaoter 2 , only 
2partially true.
With regard to the second ooint, Ricardo oroclaims that smith argues 
as if "the quantity of labour bestowed on the oroductlon of anv object" and 
"the quantity it can command in the market" are "two equivalent exoressions” . 3 
Now, as we demonstrated in the last chapter, Smith emoloys the labour quantity 
thesis solelv as an exolanation of value determination in orimitive society, 
where capital is non-existent, and land a free good, and develops the 
labour command theorem as an hypothesis designed to measure intertemporal
4
and interlocal variations in value. Whilst the aims of these two arguments 
are logically distinct, Ricardo proceeds as if they are the same, attempting 
to demonstrate the incompatibility of the conclusions arrived at by applying 
the labour quantity and labour command exnlanations to the same case.
Directing his reader to consider the following scenario, he declares that:
(1 ) See above, chapter 2 , section 2 (ill) , pp.92-100
(2 ) See above, chapter 2 , section 3(ii) , pp .125-134
(3) Prlncioles, p.14.
(4) See above, chaoter 
respectively.
2 , sections 2 (1 1 1 ) and 2 (iv), pp. 92-100, 100-112
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In the same country double the quantity of labour 
mav be required to produce a given auantitv of 
food and necessaries at one time that may be 
necessarv at another and distant time; yet the 
labourer's reward may possibly be very little 
diminished. Food and necessaries In this case 
will have risen lOO oer cent. If estimated by the 
quantity o f  labour necessary to their oroduction, 
while thev will scarcely have Increased In value If 
measured bv the auantitv of labour for which thev 
will exchange. 1
Since the quantity of goods received by the labourer Is dictated
by a minimum subsistence reguirement, it Is obvious that the wage-rate
has remained falrlv constant, whilst the actual cost o f  oroducing the goods 
2has varied. This leads Ricardo to argue that the labour command hypothesis 
is invalid as an exolanation of value regulation. Tie oroblem is further 
compounded by the fact that should the wage-rate fluctuate (from alterations 
in sunply and demand, for instance), the value of the commodities in question 
will also be seen to varv even though the cost of oroduclng them has remained
As far as Ricardo is concerned, it is "the comoaratlve auantitv of 
commodities which labour will oroduce, that determines their oresent or
labourer receives in exchange for his labour. According to »1cardo's 
theoretical standooint, value is made a function of labour productivity; 
any fluctuation in the wage-rate unaccompanied by a change in labour
(1) Principles, p.15 (original emphasis)
(2) See chapter 4, section 2 (i),pp.254-282 for treatment of the Ricardian view 
of subsistence wages.
(3) Cf., Principles, pp.lSff.
(4) Principles, p.17 (My emphasis)
(5) As we shall demonstrate below, Ricardo is actually compelled to modlfv 
this claim somewhat.
3constant.
ouantitv of goods which the
productivity should not, Ip s o facto, affect the value or price of anv commodity.' 12345
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Aside from the fact that Ricardo is mistaken in regarding the purpose 
of the labour command hypothesis as an explanation of value determination, 
it is also becoming clear that his own stance on the role of the labour 
cost theory is unclear. As we saw in section 2(1) of the previous chapter, 
any theory of value-determination (labour-based, or otherwise) is concerned 
with how the exchange rate is regulated at a particular oolnt in time.''
It is not concerned with the issue of how the value of goods mav be estimated 
over time, or from place to olace. The problem with Ricardo is that he 
begins from the standnoint of considering how the exchange rate is regulated 
at any point in time, and shifts almost lmoerceotiblv into the realms of 
value measurement over time. Thus, for examole, in his treatment of the 
qualitative differences existing between various tvpes of emplovment, 
which we will consider next, it is evident that he is not essentially 
interested in the setting of the exchange rate at a particular ooint in
time, but with "comparing ... the value of the same commodity at different
2points of time", or, in other words, with the oroblem of "variations in
the relative value of commodities" ^over time.
Addressing the issue of how a reoresentative unit of labour mav be 
, 4established, Ricardo notes that it is both difficult to comoare different 
qualities of labour, and to compare temporal units of labour across 
occupations, since one hour's labour in one task may vary greatly from one 
hour's labour in another - in terms of comoarative levels of skill and
(1 ) Cf.,pp.84-86. *
(2 ) Principles, p.21.
(3) Ibid.,p.21.
(4) Since Ricardo wants to establish that labour 
measure value, he must show that qualitative 
can be reduced to a simple man-hours unit of
can both determine and 
differences in emplovment 
labour.
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Intensity of labour performance. Following Smith, Ricardo argues 
that the differential characteristics of different occupations may be 
adjusted through the mechanism of the market, with sufficient accuracy 
for oractical ends. This scale, once formed,is, he claims, "liable to
little variation".  ^Indeed Ricardo notes that whatever the original
2inequalities between tvpes of labour, "it continues nearlv the same from 
one generation to another". The labour of a jeweller is always more valuable 
than that of a common labourer.
Qualitative differences in labour may, therefore, be reduced to 
quantitative differences, allowing Ricardo to assume that labour is 
roughly homogeneous. Skilled labour can, thus, be reduced to a quantity
I
of unskilled labour, rendered in man hours, so that anv changes in the 
level of skill requisite to a Dartlcular occupation may be reduced to, and 
be exoressed in,units of unskilled labour. Thus:
One description of labour at one time is 
compared with the same descriotion of labour 
at another; if a tenth, a fifth, or a fourth, 
has been added or taken away, an effect prooortioned 
to the cause will be oroduced on the relative value 
of the commodltv. 3
And so, if more or less labour (exoressed in the basic unit) is required in
production, this will be reflected in the exchanqeable value of the commodity 123
(1) Principles, p.20.
(2) Ibid.,p.22. Such inequalities derive from the different levels of skill 
and Ingenuity appropriate to particular occupations, as well as to 
variations in training times.
(3) Ibid, ,p~.21. When Ricardo claims that: "In comparing ... the value of 
the same commoditv at different periods of time, the consideration of 
the comparative skill and intensity o *  labour, required for that 
production, needs scarcely to be attended to, as it operates equally at 
both periods", I take Ricardo to mean not that oroduction requires the 
same skills at all times, but that the differentials between occupations 
remain constant - albeit an unrealistic assumption.
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in question; the feet that different snecies of labour are rewarded at slightly 
different rates does not, of itself, alter relative value.
We noted at the outset of this section that Ricardo's treatment of value 
grew out of an attempt to address two problems inherent in Smithian theory; 
the first, the purported confusion between the labour command and labour 
quantity theorems; and the second, the lnvaliditv of Smith's claim that 
once capital has been accumulated and land appropriated, value is recrulated 
by adding together wages, orofit and rent, with the possibility that a change 
in the rate of remuneration of anv of the three will amend the relative value 
of commodities, independent of changes in labour productivity. Havino examined 
the former notion, it is to the latter that we now turn.
Smith, as we know, confined the application of a labour cuentity thesis to 
the "early and rude state of societv" orecedinq the accumulation of stoeik, and 
appropriation of land, preferring instead a cost of production explanation 
of relative price for commercial societv. One of Ricardo's aims in the 
Principles is to refute the historical specificitv of Smith's labour thesis. He 
wants to show that Smith was mistaken in arguinq that the emergence of rent and 
profit immediately and necessarily altered the way in which relative value was 
determined. Rent, as we shall see in the next chanter, was viewed as a price- 
determined surplus, and thus of no importance in value determination; profit 
and the issue of capital use in production, was however, a different matter.
As Sraffa has demonstrated, Ricardo did not mean that the use^ capital in 
production could not affect relative value - for this he patently recognised, 
as evidenced bv his acknowledqement of the *wage/durability of canital'theorem1 - 
but that Ricardo believed that Adam Smith was mistaken in his argument that:
(1) The phrase derives from O'Brien; C*.,O'Brien, D.P. "J.R.McCulloch and
the Theory of Value", s j p e . 1Q66. This phenomenon is also labelled the 
"Ricardo Effect", bv F.A.V.Havek.
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... as after stock was accumulated, a part went
to profits, that accumulation, necessarily, without
any regard to the different degrees of durability of
capital, or anv other circumstance whatever, raised
the prices or exchangeable value of commodities, and
consequently that their value was no longer regulated
by the quantitv of labour necessary to their oroductlon. 1
Criticising Smith for his failure to consider accuratelv the effects of
2accumulation on relative value, Ricardo goes on to consider preclselv that.
Even in the "earlv and rude state of socletv", some capital, he 
argues, nosslblv made and accumulated bv the labourer himself, would be 
necessary to assist him in the acquisition of food. Without a weaoon, the 
paradigm deer and beaver could not be destroved; therefore, the value of 
these animals In this early age must be determined, not solelv bv the time 
and labour required to destroy them, hut also bv that necessary to equip 
the hunter with the necessary capital, his weaoon. If more labour was
exoended on the production of the capital necessary to kill the beaver than on
that necessary to kill the deer, the value of the former would be greater than 
that of the latter. If the auantitv of labour reoulslte to the oroductlon of 
capital was the same In both cases, but If the weaoons were of disnroportlonate 
durability, then the value of both animals would be different since onlv a
small portion of the value of the durable implement would be realized In the
value of the object that it assisted In orocuring, compared with a much 
greater portion In the case of the less durable Implement.^ 123
(1) Ricardo to James Mill, in Sraffa, ed., Works, Vol.VII, p.377. See Plerrp 
Sraffa, Introduction, Principles, Works, vol.I, pp.xxxvi-xxxvii. See also 
Principles, p.22n.2.
(2) Principles, p.22n.2. This criticism of Smith's failure to analyse the 
effects of the accumulation of capital and appropriation of land on 
relative value Is suppressed from edition 3. Chapter II, 'on Rent', 
contains Ricardo's refutation that payments to rent form part of the 
exchangeable value of commodities.
(3) Principles, p.23. It is, therefore, an amortisation charge.
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On the assumption that caoital is simply accumulated labour Ricardo 
argues that the relative value of a commodltv, In commercial socletv 
as well as In rude socletv, 1 Is determined by the total ouantitv of labour 
expended in Its oroduction, "not on their Immediate oroduction onlv, but
on all those Implements or machines required to give effect to the oarticular
2labour to which they were anplied". Anv abridgements in this total Quantity 
of labour will lead always to a reduction In Its value. 1 2345
4Ownershlo of this caoital is unlmnortant for value determination.
Whilst the finished product mav, at different times, deoendina on the 
magnitude of capital compared with the demand for labour, be shared out 
in different prooortions between wages and orofit, the relative value of 
the commodities in question is unaffected, since the oroduction of each, 
Ricardo alleges, is subiect to the same rates of waoes and profit. 5
This claim relies on the soecial assumotlons that the factor mixes for 
all occuoatlons are identical, and that the capital utilised in all fields 
is of equivalent durability. Now, as we have seen, the status of capital 
within the labour theory of value is potentially one of its most debilitating 
aspects. Once it is assumed that labour and capital combine in production,
(1) Principles, pp.24-5.
(2) Ibid,,p.24. As we shall see shortly, the labour quantity theorv falls 
to explain the origin of profit. If caoital did not earn a profit, then 
Ricardo's explanation would be tenable. Value would be oroportloned to 
the quantity of immediate labour required for production plus amortisation 
costs. See O'Brien, n.R. The Qlasslcal Economists, o.R5.
(3) Principles, p.26. •
(4) Smith had argued that once capital had accumulated in "the hands of 
particular oersons" the capitalist could demand a share of the produce
of labour, and that this verv process increased the value of the commodity.
(5) Ricardo qualifies this view shortly. See op.169-173.
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relative labour innut can onlv explain relative value if either (1 ) capital 
can be reduced to labour, so that the return on canltal can be seen as relating 
to the quantity of caoital expended in production,^ representing, as it 
were, the "wages" of accumulated labour; or if (ii) the ratio of capital to
•jlabour is assumed to be uniform throughout Industry.
Whilst Ricardo makes such assumotlon9 , he can quite justifiably claim
that only changes in labour productivity can affect value; and that, since
wages and orofit are, according to his phllosophv, locked together in an
inverse relationship, any change in the wage-rate will affect onlv the share
of profit, and not the relative value of commodities.^ Building uoon
these assumptions he cam feasiblv suggest that with the aid of another
4 'commodity, Invariable in its own value, (assuming that such a food could 
be found); it would be oossible to locate the source of changes in the 
relative value of two or more goods, by comparison with this invariable 
standard.^ So, he notes, "we should be able to ascertain, by comparing the 
value of fish and game with this commodity, how much the variation was to 
be attributed to a cause which affected the value of fish", and how much to 12345
(1) See O'Brien, D.P., The Classical Economists, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 
1975), p.85. The underlying assumption of this argument is that capital 
earns no profit.
(2) The short comings o^ the labour theory of value have been well documented.
See e.g. O'Brien, D.P, The Classical Economist, pp.78-100, esp.pp.85-87 & 
93; Meek, Ronald L, Studies in the labour Theory of Value, ed.2,pp,123-4 
and Burkitt, Brian, Radical Political Economy.(Sussex. Wheatsheaf Books, 
1984), pp.32-3, 55-6» Blaug, Mark, Ricardian Rconomics? R Historical 
Study, (New Haven and London, Yale HP, 1964), pp.48-9. •
(3) Cf., Principles, pp.26-27.
(4) This measure would have to be the product of a constant amount of labour 
and presumably have the same factor mix as the other goods in question.
(5) Principles, p.28. See Blaug, Economic "’beorv, p.lll.
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that affecting the value of game.'*' In this wav It would be oossible 
to monitor all kinds o* variations In relative value eraanattna from 
changes in oroductive conditions.
However, once It Is recognised that caoital ratios varv from industrv 
to industry, and that different soecles of caoital may be of differing 
degrees of durability, then labour productivity alone is insufficient to 
account for value determination.
Where Adam Smith had recoonised that anv alteration in the wage-rate 
would, of necessity, amend the value of all those commodities of which 
wages formed a component nart of nrice, Ricardo had denied that a change 
in the waoe-rate could affect value. However, Ricardo is graduallv
I
compelled to modlfv his stance, mhe dilemma for Ricardo is how to 
accommodate the recognition that the labour-embodied orinclple of value
regulation is "considerably modified bv the emolovment of machinerv and
2other fixed and durable caoital", bv the "unequal durabilitv of caDltal, 
and by the uneoual raoiditv with which it is returned to its emolover",^
with his initial claim. In other words, capital-labour ratios vary from
4 c
industry to industry; fixed caoital may be of varying degrees of durability»
the rate of capital turnover may vary from industry to industry; 6 and,
finally, the production period - that is the length of time nrior to a
commodity being brought to market - may also varv from industry to industry, 6
(1 ) Ibid, p.30.
(2 ) Ibid.,p.38.
(3) Ibid.,p.32.
(4) Ibid.,pp.31-32
(5) Ibid., p.38ff.
(6) Ibid.,p.31.
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qualifications which,Ricardo recognizes, modify the labour theorv of 
value by introduclnq the problem of time and profit generation. 1
The question of the effect on value o' the different proportions, 
or durabilities of capital can, Rraffa has shown, be viewed from two 
perspectives. Firstlv, that of "occasloninrr a difference in the relative 
values of two commodities" produced bv equal quantities of labour, and
secondly, that of the effect which "a rise of wages has in oroduclno a
2chancre In their relative value".
Although Ricardo tends to concentrate on this second issue in the 
Principles Interested as he is in the question of variations in value, he 
does pay heed to the first also, as we can see below. With the same quantity 
of labour expended on the production of two commodities, it is still possible 
for their relative values to be different, on account of disparities in the 
length of the production process, and the duration of capital investment.
The longer capital is tied up in production, the hiqher the price of the 
commodity in question, because the oreater the amount of profit earned.
Thus, if two men employ one hundred men for a vear in the construction 
of two machines, whilst the farmer employs a hundred men in the production of 
corn, the value of the end products of all three will be identical. However, 
if the owners of the machines then employ them in production the following 
year with the aid of one hundred men , 1 whilst the farmer continues to employ 
one hundred men only, the value of the produce of the farmer will be worth 123
(1) Ricardo to McCulloch, 17 June, 1820, Works, Vol. VIII, p.193.
Ricardo sees the principal difference between fixed and circulating 
capital as one o' durability.
(2) Sraffa, Introd., Principles, Works, Vol.I, p.xlvii (original emphasis)
Cf., Rlaug, OP.clt.,op.08-7
(3) Principles, pp.33-34. Ricardo assumes that one produces cotton, the 
other cloth.
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more than twice that o* the com, for "the nrofit on the clothier's 
anti cotton manufacturer's capital for the first vear has been added to 
their capitals, while that of the farmer has been expended and enjoyed" . 1
One oroblem with the labour theorv of value,as enunciated by Ricardo, 
is that it does not adequatelv explain how profit originates, nor how 
profit affects value, '"his latter oolnt is of «articular note, as we 
shall see shortly, for both McCulloch and .Tames Mill attempt to resolve
the problem by claiming that nrofit is reducible to labour productiveness,
2whereas Ricardo argues that it is somehow a comoensation for waiting.
With regard to Sraffa's second oersnectlve on the relationshio between 
capital and value, namely, the Impact of a wage increase on a chanae in 
relative value, Ricardo realises that the exchange ratio of goods produced 
under similar conditions, that is, with similar factor mixes, would not 
alter with a variation in the wage rate unless there had been an accompanying 
change in the quantity of labour requisite to the «reduction of one, or the 
other; but that their value relative to goods produced under other oroductlve 
conditions would in fact vary, with a chance in the wane rate . 1 So, 
goods produced with a preoonderance of fixed to circulating capital, that is, 123
(1) Principles, p.34.
(2) Cf., sections 3 and 4 below for comment upon Ricardo's views on nrofit 
and time, on.1 8 6 - 1 9 0  & 198-204 Ricardo observes in a letter to McCulloch 
(13 June 1820, Sraffa ed., Works, Vol.RIII p.103), that:
"When the times are unequal, the relative guantitv of labour 
bestowed on them (l.e. goods) is still the main ingredient 
which regulates their relative value, but it is not the onlv ,
ingredient, for besides compensating for the labour, the price of 
commodity, must also comoensate for the length of time before it 
can be brought to market".
(3) "This difference in the decree of durability of fixed capital, and this 
variety in the nroportions in which the two sorts of capital may be 
combined, introduce another cause ... for the variations in their 
relative value - this cause is the rise or fall in the value of labour". 
Ibid,,p.3Q.
capital-intensive products, would tall in value with an increase in 
wages, whereas those oroduced bv a nrenonderance of labour, that is 
labour-intensive goods, would rise in value.
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"It appears", therefore, "that in nroportion to the 
durability of capital employed in anv kind of production, 
the relative prices of those commodities on which such 
durable capital is emoloved will vary inversely as wages; 
they will fall as wages rise, and rise as wages fall",
whereas "those which are oroduced chiefly bv labour with less 
fixed capital, or with fixed capital of a less durable 
character than the medium in which price is estimated, 
will rise as wages rise, and fall as wages fall. 1
Ricardo is forced to concede, therefore, that fluctuations in
relative value are not all attributable to changes in the productiveness of
labour. However, whilst conceding that an alteration in the rate of wages
(or profit) may amend the relative value of commodities, he still concludes
that such fluctuations are of limited magnitude. In fact "the greatest
effects which could be oroduced on the relative prices of these eroods from
a rise of wages, could not exceed 6 or 7 per cent", for profits could not
2admit of a greater or more permanent depression, and as such he proposes 
only to consider alterations in relative value generated by changes in the 
quantity of labour reguisite for production.
Thus, having acknowledged the vulnerabilitv of the labour cost theorv 
of value determination, Ricardo still proposes to employ the labour cost 
hypothesis as his guide to estimating changes in value. As we shall see 
in the next sub-section, this concern with estimating changes in value leads 12
(1) Ibid.,p.43.
(2) Principles, p.36. Hence Stlgler's famous remark about Ricardo's "93% 
labour theory of value". See George Stigler, "Ricardo and the 93 per 
cent Labor 'theory of Value". American Economic Review. vol.XLVIII, 
June, 1953, pp.357-362.
173
him to formulate an account o* value measurement also founded uoon 
labour cost which is closeIv linked with the nrimarv focus of his theory 
of distribution, namelv the question of the trend of relative shares in 
societal proqress.
(lii) The Problem of Absolute value
In his inqulrv into value, hitherto, Ricardo has been principally 
preoccupied with the problem of chanqes, or "variationsH in relative 
value. The purpose of this Inquiry, relatinq as it does ultimately to 
his construction of a measure of value, derives from Ricardo's concern 
with the laws regulating the distribution of the national income amonost 
the three social classes, the labourers, canitalists and landlords; and 
the manner in which that distribution changes throughout time. Given his 
preoccupation with a falling profit rate, diminishino marginal returns 
on land, and the seeminoly inexorable growth of population, Ricardo requires 
some means of measuring the effects of changes in relative value on the 
division of the social oroduct. 1 Since, for example, a fall in the wage 
rate had the caoacity not only to alter the value of labour-intensive goods to 
a greater degree them the value of capital-intensive goods, but also to affect 
the share of the total oroduct falling to both labour and capital, Ricardo 
needs to find a method of quantifying such changes in distribution.
(1 ) Underlving this, always, is a concern nrimarilv with agricultural
progress. Cf.,Essay. His "pessimistic" conclusion probably derives 
more from a concern with the specific issue of the impact of the Corn 
Laws, than from anv overriding belief that the stationary state was 
inevitable under all conditions. Cf.,Blaug, oo.cit.,p.lo8 , pp.48-4R; 
and chapter 4 below.
In the final two sections of the Principles, and in the unfinished
papers, "Absolute Value and Exchangeable Value",“ Ricardo sets out to 
delineate the prerequisites for a measure of value against which changes 
in relative value could be estimated.
Clearly a measure of value ought to be free from all the fluctuations 
to which other goods are exposed, and yet no commoditv exists which is
not affected by both variations in the quantltv of labour necessary for
2its production, and by changes in the rate of wages. Even assuming that
the latter contingencv may be ignored, still according to the labour cost
principle, no existing commodity can be a perfect measure of value, for
the simple reason that periods of production varv between commodities.
Taking cold as his candidate measure, he notes that, "it would be a perfect
measure of value for all things produced under the same circumstances
precisely as itsel*, but for no others".^ Rowever, although gold cannot be
4a perfect measure of value, it can be a proximate measure, since its 
conditions of production are seen to be rouohlv representative of those 
tinder which the average commodity is produced; in other words, gold combines 
both labour and capital in its production, and in "such proportions ... 
as approach nearest to the average guantitv emoloved in the production of 1234
(1) "Absolute value and Exchange value", 1833, Sraffa, ed., Works, Vol.IV 
pp.361-3Q7 and 3Q8-413.
(2) "It would be a great desideratum in political economy to have a measure
of absolute value in order to enable us to know(,) when commodities 
altered in exchangeable value(,) in which the alteration had taken 
place", Ibid.,p.3Q°n. •
(3) Principles, p.4S.
(4) Ricardo spends some time at the end of Chapter One comparing the effects 
on the price of goods arising from (i) chances in the labour necessary to 
production; and (li) from changes in the value of the goods themselves 
and changes in the value of medium in which thev are estimated. See
pp.47-51.
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most commodities" » 1 with its oeriod of production representing a "mean 
between the extremes of commodities produced on one side by labour and
advances for much more than a year, and on the other bv labour employed
2for a day without advances", the assumption being that gold (like com)
takes a year to produce.^ His standard is produced, therefore, under the
median conditions of production; equidistant from those conditions where
little fixed canital is used, and those where it preoonderates.
Although Ricardo is o^ten regarded as an exoonent of a labour theory
of exchange value, consideration of the content and puroose of his hypothesis
seems to suggest that such an interpretation is not, in ^act, valid, given
that he is less concerned with how prices are actually regulated, than with
evaluating the effect of amendments in relative value on the partition of the
aggregate product of industry. His focug is the problem of how shares in
the total product of industry may alter, whilst the actual magnitude (or
4size) of the product remains the same. He chooses to emohasize labour 
quantity as the most reliable factor in value-determination, though 
recognizing that other factors - namely, the durability of caoital, and the 
length of the production process - also affect the value of a commodity, 
and in fact sees profit as a comoonent o * relative value. Indeed, in a 
footnote directed at Malthus, Ricardo notes that cost and value are synonymous 1234
(1) Prlnclpies, p.45.
(2) 'Absolute value and Exchangeable Value", p.4o5. ,
(3) The agriculture bias of Ricardo’s model is apparent in his choice of a 
standard whose oroduction period is identical with that of agriculture — 
viz, a year.
(4) Cf., Sraffa, Introd. works, Vol. I, pp.lxxviii-xlix
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terms in his thesis, if bv cost is meant "cost of production includino 
profits", but presumablv not 1 ^ all that is meant is labour cost - that 
is, a quantity of labour valued in a monetary unit.*'
How Ricardo actually treats the problem of distribution and the 
status of value within that thesis will be deferred until the next chapter. 
However, it is apparent that his consideration of the role of labour in 
the determination of value (in exchange) was designed with the elucidation 
of a particular question in mind - the Droblem of the trend of relative 
shares throughout societal oroaress. The manner in which his followers 
took up the gauntlet of a labour theorv of value, and their incredibly 
tenacious attempts to reduce both orofit and caoital to some common unit 
of labour, cannot be viewed in the same light, for thev genuinelv attempted, 
in the beginning at least, to oostulate an exolanation of value in exchange 
based on labour alone, and it is to these exolanatlons that we now turn. 1
(1) Principles, p.47n. The reference is sparked o^f by Malthus* claim 
that Ricardo confounds cost and value in his theory. See also 
Chapter XXX, where Ricardo argues that it is cost of production which 
ultimately (l.e. in the long term) regulates price and not supply and 
demand. Principles,pp.382-38S. Ricardo also makes a distinction 
between the long run natural price of a comraoditv - rendered bv the 
comparative quantitv of labour necessary to production - and the 
market or actual (short-term supply and demand) price with the latter 
gravitating about the former. Cf. Chapter IV, pp.88-92.
177
Section 3: John Ramsav McCulloch; Qlsclole or Dissenter?
In the last section we traced the develooment of Ricardo's theory 
of value out of a critique of Smithian value theory. In the next two 
sections we prooose to examine the way in which Ricardo's labour theorv of 
value was develooed bv two of his so-called disciples, namely John Ramsay 
McCulloch, and James Mill, focuslnq In «articular on the wav In which 
both authors dealt with the Droblem of capital and orofit in value 
determination. The aim of this oartlcular section will be to examine the 
genesis and develooment of McCulloch's theory of value. Whilst his initial 
exposition reflects a strong Ricardian Influence, reflection In Dart
his role as the oooularizer of Ricardian orthodoxv, 1 it will be argued 
that in recognition of the difficulty of uoholding a labour theory whilst 
acknowledging the Implications of canital and nroflt for value determination, 
McCulloch gradually modifies his position until he is ultimately left with
a (marginal) cost of production theory more suited to the broadly Smithian
2dimension of his oolltical economy, namely a concern with growth. 12
(1) D.P.O'Brien notes that McCulloch was a "pioneer of popular exoosltion". 
See, "J.R.McCulloch and the Theory of Value", SJPE 1066, pp.332-351,p.333. 
McCulloch himself also acknowledges that "in order to give any chance
of making the subiect pooular I must pass slightly over some of the 
more difficult parts". See McCulloch to Ricardo, April 17, 1822, Works, 
Vol.ix, p.185. Cf Ricardo to McCulloch, March 18, 1822, works, Vol.ix. 
pp.177-9., esp.p.178.
(2) O'Brien argues that McCulloch's mistakenly attributed "Ricardian" label 
emanates from a failure, on the part of modem commentators, to recognise 
that McCulloch was simultaneously expounding two theories of value: a 
simple (Ricardian) labour cost thesis deslqned for "popular" consumption* 
and a more comolex, "scientific" cost of production hypothesis. Though 
O'Brien draws attention to McCulloch's confusion over capital and profit, 
he seems to minimise the degree to which amendments to the labour cost 
hypothesis led to its subsequent replacement by a cost of production 
hypothesis. Re also ignores the fact that McCulloch's confusion over 
profit reflects a dichotomy in his political economy generally, viz.
the conflict between those Ricardian elements uncomfortably tacked onto 
an essentially Smithian framework.
In all of his early articles, and some of the later ones, McCulloch 
follows Ricardo's lead, and substantially reoroduces the Ricardian labour 
theory of value in exchange - complete with problems. 1 Broadlv speaking
Ricardo's thesis was that the relative value of commodities, at all stages
2of societal development, is determined by the comparative amounts of labour
(both direct and indirect) requisite to production. Rent is removed from
the value equation in the usual oost-Ricardian fashion,by makino it a
price-determined surplus, 1 23 4 whilst profit, and caoltal remain as oroblematic
for McCulloch as they were for Ricardo. Since we intend to consider the
inadequacies of McCulloch's explanation of value theory relative to his
account of the emergence of orofit below, nothino more will be said on that
point here. What is worth noting, however, is that McCulloch followed ,
Ricardian orthodoxy quite strictly in terms of the wane-durability of capital
theorem, again allowing a variation in the wage-rate to amend the relative
value of goods even where the quantltv of labour requisite to production has 
4remained constant. As McCulloch observes:
(1) See, for example, his review of Ricardo's Principles in the Scotsman,
May 3, 1817, pp.119-20; "Mr.Ricardo and the British Review", Scotsman ,
Nov.15 1817, p.343; "Ricardo's Political Economv", Edinburgh Review,
Vol.XXX 1818, pp.59-87; "Political Economv", Supplement to the Encvclopaedl; 
Brltannlca, 1824 (6th ed. henceforth, EB6), pp.^Sj-2bd
(2) Smith had claimed that the labour explantion is tenable only in those 
conditions where labour comprises the sole factor of production. Once 
land becomes private property and capital is accumulated, the labour theory 
is Invalidated. It is replaced by a cost-of-productlon (or "adding up“) 
hypothesis. See Chapter 2, pp.100-112.
(3) Cf., chapter 4, section 1 (ii),pp below,and Myrdal Gunnar, The Political 
Element in the Development of Economic Thought, 2nd ed., (London, Routledge 
and Kegan Paul, 1965), p.62.
(4) Note that McCulloch ignores the wage/durablllty of capital on one occasion, 
namely in the first of the Scotsman articles cited above, viz.. he asserts 
that fluctuations in the wage rate can have no Impact on relative value, 
since all wages are eguallv affected.
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In as much as any commodity taken for a standard by 
which to estimate the relative values of other 
commodities must Itself be oroduced by capital returnable 
In a certain period, that when wages rise all commodities 
produced bv LESS durable capitals than those which produce 
the commodity taken for a standard, will rise In exchangeable 
value, and all those produced by MORE durable capitals will 
fall, and conversely when wages are reduced. 1
2but that such variations are "confined within very narrow limits”, initially 
the 6 or 7 per cent identified by Ricardo, but later simply "comparatively 
narrow limits".^
McCulloch's only point of innovation on this Issue appears in the later
4editions of "Political Economy'1, for the Encyclopaedia, where he again, 
valiantly endeavourlnq to minimise the significance of this qualification for 
the labour value theory, suoqests that variations In the wage rate only 
significantly affect the value of those qoods produced under extreme 
conditions - that is, where their production Is preponderantly executed by 
either manual labour, or fixed capital. Where the majority of goods are 
concerned they are produced by a comparable amount of fixed and circulating 
capital, and thus any Increase in the (proportional) wage rate leads, of 
necessity, to a fall in the profit rate (or to a proportional Increase In 
the productiveness of Industry), and thus, whilst the relative value of 1234
(1) "Political Economy", EB6 , p.266. McCulloch has here adapted the 
explanatory schema developed by Mill to explain this phenomenon. Cf. 
Mill, James, Elements of Political Economy, ed., 1, 1871, p.77 (original 
emphasis).
(2) "Political Economy", EB6 , p.267, Cf., also "Political Economy” 7th ed., 
Encyclooeadla Brltannica, 1842, (henceforth 7 B7 ) p.251.
(3) The 6-7 per cent., variant was abandoned In the 8th ed. of "Political 
Economy", for the Encyclopaedia, In 1859. (Henceforth EB8), p.251. Cf. 
also, Ricardo's Principles, Works, Vol.l, p.36.
(4) EB7, p.297, EB8 , pp.250-251.
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Individual commodities mav vary, the total value of the entire mass of
goods remains constant. 1  From this McCulloch concludes that: "though it
may not be strictly true of a particular commodity, that its exchangeable
value is directly as its cost or real value", that is, the quantity of labour
needed to produce it and brinq it to market, "it is most true to affirm this of
2the mass of commodities taken together".
The aspect of value theory in which McCulloch was interested almost
exclusively focused on "the circumstances which determine the exchangeable
value of commodities at any given period!^ Me was, therefore, uninterested
in the problem of delineating an invariable measure of value, the search
for which he regarded,throughout his life, as "entitled to no more respect ...
4them the search after the philosopher's stone". '
Value, for McCulloch, was a twin-edged concent, relating both to the 
power, or capacity, of a commodity to exchange for,or purchase,a certain 
quantity of labour, or of other commodities obtainable only through the 
expenditure of labour; 1 2345 6 and to the quantity of labour expended in its production 
or appropriation at any point in time.^ The former comprises ”exchangeable" 
value and the latter “real value".
(1) "Although, therefore, a rise of wages has a necessary tendency to raise the 
exchangeable value of one class of commodities, and consequently to lower 
that of another, the fall of profits, which must inevitably follow every 
rise of wages that is not accompanied by an increased productiveness of 
industry, has a contrary effect, and tends to sink the value of the 
commodities which the increased rate of wages would raise, and to elevate 
the value of those which the same Increased rate would sink",EB7,p.297.
Cf.EB8 , pp.250-51. The wording is slightly different, but the substance the 
same.
(2) "Political Economy",EB7, p.297. Cf.,EB8,p.251.
(3) McCulloch to Ricardo, Aug.11, 1823, Works, Vol.IX, p.344.
(4) "Principles which Determine the Exchanoeable Value of Commodities", Scotsman,
Feb.21, 1824, p.113. ---------
(5) The spontaneous products of nature, assuming their super-abundance, are 
regarded as of little or no value, whereas the goods produced by human 
labour are valuable - in part because of the sacrifice incurred in productior 
See (e.g.), ‘Political Economy", EB6 , pp.216-8; Principles of Political 
Economy, (henceforth PPE) 1st ed.,1825, pp.117-118.
(6) This clarification of the concept of value is first introduced in PPE,
1st ed., 1825, pp.H5ff.
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The essential idea of value in exchange is that it is a relational 
concept. There is no such thing as absolute value in exchange. This form 
of value is meaningful only when the worth of two or more commodities is 
being compared, 1 thus am alteration in the exchangeable value of a commodity 
signifies an alteration in its ratio of exchange compared to other commodities.
If A rises, it must be in relation to something else, 
as B, amd if B falls, it must be in relation to something 
else, as A, so that it is obviously impossible to change 
the relation of A to B without at the saune time chamglng 
that of B to A. 2
A commodity could only be constamt or invariable in its exchangeable value
if it always exchanged for the saune quantity of all other commodities (or
labour), which implies, McCulloch alleges, that the circumstances determining
these Dresent relationshios remain precisely the same at all times. However,
to say that value in exchamge is a relational concept does not explain how
the relationship between aoods is determined; that, according to McCulloch,
is a function of labour expenditure, the principle underlying real value. The
real value of a commodity is determined by the "quamtity of labour required to
render a demand effectual" , 1 or as it was alternatively expressed, by "the
quamtity of labour, or of sweat amd toil, required ... to produce or obtain
4articles or products". 1234
(1) The point though obvious was not normally explicated by the Ricardiams.
It is possible that McCulloch's decision to illuminate this point was 
prompted by the publication of Samuel Bailey's A Critical Dissertation on 
the Nature, Measure and Causes of Value, 1825. •
(2) PPE, 1st ed. , pp.115-116.
(3) Ibid., pp.116-117.
(4) PPE, 2nd ed., 1830, pp.293-4.
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If then, it should, under such circumstances, be 
found that the oower of a commodity A, to purchase, 
or exchange for another coirriodlty B, was increased, 
and if it should also be found that an equal increase 
had taken place in the quantity of labour required to 
produce A, while the quantitv required to produce B 
continued the same, we should be entitled to say, that 
A had increased in real value. 2
Real value refers, therefore, to the cost underlying production. Althouqh 
the quantity of goods produced by equal quantities of labour may vary, due 
to differences in the application of labour, technological innovations 
enhancing labour productivity, or the differential fertility of land,^  
the value of those goods will be the same, since labour expenditure "must
4unavoidably occasion the same sacrifice to those by whom it is performed. 
McCulloch assumes as it were, that the disutilitv oer unit of labour is 
constant.^
This discussion of the distinction between value in exchanqe and real 
value tells us little, however, about how McCulloch regarded the functioning 
of the labour theory of value. Now, McCulloch's usual procedure in any 
discussion of value was to relegate the influence of supply and demand to the 
short term, and to concentrate on enunciating the principles regulatinq cost 
of production, since this cost was assumed to be the regulator of value.^
It is important to note two things here: firstly, that by cost of production, 123456
(1) Assuming the free reproducibilitv of commodities, and the exact 
coincidence of supply and demand.
(2) PPE, 1st. ed., 1825, pp.116-117.
(3) Ibid.,p.117.
(4) Ibid.,p.117. Cf. also op.118, 120-121. That McCulloch should Identify labou: 
with disutility is unsurprising since he believed that man had a natural 
aversion to labour and that the only reason that he was "prepared to 
submit to the greatest privations" was to acquire the wealth necessary to 
existence ("Political Economy", EB6 , o.218).
(5) Blaug, op clt.,p.56. Following Smith, McCulloch also assumes that the 
varying degrees of disutilitv incurred in different fields are equalised 
in the market, so that wages are (in part) determined by a disutility 
schedule.
(6 ) See e.g. "Ricardo's Political Economy", Edinburgh Review. 1818, Vol.XXX,
p.61.
183
McCulloch usually means "the quantities of labour required to produce 
them ¿commodities, that ls7 and brinq them to market" ; 1 and secondly, that
he Is normally talklnq about the cost of produclna the maralnal unit, l.e.,
2the cost of producino the last unit of any qood.
In a capital-less staqe of society, labour quantity only Is assumed 
to regulate value.^ However, where capital exists,McCulloch, If he Is to 
consistently enunciate a labour cost explanation of price, must show that its 
coooeratlon In production is reducible to labour quantity. This he attempts 
to do by arguing that capital is. nothing but the "accumulated produce of 
anterior labour"; and that the value of commodities produced in a capitalist 
economy, is regulated by "the total quantity of immediate labour and of
accumulated labour, or capital, which have been necessarily laid out in their
4 5production", with Drofit defined simnlv as the "wages of accumulated labour".
Accepting McCulloch's hypothesis that value is reaulated bv total
quantity of labour, it is important to note two things: firstly, that the
durability of the capital emploved in production is significant in determining
value, for the greater its durability the lower the return to capital,
compared to capital of a less durability, since a proportionately less amount
will be expended in production. Thus, on the assumption that the profits of
stock are simply the "wages of accumulated labour", it can be surmised that 12345
(1) "Political Economy", Encvclopaedla Brltannlea, 8th ed.,18F0, p.239.
(2) "Cost of Production: the Regulatinq Principle of Price", Scotsman, June 8 
1822, p.182, and June 2 1 , 1822, D.207. See O'Brien, art.cit.,p.338.
•
(3) "Political Economy", Supplement to the Encyclooaedia Britannlca, 6th ed. 
1824, p.253.
(4) Ibid,,p.263 (original emphasis)
(5) Cf O'Brien, The Classical Economists, p.85, where he makes a similar point 
with regard to Ricardo.
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these wages vary Inversely with the durability of capital, 1 and secondly, 
that McCulloch is here confounding profit - usually conceived of as the 
return on capital over and above oayments to labour and capital expenditure - 
with amortisation costs.
This confusion between profit and amortisation costs stems in part
from an article McCulloch wrote, entitled "Mr.Ricardo's Theory of
2Exchangeable Value Vindicated from the Objections of R", which contained an 
unsolicited defence of Ricardo's theory of value against the criticisms of 
Colonel Robert Torrens. 1 23 Torrens had alleged that once society had advanced 
beyond a state in which labour comprised the only factor of production, the 
labour theory of value was inapplicable, and cites Ricardo's "admission" 
that "when capitals are of different degrees of durabilitv, the products' of equal 
quantities of labour will not be of equal value" as evidence of this . 4 
Rather, advancing the truism that as the profit rate tends towards equality in 
all fields, products obtained by the employment of equal capitals will be of 
equal value, whilst the labour embodied in them varies in amount, he proposes a 
capital theory of value.
Against this McCulloch had claimed that, in actuality, Ricardo and Torrens 
were advancing the same thesis:
(1) "Political Economy", Eb6 , p.263. Ct_. O'Brien, art.clt.,pp.332-351, passim.
(2) Signed "M^McCulloch's article appeared in the Edinburgh Magazine, Nov.1818, 
pp.429-31.
(3) Signed "R". Torrens' article: "Strictures on Mr.Rlcardo's Doctrine respecting 
Exchangeable Value", appeared In the Edinburgh Magazine, Oct.1818, pp.335-8.
(4) Ibid.,p.336.
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To tell us that the value of commodities depends on 
the amount of capital consumed in their production is 
only another, but an extremely cumbrous, roundabout 
and incorrect way of telling us, that their value 
depends on the total quantity of labour required to 
bring them to market. 1
McCulloch is, of course, failing to recognise that Torrens counts
only capital (or accumulated labour), whilst Ricardo is adding together both
2immediate and accumulated labour. If no profit (qua Interest) were paid, 
then the argument that value is determined by the amount of immediate labour 
and accumulated labour exoended in production might be tenable. However, as 
Blaug notes, relative value is never strictly equal to the "total quantities of
labour required”, when the rate of profit is uni form but the factor mixes of
3 'commodities variable. The problem arises because the supply price of
machines (capital) Includes a going rate of profit. Thus, as Blaug continues,
the greater the proportion of fixed capital per labourer, the greater the
percentage of non-labour income in cost price, and the lower the proportion of
4wage cost to sales price.
Some account must be rendered of the role of profit in value-determination. 
A definition of profits as the wages of accumulated labour fails to take 1234
(1) "Mr.Ricardo's Theory ... vindicated", p.341 (original emphasis).
(2) This confusion persisted until the 1859 version of "Political Economy" 
for the Encyclopaedia Britannica. See, for instance, his "Review of 
Torrens' Essay on the Production of Wealth". Scotsman, Dec.22, 1821, 
pp.406-7, "Political Economy", EB6,'pp.267-8,EB7,p.298.etc. Cf.,O'Brien 
art.clt.,pp.332-351, passim, McCulloch's defence in the Edinburgh Magazine 
is also of note since he denies that Ricardo ever admitted the problem of 
capital durability, when he is explicitly aware of the fact that Ricardo 
did just that. See Ricardo to McCulloch, 24 Nov.,1818, Works, Voi.VII,p.337 
"I have distinctly stated ... that value is not regulated solely by 
quantity of labour, when capitals employed ... are not equally durable".
(3) Blaug, Mark, Ricardian Economics, pp.47-G. Capital labour ratios could vary, 
but their sum would he equa).
(4) Ibid.,pp.47-8. Cf., also O'Brien, op.clt.,p.85.
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account of the fact that production is a time-consuming process; of the 
reasons a mam should employ capital to set to v?ork labour to produce 
machines, rather them directly saleable g o o d s a n d  why the capitalist 
furnishes the funds for maintaining labour and the wherewithal necessary 
to production in the first place.
Clearly, the answer lies in the fact that the capitalist expects to 
make a profit on his investment. Now, profit, strictly speaking, is "the 
advantage or gain resulting to the owner of capital from its employment in
2industrious undertakings. It is the premium as it were, on accumulation". 
Ricardo locates the source of this "advantage or gain" in the compensation 
due to the capitalist for the disutility of ‘'waiting1', 3 whereas, McCulloch, 
sees it, initially at least, as a reward for productiveness. The question 
is, how do these contrary explications of profit relate to value determination?
McCulloch and Ricardo's contrary viewpoints on the conditions reguislte 
for the emergence of profit were mainly posited in their extensive 
correspondence during the 1820's. The example they focused on primarily 
concerned the case of new wine, which after a period of storage, appears to have 
acquired additional value. Ricardo explained such additional value (or "profit") 
as a compensation for waiting. McCulloch, however, attempted to explain it in 123
(1) This example is culled from O'Brien, oo.clt.,p.85.
(2) See A Dictionary, Practical, Theoretical, and Historical, of Commerce 
and Commercial Navigation, 1875, ed.,pp.H34, and W.T.Brande (ed.)
A Dictionary of Science, Literature, and Art, 1853 ed.,pp.986-7.
(3) Cf.,Ricardo to McCulloch, June 13, 1820, Works, Vol.VIII, p.193, where 
time Is the only variable dimension of capital the labour embodied in 
production cannot estimate value, the "price of the commodity must also 
compensate for the length of time that must elapse before it can be 
brought to market". See also, Ricardo to McCulloch, May 2, 1820, Works, 
Vol.VIII, p.l8o. Cf.,O'Brien, art.clt.,p.337.
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terms of the productiveness of "labour" albeit a concept of labour 
far removed from the norm. The mere passacre of time, McCulloch observes, 
cannot Ipso facto explain the increased value'of wine, since time Itself
"produces no effect whatever"; but it does afford "space for reallv efficient
2agents to produce effects". So it is the change in the actual nature of the 
wine that explains its increased value. Obviously, this approach is somewhat 
problematic.
The "effects" noted by McCulloch are seemingly those necessary to render 
a commodity fit for consumption, for a wine kept in storage for any period of 
time, whose substance at the end of that period had not altered for the better, 
would not,according to McCulloch's hypothesis, have acquired any additional 
worth: additional value only accrues because a necessary change has taken
place in the substance of the good in question, 1 23 What McCulloch must 
establish, therefore, is what causes that change? and is it explicable in 
terms of the labour theory of value?
Obviously, on a wine kept in storage for any period of time, it is clear 
that no additional human labour has been expended - but, according to McCulloch, 
this does not mean that labour per se has not been applied to the product, 
since labour, for this author, is not conceptualized simply in terms of the 
actions of man. Indeed, McCulloch condemns Ricardo for the very assumption 
that labour "should be applied by the instrumentality of workmen"; it is,
(1) That is, until the 1830 edition of the Principles.
(2) McCulloch to Ricardo, Aug.11, 1823, Works, Vol.IX, pp.342-3.
(3) This specification of the nature of profit may have been advanced in 
order to demonstrate that profit has something distinct from mere 
speculation.
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he claims, immaterial whether it is by "human hands, by machines for making 
beef, or by the action of natural juices in the process of fermentation” 
that labour is applied,* for labour may be defined as "any sort of action or
operation, whether performed by man, the lower animals, machinery, or natural
2agents that tends to bring about any desirable result".
This conception of labour is significant in a number of ways: firstly, 
it applies to any process that renders production complete; secondly, and by 
implication,it empties the concept of human labour of any special status.*
Man is conceived merely as a machine, the repository of a natural force, 
requiring a certain amount of labour for his construction (reproduction), and
to replace his wear and tear (his subsistence). He is, as it were, a "portion of
4 'national capital". He labours (l.e.produces "desirable results") only in the
same way as machinery or nature. Thirdly, this conception of labour makes
all those factors subsumed under it ultimately rewardable, enabling McCulloch
to deny to human labour any special notion of entitlement. The juridicial
claim advanced by Locke and Hodgskin, for example, that because mein has property
in his labour he has a title to the produce of that labour,is potentially
undermined, for if the labour of man can give him an exclusive title to the 1234
(1) McCulloch to Ricardo, Dec.5, 1819, Works, Vol.VIll, p.138.
(2) McCulloch (ed.), The Wealth of Nations, 1828, ed., Vol.4, p.75. (original 
emphasis).
(3) Yet this conflicts with McCulloch's own view that human labour is the 
"talisman" that has raised man in terms of civilisation. Cf "Political 
Economy",EB6 , p.235. Indeed, the Smithianesque stadial hypothesis adopted b 
McCulloch has the purpose of showing that it is the growing efficiency
with which that labour is applied that is responsible for man's more 
exalted status in commercial society.
(4) PPE (1st ed.), p.169. On the grounds that human labour is a "machine"
(a portion of national capital) it might be argued that the capitalist as 
Its owner can appropriate the value generated by it. An underlying, 
assumption of the distributional theories of the economists was I believe tha 
the labourer not only sells his labour to the capitalist (for wages) , but 
also (and necessarily) his title to the product of that labour. Cf James 
Mill, Elements, ed.3, pp.19-21 and 41; and Chapter 4, Section 2(11) op.268-282
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property created by that labour, then, by implication, the labour of nature, 
or the labour of capital might also be seen to create a title to property.
Nature could, as it were, hold property rights. Similarly capital, by 
labouring, could also be seen to generate a right to property - and since 
capital is the property of the capitalist, the oroduce of the labour of that 
capital will be seen to be his.
Geoff Hodgson has suggested in his book. Capitalism, Value and Exploitation 
A Radical Theory1 that the oost-Lockean Justification of the distribution of 
wealth - that is, a theory of distribution taking as given the existence 
of three productive sectors all entitled to factorial returns - relies on 
the exposition of a theory of value which manaaes to dissolve anv distinction 
between man and nature in propertv-holding terms. One way in which this 
distinction could be dissolved was to argue with Adam Smith, that the act 
of labouring could be conceived as an act of exchanae. Thus, the statement,
"Labour was tlje first price, the original purchase-money that was paid
2for all things", implies, Hodgson asserts, that labouring - which involves 
the creation of an output - is, in fact, an act of exchange. Someone or some­
thing is being paid - and that something is nature. "Production is an 'exchange 
with nature'“,^which implies that nature too can hold rights to property. 123
(1) Hodgson, op cit.,pp.108-110.
(2) Adam Smith, WN.I, v.2.
(3) Hodgson, op clt.,p.llO. Thomas Hodgskinin both Labour Defended Against 
the Claims of Capital, (London, 1825), pp.75-78; and Popular Political 
Economy, (London, Charles Tait, 1827), pp.219 ff., actually makes this • 
point. "Natural or necessary price means ... the whole quantity of 
labour nature requires from man ...", Pop.Pol.Ec.,p.219. Chapter 7,
Section 3,
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McCulloch's concept of labour, which accords no SDecial Droprietary 
title to human labour, enables him to avoid some of the juridical/ 
distributional consequences implied thereby. By extendincr that concept 
to cover all species of productive activity, McCulloch can then imply 
that all labour deserves some kind of reward. The question about 
additional value then becomes a question about the title to that additional 
value. Now, McCulloch assumes that nature has laboured to create that value, 
and that since the capitalist owns the product - havlnq previously 
remunerated labour for its services - ascribes the additional value to the 
capitalist. However, the arqument that it is the productivity of nature 
which is the source of profit, is, of course, highly artificial. What has 
happened, in actuality, is that the human labour invested in production, has, 
by operatinq on capital, created the potential, or the conditions necessary 
to bring wine to maturity. It has, as it were, intentionally set up the 
conditions for fermentation. In other reasonings, therefore, labour might 
be ascribed that additional value.*
Until 1830, then, McCulloch was of the view that additional value accrued 
because a change had taken place in the commodity in question, via the labour
of nature. In the edition of the Principles of that year, however, this thesis
2was abandoned. In its stead, the author argues that the chanqe in the wine 
"is entirely brouqht about bv the operation of natural agents" whose principal 
productive characteristic is that thev "render their services gratuitously".^ 
"Profit" "additional value" accrues because "the cask of wine is a capital", 
which requires "time for the processes of fermentation, decomposition, etc.,to
4effect the desired changes". As O'Brien notes "waiting" also seems to be 1234
(1) i.e.»Where the ownership of capital does not create a title to property.
(2) PPE (ed.2), pp.352-4.
(3) Ibid.,p.353.
(4) Ibid.,pp.353-4
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proferred by McCulloch,as it was previously by Ricardo, as the explanation 
for this Increased value. 1  It Is only In the 1838 edition of the Wealth 
that McCulloch finally acknowledged that both time and productiveness are 
apposite to the generation of profit.
The value of that change is not, however, dependant 
upon them /T.e. natural processed, but on the amount 
of capital, or of the produce of previous labour, 
that cooperated with them in the production of the 
effect, and the time during which it was so employed.
Additional value reflects, therefore, reward on the value of a given investment 
of capital. 1
The fact that McCulloch is gradually compelled to acknowledge implicitly 
that the labour theory of value cannot explain the relative price structure of 
a capitalist economy, since it cannot discount the fact that the value of 
commodities reflects, not only labour quantity, but also the relative time
4
periods of capital investment, leads him ultimately to the enunciation of 
a cost of production thesis. Price - or the value in exchange of goods 
calculated in monetary terms - is estimated by reference to the quantity 
of labour and capital necessary to production, plus the ordinary rate of 
profit at the time, with profit construed as "the excess of the produce 
realized by those who engage in industrial pursuits, over and above the produce 
necessarily expended in carrying them on".  ^1234
(1) O'Brien, art.clt..p.349.
(2) McCulloch, (ed.), Wealth of Nations. 4th ed., 1850, p.437. Cf . O'Brien, 
art.clt.,pp.349-50.
(3) Blaug', Ricardian Economics, ]Sp.49-50.
(4) The slower a good is produced, the higher its price must be. Burkitt, 
Brian, op clt., pp.32-3; 35-6.
(5) PPE, 5th ed., 1864, p.55.
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The acknowledgement that the capitalist only furnishes the funds
and material necessary for production to be carried on, in the expectation
of a reward, is in part related to McCulloch's concern with growth. Following
Smith, McCulloch identifies capital accumulation afl one of the principal
requisites for growth.  ^ Since the magnitude of capital accumulation is
2contingent on the rate of profit (and on the level of Droductlvity), McCulloch' 
theory of profit must explain the emergence of profit as an excess over and 
above the costs necessary to oroduction. Accumulation occurs because saving (or 
parsimony) is a basic human desire motivated by the will to better our 
condition , and indeed, "such is the wise arrangement of nature, that while 
high profits afford greater means of saving, they give additional force to the
I
parsimonious principle". The explanation of profit - and the role of capital 
in value formulation - required by the labour theory of value is, I believe, 
inconsistent with the views on profit necessary to McCulloch's conception 
of growth. Hence his gradual move away from profits as the wages of 
accumulated labour (qua a charge for depreciation) to profit as a surplus 
over and above the costs of production; and the gradual modification of the 
labour theory of value to a cost of production hypothesis.
In this section we have seen that McCulloch was compelled,through his 
recognition of the fact that the labour theory of value could not account for 123
(1) Capital is defined by McCulloch as "that portion of the produce of labour
which is saved from immediate consumption, and employed in maintaining 
productive industry, or in facilitating production", "Political Economy" 
EB6 . p.244. (original emphasis). •
(2) See PPE, 2nd ed., 1830, p.116, and PPE, 5th ed.,1864, p.55.
(3) PPE, 1st ed., 1825, pp.60-61.
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the effects of capital (and Droflt) In value determination, to abandon 
that thesis in favour of a cost of production theory. We have also seen Just 
how extensive a conception of labour McCulloch employed in his attempt to 
reduce profit to labour. In the next section, it is our aim to examine 
James Mill's treatment of value formation, considering in the course of that 
treatment Mill's adoption of McCulloch's "labour (embodied-in-capital) 
goes-on-working" theorem.
a
Section 4: James Mill — A Disciple Plus Royaliste?
Eric Roil, in the History of Economic Thought, commented of 
James Mill and John Ramsay McCulloch, that "in them the contradictions and 
confusions of Ricardo are either repeated, glossed over, or left out")" 
whilst Donald Winch in his Introduction to the Selected Writings of James Mill, 
notes that it was:
Mill's attempt to do for Ricardo what he had 
already done for Bentham in the field of 
law and government: to consolidate the 
Ricardian School and remove any obstacles 
which might be the way to a full acceptance 
of 'correct' principles 2
that motivated Mill's composition of the Elements of Political Economy.^ .
In other words, both men are deemed to have foresaken originality in favour 
of popular ejq>osition. 4 Whilst the charge when levelled against McCulloch's 
system of political economy, generally, is somewhat unfair, given his 
propensity in later writings to develop ideas and themes directly at variance 
with Ricardian orthodoxy, reflecting more the impact of Smithian concepts,^ 1
(1) Roll, Eric, History of Economic Thought, (London, Faber and Faber, 1953), 
p.300, Cf. Blaug, Ricardian Economics, p.46.
(2) Winch, Donald (ed.), Selected Economic Writings of James Mill, (Edinburgh 
Oliver and Boyd Ltd., 1966) p.188.
(3) Mill, James, Elements of Political Economy (London, ed.I, 1821; ed.2, 
1823, ed. 3, 1826, reprint 1844). All references unless otherwise 
stated are to the 1844 reprint of edition 3. (New York, Augustus
M.Kelley, 1965).
(4) Cf,, Blaug, op. cit. , p.46.
See below, chapter 4; Cf. O'Brien, J .R.McCulloch, for a consideration 
of the comparative Smithian or Ricardian paternity of McCulloch's 
political economy.
(5)
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the charge when directed at Mill is, on the whole, inescapable. For, 
although Mill did Innovate in some areas\ the primary motive behind his 
political economy was simply to give a logical, but rudimentary, account of the
Ricardian system, and thus the Elements of Political Economy is advertised as
2a "school-book" composed for the dissemination of those principles.
Mill's tendency to view Ricardianlsm as an accepted doctrine requiring 
propagation and defence, and not a svstem requiring criticism or revision, 
is again evidenced, as Winch observes, in Mill's attitude to the Political 
Economy Club . 3 In addition Mill himself regarded his relationship with 
Ricardo as one of a committed apostle, proclaiming in a letter to McCulloch 
after the death of Ricardo, that:
... as you and I are his two and only two 
genuine disciples, his memory must be a 
bond of connection between us. 4
Limiting ourselves in this chapter to classical economic theories of 
value, it will be the main purpose of this section to examine Mill's treatment 
of both value determination and measurement, evaluating as we qo the degree 
to which he supports, and the degree to which he deviates from,Ricardian 
orthodoxy in his value analysis we de^er consideration of his contribution 
to the classical economic theory of distribution to the next chapter. 1
(1) Blaug cites, for example, Mill's proposal to tax the "unearned increment” 
of rental values, op clt.,p.46.
(2) Elements, p.iii.
(3) Cf,, Winch, Selected Writings, po.192-3. Mill argued for example, 
that it was the duty of the Club to "study the means of obtaining 
access to the public mind through as many as possible of the periodical 
publications of the day and to influence as far as possible the tone
of such publications in favour of the just principles of Political Economy" 
(cited in Winch, op clt.,p.192)
(4) Mill to McCulloch, 19 September 1823, in Sraffa ed.. Works,VolIX, pp.391-2. 
Ricardo had died on 11 September that year.
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Ricardo's theory of value, as we demonstrated in section 2, 
consisted exclusively in a labour cost explanation of both value 
determination and value measurement. It is our contention in this section 
that it was out of an attempt to simplify and thence defend this labour 
cost explanation of value, that many of the absurdities inherent in Mill's 
theory of value arose.^
Mill's exposition of value in the Elements begins with an attempt to 
explain the principles regulatinq the rate of exchance of commodities. 
Considering the market exchange rate first, Mill declares that this rate is 
set according to the principles of supply and demand.
If a great quantity of corn is brought to market to exchange for cloth, 
but only a small quantity of cloth is brouoht to market to exchange for corn, 
then a great quantity of the former will exchanqe for a small quantity of the 
latter. However, whilst it is the proportion of supply to demand that 
influences this market exchanae ratio, this alone does not explain the manner 
in which the proportion of supply to demand is regulated in the first place,
rather this requires an elucidation of the laws underlying the conditions of
2supply, that is, the laws requlating cost of production.
Like Ricardo, Mill assumes that two factors combine in production, viz., 
labour and capital. Labour, for Mill, represents not only the physical 
exertion of the labourer, but also comprises his consumption, for "there can 
be no labour, without the consumption of the labourer, 3 thus "in the idea
4of labour, the idea of this subsistence is included", whereas capital. 1234
(1) See, for example, Mill's treatment of the problem of the passage of time 
and the generation of profit in value regulation» and the "wage durablllty- 
of-capital" conundrum. See below, pp,198-2o4 & pp.205-207.
(2) Following both Smith and Ricardo, Mill assumes that the market price of 
any article will tend to fluctuate about its cost of production.
(3) Elements, p.9.
(4) Ibid.,p.8 .
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comprises "the instruments which aid labour, and the materials on which
it is employed" . 1 With the exception of original or primitive capital - that
is, the first capital utilised bv man which is the result of pure labour on
the materials of nature - all capital is the result of previous labour.
Thus, "the flax and the cotton, which are to be manufactured into cloth and
2muslin, have been the result of the labour of agriculture".
Assuming a scenario where labour is the only factor of production Mill 
sets out to demonstrate that labour quantity measured in man hours regulates 
value. Thus: "in the rude state of society, if the hunter and the fisherman 
desired to vary their food, the one by a portion of game, the other by a 
portion of fish, the average quantity which thev took in a dav would form the 
standards of exchange".^ ,
Although labour quantity determined in man hours appears to be the 
only determinant of value. Mill, like Smith and Ricardo before him, also 
acknowledges the problem of the differential characteristics of different 
jobs, noting that "an allowance would, of course, be included", in the
4estimate of labour quantity, "for different degrees of hardness and skill". 
Where Smith, and Ricardo suggest that, in substance, the "higgling and 
bargaining" of the market would establish this differential scale, Mill 
makes no mention of the process by which a differential scale would be set. 
Having cursorily dismissed the problem of wage differentials. Mill moves on 
to show, a la Ricardo, that capital is reducible to labour.
Since the first capital must have been the produce of pure labour, 
it is obvious, asserts Mill, that the value of this capital, "the quantity ' 1234
(1) Ibid.,p.!7.
(2) Ibid.,p,17. See p.19 also.
(3) Ibid.,p.95.
(4) Ibid.,pp.95-6
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of other commodities for which it would exchancre, mu9t have been estimated 
by labour".^ Now, as the value of the commodities produced bv the first 
capital is determined by labour quantity, and as the capital of the second 
staqe must comprise qoods manufactured in the first staqe, it is patent that 
the value of this second-stage capital is also regulated by labour. And "it 
thus appears by the clearest evidence, that quantity of labour in the last
resort, determines the proportion in which commodities exchanqe for one
2another".
Hitherto, Mill has merely restated the substance of Ricardo's theory
of value. However, incorporated into the second edition of the Elements
is a consideration of the effect of time on value determination, which
reflects the curious "labour (embodied-in-capital) goes-on-working"
theorem developed by McCulloch. It had been alleged, against the labour
theory of value, that the worth of commodities is affected by time,
"without the Intervention of labour", for the simple reason that when the
profits of stock are included in price, "so much must be added for every
portion of time which the production of one commodity requires beyond 
4that of another", and so it was cost of production that was seen to 
regulate value in exchange, and not simple labour expenditure.
Thus: ... if the same quantity of labour 
has produced in the same season a cask of 
wine, and 2 0 sacks of flour, they will exchange 123
(1) Elements, 1844, p.96.
(2) Ibid.,p.98.
(3) The phrase "labour (embodled-in-capltal) qoes-on-working" is taken from 
D.P.O'Brien's article: "J.R.McCulloch and the theory of value",
pp.332-351, passim.
(4) Elements, 1844, ed., p.99
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aqainst one another at the end of the season: 
but if the owner of the wine places the wine 
in his cellar, and keens it for a couple of 
years, it will be worth more than the 2 0 sacks 
of flour, because the profits of stock for the 
two years must be added to the original price.
Here, it was affirmed, was an addition to value not proportioned to 
labour, which provided evidence that value in exchange was not requlated
by labour alone. Mill, following McCulloch, claims that the above hypothesis
2is based on a "misapprehension" concerning the nature of profit.
In order to explain why something like a cask of wine which cost a 
particular quantity of labour (and capital) in its production, should 
acquire labour, Ricardo, unlike Mill and McCulloch, had argued that where 
relative labour quantitv determined value, when nothing but labour was 
bestowed on the production of commodities, and that labour for an equal' 
length of time, the minute production times become unequal, then labour 
quantity, though still perhaps the principal determinant of value, can no 
longer be considered as the sole determinant of value, "for besides 
compensating for the labour /embodied in production/, the price of the 
commodity must also compensate for the length of time that must elapse before 
it can be brought to market".^ In other words the additional value of the 123
(1) Ibid.,p.99.
(2) McCulloch in a letter to Ricardo, writes that:"In so far as you differ
in opinion with me on the vexata question of value, I think the difference 
principally hinges on the interpretation we are to give to the word 
profit - whether is /sic/ the additional value we get back in exchange 
for capital we have emploved in production a compensation for time, or 
for our forbearance in not having consumed the capital immedlatelv, or 
is it a positive additional value resulting from the employment of the 
capital and not dependent on time?" McCulloch to Ricardo, August 24, 1823, 
Works, vol.IX, pp.366-7.
(3) Ricardo to McCulloch, June 13 1820, Works, vol.VIII, p.193. The problem 
of varying production times (etc.) is dealt with in Ricardo's treatment 
of the question of the "wage/durability-of-caoital" theorem. See
pp.169-173.
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wine - represented as profit - signifies compensation for the disutility of 
waiting: since waiting involves a real cost.
Contra Ricardo, McCulloch had asserted, as we revealed in the last 
section, that time of itself was unimportant, merely affording "space 
for really efficient agents to produce effects, " 1 With these "efficient 
agents" all falling under McCulloch's umbrella term "labour", defined as 
"any sort of action or operation, whether performed by man, the lower animals,
2machinery, or natural agents, that tends to bring about ¿my desirable result."
So the increased value accruing .to the capitalist on wine laid down for a year
represents, not compensation for the disutiliy of waiting, but rather reflects
"labour" expenditure, or the productiveness of the labour (of natural agents)
set in motion by a quantity of capital, viewed as accumulated labour. Increased
value is not a "compensation for the time that capital has been locked up",
it is the result of "an effect produced by agents which it has cost a certain
.3 12345 Profit is, therefore, 
4
quantity of capital or labour to set in motion.
"only another name for the wages of accumulated labour."
Mill, in the second edition of the Elements, follows McCulloch's lead 
contra Ricardo. "Profits" he claims, "are, in reality the measure of 
quantity of labour"'*; they represent "the wages of that labour which is 
applied not immediately by the hand, but mediately, by the instruments which
(1) McCulloch to Ricardo, Aug 11 1823, Works, vol IX pp.342-3.
(2) McCulloch (ed), The Wealth of Nations, 1828 (ed) "Notes and Dissertations", 
vol IV, p.75. (McCulloch's emphasis). Cf. , above, pp,186-190.
(3) McCulloch "Principles which Determine the Exchangeable Value of Commodities 
and the Rate of Profit", Scotsman, Feb 21, 1824, pp 112-3. Mark Blaug 
notes that McCulloch had glimpsed the fact that differences in the length 
of production cycles presupposes a rate of interest to equalize the 
returns per unit of time on capital invested, but had failed to 
investigate the phenomenon. Cf., Blaug, Ricardian Economics, 2nd ed. , p.50. 
NB. also, McCulloch abandoned this idea of profit as the wages of accumulate' 
labour in edition 2 of the Principles 1830.
(4) McCulloch PPE (ed.1) 1825, p. 154.
(5) Elements, 1844 ed., p.99 Mill does not include the work of nature under
the heading "labour", deviating slightly from McCulloch's definition.
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the hand has produced. " 1  Time, it is proclaimed, "does nothing ... /itj
is a mere abstract term. It is a word, a sound, and it is the very same
logical absurdity to talk of an abstract unit measuring value, and of 
2time creating it."
If two goods are produced for immediate consumption, with the same 
amount of labour embodied, they would. Mill claims, be of equivalent value 
in exchange. The quantity of labour expended in their generation would 
regulate their relative values. However, should the owner of one of these 
items (a machine, for example), rather than sell it, decide to employ it 
in production, in order to accrue profit, he would, instead of receiving 
its entire value all at once, receive deferred payments. In other words, 
he would receive an annuity, determined by the competition of the market, 
instead of a capital sum. 1
There is, Mill proclaims, no real difference, therefore, in the 
exchangeable value of the two items produced by equivalent quantities of 
labour, however variously those items may be employed. The sale of one 
merely brings about the entire payment of its value immediately to its 
owner, whereas the employment of the other in production brings about 
its payment in installments. Capital is, therefore, simply hoarded labour 
which releases its value over time. The only sense in which time is 
relevant, then, is as it relates to the computation of that annuity 
according to which the quantity of labour applied in production can be 123
(1) Elements, 1844 ed., p.103. This phrase does not appear in earlier 
editions.
(2) Elements, 1824 ed. only, p.99. See Ricardo, "Absolute Value and 
Exchangeable Value" (A Rough Draft), Works, vol IV, pp.361-397. See 
pp. 375-6 especially where he notes that the increase in value of the 
wine identified by Mill as a reflection of the quantity of labour 
worked up in it, is actually "a compensation for the time that the 
merchants capital has been invested in it."
(3) Thus "whatever the proportion which the capital sum bears to the annuity, 
whether it be ten years' purchase, or twenty years' purchase, such a 
proportion is each years annuity of the original value of the machine.” 
Elements, 1844, p.lOO. The annuity is, therefore, the exact equivalent 
of the capital sum.
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measured.
If capital, paid for by an annuity, is paid for at the rate of
ten per cent, one-tenth of the hoarded labour may be correctly regarded
as expended (or_ consumed) in one year. If the capital was the result of
lOO days' labour, and is designed to last ten years, at an annuity payment
of lO per cent, one-tenth of the fruits of lOO days' labour is expended
every year - which is "the same thing in the view of cost and value, as
saying that lO days' labour have been expended. " 1  And so Mill proclaims,
"if the wine which is put in the cellar is increased in value one-tenth by
being kept a year, one-tenth more labour may be correctly considered as
2having been expended upon it."
That additional labour has been expended on the wine is evidenced ( 
exclusively by this increase in its value. Just as immediate labour creates 
value in proportion to the quantity of it utilised in production, so too does 
hoarded labour; thus profit is paid because the labour applied "mediately, 
by the instruments which the hand has produced" 1 requires remuneration. 
Immediate labour is recompensed with wages, secondary labour with profits, 
with the rate of this return on profit reflecting the extent of value 
created by capital (hoarded labour) expenditure. 123
(1) Elements, 1844 ed. only p.103.
(2) Elements, 1824 ed. only pp.97-98.
(3) Elements, 1844 ed. only p.103.
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Mill's perspective on this question of the relationship between 
value, profit, and time is important in two ways: firstly, because 
Mill's conception of capital as hoarded labour releasing its value gradually 
over a period of time determined by the length of its amortisation 
process, provides, as Blaug notes, not an explanation of the emergence of 
profit or interest on capital, but simply of the value of a given 
investment of capital;*' and secondly, because of the argument developed 
by McCulloch, and to some degree rehearsed by Mill, that labouring is a 
faculty attributable to non-human phenomena, which, as we demonstrated 
in the previous section, is an argument with interesting proprietary 
réunifications, for it denies to labour any exclusive appropriative title 
originating in value creation. Again this stance suggests that the < 
classical economists failed to regard the status of human labour as 
in any way distinctive - in either property or value terms.
To borrow a phrase from Marx, labour is conceiyed . not as "species - 
activity", a special attribute of human beings, but simply as the lowest 
common denominator in production, a factor to which all other value- 
related inputs may be reduced, and as such of a dehumanized, impersonal 
quality. This particular conceptualization of labour, and its links with 
value theory, tend to reinforce the claim we made in Section 1, that the 
classical economists regarded the labour theory of value, not as a causal 
theory, grounded in the notion that labour is unique in that it alone 1
(1) Blaug, Ricardian Economics, 2nd ed., p.51. Blaug comments that 
both Mill and McCulloch, "in so doing ... already assume the 
existence of a discount factor independently determined, at which 
to capitalize the expected stream of future earnings". Cf., Elements, 
p.104.
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can confer value upon an object*' (which may or may not have proprietary
implications), but as an explanatory theory, founded upon the assumption
that value is principally estimable in terms of labour input - with
capital reducible to labour quantity - but allowing factors other them
2labour to influence value formation.
As we observed in section 2, Ricardo's theory of value developed 
in part, at least, out of an attempt to refute the Smithian proposition 
that the emergence of a capitalist economy based upon the existence of 
private property in land led inso facto to the abandonment of the labour 
theory of value, and to its replacement by a cost of production theory, 
for this implied that a change in the rate of return to any factor would 
alter the value of all those commodities in whose production that '
factor was employed. Abstracting land from the value equation through 
the enunciation of the differential theory of rent, Ricardo had set out 
to show that a change in the wage rate, whilst amending the share of 
the product falling to profit,would not necessarily affect the value of 
the commodity itself. However, consideration of the fact that factor 
mixes varied from industry to industry, and that capital itself could be 
of varying degrees of durability, compelled Ricardo to modify his argument 
and to acknowledge that fluctuations in the wage/profit rate may cause 
alterations in the exchange ratio of commodities, independent of labour. 1
(1) Cf^ . Locke, "'tis Labour ... that put3 the difference of value on 
everything", and "labour (that) makes the far greater part of ... 
value", 11.8 40. (Original emphasis).
(2) See above, section 1, pp.149-153.
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Mill, following Ricardo in the enunciation of a labour cost 
explanation of price, must also tackle the issue of the "wage/durability 
of capital” theorem. Beginning his analysis with his customary differentiation
between capital - "hoarded, or secondary" labour - and labour - "immediate,
2or primary" - Mill asserts that although both represent species of labour,
there are important differences between them: firstly, they are not
remunerated at the same rate, and secondly, the proportions of each combined
in production varies from commodity to commodity.^
Abstracting for a moment from the issue at hand Mill notes that if
two species of labour (skilled and unskilled, for exemple) existed, which
did not rise or fall in value to the same extent, and which were combined
differently in the production of various goods, then "this circumstance'...
would create a difference In exchangeable values, as often as any fluctuation
4took place in the rate of wages". For, if as often as the wages of skilled
labour rose, those of unskilled labour rose twice as much, then "it is 
very obvious, that, upon a rise of wages, those commodities to the 
production of which a greater proportion of unskilled labour was applied, 1
(1) Ricardo does, of course, endeavour to minimise the significance of 
this qualifying factor to 6 or 7 per cent variation in value, declaring 
that profit could not be depressed permanentlv, beyond that limit. 
Principles, Sraffa ed., Work3 , vol.I, p.36.
(2) Elements, 1844, ed. , p.105.
(3) Ibid., p.105.
(4) Ibid.,p.106.
would rise in value as compared with those to which a less proportion was 
applied. "*■
Primary labour and capital as different species of labour, viz.
skilled and unskilled labour, are, assuming varied factor mixes in the
production of different articles, also affected by variations in the wage
rate in the same way as skilled and unskilled labour. Mill argues. Thus
the more capital-intensive goods are less affected by a change in the
wage rate than labour-intensive goods. In order to illustrate his
argument Mill constructs a model of a standard product in which labour and
2capital combine in equal ratios.
Assuming an increase in wages, all those commodities made with a 
less proportion of labour to capital than the standard product will fall 
in value, as compared with those which are made with a greater proportion 
of labour to capital than the standard product, which will increase in 
value.^
However, although Mill adopts Ricardo’s position in his discussion of 
the impact of a fluctuation in the wage rate upon value determination, he 
adopts a position plus royallste on the question of the universal operability 
on the labour quantity theory, declaring that even though a variation in 
the wage rate will affect the rate of exchange of commodities,because of 123
(1 ) ibid., p.105.
(2 ) ibid., p.107.
(3) ibid., pp.110-111. It is, Mill alleges, easy to compute the effect 
of a wage rise upon price. All goods are compared with money.
If money is assumed to be produced, la “standard” commodity, with 
equal quantities of labour and capital, then goods produced under 
comparable circumstances would not have their relative value inter­
fered with by a change in the wage rate; whereas, those articles 
produced with a preponderance of labour would rise in price, and those 
at the other extreme, produced principally with capital, would fall 
in price. The aggregate level of price of commodities would, 
however, remain constant. See, Thld..pp.112-113.
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differences in the capital-labour ratios of different goods, "it would
do so, without in the least degree affecting the truth of the proposition
that quantity of labour determined exchangeable values , " 1 a defence of the
Ricardian system so absurd as to provoke Ricardo to write:
If a watch and a common Jack altered in relative 
value without any more or less labour being 
required for the production of either of them, 
could we say that the proposition "that quantity 
of labour determines exchangeable value" was 
universally true? What I call exceptions 
and modifications of the general rule you 
appear to me to say come under the general 
rule itself. 2
The final element of Mill's theory of value concerns his elucidation 
of the concept of a measure of value, as distinct from the principles 
regulating value in exchange, where somewhat surprisingly Mill rejects 
labour quantity as the standard of value.
A measure of value, capable of estimating the power of purchasing
articles over time, ought to be invariable in its own value r that is,
its cost of production ought to be constant. However, the impossibility
of finding such a commodity leads Mill (as it did Ricardo) to consider
3the best approximation available. All that could be expected of this 
proximate measure was that it estimate the fluctuations in value of those 
commodities produced under identical (labour-capital) conditions to 
itself; and, secondly, that it gauge roughly the changes in value, 
prompted by variations in the wage rate, of goods produced tinder
4alternative (labour-capital) conditions of production to itself.
Having rejected gold as a possible measure of value , Mill considers 123
(1 ) ibid., pl06
(2) Ricardo to Mill, 18 Dec. 1821, Sraffa ed. Works, vol. IX. pl27. 
cf.. Winch, Donald, ed., Selected Economic Writings, p260n.
(3) Elements, 1844 ed., ppll3-114.
ibid., pll4: The measure of value might be "accommodated by calculation 
to the change in value" of goods produced by different factor mixes.
How it may be accommodated remains unclear.
(4)
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labour, since the exchangeable value of commodities is directly pro­
portioned to labour quantity, but rejects it on three counts: firstly, 
that it is unsuitable because two kinds of labour are employed in 
production, and the proportion of the product received by each varies, 
leading to a corresponding variation in the value of goods produced under 
different circumstances; secondly, because "we have no practical means 
of ascertaining before hand the exact quantity of hoarded labour which 
goes to production, since the only measure we have of its quantity is 
the price which it brings"1, and, finally, because the productive power 
of labour is variable. If, for e x a m p l e , a uniform quantity of gold is 
created by a day's labour, but variable amounts of c o m  or cloth, then the 
relative amount of gold would alter vis-a-vis c o m  or cloth. 1 2 3
With the exception of a number of features, such as his treatment 
of value measurement, Mill's theory of value is, on the whole, little 
more them a reiteration, in highly simplistic terms, of the ideas of 
Ricardo. Where Mill does amend Ricardo's thesis, in an attempt at 
clarification, and popularisation, and in order to demonstrate the 
exclusivity of "labour” - in the broadest sense - in value determination, 
he usually adopts a position "more Ricardian than Ricardo himself"^, as 
evidenced, for example, by his assertion that the "wage/durability-of- 
capital" theorem was somehow compatible with the idea that labour cost 
alone explicates value in exchange; and by his conception of profit 
as the wages of "mediate" labour, derived primarily from McCulloch.
The net effect of Mill's clarificatory modifications is, however, not 
to reinforce the credibility of the labour theory of value at all, but
(1) ibid., pll6 , cf., ppll4-115.
(2 ) ibid., pll6 .
(3) Halevy, Elie, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, trans. Mary 
Morris, (London, Faber and Faber Ltd., 1928), p343. Halevy was, of 
course, referring to McCulloch at the time, though the•judgement 
seems more applicable to Mill.
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rather, to undermine it. As McCulloch wrote of the Elements, in general:
Those secondary principles and modifying 
circumstances, which exert so powerful an 
influence over general principles are wholly, 
or almost wholly, overlooked by Mill ... 
although their consideration might be omitted 
in an original work like that of Ricardo, it is 
not so easily excused in an elementary treatise, 1
and certainly with regard to Mill's treatment of value, nothing could be
more true. 1
(1) McCulloch, J.R.»Literature of Political Economy, (London, 1855),
pp.17-18. Cf., Winch, ed.. Selected Economic Writings, pp.188-189.
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CONCLUSION
Of the concept of value, F.von Wleser once wrote, It is "the essence 
of things in economics. Its laws are to political economy what the law 
of gravity is to mechanics".1 For the classical oolitlcal economists, 
studied in this dissertation, value certainly had such a crucial 
role: it was central to their delineation of the laws of distribution, the 
question of price, and the issue of welfare. The oroblem of value has, 
as we demonstrated in chanter 2, two dimensions: it may concern the orinclples
regulating the exchange ratio of commodities, or it may concern the problem
2of value measurement. And, indeed, it is possible to identify both of 
these dimensions within classical political economy. Thus, all the 
classical economists studied in this dissertation demonstrate a concerh 
with value determination, whilst most - the notable exception is McCulloch - 
demonstrate a similar concern with value measurement.
In this chapter, we have concentrated on the nature and development 
of the labour theory of value within Ricardian thought. Adam Smith, we 
concluded in chapter 2, had developed three different explanations to 
elucidate various aspects of value theory: a "labour command theory” 
designed to explicate value measurement; a "labour quantity theory" 
designed to explicate the principles regulating exchangeable value in 
pre-capitalist societies in which land remained a free good; and, a 
”cost-of-production", or "adding-up" hypothesis, designed to explicate *2
.(1) Wieser, F. von.Natural Value, trans. by C.A.Malloch, (London, 1893), ,
p.xxx. Cited in Myrdal, The Political Element in ... Economic Theory, 
p. 58.
(2) See above, chapter 2, section 2 (i), PP.R4-88.
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the principles determining the exchange ratio of commodities after 
capital had been accumulated, and land had become orivate oroperty.
We concluded in this chapter that it was the problems and inconsistencies 
both apparent and real - within Smith's theories of value that formed the 
sprinq-board for the development of Ricardo's enunciation of a labour 
cost theory of value.
One particular question addressed by this dissertation is the nature 
of the relationship, if any, between labour, value and oroperty. In 
section 1 of this chapter, therefore, we examined the status of that 
relationship within Ricardian economics, comparing the general assumptions 
of the labour theory of value, with those of the labour theory of 
entitlement. We concluded that the labour theory of value failed to 
accord any special status to human labour, whilst the juridical thesis 
is underwritten by that very assumption.
We demonstrated that, in consequence, "labour" simply represented, 
within the labour value thesis, a unit of measurement, the lowest 
common denominator in production, to which all other value-related Inputs 
may be reduced, and that as such, the labour value thesis was an 
explanatory thesis. By contrast, we showed that the juridical thesis, 
conceiving "labour" as (in some sense) "species-activity" regarded labour 
as the only factor capable of creating value} and that the theory of 
valuation advanced by juridical theorists was a causal theory. Finally, 1
(1) Land and capital, whilst essential to production, are regarded as 
passive instruments in that process.
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we concluded that the conception of property underlying the classical 
theory of value and distribution was not a conceotion derived from the 
natural rights theory of John Locke, but rather a conception derived 
from Utilitarian theory. This point will be explicated in greater 
detail in section 3 of chapter 5, where we shall discuss the notion 
of "security" within classical political economy.
In section 2, we moved on to examine the theory of value developed 
by David Ricardo. We demonstrated that in the Essav on Profit Ricardo 
was primarily concerned with the Impact of a change in the price of 
c o m  on the profits of stock; that he employed a model of distribution 
conceived in simple physical product terms - the so-called "corn-ratio 
theory" - in order to explicate that imoact; and that he Ignored the 
problem of how the prices of commodities are regulated throughout the 
economy as a whole. In other words, Ricardo in the Essav did not present 
a systematic account of value determination.
In section 2 (ii) we focused on Ricardo's value theory in the 
Principles of Political Economy and Taxation. We observed that Ricardo 
developed his views on value out of a critique of the ideas of Adam 
Smith, but that this critique was, in part, grounded in' a misconception 
concerning Smith's labour command thesis. We demonstrated that Ricardo 
aimed to refute the Smithian claim that the labour cost theory was 
historically specific, by showinq that even after capital had accumulated 
and land been appropriated, exchanaeable value was still determined by 
labour quantity. This endeavour led Ricardo to argue that capital was
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simply accumulated labour, and that it could, as such, be reduced to 
labour quantity 1 and that land - and the cruestion of rent - was, in 
fact, extraneous to the question of valuation. So we shall explain in 
the next chapter, this latter point involved Ricardo in the enunciation of
the differential theory of rent based upon the concept of diminishing
2marginal returns in aoriculture. Furthermore, we also noted in this 
section, that Ricardo's recognition that factor mixes are variable between 
industries led him to modify his strict labour cost position. Acknowledgement 
of the "wage/durability-of-capital" theorem compelled Ricardo to concede 
that the relative value of commodities might be modified by conditions 
other than alterations in the amount of labour requisite for production.
Our final point of inquirv vis-a-vis Ricardo concerned his exposition
I
of a theory of absolute value. The purpose of this theory, we concluded 
was to enable Ricardo to construct a measure of value desiqned to estimate 
changes in the division of the total product of Industry throughout time.
In section 3, we turned to the labour theory of value developed by 
John Ramsay McCulloch. We observed that McCulloch begins by enunciating 
a simple labour cost explanation of value, but that, following his 
recognition that the labour cost thesis was inadequate to accommodate 
the impact of variations in wages and profit on relative value, he developed 
a cost-of-production account of value regulation, with rent excluded in 
the usual post-Ricardlan fashion. Vie also noted that McCulloch was only 12
(1) Ricardo at this Dolnt assumes that faietor mixes are constant 
throughout the economy.
(2) See below, chapter 4, section l(li).
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Interested In the Issue of exchangeable value and that he regarded the 
quest for a standard of value as a waste of time. Our main consideration 
in this section related to McCulloch's conception of "labour", as enunciated 
in the light of the problem of profit generation for value determination, 
and the relationship of that conception of labour for distribution.
Labour, for McCulloch, we observed, was a largelv dehumanized conceot, 
covering all species of productive activity. The -Pact that McCulloch 
did not accord to human labour any special status, we concluded, allowed 
him to deny that that labour might generate a soeeial title to the 
property created by its exertion - as implied, for instance, in the 
juridical theses of Locke and Hodgskln. In this way, he could, we 
noted, allocate the additional value generated by maturing wine during 
its petiod of storage to the capitalist. Finally, we noted that McCulloch's 
initial, confused, belief that profit was a reward *or productiveness, 
was gradually replaced by the awareness that both time and oroductiveness 
are apposite to profit-generation.
The labour theory of value enunciated by James Mill formed the 
focal point of section 4. We observed that, for the most part. Mill's 
theory of value was a simple reiteration of Ricardian orthodoxy. We 
also noted that it was out of his attempt to simplify, and thence defend 
the labour cost thesis that most of the absurdities and inconsistencies 
of Mill's value theory arose. Mill thus attempted to explain the increase 
in value accruing on maturing wine during its period of storage, in 
simple labour quantity terms. Here, as we showed, he adopted the "labour 
(embodied-in-capital) goes-on-working" theorem developed by McCulloch.
The position adopted by Mill and McCulloch was, of course, at 
variance with the position adopted by Ricardo on this question.
215
The two former men enunciated an argument from productiveness, whilst 
the latter employed an argument from "waiting". Furthermore, Mill 
adopted and adapted the unusual conception of labour utilised by 
McCulloch. We concluded that the dehumanization of the concept of labour 
potentially undermines claims from human labour to the additional value 
created during the maturation process. In his discussion of the impor­
tance of the "wage/durabllity-of-capital theorem" for value regulation, 
we observed that Mill attempted to reduce this source of variation to 
an argument from labour quantity by analogizing wages and profit with 
the remuneration for two different species of labour, namely skilled 
and unskilled labour. Such an approach, we concluded, reflected Mill's 
misunderstanding of the concept of profit. Our final concern in this 
sub-section, was Mill's position on value measurement - a position 
distinct from that adopted by Ricardo, for Mill rejected labour as 
the most satisfactory candidate standard of value.
In this chapter we have been concerned with the labour theory of 
value in the writings of the classical political economists. In chapter 
7, we shall examine the role of the labour theory of value in the 
writings of the antl-Ricardians^ We- asserted at the beginning of this 
conclusion that the issue of valuation was closely related to the 
problem of distribution in classical political economy. It is our 
intention in the next chapter to examine that theory of distribution, 
and to comment, where appropriate, upon its connections with the labour 
value hypothesis. 1
(1) See below, chapter 7, section 3
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Chapter 4. Distribution and the Classical Economists
The main subject matter of this chapter relates to the question of 
distribution and the Classical Economists. Distribution may be defined 
as: "the sharinq of a Joint product amonq an Indefinite number of agencies 
(owners) cooperating In Its creation" , 1  and relates therefore, to the 
problem of how returns to the several factors of production are determined.
The agencies, or factors, identified by the classical economists were 
threefold - land, labour, and capital - to which conformed not only 
three particular types of propertv income - rent, waqes, and profit, but 
also three distinctive social classes - landlords, labourers, and
capitalists. Each of the authors discussed in this chapter Is endeavouring,
2therefore, to explicate the social process of division. Thev are conqerned 
not so much with pricing of productive services, and the mechanism whereby 
resources are allocated within and between Industries, but with the 
actual physical division of the product of Industry. For unlike Smith, 
who had sought primarily to explicate the way all productive factors would 
be transferred between competing uses moving from the least to the 
most remunerative until returns to all factors are equalised throughout 
the economy, 1 23 the Ricardlans and Malthus had focused only on the movement
(1) Knight, F.H., 'The Ricardian Theory of Production and Distribution',
I & II, Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science, 1935, pp.3-25, 
and 171-196, p.6 .
(2) Ibid.,p.176.
(3) This is the substance of WN.I.vii, "Of the Natural and Market Price of • 
Commodities". Smith was also interested in how the aggregate product 
of Industry was partitioned, but this was slightly less significant 
than the issue of resource allocation.
of capital, regarding the equalisation of the returns on capital as capable«
automatically, of equalising the rate of return to labour.^
The sense in which the "agencies" identified above may be seen to
"co-operate" in production requires, however, some preliminary
elucidation. Co-operation may simply represent conjoint operation: that is,
land, labour, and capital may simply be regarded as factors whose
co-operation is technically necessary to the production of a commodity.
This fact, as such, conveys no particular information as to the
ownership of, or shares in, the final product of those combined efforts.
Alternatively, co-operation in production may signify something about
the bases of distributive claims. In this instance it is the co-operation
of the social classes - landlords, labourers, and capitalist - in providing
the requisite factors - land, labour, and capital - that is being considered.
Such co-operation to bring about the completion of a productive process might
then imply something about desert or reward - and also something about the
legitimate foundations of property rights.
The classical economists, on the assumption that the actual pattern
of ownership of the factors of production was itself legitimate, extrapolated,
therefrom, to considerations about how the returns to such factors were
determined, and, as such, employs the second definition of co-operation
outlined above, although the question was empirical, rather than normative.
The anti-Ricardians however, denied that the prevailing distributive
pattern was either just or legitimate, and thus through a critique of the
technical side of production deduced that the labourer alone was entitled • 1
(1) This is due to the belief that the value of a product was
shared exclusively between labour and capital; and thus changes 
in the profit rate necessarily alter the rate of wages.
218
to a reward in the product of industry,1 since the application of 
labour was necessary to render productive both capital and land. For them 
the issue of distribution was normative: they were interested in the just 
grounds of entitlement.
The empirical theory of distribution underlying the Ricardian system -
and to some extent that of Malthus - relies on two principles: a marginal
2principle, and a surplus, or residual principle. The former explains the 
derivation of rent, and the latter the division of the remainder - the 
residue - between wages and profit. There is, therefore, a double dichotomy 
inherent in this explanation of the distributive process. The social product 
as a whole is partitioned between land, on the one hand, and labour and 
capital combined, on the other. The latter share is subsequently split 
into two separate portions: one each for labour and capital respectively.
The marginal principle is founded on the claim that rent is price- 
determined, rather them price-determining: it represents the excess accruing 
over marginal costs, and can, as such, be abstracted from the issue of 
valuation - leaving the value of a commodity to be divided exclusively between 
the shares to labour and capital. This view of rent simplifies the problem 
of' dlatributibntherefore, to a straight-forward dichotomy. Only one share 
appears to require explanation,the other being determined by subtraction.
For the Ricardians the share requiring explanation was assumed to be that 
of wages. Using on the Malthusian doctrine of population growth, the 
classical economists argue that since population growth tends to outpace 12
(1) Consideration of the anti-Ricardians’ respective critiques of 
capitalism will be deferred until chapter 7. Suffice it to say that 
land, on the whole, was viewed as a free good accessible to all; and 
capital a product of labour rendered productive only through the 
application of labour. There are,of course, alternative expressions of 
these viewpoints.
(2) The classification adootedis a synthesis of two modes of categorisation 
derived from Knight, art.cit., ppl76 - 8 and Burkitt, Radical Political 
Economy, pp 21 - 24.
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capital accumulation, the "active prlnciole of change Is on the side of 
population”* which combined with their interest in lonq run wage theory, 
and the concept of a natural wage, leads them to assert that Drofit comprises 
the residual element. It is calculated according to the marginal product 
of labour.
It is worth noting, in advance, that the basic foundation for the 
various theories of distribution propounded by the authors considered in 
this chapter is an agricultural model, premised upon a production cycle of 
one year's duration. The ramifications of this supposition will, however,
be dealt with in those sections in which it has particular relevance, viz,
2the sections on rent and on the wage-fund hypothesis.
This chapter will be divided into three sections: in section 1 we will 
consider the question of rent, focusing primarily on the thesis advanced by 
Ricardo, Mill and McCulloch; in section 2, we will examine the classical 
economic theory of wages, concentrating in section 2 (1 ) upon the notion of the 
natural or subsistence wage rate, and in section 2 (1 1 ) upon the wage-fund 
explanation of market wages. In section 3, we will turn our attention 
to the question of profit, beginning with an analysis of the nature 
of the profit reward, continuing with a brief account of the problem 
of the origin of profit,and centring primarily upon an exposition 
of the manner in which the profit rate was seen to be determined. 12
(1) Mill, James, Elements of Political Economy, p.7. Malthus1 view on the 
relationship between wages and profit deviates somewhat from that of 
the Ricardlans.
(2) See sections l(ii) and 2(ii).
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Section 1: The "Ricardian" Theory of Rent
Ci) Background
The differential theory of agricultural rent developed simultaneously 
1 2by Sir Edward West , and Thomas Malthus , and subsequently refined by
David Ricardo"*, grew out of the controversy surrounding the Corn Laws,
1813-1815. During the Napoleonic Wars, Britain's access to supplies of corn
from the Continent had been closed off. Consequently British farmers had
recourse either to the more intensive cultivation of land already in
production, or to the extension of cultivation to previously unused, less
fertile land. This led to an increase in the price of corn. With the
end of the Napoleonic War, and the resumption of the corn trade with the
Continent, prices at home fell, and agriculture was generally depressed.
This fall in price prompted the landed classes to agitate for increased
tariffs on imported corn in order to protect the high prices earned during 
4the war. Business interest, by comparison, was more concerned to ensure 
that the price of raw materials was kept down to the lowest possible point. 123
(1) An Essay on the Application of Capital to Land, with Observations Showing 
the Impolicy of any Great Restriction on the Importation of Corn, (Anon.,) 
(London, 1815)
(2) An Inquiry into the Nature and Progress of Rent (London, 1815).Malthus 
substantially reiterates the arguments of the Inquiry in his Principles of 
Political Economy (London, 1820)
(3) Essay on the Influence of a Low Price of Corn on the Profits of Stock. 
(London, 1815) in Sraffa ed., Works vol IV pp.9-41. See also the 
chapter on Rent in his Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, 
(London, 1st ed., 1817 2nd ed., 1819; 3rd ed., 1821) in Sraffa ed.Works 
Vol I. All references are to the 1821 edition unless otherwise stated. 1
See Buchanan, D.H., "The Historical Approach to Rent and Price Theory", 
Economica, 1929, ppl23 - 153; Burtt.Jr., E.J., Social Perspectives in 
the History of Economic Theory. (London St.James Press, 1972)
Chapter IV, ppJ8- 80 espj Blaug, op.clt., p77.
(«)
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As Ricardo notes: "Corn being one of the chief articles on which the waqes 
of labour are expended, its value to a great extent regulates wages - and 
there is no other way of keeping profits u p  but by keeping wages down" . 1  
Since profits are dependent on wages, the lower the wages the higher the 
return to profit, and the better off the business sector.
It is against this background that the pamphlets on rent were composed. 
Their central concern was to elucidate the principles regulating the high 
price of corn, and to illuminate the relationship between that high price 
and distributive shares, that is, to focus on the issue of how distributive 
shares (especially rent) were determined. The classical economists were 
not interested, therefore, in the proDrietary grounds of the title to 
factorial income, simply in the question of how the rate of such income 
was regulated, taking as data the prevailing pattern of Droperty distribution. 
For the issue of rent and land, this means that there is no analysis of the 
origins of property in land, rather a straightforward concentration on the 
"technical" aspect of rent determination. Theirs is, as it were, an empirical
explanation of the rate of rent, not a justificatory explanation of the
2title to rent. One possible reason for this disregard of the origins of 
rent, and the question of the ownership of land is that such a discussion 
might have led the classical economists to the recognition that rent is 
a social, not a natural phenomena. In other words, if the classical 
economists had actually embarked upon a study of the origins of rent, they 
would have discovered that rent emerges as a consequence of appropriation, 
and that the rate of rental Dayment is at least partly regulated by this 
ownership factor. That is, rent is (in part) a monopoly return and as such, 12
(1) Ricardo, David, Protection to Agriculture
(2) W.Stark makes a distinction between the "technical" and "social" aspects 
of Smithian value theory, claiming that Ricardo concentrated on the 
"technical" (or descriptive) aspect, whilst Hodqskin undertook to 
develop the "social" (or prescriptive) aspect. Cf. Stark, W., The 
Ideal Foundations of Economic Tiouqht, (London, Keoan Paul, Trench 
Trubner, and Co., Ltd., 1943), pp.68-70.
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price-determined. Avoidance of the social aspect of rent theory allows the 
Ricardians et.al.f to view rent exlusively as a function of differences in 
fertility and location, and as such as a price-determined surplus, 
originatir.q with the advent of diminishing returns to agriculture. 1
It will be the aim of this section, therefore, to concentrate upon 
the evolution of the differential theory of rent as espoused by Ricardo, 
McCulloch and Mill, noting the initial formulation of that theory by 
Malthus, and with occasional reference to the work of Sir Edward West. We 
begin with an analysis of the.question of how rental shares are 
calculated.
(1) Malthus occasionally views rent as price-determining.
(ii) The Determination of Rent: The Question of Differential Fertility
According to Malthus, from whom many of the ideas embodied in the
Ricardiantheory of rent were derived, rent was defined as:
that portion of the value of the whole 
produce which remains to the owner of 
the land,, after all the outgoings belonging 
to its cultivation of whatever Vfnd have 
been paid, including the profits of the 
capital employed, estimated according to the 
usual and ordinary rate of the profits of 
agricultural stock at the time.
It constituted, as it were, a surplus above ordinary costs of production. 
Adopting a slightly qualified version of this definition, the Ricardians,
following Malthus, set out to establish the reasons for the emergence
2of this surplus. Why was it,they inquired, that the price of raw produce 
was so in excess of cost of production as to yield a surplus in the 
form of rent. 1
(1) Malthus, Inquiry, pl79; Principles of Pol.Ec., pl34
The Ricardians qualified the definition by noting that rent was 
paid only for "the use of the original and indestructible 
powers of the soil". cf..(qgj Ricardo, Principles p67. The 
implications of the qualification are examined below.
(2)
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In other words:
"if the price of every other commodity depends',' 
McCulloch asks,"upon what is necessary for 
replacing with the ordinary profits the capital 
expended in its production, and if competition 
will not suffer it for any length of time to 
exceed this limit, why does not competition also 
keep down the price of raw produce to what is 
sufficient for replacing the capital and affording 
the ordinary profits? * 1
What was so special about raw produce that a surplus above the 
ordinary rate of profit could accrue, in the form of rent?
According to Malthus, three factors were identified as significant 
in the determination of both the high price of raw produce, and rent, 
namely:
First and mainly. That quality of the earth by 
which it can be made to yield a greater portion 
of the necessaries of life than is required for 
the maintenance of the persons employed on the 
land.
Secondly. That quantity peculiar to the necessaries 
of life of being able to create their own demand, 
or to raise up a number of demandera in proportion 
to the quantity of necessaries produced.
And, thirdly. The comparative scarcity of the 
most fertile land. 2 12
(1) McCulloch, (ed.) , Wealth of Nations. 1828, Vol.4, p.lol. (My emphasis) 
Cf., Wealth, 1850, p.444.
(2) Inquiry, pp.184-5, Cf., Malthus, Principles of Pol.Ec., pp.139-40, 
here Malthus amends the second cause to "That quantity peculiar to 
the necessaries of life when properly distributed, to create their 
own demand" (my emphasis), and the third to: "the comparative 
scarcity of fertile land, either natural or artificial", whilst the 
first cause remains unaltered.
225
Of these three the first cause, the idea that the aggregate produce 
of the soil is capable of exceeding the subsistence requirements of those 
employed upon the land, is regarded as the most influential in rent 
determination. However the statement is, of itself, ambiguous.Tt may, 
as George Stigler claims, simply constitute a "clumsy statement that 
land must be productive";1 alternatively, Malthus may have intended simply 
to demonstate that the continuous payment of rent (from the farmer to the 
landlord) was conditional upon the capacity of the soil to generate this 
excess, with the unwritten assumption that once the land can only support 
those labouring upon it, rent will no longer be paid. Whichever 
connotation Malthus himself favoured, it is Ricardo's interpretation of this 
first cause that is of particular note. (
In contradistinction to Malthus, Ricardo and his followers 
based their elucidation of rent determination exclusively upon the 
third of Malthus' factors,outlined above, namely the notion of 
differential fertility. The second cause, or the notion that
the necessities of life can never be overproduced since they are able
2to generate their own demand , is largely ignored, though some substantive 12
(1) Stigler, G.J. "The Ricardian Theory of Value and Distribution" in 
Essays in the History of Economics, (Chicago,Chicago TTO«.> 1965)pl80
(2) Malthus regards the nature of the demand for those articles necessary 
to life as intrinsically different to the demand for all other goods. 
With regard to articles other than subsistence goods, a high price is 
generated only when the demand for goods is in excess of the supply. 
Here, presumably,production of the desired goods will increase in order 
to accommodate supply. Whereas, in relation to subsistence goods, the . 
existence and increase of the demand, or number of demanders depends 
upon the existence and increase of those necessaries per se> the excess 
of price over cost contingent upon, and limited by the excess of their 
quantity above the quantity required to maintain the labour required 
to produce them. Inquiry, pp.185-191, Principles of Pol.Ec.,ppl47-149.
■ .
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input Into the differential thesis does, of course, emanate from the 
Malthusian concept that population is (everywhere) continually pressing 
against the means of subsistence, the concept underlying the second cause. 
However, vis-a-vis the first cause, Ricardo objects that it renders rent 
proportionate to the "absolute fertility of the land in cultivation", such 
that any increase in the fertility of the soil would necessarily entail an 
increase in rent, whilst any diminution in that fertility would necessarily 
entail a reduction in rent.^ According to Ricardo, however, it is the 
"relative fertility" of the soil under cultivation that is of signlficance, 
leading him to exclaim that:
It does not appear then, that Mr.Malthus's 
proposition is correct: rent does not immediately 
and necessarily rise or fall with the increased or ,
diminished fertility of the land but its increased 
fertility renders it capable of paying at some future 
time an augmented rent, ¿should recourse to its 
cultivation become necessary^
The absolute ■ fertility of the soil is significant in the Ricardian theory 
only to the extent that it refers to the capacity of land to sustain a 
greater rent at some future point in time. Absolute fertility at a 
particular point in time, is, however, quite irrelevant to Ricardo's thesis.
In addition to Ricardo's disagreement with the implications of the 
first cause of high price, and rent, outlined above, he also argues, in 
a letter to Malthus, that "your first and third causes of high price appear 
to me to be directly at variance with each other. The first is the 
fertility of land, the third is the scarcity of fertile land" . 3 In Ricardo's 
view, therefore, Malthus is claiming both that it is the very fertility 
of land that generates rent,and that also it is the very lack 
of fertile land that generates the same rent. If Ricardo's view is 123
(1) Ricardo, Principles, p.403 (My emphasis)
(2) Ibid.,p.404.
(3) Ricardo to Malthus, Jan. 24, 1817; Sraffa, ed., Works, Vol.VIII,pp.119-20.
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correct»then Malthus is openly contradicting himself, and so Ricardo sets
out to show that rent is a function, not of absolute fertility, but of
differential fertility, that is of the difference in productive power of
different quality lands. The rest of this section will focus, therefore,
upon the differential thesis developed by Ricardo, Jaimes Mill and McCulloch.
"if all land had the same properties',' Ricardo argues,
*if it were unlimited in quantity, and uniform in 
quality, no charge could be made for its use, unless 
where it possessed peculiar advantages of situation.
It is only, then, because land is not unlimited in 
quantity and uniform in quality, and because in the 
progress of population, land of an inferior quality 
or less advantageously situated, is called into  ^^
cultivation, that rent is ever paid for the use of it.
Earlier we observed that the Ricardians whilst largely employing the
definition of rent advanced by Malthus subjected it to one qualification,
namely, that rent was not paid for the use of land ipso facto, but for the
2use of the "original and indestructible powers of the soil". Thus rent, 
Ricardo claimed, could be contradistinguished from the profit accruing to 
the landlord on account of the capital previously invested in the soil. 
McCulloch and Mill, following Ricardo,also distinguish between rent as *2
Cl) Ricardo, Principles, p.7Q. cf.,Mill, Elements, n29. e .a .
(2) Ricardo, Principles. p£7. cf.. Essay on Profits, pl8n., 
"By rent I always mean the remuneration given to 
the landlord for the use of the original and inherent 
power of the land".
228
payment for natural fertility, and those returns on capital expenditure,1
with McCulloch noting that payments for "pure" rent often constitute only
a small part of the total return earned on the lands
Even in the best farms the payment on account of 
houses, fences, and roads are usually far from being 
an Inconsiderable portion of the rent; while the 
rent of such naturally inferior farms as have been 
highly improved, consists almost entirely of the 
profit of the outlay upon them. 2
Malthus, in his Principles of Political Economy,however, adds what 
may be seen as a disclaimer to this assertion, when he notes that rent is 
determined (in part) by "the comparative scarcity of fertile land, either 
natural or artificial". ^
The consequences of this distinction between the natural and inherent 
powers of the soil, and changes in the productivity of the land due to 
capital investment are problematic in terms of rent determination, and the 
ascription of the benefits of capital investment. Fbr example, the first 
occupant of a portion of land may decide to invest capital in the land 
thus enhancing the natural and original powers of that land. At this 
stage the distinction between the natural attributes of the soil, and 
the artifical (capital-invested) attributes may still be obvious,in which 
case the landlord-farmer would receive both rental and profit payments. 123
(1) See Mill, James, Elements of Political Economy, (od.3., 1844 version)
p31; he distinguishes between "payments for the power of the soil", 
and payment for the "capital bestowed upon the soil". See also 
McCulloch,J.R. "Ricardo's Political Economy", Edinburgh Revlew;vol XXX, 
June 1818, p73, and "Political Economy”, EB8 . ¿2371 •
(2) "Political Economy", EB8 . p247.
(3) Malthus, Principles of Political Economy, 1820, ppl39-40 (my emphasis). 
The Inquiry has "the comparative scarcity of the most fertile land", 
ppJ.84-5.
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However, should that land become vacant, and another farmer occupy it* 
a problem arises concerning the "natural" state of the soil for this 
second occupant. Is that "natural" state defined as the state in which 
he finds the soil - that is, a state reflecting the compound of natural 
powers and capital effects? Or, is that state defined according to the 
conditions under which the initial occupancy took place, which requires the 
assumption that it is possible, somehow, to differentiate between the 
influence of capital investment, and the original powers connate in the 
soil? Clearly, whichever solution is favoured has implications for the type 
of remuneration accruing to the landlord-farmer.
Ricardo,obviously perturbed by this vexatious question,observes in a
footnote to Chapter XVIII, on the topic of the "Poor Rates", that his
earlier differentiation between natural and capital-based powers "did not
sufficiently distinguish the difference which would arise from the different
modes in which this capital might be applied". ^
As a part of this capital, when once expended in 
the improvement of a farm is inseparably amalgamated 
with the land, and tends to increase it's productive 
powers, the remuneration paid to the landlord for its 
use is strictly of the nature of rent, and is subject 
to all the laws of rent... Some of these expenses 
/of improvement^, however, only give advantages to the 
land for a limited period, and do not add permanently 
to its productive powers: being bestowed on buildings 
and other perishable improvements, they require to 
be constantly renewed, and therefore, do not obtain ^
for the landlord any permanent addition to his real rent.-
Agricultural rent,^ it seems, may be paid also for those species 
of capital expenditure indissolubly connected with the natural powers of 
the soil, but not for those species of capital which do not 
permanently enhance land productivity. 12
(1) Principles,pp.261-2. Mill and McCulloch, per contra, make 
the original distinction, but adhere to it without qualification.
(2 ) ibid., p262
(3) As Buchanan notes, these writers are concerned uniquely with 
agricultural rent, art..clfc, p!39.
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We have seen that the "fertility" of the soil is inextricably 
linked with the question of rent. The question we sure now concerned with is, 
how? Why should the fact that land is not "unlimited in quantity, and 
uniform in quality" lead to the generation of rent?
At the time of the first settlement of a country, there exists,
Ricardo et al. argued, a profusion of as yet largely unappropriated, 
rich and fertile land, the cultivation of only a small orooortion of 
which is sufficient to maintain the current population. Rent is, therefore, 
non-existent. "For no one would pay for the use of land, when there was 
an abundant quantity not yet appropriated, and, therefore, at the disposal
of whosoever might choose to cultivate it". ^ At this stage wages and
2profits are normally extraordinarily hiqh. Thus, whilst suoplies of such land 
are inexhaustible (admittedly within finite terms) and at every man's 
disposal, no charge is made for their usage. This sugqests two points about 
the "Ricardian" theory of rents firstly, that rent is in part a payment 
for scarcity - namely, the scarcity of fertile land, and, secondly, that 
it arises in part because that land is privately owned. 12
(1) Ricardo, Principles, p.69. Cf., McCulloch, 'Political Economy',
EB6 , p.259, EB7, p.291, EB8 , p.244; Principles of Political Economy 
ed.l., 1825, pp.142-3 a 146; Malthus Inquiry, p.191. Principles of 
Political Be., pp.150-151; and Mill, Elements p.31, "So long as land 
produces nothinq, it is not worth appropriating".
(2) Malthus wrote, "in the early periods of societv, this surplus 
produce, this bountiful gift of Providence, shows Itself chiefly 
in extraordinary high profits, and extraordinary high wages and 
appears but little in the shape of rent", Inquiry, p.191.
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Once all the best^ lands have been cultivated, the Inexorable
tendency of population to grow and to lead to an increased demand for
2food, necessitates recourse to the next grade of land.
When In the progress of society, land of the second 
degree of fertility is taken into cultivation rent 
immediately commences on that of the first quality, 
and the amount of rent will depend on the difference 
in the quality of these two portions of land. 3
This incapacity of the lands under cultivation to furnish sufficient
raw produce to accommodate the ever increasing demand of food of a perpetually
expanding population obliges recourse to land of worse quality, and
leads to an increase of rent on all the more fertile land. Thus, the
"rent of the higher qualities would plainly be equal to the difference,
or the value of the difference between their produce and the produce of
4the worst quality under cultivation."
The assumption here is that the "dose" of capital"’ remains constant, 
and the fertility of the land varies; thus rent is the difference in
g
yield per acre. Qualitative difference in land, that is, the scarcity 1
(1) That is, the most fertile, and optimally situated. The question 
of location will be considered shortly.
(2 ) Here we are considerino the extension of cultivation only, and the 
existence of rent due to differential fertility.
(3) Ricardo, Principles, p.7o.
(4) McCulloch, "Political Economy", EB6 , p.259.
(5) Mill's term. See Elements, pp.3Qff, passim. Sometimes reference 
is made to capital alone, sometimes to the combined input of labour 
and capital.
(6) Or some similar quantity of land.
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of the most fertile land - gives rise, therefore, to differential rents.
As Ricardo shows,
suppose land - No. 1,2,3, - to yield with an 
equal employment of capital and labour, a net 
produce of 106, 90, and 80 quarters of corn. In 
a new country, where there is an abundance of 
fertile land compared with the population, and 
where therefore it is only necessary to cultivate 
No.1, the whole net produce will belong to the 
cultivator. As soon as population had so far 
increased as to make it necessary to cultivate No.2 
from which ninety quarters only can be obtained 
after supporting the labourers, rent would commence 
on No.l» For either there must be two rates of 
profit on agricultural capital, or ten quarters, or 
the value of ten quarters must be withdrawn from 
the produce of No.l, for some other purpose • 1
Thus the cultivator of No 2 gets the same result with his capital
whether he cultivates no.l, paying ten quarters of corn for rent, or
continues to cultivate No. 2, paying no rent. The underlying assumption
being that competition equalizes the return on capital, ensuring a uniform
rate of profit throughout the economy. Rent is, as we shall see below,
not a new creation of revenue, simply the transference of a portion of that
revenue previously created - namely profit.
The Ricardians, Malthus, and West also envisaged another scenario 
for the emergence of rent - namely, the problem of diminishing returns 
arising from the successive application of a constant dose of capital and 
labour to land already under cultivation, defined by West as the principle
that "in the progress of the improvement of cultivation the raising of
2rude produce becomes progressively more expensive" , or in other words » 12
(1) Principles, P71
(2) Sir Edward West, Essay on the Application of Capital, p9
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that,
In the progress of improvements an equal
quantity of work extracts from the soil a
gradually diminishing return; and that,
therefore, the whole quantity of work
bestowed on land in the progress of improvement
extracts from the soil a gradually diminishing
proportionate return. 1
Let us suppose again, that instead of 
cultivating land of the second quality, it is 
more advisable to apply a second dose of capital 
to land of the first quality; and that, while 
the first dose produces ten quarters, the second 
of equal amount, will produce only eight quarters.
Rent is, therefore,"the difference, or the value of the difference, 
between the produce obtained from the capital first applied to the land, 
and that which is last applied to lt^, or in other words, the difference 
between the product of all capital-and-labour and the product of the 
final dose at the intensive margin. 4
Cl) ibid., pl5. Although West acknowledges that diminishing returns may be due 
to the extension of cultivation to less fertile soils, he tends to 
emphasize the diminution of returns caused by the intensification of 
cultivation. Thus he wrote, "that every additional quantity of capital 
laid out produces a less proportionate return, and consequently, 
the larger the capital expended, the less the ratio of the profit 
to that capital" plO. West was also the most rigid adherent of the idea 
that technological improvements would not, and could not abate the 
tendency for agriculture to yield a diminished return. See Essay,ppl9-2Q, 
and Blaug, op.clt.. p77.
(2) Mill, Elements p32. See (eg) Ricardo, Principles pp71ff,and Malthus, 
who notes the "decreasing proportion of produce which must 
necessarily be obtained from the continual additions of capital applied 
to land already in cultivation".- A Summary View of Population, 1830 
(Reprinted by Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1970, - 1979 repr.)p225.
(3) McCulloch, Principles of Political Economy, 1825, p.272 (original , 
emphasis). Mill notes that rent comprises "the difference between the 
return made to the more productive portions, and that made to the least 
productive portion, of capital employed on the land",,Elements p.33
(4) Blaug, op.clt.,pfl2.
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Thus, the quality of the land within each cateqory Is assumed to
be homogeneous, and the productivity of capital variable. 1
"It follows that rent increases”. Mill asserts, "in proportion
as the productive power of the capital, successively bestowed upon the 
2land, decreases".
Classical economic rent theorv as outlined here, concentrates on 
both an extensive, and an intensive margin in explaining the emergence of 
rent - the former viewinq rent as a function of the decreasing fertility 
of the soil husbanded; the second, regarding it as a function of the 
diminished productivity of the capital-labour "doses” applied to units 
of homogeneous land. It is, as it were, the market requirement of an 
equalization on the return to capital that generates rent.
If then, good land existed in a quantity much 
more abundant than the production of food for 
an increasing population required, or if capital 
could be indefinitely employed without a diminished 
return on the old land, there could be no rise of 
rent; for rent invariably proceeds from the employment 
of an additional quantity of labour with a proportionally 
less return. 3
Ricardo assumed that it is the most fertile land that is initially 
4cultivated. The value in exchange of its produce, like that of all other
(1) To obtain the same produce with the last capital applied, as was 
obtained with the first, would require that the last portion of 
capital was greater in quantity than the former. The Ricardians 
usually keep the quantity of capital constant.
(2) Mill, Elements, pp.32-33.
(3) Ricardo, Principles, p.72.
(4) The objection levelled at this thesis by Carey, and countered by 
McCulloch, will be dealt with shortly.
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commodities,is determined by the total quantity of labour necessary
to its production. When land of inferior quality is taken into cultivation,
the exchangeable value of raw produce will rise, given the augmentation
in the quantity of labour requisite to production.
The exchangeable value of all commodities... is 
always regulated , not by the less quantity of 
labour that will suffice for their production 
under circumstances highly favourable, and exclusively 
enjoyed by those who have peculiar facilities of 
production» but by the greater quantity of labour 
necessarily bestowed on their production by those 
who have no such facilities. 1
In other words, the exchangeable value of commodities is determined
by those producing under the “most unfavourable circumstances", the
most unfavourable that is, "under which the quantity of produce required,
2renders it necessary to carry on production", assuming always that the < 
ordinary rate of profit is earned on such an endeavour.
Clearly this scenario is peculiarly agricultural. In agriculture, 
where a variety of productive conditions prevail, rather than competition 
force the agriculturist working under the worst conditions out of the 
market, as it would in manufacturing, assuming that the rate of profit 
earned on his enterprise is less than that earned by others,^ rent 
becomes a device for levelling the profit rate, and for ensuring that 
sufficient capital is retained in agricultural production to provide 123
(1) Ricardo, Principles, p.73. Cf ■ McCulloch, "Political Economy" EB6 . 
p259, EB7 p291, EB8 . p244» ed. Wealth of Nations, 1828, pp. 101-4» 
Principles of Political Economy, 1825, p!42.
(2) ibid., p.73
(3) The premiss is that a uniform rate of profit operates throughout 
the economy. Any industry earning greater than average profits will 
tend to attract capital, whilst any earning less than average will 
tend to lose capital to more profitable exploits, thus effecting 
an equalisation on the return to capital throughout the economy.
Cf. Malthus, Inquiry,p2Q6 and Principles of Pol.Ec., pp.206-8, where 
he compares the diminishing returns yielded in agriculture with the 
increasing returns brought forth in manufacturing, due to the 
utilisation in agriculture of the best 'machines' ' * irst, and 
worst later, compared with the use in manufacturing of successively more 
efficient and productive machines.Cf. McCulloch.Principles of Political 
Economy, 1825, b 148, and"Politlcal Economy", EB6,pp261-2 (egl for a 
similar treatment. . . . . .
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enough food for the population. What was previously profit becomes rent.
"Rent then is in all cases a portion of the profits previously obtained
on the land. It is never a new creation of revenue." 1
Kalthus adopts a similar stance, though noting that rent is, in the
first instance at least, actually a "transfer from profits and wages", 
since the extraordinarily high rate of remuneration of each, typical of 
the beginnings of society, cannot continue once recourse to inferior grades 
of land is necessitated by population increase and the increased demand 
for food.^
As soon as it is necessary to apply capital to land 
of an inferior quality, or upon the same land to 
apply a further dose of capital with an inferior return, 
all that is yielded, more than this inferior return, is 
as if it did not exist, with respect to the capitalist 
and the labourer. 3
Rent is, therefore, a transfer payment. The advantages of fertile
over inferior lands are not lost, "but only transferred from the cultivator, o
4consumer, to the landlord".
The exchangeable value of corn is determined by the marginal costs of 
its production. It is,as it were, extraneous to those costs. "Corn is
(1) Ricardo, Essay on Profits, r 18. Malthus disputes this second point.
(2) Malthus, Principles of Pol.Ec., pp.151-2. Presumably, once wages 
cure remunerated at their minimum rate, rent can only be viewed as 
a transfer of profit.
(3) Mill, Elements, p . 6 8
(4) Ricardo, Principles, p.74
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not high because a rent Is paid, but a rent Is paid because corn Is
high" . 1  Rent Is price-determined, not price-determining. Were landlords
to relinquish their riohts to rent, or were those rents remitted from 
2landlord to tenant, the price of agricultural produce and the rate of 
profit would continue unimpeded - because the marginal cost of producing 
c o m  is unaffected by the oavment of rent, and is shared out only between 
capital and labour.
Whatever is yielded beyond this lowest return, 
either on particular spots of ground or to 
particular portions of capital, might be 
annihilated, the moment it is produced, without 
affecting the portion which goes to either of those 
two classes. 3
The emergence of rent is always the effect of increasing wealth,
and of the enhanced difficulty of procuring the means of subsistence for
an increased population. "It is a symptom but, it is never a cause of 
4wealth".
One important facet of the Malthus - West - Ricardo model of 
rent is the assumption that land is a factor of production with no 
competing uses: it is a completely specialised factor. Thus, it was 
assumed that should the demand for raw produce diminish as society progresses, 
for whatever reason, or that technological developments in agriculture can 
ensure that only top grade lands need be cultivated, "land of a less 
unproductive quality will be in succession relinquished".  ^The land
(1) Ibid., p.74. This view is echoed by McCulloch in the same terminology, 
in the Principles of Political Economy, 1825, p.144.
(2) Blaug, op cit.,p.82.
(3) Mill, Elements, p.6 8 .
(4) Ricardo, Principles, p.77. Cf. Malthus, Principles of Pol.Economy, 
pp.160-178.
(5) Ricardo, Principles, p.78. Sraffa notes that this should probably 
read "land of a less and less unproductive quality", since this
is the sense intimated.
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of society is, then, as Buchanan indicates,1 23 taken up freely whenever
it is required, and is taken, not away from any other rent-nsvlno uses, but
from non-paying idleness. land, it seems, never shifts between alternative 
2uses - though labour and capital might . In this way the existence of the 
extensive margin is explained.3 If recourse is necessary to inferior 
grade lands, those lands will be readily available for cultivation.
In addition the differential theory of rent assumes that the supply of 
land is fixed; and that the rent is agricultural rent, more specifically,
rent for the "raw produce" of agriculture in toto, and not particular
4products individually.
The theory of rent developed by Ricardo was subject to a number of 
criticisms - that it ignored, for instance, the question of the non-existence 
of rent-free land, or that it failed to recognise that land was not the 
specialised factor the Ricardians assumed it to be, all of which criticisms 
McCulloch endeavoured to refute. It is,thus,to McCulloch's attempted 
refutations that we now turn.
(1) Buchanan, art.cit.. pl43.
(2) cf. Smith, WN.r.vii. 13,14.
(3) Blaug, op.cit.. p81.
cf.,Buchanan, art cit., pp. 140-143, Blaug op.cit., p81.(4)
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(iii) McCulloch - Defender of the Faith?
As we saw in the last chapter, McCulloch occasionally took it 
upon himself to defend what he conceived to be Ricardian orthodoxy 
against the strictures of his contemporaries, and the theory of rent 
proved to be no exception Por here too McCulloch endeavoured to defend 
the views of his mentor against the objections levelled at his thesis.
The first such objection tackled by McCulloch concerns the problem 
of the purported existence of no rent-free land,1 a factor which was seen 
to undermine the Ricardian claim that rent was a surplus above costs 
of production at the margin of cultivation.
It has been said that... the worst land in
every civilized and appropriated country, (
like England, always yields some small rent
to the proprietor, and that, therefore, it
cannot be said that the price of produce
is, in such countries, determined by the cost of
raising it on that quality of land which pays
no rent. 2
McCulloch evinces three arguments to confute this claim. Firstly, 
he adduces the argument developed by Mill in the Elements, that the rent 
paid on some lands is so negligible as to not seriously affect the 
proposition established.^ Secondly, and again following Mill, he notes 123
(1) James Mill also subjects this problem to brief analysis in the 
Elements, see pp.34.
(2) "Political Economy", EB8 . p.292.
(3) cf.Mill, Elements, p35j and McCulloch, "Political Economy" EB6 . p.260 
for example.
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that land is normally let in large tracts, some portions of which 
might not yield rent:
The poorest lands are always let in immense 
tracts. If it were attempted to let particular 
portions of these tracts separately, they would 
bring no rent whatever; but they appear to yield 
rent, because rent is paid not for them, but for 
the most fertile spots intermixed with them. 1
And finally, McCulloch notes that,
It is not essential to the theory of rent, that 
there should be no land for which some rent is 
not paid. What the theory requires is, that of 
the whole capital employed in agriculture, there 
should always be one portion which yields no 
rent; one portion which barely replaces itself, 
with the ordinary profits of stock. 2
Thus, provided there is capital which does not yield rent, McCulloch 
argues, Ricardo's theory is safe from objection, for rent is still determined 
by the costs of producing corn under the worst possible conditions. What 
McCulloch has done, of course, is to shift the argument away from the 
exensive margin to the intensive margin.
The second objection of note which McCulloch endeavoured to refute 
was that advanced by Henry Carey, namely the assertion that land, in a 
young country, is actually taken up in inverse order of its fertility.^ 123
(1) McCulloch, "Political Economy, EB6, p26Q. cf_ Mill, Elements pp36-7, 
"When it is asserted that every part of the mountains of Scotland 
pays rent, the state of the facts is misunderstood. It is only true 
that there is no tenant of any portion of any man’s estate in the 
highlands of Scotland, who does not pay rent.”
(2) McCulloch, ed.. Wealth, 1828, vol IV, r 113, Cf Ricardo to McCulloch, . 
Jan 3, 1819, Sraffa ed., works, vol VIII, ppl-4, cited in O'Brien, 
op.cit., p399n.
(3) Carey's thesis was also subject to criticism by J.S. Mill in 
his Principles of Political Economy, 1848, Book I, chapter 12, 
section 3.
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Light and sandy soils, it is said, are usually 
first cultivated while the clay and alluvial 
soils, though ultimately by far the most 
productive, require greater outlays of capital 
to bring them into cultivation than can be 
spared in the early stages of agriculture. 1
As interpreted by McCulloch, Carey's assumption is based on the 
premiss that "fertility" is a peculiar attribute of lands on which the greatest 
quantity of produce may be raised irrespective of expenditure. What is require 
by the differential rent theorem is fertility be conceived not in the
sense of "the greatest quantity of produce, but the greatest compared
2with expenses of cultivation" ■, that is relative, as opposed to 
absolute fertility.
When it is said that superior lands are the 
first to be brought into cultivation, that... 
statement is not made absolutely, but with 
reference to the capacities of the cultivators.
Lands endowed with a high degree of natural 
fertility are often, in thinly-peopled countries, 
either heavily timbered or so very wet as to be 
totally unfit for tillage; and wherever this is 
the case, cultivation is confined at first to 
open, dry, or down lands. The latter are, in. 
fact, the most fertile which it is in the power 
of the inhabitants to cultivate. 3
Once population has been increased, and capital been accumulated,
these neglected lands will in all probability be cleared, and once under
4cultivation may, in fact, yield "a greater amount of produce per acre".
This does not, however, make them more fertile. Fertility, it appears, 
is a function of capital expenditure.
McCulloch's argument makes fertility time-dependent. That is, it is 1
(1) McCulloch ed., Wealth, 1850, p.449, Cf. also, Wealth, 1828, vol IV, 
ppll4-5> Principles of Political Economy, ed 5, 1864, pp416-7;
"Political Economy", EB8. pp245-6
(2) McCulloch, (ed.), Wealth, 1 8 5 0 , n. 44®
(3) "Political Economy", EB8 , pp245-6
(4) ibid,, p246.
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the return on capital at a particular point in time that reflects or 
measures the fertility of the soil, whereas according to Carey, fertility 
is conceived as a flow. So land that is initially the most productive may, 
in fact, not be ultimately the most productive, and should, as such, not 
be presented as the most "fertile" land at all. The "light and sandy soils" 
which yield most on first cultivation are not, in the long run, as 
productive as the "clay and alluvial" soils which require greater initial 
investment. In this sense, McCulloch's conception of fertility seems to be 
more closely linked with the question of comparative capital investment 
than with the issue of fertility as a natural, though potentially 
variable quality inherent in the soil. McCulloch is adopting,here, a 
stance slightly at variance with Ricardian orthodoxy. Ricardo endeavoured,
I
on the whole, to limit rent to the payment for the use of the lands 
"natural" attributes, though recognizing that posterior to capital 
expenditure the productiveness of the land became a function of both its 
natural powers and the capital previously invested in it, such that land 
which yielded lo quarters of corn per acre in its natural state, prior 
to the expenditure of capital, might yield 15 quarters of corn after 
that expenditure. 1  Whereas McCulloch is interested, in a sense, in how 
to get all grades of land to yield 15 quarters of corn, noting that the 
one that requires the least capital outlay now is the most fertile. He 
is, as such, less interested in previous capital investment, than in 
current outlay.
Not only does McCulloch modify the conception of fertility required , 
by the Ricardian system, but he also makes other slight changes in 
factors capable of influencing rent determination, such as his claims 1
(1) The example is mine.
243
that (i) location affects rent in the same way as differential fertility.
Difference in proximity to the market is a source 
of rent precisely analogous to difference in fertility.
When the produce of different lands is sold in the
same market, and consequently, at the same price,
the land which is nearest to the market and pays least
for carriage enjoys the same sort of advantage over
the others as if it were more fertile. 1
And that (ii) transport costs are equivalent to an overall reduction
2in fertility for a region distant from market ; thus:
As vicinity to a town is always a cause of rent, 
so vicinity to a road or a navigable river or canal, 
by diminishing the expense of transporting the 
produce to some great market, may have a similar 
operation. 3
Obviously neither locationnor transport cost can be reduced to an
argument from fertility, and if admitted into the Ricardian explanation
of rent, render rent a function of overall cost of production, and not
just differential fertility.
The final objection to the "Ricardian" theory of rent which McCulloch 
endeavoured to refute was the argument developed by Samuel Bailey to 
explain the differences in productive conditions of different categories 
of goods, relating to the "degree of competition" under which they are 
produced^. 123
(1) McCulloch ed., Wealth of Nations, 1828, vol TV, pp.109-110, cf, 
McCulloch ed., Wealth of Nations, 1850, pp*447, and "Political 
Economy", EB8 , n?47.
(2) O'Brien, op.clt., p399.
(3) McCulloch, ed., Wealth of Nations, 1828, vol IV, pllO.
cf.,Bailey, Samuel, A Critical Dissertation on the Nature, Measure, 
and Causes of Value, (London, 1825), nt5.185-?on.
(4)
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When commodities such as c o m  produced under conditions of Increasing 
costs, the low cost producers were conceived, by Bailey, as possessing 
monopolies
The owners of land of superior fertility enjoy 
a monopoly ... it Is simply out of this 
monopoly-value that rent arises ... Rent proceeds.
In fact, from the extraordinary profit which is 
obtained by the possession of an instrument of 
production, protected up to a certain point from 
competition. 2
The concept of rent has, it appears, been generalized by Bailey to 
cover the earnings of any factor that is limited in su d o I v , and adaptable 
to only one use . 3 Rent has, therefore, nothlnq to do with differences 
in the fertility of land, and is, as Blaug points out in Ricardian Economics, 
perfectly analogous to the "extraordinarv remuneration which an artisan 
of more than common dexterity obtains beyond the wages given to the workmen 
of ordinary skill”. 4
Bailey's objection to the Ricardian theory of rent is, therefore, that 
since the value of corn raised on lands yieldinq rent is not, after 
the commencement of cultivation on lower grade lands, proportioned to the 
cost of production, it is allegedly misguided to represent the value of 
the aggregate quantity of produce raised as dependent upon that principle. 1
(1) Bailey, op clt., p.193.
(2) Ibid., pp. 195-6.
(3) Bailey specifically chooses the term "instrument of production" 
not land. Cf Rauner, R.M., Samuel Bailey and the Classical Theory 
of Value, (London, 1961), p.6 8 .
(4) Balua. Ricardian Economics, p.55, citing Bailev, op clt., p.197.
(5) Rauner, op clt., pp.109-110.
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that (i) location affects rent in the same way as differential fertility.
Difference in proximity to the market is a source 
of rent precisely analogous to difference in fertility.
When the produce of different lands is sold in the
same market, and consequently, at the same price,
the land which is nearest to the market and pays least
for carriage enjoys the same sort of advantage over
the others as if it were more fertile. 1
And that (ii) transport costs are equivalent to an overall reduction
2in fertility for a region distant from market ; thus:
As vicinity to a town is always a cause of rent, 
so vicinity to a road or a navigable river or canal, 
by diminishing the expense of transporting the 
produce to some great market, may have a similar 
operation. 3
Obviously neither locationnor transport cost can be reduced to an
argument from fertility, and if admitted into the Ricardian explanation
/
of rent, render rent a function of overall cost of production, and not 
just differential fertility.
The final objection to the "Ricardian" theory of rent which McCulloch 
endeavoured to refute was the argument developed by Samuel Bailey to 
explain the differences in productive conditions of different categories 
of goods, relating to the "degree of competition" under which they are 
produced4. 123
(1) McCulloch ed., Wealth of Nations, 1828, vol IV, ppJL09-110, cf, 
McCulloch ed., Wealth of Nations, 1850, pp£47, and "Political 
Economy", EES, r 247.
(2) O'Brien, op.cit., p399.
(3) McCulloch, ed., Wealth of Nations, 1828, vol IV, pllo.
çf.,Bailey, Samuel, A Critical Dissertation on the Nature, Measure, 
and Causes of Value, (London, 1825), no.185-700.
(4)
PAGINATION
ERROR
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When commodities such as c o m  produced under conditions of Increasing 
costs, the low cost producers were conceived, by Bailey, as possessing 
monopolies
The owners of land of superior fertility enjoy 
a monopoly ... It Is simply out of this 
monopoly-value that rent arises ... Rent proceeds.
In fact, from the extraordinary profit which is 
obtained by the possession of an Instrument of 
production, protected up to a certain point from 
competition. 2
The concept of rent has, It appears, been generalized by Bailey to 
cover the earnings of any factor that is limited in suoolv, and adaptable 
to only one use.3 Rent has, therefore, nothing to do with differences 
in the fertility of land, and is, as Blaug points out In Ricardian Economics, 
perfectly analogous to the "extraordlnarv remuneration which an artisan 
of more than common dexterity obtains beyond the wages given to the workmen 
of ordinary skill". 4
Bailey's objection to the Ricardian theory of rent is, therefore, that 
since the value of corn raised on lands yielding rent Is not, after 
the commencement of cultivation on lower grade lands, proportioned to the 
cost of production, It Is allegedly misguided to represent the value of 
the aggregate quantity of produce raised as dependent upon that principle. ^ 1
(1) Bailey, op clt., p.193.
(2) Ibid., pp. 195-6.
(3) Bailey specifically chooses the term "Instrument of production"
not land. Cf Rauner, R.M., Samuel Ballev and the Classical Theory 
of Value, (London, 1961), p.68.
(4) Balug. Ricardian Economics, p.55, citing Bailey, op clt., p.197.
(5) Rauner, op clt., pp.109-110.
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McCulloch acknowledges Bailey's point but contends that,
according to Ricardo, the claim that value is determined by the
cost of production applies only to goods produced at the margin of
production. That value depends upon cost of production does not
mean that the value of
Every particular hat or bushel of corn or
other article offered for sale is determined
by the quantity of labour actually expended
on its production. What is really meant is,
that the value of all the hats, as of all
the corn required for its supply of the market,
is determined by the quantity of labour required
to produce that hat, or that bushel of corn,
which has been produced with the greatest
difficulty. 1
On the assumption that production is homogeneous, it could be
claimed that the produce yielded by the last land cultivated
represents the entire class of such products. Unless this no-rent cost
is met, the supply of corn would be less than its demand, in which case
2cultivation would again be extended to meet the demand. The cost 
at the margin represents, therefore, the determining cost, and rent is 
explicable as price-determined (not price-determining), subject to 
a distributive theory distinct from that of other factors.
It was, as we have seen in the previous sub-sections,the 
contention of the Ricardian classical economists that rent increased 
in the progress of society, as recourse was had to the cultivation 
of land of decreasing degrees of fertility. It will be our aim in 
the final part of this section to consider the relationship between 
technological advance and rental progress. 12
(1) Principles of Political Economy, ®d 1, 1825, pl52.
(2) Rauner, op.cit., pp.109-110
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Civ) The Effect of Improvements Upon Rent
The only time that the Ricardians actually consider the "social" 
implications of rental payments is in their discussion of the effects 
of improvements in agricultural technique upon the payment of rent, and 
on the interests of the landlord.
In the Essay on Profits, Ricardo had declared that "the interest of 
the landlord is always opposed to the interest of every other class in 
the community”,1 counselling that:
If the interests of the landlord be of-sufficient 
consequence, to determine us not to avail ourselves 
of all the benefits which would follow from importing 
corn at a cheap price, they should also influence us 
in rejecting all improvements in agriculture, and the 
implements of husbandry ... 2
f
The assumption that is being made is that anything which raises the
price of corn automatically and necessarily benefits the landlord. So
in the progress of society the increasing difficulty of acquiring sufficient
food to support the ever burgeoning population, requiring as it does an
increase in the marginal cost of production,^ and thereby occasioning an
increase in rents, benefits the landlord in two ways: he receives both
a greater proportion of the produce generated, as well as a greater value
that is, the commodity in which he is paid is of greater value since its
4cost of production has increased.
(1) Essay on profits, p.21.
(2) Ibid.,p.41.
(3) Due to either a shift in the extensive, or intensive margin.
(4) Principles, pp.83-4.
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He will have more corn, and each defined measure 
of that corn will exchange for a greater quantity ^
of all other goods which have not been raised in value.
Anything which lowers the marginal cost of production will, 
therefore, tend to both reduce the quantity of produce received by the 
landlord, and also reduce the value of that produce, and is regarded, 
by Ricardo, as automatically contrary to the interests of the landlord.
Cost-cutting improvements in agriculture may, Ricardo asserts, be 
of two kinds: those increasing the productive powers of the land, as 
the more efficient rotation of crops, for example; or those generating 
improvements in machinery, enabling the former to obtain the same produce 
with less labour. The former increase the output from a given quantity
of land- the latter the amount of labour necessary to produce a given '
2product from a given quantity of land, but both varieties of improvement, 
as a consequence, lower rent, and, as such, are "positively injurious" to 
the landlord. Such is Ricardo's view prior to the publication of the 
third edition of the Principles, in 1821.
Against this, Malthus argued, following Smith,1 *3 4that, firstly, 
there was complete coincidence between the interest of the landlord and
the state, and secondly, that both sets of interests are, in fact, served
4by improvements in agriculture. Any improvement in agriculture, Malthus
(1) Ibid.,p.102. A comparison is made with the labourer who, in the
progress of society, receives greater money wages, but lower corn wages.
•
C2) See Stigler, op clt.,pp.182-3. The former is identified as an upward 
shift in the marginal product curve of labour on land, whilst the 
latter represents a change in the shape of that curve.
(3) Cf.,Smith, W.N.I. xi. p. 1-8.
(4) Malthus, Principles of Pol.Ec.,pp.204-217.
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proclaims, however sudden, cannot. In reality, prevent the Implacable 
tendency of population to increase up to the additional means of subsistence. 
Indeed, improvements in agricultural productivity actually function as a 
spur to population increase, for, wherever improvements are found, "there 
is always an effective demand for ... labour", and where this occurs, 
population soon increases to such an extent that the additional produce 
acquired through agricultural advances, is no longer sufficient to support 
it.
Instead of land being thrown out of 
employment, more land is cultivated, owing 
to the cheapness of the instruments of 
cultivation, and under these circumstances 
rents must rise instead of fall ... I should 
further say, that not only have Improvements 
in agriculture never lowered rents, but that 
they have been hitherto ... the main source 
of the Increase of rents. 1
Malthus denies, therefore, that it is the Increase in marginal 
costs of producing raw produce that generates an increase in rental
payments, arguing to the contrary, that it is, in fact, to Improvements
2in agriculture that rent increases may be ascribed.
Although Malthus' argument is somewhat ambiguous, it was evidently 
persuasive enough to compel Ricardo to modify his position on the relationship 
between improvements in cultivation and the landed Interest, for in edition 
three of the Principles, Ricardo differentiates between those short-term 12
(1) Ibid.,p.207. (Original emphasis).
(2) Ibid.,p. 208
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effects which positively dlsbeneflt the landlord, and the more long-term 
effects of improvements which positively advantage him. So he notes in 
the Principles;
I hope I am not misunderstood as under-valuing 
the importance of all sorts of Improvements in 
agriculture to landlords - their immediate 
effect is to lower rent; but as they give a 
great stimulus to population, and at the same 
time enable us to cultivate poorer lands, with 
less labour, they are ultimately of immense 
advantage to the landlord. 1
McCulloch, following Ricardo, also begins his career by proclaiming
that the landlord is injured bv cost-cutting developments in agricultural
2 , technique, before conceding, as Ricardo was also compelled to concede,
that "there is no such opposition between his interests and those of the
rest of the community", in fact, improvements are "no less advantageous
to the owners and occupiers of land than to others".^ This latter claim,
however, is qualified by the assumption that whilst outlay remains constant,
improvements will be beneficial to the landlord only if they are accompanied
by an expansion of demand. Without that, capital will be withdrawn from
4agriculture until supply and demand coincide. In addition to this, 
McCulloch also assumes that even an improvement in agricultural technology 
with the capacity to dlsbenefit the landlord by reducing his rent, will not 1
(1) Ricardo, Principles, p.81n. Cf. Essay on Profits, p.19, where Ricardo»
as Sraffa notes, mentions that the fall of rent would be temporary. '
Cf, , also McCulloch, ed. Wealth, 1850, p.452. Improvements in agricultural 
technique normally follow rather than precede an increase in the price of 
of raw produce consequent upon a population increase.
(2) Cf. McCulloch, ed., Wealth, 1828, Vol IV, pp.120-121» and ed. , Wealth 
1850, pp.450-2. Cf.,O'Brien, op cit.,pp.599-401.
(3) McCulloch, ed., Wealth, 1850, p.450.
(4) Ibid.,p.451.
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in fact so do, for the simple reason that:
... there is not a shadow of a around for 
supposing that ... ¿itJ can ever be so 1
rapidly diffused as to produce this effect.
Indeed, improvements usually spread so slowly and Imperceptibly that they
tend "not so much to occasion any actual reduction of prices as to
2prevent their rising to an oppressive height".
Where Ricardo and Malthus base their consideration of the Impact of 
agricultural advances on rental payments, upon the premise that all grades 
of land are equally affected by those improvements, McCulloch extends 
the discussion by considering the case of where such Improvement would 
actually tend to disproportionately advantage the holders of the best grade 
lands.^
Prior to Improvements in agricultural productivity, McCulloch surmises 
that the following quantities of corn would be yielded on the various grades 
of land: 1
A B C D E Qualities of land.
(Quantities of produce obtained with
lOO 90 80 70 60 (equal capitals.
40 30 20 lo O 4Rent.
(1) Ibid.,p.452.
(2) Ibid.,p.452. Cf.» O'Brien, op clt.,p.401.
(3) McCulloch, ed., Wealth, 1850, pp.450-2; Cf.,O'Brien, o p  clt.,p.4QO.
(4) Ibid.,p.450.
However, after any improvement affecting lands variably the
scenario might, he proclaims be as follows:
A B C D E Quantities of land
HO 95 82*5 70 60 S  Quantities of produce after 
\  improvement.
50 35 22«! l o O Rent after ditto.^
Provided that the price-determining margin did not contract, both themonev
and corn rents of proprietors A to C would augment, so as to permit
2them to reap the whole advantage due to the improvement. Lands D and E 
would remain in the same position as before, though the extent of land , 
under tillage of class E type miaht actually be reduced (though not taken 
out of production).^
This view suggests, then, that not all landlords are benefitted by 
improvements in agriculture. The owner of land D is in neither a better 
nor worse position than before, whilst the owner of land E (which remains 
in cultivation) is equally unaffected, although the owner of that portion 
of E-grade land which is thrown out of cultivation is, in fact, disadvantaged.
Rent, as we observed in the Introduction, was normally the first aspect 
of the theory of distribution dealt with by the classical economists, leaving 1
(1) Ibid.,p.451
(2) O'Brien, op cit.,p.4QO.
(3) Should E be thrown out of cultivation causing, thereby, a reduction
in rents, the effect would be temporary, since the increased cheapness of 
corn would cause demand to expand sufficiently to necessitate the 
cultivation of E again. Wealth, 1850, p.451.
them free to deal with the problem of the dichotomy between wages and 
profit. In similar fashion, having treated rent first, we intend to 
turn our attention now to the theories of wages developed by the classical 
economists. These are first, on subsistence explanations of the natural
wage-rate, and second a wage-fund explanation of the market wage-rate
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Section 2 : The Classical Theory of Wages
Wages for the classical economists were conceived as "the remuner­
ation to the labourer for his personal exertions",1 that is, as "a
compensation given to the labourer for the exertion of his physical powers
2or of his skill, or ingenuity".
Despite the multiplicity of choices suggested by Smith concerning the 
nature and origin of wages, these authors tended to focus on only two 
particular aspects - a subsistence theory of wages designed to explicate 
long-term trends in the wage-rate, and conceived as the natural
price of labour, and a wage-fund hypothesis used to explicate short-term
3trends in the wage rate conceived as the market price of labour.
This said, however, it is still possible to detect occasional elements * 
of those alternative explanations of wages offered by Smith - particularly 
traces of a productivity theory of wages, and a bargaining theory.
Before analysing both the subsistence theory of wages and the wage- 
fund theorem, it is important to note that one underlying assumption
of classical wage theory was the view that the market established a differ
4ential wage structure which equalized the returns to all occupations.
As Ricardo writes, "I must not be supposed to be inattentive to the 
different qualities of labour, and the difficulty of comparing an hour's 
or a day's labour, in one employment with the same duration of labour
(1) Malthus, Principles of Pol.Ec., 1820, p.240.
(2) McCulloch, PPE, ed. 1, 1825, p.124.
(3) For some interesting remarks on the genesis of wage theory from 
Adam Smith, through J.S.Mill, to J.E.Cairnes, see O'Brien, The 
Classical Economists,pp.111-118.
(4) This derives from Smith. See WN.I.x.b.1-52.
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in another".1 The relation in which different qualities of labour are
held is adjusted by the market -
Wages are not equal when each workman earns the same 
number of shillings or of pence in a given space of 
time, but when each is paid in proportion to the 
severity of the labour he has to perform, the degree 
of previous education and of skill that it requires, 
and the other causes of variation. 2
McCulloch's references to comparative severity, education and skill,
are rough approximations to the five differential characteristics identified
by Adam Smith, viz, the comparative agreeableness or disagreeableness of
the employments; the expenses of training; the constancy or inconstancy
of employment; the degree of trust reposed in the executors of the employ-
. 3ments; and the possibility of success in those occupations.
Malthus also adopts Smith's five circumstances, but explains them 
solely in terms of supply and demand. The cost of producing any kind of < 
labour is roughly equivalent; the quantities of necessaries requisite to 
life, and reproduction of the optimum supply of labourers. Education 
costs are excluded from this calculation. Lawyers are comparatively 
ill-paid, despite expensive educations, because their supply exceeds demand. 
A coal-heaver, for example, may be better remunerated, because the
disagreeableness of his employ deters people from entering, and thus
4supply is less than demand.
(1) Ricardo, Principles, p.20. See Chapter 3, section 2 for further 
consideration of this aspect of Ricardo's thesis.
(2) McCulloch, "Political Economy", EB8, p.240.
(3) Smith, WN.I.x.b.l. See Chapter 2, section 3 (i) above.
(4) Malthus, 'Principles of Pol.Ec., 1820, pp.243-246.
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The contention here is that the expense of acquiring a profession 
may limit the supply of any particular profession in the market, and 
thus cause it to be comparatively well— remunerated. It can only be
assumed, therefore, that he was arguing that cost of education per se, 
does not comprise a reason for high wages except insofar as it is a 
cause of scarcity.
(i) The Natural Rate of Wages, or the Subsistence Wage Theory
Labour, for the classical economists, like all other useable 
commodities, has a natural and a market price, with the former normally 
determined by cost of production, and the latter by supply and demand. 
This section will concentrate on elucidating the former of these two 
concepts, viz, the natural price of labour, designed to illuminate long- 
run trends in the wage-rate.
This natural price was defined in a variety of ways: Ricardo offers 
an essentially static definition, arguing that the natural price of 
labour is "that price which is necessary to enable the labourers, one 
with another, to subsist and to perpetuate their race, without either 
increase or diminution".1 The implication of this hypothesis is that, 
were labour to be remunerated according to its natural rate, population 
would be incapable of increase or diminution; suggesting that the 
dynamic element in the relationship between wage theory and population 
growth is provided by the deviations of the market rate of wages from
the natural rate. Thus wherever the market rate of wages is in excess
2of the natural rate, population growth is encouraged.
McCulloch's definition, though similar to Ricardo's, is supplemented 12
(1) Ricardo, Principles, p.93. James Mill focuses exclusively upon 
the comparative rates of growth of capital and population in his 
analysis of the determinants of the wage rate.
(2) This point will be considered in more depth shortly. See Ricardo, 
Principles, p .94.
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by a customary, or psychological dimension. The natural or necessary 
price of labour is such as to "enable the labourers to exist and 
continue their race according to the habits and customs prevailing in
the countries to which they belong".1 23 4 Ricardo also acknowledges
2this customary dimension, but,as we shall see shortly, underplays its 
significance, whereas McCulloch is concerned to consider the implications 
of this psychological element.
Malthus' definition, in deliberate contradistinction from Ricardo's, 
is a more dynamic definition. Commenting on Ricardo's conception of 
natural price, Malthus notes that "this price I should really be disposed 
to call a most unnatural price", because in the natural course of things 
"that is, without great impediments to the progress of wealth and popul­
ation, such a price could not generally occur for hundreds of years".3 <
The natural or necessary price of labour in any country 
I should define to be "that price, which, in the actual 
circumstances of the society, is necessary to occasion 
an average supply of labourers sufficient to meet the 
average demand. 4
Malthus' delineation of the concept of the natural price of labour
is more circumstantially related than Ricardo's. Supply and demand
are dislocated from their usual place in the market, and elevated into
determinants of natural price.5 Thus Malthus incorporates into his
concept of natural price elements which for Ricardo affect market price.
Consequently Malthus' definition of market price seems a little
(1) McCulloch, ed.. Wealth of Nations, 1850, Note on Wages, vol.IV, p.472.
(2) Ricardo, Principles, pp.96-97.
(3) Malthus, Principles of Pol.Ec., 1820, p.247.
(4) ibid., p.247 (my emphasis)
(5) Cost of production represents the determinant of natural price 
for the Ricardians.
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superfluous: market price, for him, represents actual price, "which 
from temporary causes is sometimes above, and sometimes below, what 
is necessary to supply this average demand".^
Malthus, like Ricardo and McCulloch, also acknowledges the signif­
icance of habituation in the regulation of natural price.
The condition of the labouring classes of 
society must evidently depend, partly upon 
the rate at which the resources of the 
country and the demand for labour are 
increasing, and partly, on the habits of 
the people in respect to their food, 
clothing, and lodging. 2
Natural price appears, therefore, to be regulated by two circumstances
firstly, the cost of producing the basic requisites of the labourer’s
subsistence; and secondly, the customs of the people. This section will,
accordingly, be divided into a sub-section covering cost of production ,
and a sub-section covering the psychological dimension.
(a) The Cost of Producing Labour
The power of the labourer to support himself, and the family 
which may be necessary to keep up the number of labourers, 
does not depend on the quantity of money which he may receive 
for wages, but on the quantity of food, necessaries, and 
conveniences which become essential to him from habit, which 
that money will purchase. The natural price of labour, 
therefore, depends on the price of the food, necessaries 
and conveniences required for the support of the labourer 
and his family. 3
Or, as McCulloch expresses it, "the natural or necessary
rate of wages must, therefore, be determined by the cost
of producing the food and other articles which enter
into the consumption of the labourers". 4 1234
(1) Malthus, Principles of Pol.Ec., p.247r8.
(2) Malthus,. Principles of Pol.Ec., p.248.
(3) Ricardo, Principles, p.93.
(4) McCulloch, PPE, ed.l, 1825, p.177.
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Natural wages represent for these authors the minimum remuneration 
upon which the labourer can survive. Although market wages may sink to 
the level of natural wages, they cannot long remain below that level.
Qi the presupposition that wages are determined by supply and
demand, in the progress of society, there would be an incontrovertible
tendency for wages to fall, since population growth outpaces capital
accumulation. However, wages are not exclusively regulated by the
supply and demand of labour. They are, more importantly, determined
by the prices of the goods on which they are expended. In the Essay
on Profits Ricardo had confined such wage goods to the produce of
agriculture. In the Principles, however, although still adjudging
agricultural produce to form the principal part of the wage basket,
he does acknowledge that wages are expended on other produce. This
acknowledgement aside, however, he still tends to make the level of
subsistence wages dependent upon the price of agricultural produce ,^
with scant allowance accorded the possibility that advances in
manufacturing, by reducing the cost of production of the commodities
2generated therein, will affect the long-run trend on wages.
Assuming the primacy of agricultural produce in the wage basket, 
the classical economists, adopting the Malthusian population principle, 
and the theory of diminishing marginal returns in agriculture, note 
that the cost of necessaries and conveniences tends to increase as 
society progresses. In consequence, the money wages of labour must 12
(1) O'Brien, The Classical Economists, p.117; see also, Dobb, 
Theories of Value and Distribution since Aiam Smith,
pp.70-71.
(2) As O'Brien notes, the underlying assumption is that the 
wage-basket is fixed.
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also rise in order to compensate for the increased cost of procuring
such goods, or else the labourer would be eventually deprived of his
subsistence. The same cause that raises rents appears, therefore,
to raise wages: i.e. "the increasing difficulty of producing an
additional quantity of food with the same proportional quantity of
labour",^ both of which, it seems, augment as society evolves.
The comparison is, nevertheless, spurious. There is a fundamental
distinction between the increase in rent and that of wages, namely,
that rent increases in both monetary and real terms, whilst wages
increase in monetary terms only.
Not only is the landlord's money rent greater, 
but his corn rent also; he will have more corn, 
and each defined measure of that corn will 
exchange for a greater quantity of all other 2 
goods which have not been raised in value.
The fate of the labourer is less happy, though receiving more money
wage s ,
his corn wages will be reduced; and not only 
his command of corn, but his general condition 
will be deteriorated, by his finding it more 
difficult to maintain the market rate of wages 
above their natural rate.
Not only will agricultural goods be affected by this propensity 
for production costs in the agricultural sector to increase as society 
develops, but also all those other commodities in whose production raw 
products cure required. The labourer will also be compelled, therefore, 
to spend more on their purchase. 12
(1) Ricardo, Principles, p.102. Assuming, of course, that money is 
invariable in value, rent and wages will both tend to augment as 
wealth and population progress.
(2) ibid., p.102.
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Although his tea, sugar, soap, candles and house 
rent, would probably be no dearer, he would pay 
more for his bacon, cheese, butter, linen, shoes 
and cloth; and therefore, even with the above 
increase ,of wages, his situation would be 
comparatively worse.
With the exception of a slight offset in the cost of production in 
the manufacturing sector, it seems that in the progress of society, the 
cost of producing labour will increase, leading ultimately to a fall in 
the market rate of wages to subsistence level. The next question is 
then, what regulates the subsistence minimum? Is it a purely physical 
minimum; or does it have a customary component?
(b) The Psychological Dimension of the Subsistence Wage
Ricardo and Malthus,particularly, have often been interpreted as
arguing that the subsistence wage consisted exclusively in a physical
2 < minimum. For instance, Oswald St.Clair notes that, despite "occasional
reference to comforts and conveniences to be found in the modern cottage,
Ricardo habitually thinks of the labourer’s wage as affording him nothing
by necessaries".1 23 Such a view is understandable given the assumptions
of the Malthusian theory of population, that the incapacity of the means
of subsistence to support the population would lead to a reduction, via
death, of a portion of that population. However, both Malthus and
Ricardo make concessions to a psychological, or cultural element.
(1) Ricardo, Principles, p.104.
(2) See, e.g. O'Brien, The Classical Economists, pp.116-117. Samuel 
Hollander, in his book The Economics of David Ricardo, (Toronto, 
U.P, 1979), pp.395 ff. adopts an almost diametrically opposed 
viewpoint arguing that Ricardo never views subsistence wages as 
constant at the 'natural' level. See p.4CS esp.
(3) St.Clair, Oswald, A Key to Ricardo (London, 1957), p.120, cited
in Gordon, Barry, Political Economy in Paliament 1819-1823 (London, 
Macmillan Press, 1976), p.8.
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“it is not to be understood') the latter asserts, "that the 
natural price of labour estimated even in foods and 
necessaries is absolutely fixed and constant. It varies 
at different times in the same country, and very 
materially differs in different countries. It 
essentially depends on the habits and customs of the 
people ."
An English labourer would never regard his wages as remunerated at 
their natural rate, if all they enabled him to purchase were potatoes 
for sustenance, and a mud cabin for accommodation. Yet "these moderate
demands of nature are often deemed sufficient in countries where 'man's
2life is cheap', and his wants easily satisfied".
Likewise Malthus, contemplating the disparities in modes of 
subsistence amongst different peoples, notes that "much must certainly 
depend upon the physical causes of climate and soil", but,more importantly 
"an moral causes, the formation and action of which are owing to a variety 
of circumstances".^ In this way high wages, or the power of commanding 
a large portion of the necessaries of life, can have two consequences: 
such wages will either be expended on the maintenance of "large and
frequent families", or, in the habituation to an improved mode of sub-
4sistence, convenience and comfort. Both of these consequences derive 
from particular circumstances Malthus declares. A low standard of 
respectability and comfort tends to prevail in societies in which civil 
liberties are little valued, political liberty curtailed, and education 
anything but enlightened or comprehensive.’’ _Ey contrast, in countries 1
(1) Ricardo, Principles, pp.96-7.
(2) ibid., p.97. Ricardo quotes approvingly,in a footnote,from 
Colonel Torrens' An Essay on the External C o m  Trade (London, 
Hatchard, 1815) in support of this point.
(3) Malthus, Principles of Pol.Ec., 1820, pp.249-250.
(4) Malthus, Principles of Pol.Ec., p.2SO, cf., McCulloch.
(5) ibid., pp.250-251.
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where civil and political liberties are secured, and education enlightened, 
man, out of self-respect,will tend to expend his increased wages in such 
a manner that there is "a marked improvement of the quality of the food 
consumed, and a decided elevation in the standard of ...(his) comforts 
and conveniences".^
Despite such observations, however, the implications of the cultural 
dimension of the natural wage rate were left relatively unexplored by 
both Ricardo and Malthus. McCulloch, by comparison, devotes most of 
his attention, in theorising about the natural wage rate, to just this 
concern. As we saw from his earlier definition of the natural, or 
necessary, rate of wages, the "habits and customs prevailing" in a
2country are fundamental in determining the minimum acceptable wage rate.
Not only would this minimum vary internationally, because of differences ,
in the "physical circumstances under which every people is placed","*
and differences in culture, but it would also vary intranationally,
over time, according to the "perpetually occurring changes in ... (the)
4diet, dress, lodgings, and other accommodations", of the people as 
their wants and necessities alter. The requirements determining the 
natural wage basket are seen to be, in part at least, subjectively 
determined, governed to some extent by people's perceived wants.
As we saw in the previous section, the monetary wage rate was seen 1
(1) ibid., pp.251-254. Malthus adduces evidence from Irish and 
English history in "support" of his case.
(2) See p.257 of this section.
(3) McCulloch, Essay on Wages, p.141.
(4) McCulloch ed., Wealth of Nations, vol.IV, p.472
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to increase in societal development, as the cost of producing life's 
necessities increased. McCulloch notes, however, that the quality 
of food deemed necessary to life is, itself, of particular significance. 
Whilst the quality of food is high, for example, in the case of wheat, 
the labouring classes are deemed, by McCulloch, to have a kind of 
buffer to protect them against the worse consequences of the increasing 
cost of producing agricultural goods through time; however, where the 
quality of food is poor, in the case of potatoes, for example, this 
buffer does not exist. According to McCulloch the natural consequences 
of an increase in the price of food (or a contraction in the demand for 
labour) is to compel the labourers, through the ensuing depression in 
the wage rate, to economise. If this depression continues for any 
enduring period of time there is a possibility, McCulloch argues, that 
the habits of the labourers will become degraded; they will become 
accustomed to a lower standard of comfort or food. This represents, 
for McCulloch:
perhaps the most serious of all the evils that can 
befal (sic) them. Let them become contented with 
a lower species of food (etc.,) ... and they may
bid an eternal adieu to everything better.
If the labouring classes are already subsisting on the lowest species 
of food — as purportedly occurred in Ireland — then the scenario is much 
worse, for
it is, of course, impossible for them to go to a 
lower period of scarcity; and should their wages or 
the means of subsistence falling to their share, 
sustain any serious decline, an increase would 
necessarily take place in the rate of mortality.
And so, the higher the customary wage minimum, the better the
prospects for the labouring classes - in the short term - in the
( 1 )
(2)
McCulloch, Essay on Wages, p.147.
McCulloch, ed.. Wealth, 1850, vol.IV, p.474
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advancement of society.
_ This link between a depression in the market rate of wages, and 
subsistence requirements, is inversely mirrored with an increase in 
the market rate of wages, for every increase in the demand for labour 
has the potential to increase the subjective subsistence level during 
the interim period between a change in demand and provision of the 
requisite supply.^- The reason for this surprising coincidence arises 
from the fact that the number of labourers in the market at any one 
time is a fixed quantum: it can neither be speedily increased when wages 
rise, nor reduced when they fall. Rather, a time-lag of between 
eighteen and twenty years is seen to elapse before the full effect of
the increased stimulus that a wage rise gives to population can be 
2felt in the market. (
During all this period, therefore, the labourers 
have an increased command over the necessaries 
and conveniences of life: In consequence their 
habits are improved; and as they learn to form 
more exalted notions with respect to what is 
required for their comfortable and decent 
support, the natural or necessary rate of ^
wages is proportionally augmented.
This improvement in habit implies also an increase in moral restraint,
which results in the final increase in the labour force actually being in 
4deficit of demand. The basis for this voluntary exercise of restraint
is found in nan's desire for betterment. Following M a m  Smith, McCulloch
notes that "the desire to rise in the world, and to improve our condition,
nis too deeply seated in the human breast ever to be wholly eradicated. 12
(1) O'Brien, J.R.McCulloch, pp.362-3.
(2) cf., Maithus. Principles of Pol.Ec.. 1820 ed., p.242. He cites 
a time-lag of sixteen to eighteen years.
McCulloch, Essay on Wages, pp.143-4.
O'Brien, op.cit., (1970), pp.362-3. Evidence of moral restraint
may be demonstrated by the deferral of marriage to more mature 
years.
(3)
(4)
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Contrary to the gloomy conclusions of Malthus it appears that "whatever 
may be the case with a few individuals, the principle of accumulation
always predominates in aggregate bodies over the passion for expense".1
2Like Smith, McCulloch concludes from this that high market wages -
provided they are not artificially imposed - by increasing the supply
of effort, and inculcating prudential habits are to be desired from the
standpoint of both improving the condition of the labouring classes,1
and of generating support for the institution of property.
Every individual placed under such circumstances, 
feels that he derives a direct and tangible 
advantage from the institution of the right of 
property, and that otherwise he should not be 
able peaceably to enjoy the fruits of his 
industry; and he consequently becomes personally 
interested in its support, and in the support of 
the public tranquility.
The labouring classes cure, it is alleged, the "foundation of the 
social pyramid". Whilst wages are high, the foundation is "solid and 
secure", because the labourers are industrious and orderly - supply of 
effort increasing with the level of wages.“ But if this standard is 
permanently reduced, men become idle and dissipated, and the moral fabric 
of society is threatened. Public disturbances result from low market 
wages - and their repercussions for subsistence expectations.
An alteration in the demand for labour (in an upward direction) 
means that the lag in the adjustment of the population, by amending the 123
(1) McCulloch, Essay on Wages, p.155 (my emphasis).
(2) Smith, WN.I.viii.35 ff. See Chapter 2, section 3(i), pp.121-122.
(3) Underlying this appears to be the Smithian notion that where the 
labouring elements of society are flourishing and happy, so too 
is the rest of society. See WN.I.viii.36.
McCulloch, Essay on Wages, p.159. (Original emphasis).
ibid., pp.160-161. cf., Treatise on Wages, pp.48-9. This argument
is directed against the view that high wages encourage indolence 
and apathy.
(4)
(5)
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psychological expectations of subsistence, does not increase in proportion
to the change in demand. Population pressure, in consequence, is
essential to the progress of society rather than being inimical to it.1
McCulloch appears, therefore, to have moved away from his early view of
2man as "the mere slave of appetite or instinct", to a view of man as 
a rational creature capable of improving his living standards by the 
exercise of moral restraint.
One policy favoured by McCulloch as preventing, or at least
abating, the immiseration of the worker, was the establishment of a
system of public education. Poverty was thoughtto cause misery and
crime, with ignorance, "or a want of the knowledge of the laws or
circumstances that determine the conditions of the great bulk of
mankind",1 similarly regarded. Thus the provision of elementary (
education for all societal classes ought to be one of government's
most pressing concerns. Education, by strengthening prudence and
forethought, and by increasing social order through the inculcation of
support for the institution of private property could also assist in
the alleviation of distress caused by the tendency for population growth
4to outstrip capital growth.
An increased demand for labour can, therefore, be positively 
beneficial to the comforts of the labouring classes by offering them 
the opportunity to develop more elevated tastes, which will in turn 
protect them from the full debilitating impact of the tendency for 
the produce of labour to diminish as society progresses. In this way
(1) McCulloch, PPE, ed.3, 1843, Preface, p.xvi.
(2) ibid.. Preface, pp.xv-xvi; and The Literature of Political 
Economy, (London, 1845), pp.259-261.
(3) PPE, ed.5, 1864, p.396.
(4) McCulloch also considered the impact of other policies on the 
per capita wage rate - for instance, he examined the impact of 
the Poor Laws, piece-work, emigration. See O'Brien,
J.R.McCulloch, pp.319-331.
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the psychological dimension of McCulloch's definition and treatment 
lends itself to a slightly more optimistic conclusion, than the belief 
that the necessary wage rate was exclusively conceived of as a physical 
minimum.
In order to understand better the relationship between the necessary 
or natural wage rate, and the market wage rate, we must now turn our 
attention to an examination of the determinants of the market rate of 
wages, and to the issue of the wage-fund theorem.
(ii) The Market Rate of Wages, or the Wage-Fund Theory
The basis of the classical economists' conception of the determinants 
of market wages is provided by the notion of the wage—fund. Thus, as 
McCulloch proclaims, the
Rate of Wages in any Country at any particular period,
(is) dependent on the Magnitude of the Fund or Capital 
appropriated to the payment of Wages, compared with ^
the number of Labourers.
This claim has led a number of modern economic commentators to note
that i
The wage-fund theory is not, however, a theory of 
wages at all, but like the marginal productivity 
theory, a theory of the demand for labour.
In other words, capital comprises a demand for labour, which obviously 
assumes a motive for capital to demand labour. This motive is explained 
by an argument from productivity.3 Capital accumulation is envisaged. 12
(1) McCulloch, J.R., An Essay on the Circumstances which Determine the 
Rate of Wages, and the Condition of the Labouring Classes (Edinburgh 
1826), p.112. (Original emphasis).
(2) O'Brien, The Classical Economists, p.355.
(3) cf., ibid, pp.355-360
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a la Smith, as supportive of the division of labour, the extension of 
which leads to an increase in the size of the aggregate produce of 
labour due to increased productivity, which provides, in turn, 
additional scope for continued accumulation. Wages may be affected 
in one of two ways by this increase in productivity: either the wage 
bill alone will increase, since the total return to labour is augmented 
by the employment of a larger number of labourers;'*' or both the wage 
bill and the actual wage rate will increase, since, for a time at least 
the funds available to the support of labour, compared with the size of 
the labouring population,may lead to labourers being remunerated at a 
rate in excess of the natural rate of wages, which will lead ultimately 
to an increase in the supply of labour.
That capital constitutes a demand for labour seems merely to be a 
corollary of the assumption that capital was the only fund from which 
wages could be paid, given that production was a time-consuming process.
The essence of the wage-fund theory is that pre-accumulated capital 
forms a fund for the support of labour throughout the productive process 
As Ricardo recounts it:
2Before a man can work for a year a stock of food and clothing, 
and other necessaries must be provided for him. This stock 
is not his property but is the property of the man who sets ^
him to work. 123
(1) An extension of the social division of labour.
(2) The year mentioned is dictated by the agricultural scenario in 
which the wage-fund was usually situated. cf./Smith, WN.I.viii, 
7-8.
(3) Ricardo, "Absolute Value and Exchangeable Value", Sraffa, ed., 
Works, vol.IV, p.365. It is important to the wage-fund theorem 
that the capital referred to is capital qua wage-goods, McCulloch' 
"Food, clothes, and other articles" for instance (Essay on Wages, 
p.112) as opposed to capital in its generic sense. Similarly it 
it is important that the labouring population be differentiated 
from the total population. This distinction is, however, not 
always kept in mind. Mill simply notes that "the rate of wages, 
depends on the proportion between Population and Employment, in 
other words, capital", Elements, p,41.
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Commodities produced by the conjoint operation of capital and 
labour have, it seems, "two clases of persons who cure joint proprietors".1 
One class gives its labour only in production, the other advances 
capital - and both must be renumerated out of the product. Similarly,
Mill argues that the labourer may be seen to "own" the labour, just
2as the capitalist "owns" the capital necessary to production. This
sense of "ownership" of labour derives from the Lockean concept that
each individual is imbued with a right of property in his labour,3 and
represents a notion which underwrites most of the exhortations of the
classical economists that the labourer ought to be left free to direct
4his labour into whichever channel he desires.
Mills' discussion of the status of this labour, the property of the
working man, in advanced society is interesting for what it illuminates
about his concept of the wage-contract. Before examining in detail the
wage-fund theorem, we propose to consider briefly this concept advanced by
Mill, believing that it forms an implicit assumption in all classical
economic theories of wages.
The great capitalist, the owner of a manufactory, 
if he operated with slaves instead of free labourers, 
like the V7est Indies planter, would be regarded as 
the owner both of the capital and of the labour.
He would be owner, in short, of both instruments 
of production: and the whole of the produce.
What is the difference, in the case of the man, who operates by means 1234
(1) ibid., p.365.
(2) cf., Mill, Elements 1821, p.69; ed.3, 1844 vol.pp.20-21.
(3) Locke, Civil Government, II.V.§.27.
(4) cf., Smith’s idea of labour as the "patrimony of a poor man", 
WN.I.x.c.12, and his critique of apprenticeship laws etc.
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of labourers receiving wages?^-
In the case of the owner of the slaves. Mill implies that his 
proprietary right over that slave, by virtue of its absoluteness, 
entitles the slave-owner to the entire produce of the slave's labour.
In purchasing the slave, he purchases, "at once, the whole of that
2labour, which the man can ever perform". He owns the labour and 
its product, as exclusively as he owns the slave.
In the case of the manufacturer working with wage-labour, the 
relationship is slightly different - though the difference is only of 
degree. The labourer, as we have seen, "owns" his labour, which means, 
by implication, that he is free to sell it. This he does for a 
stipulated period of time and fee in advanced society. The buyer of 
that labour - the manufacturer - reimburses the labourer with wages.
i
By selling, what may be better described as his "labour-power", the 
labourer also it seems, effectively divests himself of his entitlement 
to a share in the actual product of his labour. Mill assumes, accord­
ingly, that when the capitalist buys the labourer's capacity to labour, 
he is not only buying labour qua factor of production,but also the title 
to whatever that labour creates. Thus, the only difference between the 
West Indian planter and the manufacturer lies in the "mode of purchasing". 
The slave-owner purchases the labour of his slave in advance in its 
entirèty. The manufacturer, purchasing the labour of his employee, 
buys "only so much of a man's labour as he can perform in a day, or 
any other any other stipulated time"3 He is. Mill asserts, "equally
(1) Mill, Elements, 1844, p.
(2) Mill, Elements, pp.21-22
(3) ibid., p.22
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.. the owner of the labour so purchased, as the owner of the slave is of 
that of the slave".'"
Given that the usual inference from the slave-owner relationship
2would probably be that such a relationship is inherently exploitative, 
it is difficult to avoid deducing the same conclusion from the nature 
of the capitalist-wage-labour relationship, particularly since Mill 
elsewhere identifies the "grand governing law of human nature", as man's 
desire for power sufficient to "render the persons and properties of 
human beings subservient to our pleasures"? However, avoid deducing 
such a conclusion we must, for Mill sees the sale of labour by the wage­
worker to the capitalist as the result of a "bargain between them", a bargain, 
that is, which "when made in freedom (is) ... determined by competition",
and whose terms consequently "alter according to the state of supply and (
4demand".
The labourer's voluntary divestiture of his title to a portion of the 
property created by his labour is necessitated by his non-ownership of 
capital.^ Products in advanced society tend to be the creation of the 
combined efforts of labour and capital, hence the labourer, to ensure 
the utilisation of his skill - and the procurement of subsistence - must 
rely on the provision of the requisite capital by another person. 1
(1) ibid., p.22.
(2) cf., Macpherson, C.B., "The Economic Penetration of Political 
Theory : Some Hypotheses", Journal of the History of Ideas, 
vol.39, 1978, pp.101-118.
(3) Mill, James, "Essay on Government", in J.Lively and J.Rees (eds.)' 
Utilitarian Logic and Politics, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978), p.63.
(4) Elements, p.42.
(5) McCulloch notes that "without circulating capital, the labourer never 
could engage in any undertaking which did not yield an almost immediate 
return", citing Smith in support of his argument. See "Political 
Economy", EB6. p.244.
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Freedom for the labourer consists in the ability - contigent 
upon opportunity, of course - to make a free and voluntary contract 
of employment. The labourer, can, in theory, choose between a variety 
of occupations and can change masters at will if he so desires.
Compared to the slave - who as a piece of property is sold as any 
other commodity is sold - the freedom of the wage-labourer lies in 
his ability to direct his own labour; to negotiate his own contract.^- 
Instead, therefore,
of waiting till the commodity be produced, and abiding 
all the delay and uncertainties of the market in which 
the value of it is realised, it has been found to suit 
much better the convenience of the labourers to receive 
their share in advance. The shape under which it has 
been found most convenient for all parties that they 2
should receive it, is that of wages.
Although a similar conception to this is clearly fundamental to all 
the authors dealt with in this chapter, it is not normally articulated. 
Indeed, F.W.Taussig notes, of McCulloch, that he has little to say about 
how or why wages are dependent upon capital.^
This whole scenario of a wage-labourer faced with starvation or an 
opportunity to sell his labour to the capitalist in the market is note­
worthy for what it illustrates about the conception of property under­
lying Mill's argument. If we assume;as the later anti-Ricardians do, 
that labour alone is entitled to the produce of its endeavour, then 
all the wage-contract reveals is the exploitative nature of the 1
(1) Whether the freedom to choose between labouring for minimal wages 
(as dictated by the wage-fund theorem), or starving actually 
constitutes a free choice at all, is of course, a moot point .
(2) Mill, Elements, p.41 (My emphasis.)
(3) Taussig, F.W., Wages and Capital ; An Examination of the Wages
Fund Doctrine (London, Macmillan 1896), pp.191-2. cf.. also,
Gordon, Scott, "The Wage-fund Controversy : The Second Round", 
HOPE, 1973, vol.5,pp.14-35.
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relationship between labourer and capitalist, for the labourer, though 
justly entitled to the entire fruits of his labour, only receives a 
small portion of those fruits, whilst the capitalist supplying none 
of the labour requisite for production appropriates a larger portion 
of those same fruits. Exploitation is central to this contract.
However, if we assume as the classical economists do, that the 
prevailing pattern of property distribution is legitimate, and that 
capitalism presupposes the right of the capitalist to the profit 
generated by the employment of his property (capital)then the relationship 
between wage-labour and capital is regarded as reciprocal. Both 
benefit by the wage contract - the labourer does not starve, but finds 
an opportunity to employ his skills, and the capitalist makes a profit, 
and finds an opportunity to use his capital. The market, as it were, « 
harmonises their interests.**"
To return to the wage-fund theory. It is important to note this 
theory was constructed upon assumptions derived from an agricultural 
economy. In terms of Ricardo's Essay on Profit this is patently
obvious. The economy is treated as if it represented a gigantic farm,
producing a single output - corn - with the annual harvest divided into
2food/wages for the labourer, and seed/capital for the capitalist.
VThen the harvest was in, the total amount of agricultural produce 
available for consumption until the next year could be estimated. On 
the presumption that the labourer's subsistence consisted primarily of 12
(1) cf,,Hunt, E.K., "Utilitarianism and the Labor Theory of Value", 
HOPE, 11, 1979, pp.545-571, p.567 esp.
(2) cf.TGordon. op.cit., p.16.
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agricultural produce, the average rate of wages for any particular year 
would be determined by the ratio of the last harvest’s yield to the 
total labouring population.
Malthus, in the first Essay on the Principle of Population, adheres
to just such a yearly cycle, commenting that the demand for labour is
contingent upon the "yearly stock of provisions in a country".’'
Similarly, Ricardo, in the chapter "Taxes on Raw Produce" also suggests
that it is the harvest of the past season that constitutes the fund from 
2which wages are paid, noting, for example that, a "deficient supply 
from bad seasons without any pernicious and unwise interference, would 
not be followed by a rise of wages",3 indicating that the wage fund is 
rigidly predetermined according to the quantity of produce of the 
previous season's harvest. James Mill further reinforces this view 
through his assertion that "what is annually produced is annually consumed; 
or, that what is produced in one year, is consumed in the next".4
The rigid fixedness of the annual turnover period from harvest to 
harvest is, of course, unrealistic from the viewpoint of industrial 
capitalism where production periods are of variable length.3 1
(1) Malthus, Thomas Robert, An Essay on the Principle of Population. 
as it affects the Future Improvement of Society, 1798, ed. A.Flew 
(Harmondsworth, Penguin Books, 1970), p.184.
(2) Ricardo, Principles, pp.156-172 passim. cf.,Blauq, Ricardian
Economics, p.122. ‘
(3) Ricardo, Principles, p.162.
(4) Mill, Elements, p.226.
(5) cf.. Mill. Elements, p.227: "A year is assumed in political economy, 
as the period which includes a revolving circle of production and 
consumption. No period does so exactly. Some articles are 
produced and consumed in a period much less than a year. In 
others, the circle is greater than a year".
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The purpose of this particular model, as initially expounded, was to
enable Ricardo to express factorial returns in real terms, avoiding
thereby the problem of valuation in labour terms! On the whole,
however, there is, as Taussig notes, "nothing rigid and inflexible in
2the capital from which ... wages could be paid", in the writings of
the classical economists, as evidenced by McCulloch’s contention that,
independent of an increase in capital funds, combinations and strikes
did have a tolerable degree of success in raising wages.^
In fact a variable fund was quite consistent with the theory's
main argument. Divested of its annual condition, or what Gordon calls 
4"seasonality", the wage-fund thesis could still operate. Retaining 
several features, viz., that all production is time-consuming, and 
requires in consequence, the provision, by the capitalist, of maintenance' 
to the labourer throughout this period, based on the premiss that such 
maintenance derives from a previously accumulated capital fund, the 
wage rate could now be ascertained through the simple quotient of total 
wage capital, divided by the total number of labourers.5
Thus as John Stuart Mill contends in his review of T.W.Thornton ’ s 
book,On Labour, Its Wrongful Claims and Rightful Dues,^ 1
(1) See Chapter 3, Section 2, pp.154-157.
(2) Taussig, op.cit., p.213.
(3) McCulloch, A Treatise on Wages (London, 1851 and 1854. References 
are to the later edition), pp.84, 86.
(4) Gordon, op.cit., p.17.
(5) Gordon, op.cit., p.17.
(6) (London, 1869.)
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There is supposed to be at any given instant, a sum 
of wealth, which is unconditionally devoted to the 
payment of the wages of labour. This sum is not regarded 
as unalterable, for it is augmented by saving, and increases 
with the progress of wealth; but it is reasoned upon at any 
given moment a pre-determined amount. More than that 
amount it is assumed that the wage-receiving class cannot 
possibly divide among them; that amount, and no less, ^
they cannot but obtain.
The wage-fund hypothesis need not necessarily contend, therefore, 
that the wage-fund is of a precise, unalterable and determined quantity,
but it must, for the sake of consistency, argue that "an increase in
2wages must wait upon a prior expansion of production". In other words, 
an increase in the wage rate as a whole must be dependent upon an ante­
cedent increase in the rate of capital accumulation. A temporary or 
partial increase as envisaged by McCulloch, vis-a-vis the efficacy of 
strikes, does not contradict this assertion, since market competition would 
ensure that the decline in profits due to increased expenditure on the 
wage-bill would lead ultimately to the withdrawal of capital and thus to 
an equalisation in the profit rate.
One further aspect of note concerning the wage-fund theory relates 
to its development beyond the classical economists. Scott Gordon argues 
that in abandoning the "seasonality" premiss, the classical economists 
also abandoned the fixed time qualification of the numerator, which is 
requisite if the quotient is to be interpreted as a true rate.1 23
(1) Mill, J.S., "Thornton on Labour and its Claims", Fortnightly Review. 
V, 1869. Reprinted in Dissertations and Discussions. IV, 1875 
(pp.25-84) , p.43. Cited in Gordon, op.cit. . p.18. (My emphasis.)
(2) Blaug, Ricardian Economics, p.122.
(3) Gordon, op.cit., p.17.
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quantity of goods available for consumption constitutesin fact,a flow,
rather than a stock or fund. Concern with the dimensional facet of
wage theory led later American writers to the question of whether
labour is conceived to be paid out of current output, or previously
accumulated stock.2 The Classical economists were not, however,
especially interested in this question. Their main concern was to
examine the relationship between the relative rates of growth of capital
and population, in order to assess their impact on the standard of
living of the labouring classes, and relates, as such, to such staple
elements of classical economic theory as the Malthusian doctrine of
population and the tendency of the profit rate to decline in the
progress of society. As McCulloch notes
The well-being and comfort of the labourer are, therefore, 
especially dependent on the relation which their increase 
bears to the increase of the capital that is to feed and 
employ them. 2
The Malthusian doctrine of population underlying this view was 
founded on the principle that population has a universal tendency to 
grow faster than the means of subsistence. As Malthus writes "the 
power of population is indefinitely greater than the power of the earth 
to produce subsistence for man", thus, "population, when unchecked, 
increases in a geometrical ratio. Subsistence ... only in an arith­
metical ratio".2 123
In treating of an economy where production periods overlap, the total
(1) ibid., pp.17-18. cf., for example, Wayland, F., Elements of Political 
Economy (1837) and Perry, A.L., Elements of Political Economy (1865).
It is worth noting that Hodgskin, in Labour Defended Against the Claims 
of Capital, subjects the wage-fund theorem to just such an analysis, 
concluding that, in fact, labour is remunerated out of current output. 
See below. Chapter 7, section 2<ii).
(2) McCulloch, Essay on Wages, p.114. cf.. Treatise on Wages, p.5.
(3) Malthus, Essay on Population, 1798, p.71.
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Mill, developing this viewpoint in the Elements , notes that popul­
ation has a consistent tendency to outpace capital accumulation adducing 
evidence from physiology and sociology to support his case1
It thus sufficiently appears, that there is a tendency 
in population to increase faster than capital. If 
this be established, it is of no consequence to the 
present purpose to inquire about the rapidity of the 
increase. How slow so ever the increase of population, 
provided that of capital is still slower, wages will be 
reduced so low that a portion of the population will ^
regularly die of want.
Their subscription to the theory of differential fertility and 
diminishing agricultural returns only reinforces the view that population 
growth tends to surpass that of the capacity of the means of subsistence 
to support a burgeoning population, and means that ultimately, unless 
checks are operated upon population increase, labourers will receive only 
the natural rate of wages, which given the increasing cost of producing 
raw produce, will increase in monetary terms, though not in real terms.1
However, although the ultimate tendency is for population growth to 
outstrip capital accumulation, at different stages in societal progress 
this is not necessarily so. One reason for the disparities in the 
comparative rates of growth of capital and population emanates from the 
relative productiveness of industry. Since capital is nothing but the 
accumulated produce of previous industry, it is obvious that where 
industry is most productive, growth will be greatest. 12
(1) Mill, Elements, pp,46 ff.
(2) ibid.,' p.56. McCulloch follows a similar line. _cf., Essay on 
Wages, pp.118-128, 129, 148-9, 154-5, 157-9. See also Ricardo 
Principles, pp.94-109.
See section 2(i) of this chapter, 
p.102.
(3) cf., also Ricardo, Principles
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In different stages of society, the accumulation of capital, 
or the means of employing labour, is more or less rapid, 
and must in all cases depend on the productive powers of 
labour. The productive powers of labour are generally 
greatest when there is an abundance of fertile land: at 
such periods accumulation is often so rapid, that labourers 
cannot be supplied with the same rapidity as capital.
Capital accumulation and population growth are, accordingly, most
likely to keep pace in the early periods of a country's development.
But in proportion as population increases in such new settlements , and land
of a worse quality is taken into cultivation "the tendency to an increase
of capital diminishes",
for the surplus produce remaining, after satisfying the 
wants of the existing population, must necessarily be 
in proportion to the facility of production, viz. to 
the smaller number of persons employed in production.
Unfortunately this situation cannot continue, since the product of
land, limited in quantity, and variable in quality, tends to diminish
as society advances.
As Patricia James notes in her book Population Malthus, Malthus - 
and indeed Ricardo, Mill, and McCulloch - saw the problem of the 
constantly deteriorating condition of the labouring classes "in simple 
terms of physical scarcity, not economic distribution".3 The problem 
was basically lack of food, rather than how that food was shared out
amongst the population. For Malthus the labouring classes could only
. . 4be assisted by advances in productivity and not by charity. Were the
wealthy to subsidise the poor, the result would not be that everyone
could thereby procure some meat, but simply that the effective demand
(1) Ricardo, Principles, p.98. cf., McCulloch, Essays on Wages, pp.118-
120.
(2) ibid., p.98
(3) James, Patricia, Population Malthus, (London, Routledge and Kegan 
Paul Ltd., 1979), pp.64-5.
(4) As well as via moral restraint.
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for meat would merely increase the price of it beyond the means of the
poor. The net effect of any such redistribution of income''' would be
to depress the standard of living of all by diminishing the share, or
2the "value of each man's patent".
Whilst the market wage rate is determined by the supply of labour 
relative to demand, that is by the ratio of wage-capital to labouring 
population, it is also true that the labourers are themselves "the
masters of the only means by which their command over the necessaries
3and conveniences of life can ever be materially extended. Habituation 
to a higher standard of living, prompted by a period of high wages, 
may, as we have seen, recommend to the labouring classes the judicious-
4ness of moral restraint. By limiting their numbers, the labourers 
would be able to command a larger share of the capital allocated for , 
the maintenance of labourer.
In the short-term, therefore, the rate of wages is calculated by 
the ratio of (working) population to capital, in the long-term, by 
the requirements of subsistence, whether conceived as a straight 
physiological minimum, or a combined physiological/psychological minimum.
As we observed earlier, the view of rent developed by the classical 
economists, on the whole,^ simplified the problem of distribution to 1
(1) Malthus' (et al.) views on property will be dealt with in the next 
chapter.
(2) Malthus, Essay on Population, pp.96-7. Malthus is, as would be 
expected,opposed to the Poor Laws. cf., Essay on Population, 
pp.93-103.
(3) McCulloch, Essay on Wages, pp.128-9.
(4) There are also vague endorsements of birth control in Mill's 
Elements, pp.SO, 67.
Malthus makes an obvious, though intermittentjexception to this 
rule.
(5)
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a dichotomy between wages and profit, with profit deemed the residual 
share. It is our aim, in the next section, therefore, to examine 
just how the classical economists explain the residual base of profit, 
beginning with an exposition of the nature of the profit reward.
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Section 3 : Profit, i A Residual Payment?
(i) Introduction
According to Frank H. Knight, modern discussion of the theory of
profit recognises that the classical economists did not get beyond the
"arithmetical truism of the residual idea".1 Rent, as these authors
conceived it, was a surplus determined at the margin of production, and
as such extraneous to costs. The value of the marginal product was
divisible between wages and profit only, with the former the "active", or
regulating, principle. Profit comprises, therefore, the remainder of
the produce after the deduction of wages, and is ipso facto peculiarly
sensitive to alterations in the rate of remuneration of that factor.
Thus, a la Ricardo, "profits would be high or low in proportion as
2 'wages were low or high".
Profit is seen essentially, then, as a return on capital; capital 
accumulated through saving, and conceived of as simply a quantity of 
ordinary consumable produce, accumulated as "stock".1 Capital was 
differentiated by its special use, that is: "its consumption in the special
connection and for the special purpose of production, i.e. its own
4reproduction with an additional product which is profit"; or, as 123
(1) Knight, F.H., "The Ricardian Theory of Production and 
Distribution", pt.II, p.185.
(2) Ricardo, Principles, p.110. cf. Mill, Elements, pp.68ff.
(3) cf., Mill, Elements, pp.19-20; Malthus, Principles of Pol.Ec., 
pp.293-295.
Knight, art.cit. p.186. cf., O'Brien, The Classical Economists, 
pp.118-119.
(4)
284
articulated by James Mill, "capital, from its simplest, to its most 
complicated state, means something produced, for the purpose of being 
employed, as a means towards a further production", and is evidently 
the "result of what is called saving".^
The theory as outlined above is of note for the simple fact that 
the classical authors evidently failed to acknowledge, or perhaps 
realise, that "capital" is always the "value" of some concrete thing 
endowed with earning power, and that it is only a distinct source of 
income by virtue of the fact that it is restricted to things which are 
allowed to be owned, and bought and sold, that is, to property.
Capital is simply the productive capacity of such items of property,
2Knight observes. As Cannan states in a commentary on Irving Fisher, 
Fisher's endeavours to induce late nineteenth-century economists to 
speak of the capital of both individuals and societies, as the totality 
of things owned by them, at any particular time, did not coincide with 
the aims of the economists in their theory of production."^ Capital 
for them did not comprise property, rather their concept of capital was 
linked to a search for an explanation of the comparative productiveness 
of man's industry in the past and the present. They were seeking a term 
to cover the whole of the "legacy left by each generation of mankind in
the shape of useful - that is, still useful - alterations made by man in
4his material surroundings. 1
(1) Mill, Elements, p.19.
(2) Knight, art,cit., p.136.
(3) Cannan, Edward, A Review of Economic Theory (London, 1929), 
pp.150-151.
(4) ibid., p.150.
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Although Malthus, Ricardo et al cannot be said to be pursuing an 
explanation of the comparative productiveness of capital, they too avoided 
discussing capital in terms of property - as something to be bought and sold. 
Capital merely comprised the produce of past labour capable of being 
employed to enhance labour productivity, by both supporting the labourer 
throughout production, thereby permitting the lengthening of the 
productive process, and by directly increasing the productive power of 
labour through the medium of machinery and other items of fixed capital.^ 
Aside from remarks to the.effect that capital accumulation derived 
from saving, little was said about the origins of capital, or why it came 
to be concentrated in the hands of specific individuals. Its pattern of
distribution was taken as given - and as such endorsed as both natural and
olegitimate. Only its ostensible role in production was considered.
In order to understand better the classical economists' conception of 
profit, we propose to begin with an examination of the nature of the 
profit reward.
(ii) The Nature of the Profit Reward
From the time of Adam Smith onwards, profit tended to be differen­
tiated from the wages of management. Smith had argued that profit 
consists of interest plus an additional premium for risk,  ^ and this 
definition continues, on the whole. Ricardo talks of profits 12
(1) cf., O ’Brien, The Classical Economists, p.119.
(2) cf.,Hodgskin, Labour Defended against the Claims of Capital; 
and Chapter 7, section 2 (ii).
Smith, W.N.I.vi.6, WN.II.iv.14; see also Blaug, op.cit., 
p.46. O'Brien, The Classical Economists, p.119; and 
Chapter 2, section 3 (ii) of this thesis.
(3)
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affording "an adequate compensation for their trouble, and the risk 
which they (the capitalists) must necessarily encounter in employing 
their capital productively”1 *3- 4, but fails to develop the topic any 
further. James Mill and Maithus are both noticeably reticent on 
the subject. McCulloch however discusses the nature of the profit 
reward in some depth.
Profit, he argues, somewhat contradictorily, should not be
confounded with the produce of industry received by the capitalist,
rather it comprises the value remaining after all costs of production 
2have been paid. Thus, if the produce yielded by an undertaking is 
insufficient to replace the capital expended, a loss will be incurred; 
if the capital be merely replaced, there will be no surplus,nor, there­
fore, a loss nor a profit, and if there is a surplus in excess of the 
costs, profit will be proportional to that. Thus,profits are regulated 
not by the proportion which they bear to the wage rate, but by the 
proportion which they bear to the capital employed in production.
Clearly this conflicts with his view of the inverse movement of wages 
and profit.
Profit is not only a return on capital; it is also a compensation
for risk, varying proportionally with the degree of that risk.3
"Wherever there is risk, it must be compensated to the lender by a
4higher premium or interest". The rate of interest depends on the 
rate of interest, with the former representing nothing more than the
(1) Ricardo, Principles, p.122.
X2) McCulloch, PPE ed.5, 1864, p.454. Malthus makes a similar point, 
Principles of Pol.Ec.. p.294.
(3) "Political Economy", EB8, p.240.
(4) Literature of Political Economy, p.248.
mnet profit on capital. Whatever returns accrue to the borrower beyond 
the rate of interest he has agreed to pay, are his rewards for risk, 
trouble, skill, or advantages of situation and connection.1
McCulloch distinguishes between gross profit, and net profit.
Gross profit varies according to risk, respectability, and "agreeable­
ness of different employments", employing those categories of occupational
2differentials identified by Adam Smith , thus a gunpowder manufacturer 
must earn as much profit over and above the normal rate in secure 
businesses, in order to guarantee, or insure his capital against the 
extraordinary risks to which it is exposed, and in order, presumably,to 
compensate him for the greater wage-bill incurred due to the higher rate 
of remuneration of his employees given the greater risk involved in the 
occupation in question. Net profit is identified exclusively with 
pure interest.
McCulloch also considers the question of profit as a return on 
investment in education, and the connected problem of the rent of ability. 
Whether the profit accruing to those with superior knowledge and skill 
can be identified as profit is, the author claims, disputable.
Regarding those superintending the use of capital in industries 
yielding extraordinary returns, who have received,themselves, superior 
educations, such returns should be viewed as "the profit upon, or 
returns to, the extra outlay on their education". 1 23
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(1) ibid., p.248.
(2) cf„ Smith. WN.I.x.b.l ff. cf., O'Brien, op.cit., p.310; 
McCulloch, O'Brien alleges, occasionally confused insurable 
and non-insurable risk in his calculations.
(3) PPE, ed., 5, 1864, p.460
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However, where the parties possess any peculiar talent or genius
by which they are enabled to strike out new and better 
methods of production, the results must be considered as 
the fruit of natural gifts, of which they are the 
exclusive possessors. The profits realised by such 
parties are not subject to any ordinary rule or law.
This is, of course, a curiously individualistic argument, and
conflicts with the notion of the social possession of accumulated
2knowledge envisaged by Hodgskin.
Profits may comprise therefore elements of pure interest; risk pay­
ment; the wages of management; a return to skill,' and returns due to 
advantages of situation and connection. However, an explanation of 
the nature of the profit reward indicates nothing about the origin of 
that reward. The aim of Section 3(ii) will be, then, to examine the 
source of profit. <
(iii) The Origin of Profit
Before moving on to examine the manner in which the level of profit 
is determined, a number of points pertaining to the emergence of profit, 
and the reason for its existence, ought to be considered.
The core idea in the classical economists' view of profit is that 
it comprised a reward for waiting. Adopting the Smithian theorem,that 
capital by supporting the division of labour and assisting labour led 
to an increase in productivity, the classical writers were led ultimately 
to the conclusion that the provision of capital by the capitalist 
entitled him to a reward.1 23 With Smith this includes, therefore, the
(1) . ibid.,,p.460.
(2) cf., Hodgskin, Popular Political Economy (London, 1827), pp.loO-110.
(3) cf... Smith, WN.I .viii.7-8. See Chapter 2, section 3(ii), pp.125- 
131.
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notion that the labourer must yield part of his product to capital, 
as recompense for its assistance in production.
McCulloch follows Smith's lead quite closely, noting that the 
provision of wage goods in exchange for labour will not be an equal 
exchange.
No capitalist could have any motive to exchange the 
produce of a given quantity of labour already 
performed for the produce of the same quantity of 
labour to be performed,
unless he were to benefit by the transaction. Thus, wage goods will 
never command only the quantity of labour required to produce them, 
rather they will "always exchange for more; and it is this excess that 
constitutes profits".1 23-
Profit is a reward for waiting - that is, the capitalist collects
a reward primarily because he maintains the labourer during production.
In other words, profit accrues to the capitalist because of his control
over capital. The labourer dispossessed of capital and land cannot 
2"wait"; he cannot maintain himself, so subsistence is provided by 
another. "For making this provision, the capitalist, of course, 
expects a reward".3 As we have already noted in Chapter 2, the 
exploitative implications of this scenario were not, however, developed 
by the classical economists. They avoided the normative conclusions
(1) McCulloch, PPE ed.l, 1825, pp.119-20.
(2) cf.. Blauq. Ricardian Economics, p.49. cf.,also Mill, Elements, 
pp.17-18; 20-22; 40-41; and Section 2 (ii) above.
(3) Mill, Elements, p.40. c f Malthus, Essay on the Principle of 
Population (1798), pp.183-4.
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of property distribution as legitimate, and the problem of the
determination of rent, wages, and profit as an empirical issue,
leaving it to the later anti-Ricardian writers to question the
2proprietary base of capitalism.
(iv) Determination of the Rate of Profit
In this section I intend to focus almost exlusively on the
"Ricardian” exposition of profit, as the doctrine concerning the
effect of accumulation on profit is, in a sense, the pivotal idea in
Ricardo's theory of distribution.^
As we saw in Chapter 2, Smith argues that the effect of capital
accumulation, in the absence of any compensating expansion in outlets
for capital investment, would be to lower the profit rate. An
increase in the rate of profit is contingent upon an expansion in the
opportunities for investment. Similarly the rate of profit might
also decline if capital accumulation - or the demand for labour -
outpaced the supply of labour. Thus the profit level is a function 
4of supply and demand.
Malthus isolates two factors capable of affecting profit - seen 
as the excess of the return on capital, over its advances ^-firstly 1234
suggested thereby preferring instead to see the existing pattern
(1) cf., Chapter 2, section 3(ii), pp. 127-130.
(2) cf ... Chapter 7.
(3) Winch, Donald, Intro, to The Principles of Political Economy and 
Taxation, 1821 (London, Everyman, 1973), p.ix.
(4) See Chapter 2, section 3(ii); Winch, ibid., p.ix.
(5) Malthus, Principles of Pol.Ec,, pp.293-4
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"the difficulty or facility of production on the land", and secondly, 
"the varying relation of the quantity of capital to the quantity of 
labour employed by it"^ noting that it is, in fact, the "relative 
scarcity or abundance of capital" which actually and practically 
determines profit.
Adam Smith ... in dwelling solely upon the abundance 
and competition of capital, ... is practically much 
nearer the truth, than those who dwell almost 
exclusively on the quality of the land last taken 
into cultivation.
Clearly the first point - concerning conditions of production in 
agriculture - is the offspring of his theory of diminishing marginal 
returns (in agriculture), and differential fertility. Only on the 
assumption that the real wages of labour remain constant, the level of < 
agricultural skill unchanged, and the establishment of absolute restrictions 
upon the importation of corn, would the problem of recourse to inferior 
lands, and increasing marginal costs of production necessitated by 
population growth, lead to a fall of profit. For then, "the portion 
destined to the payment of labour would be continually encroaching 
upon the portion destined to the payment of profit".1 23 In actuality, 
however, real wages do not remain constant. The labourer does not 
always receive "an unvarying quantity of the necessaries of life";4 
rather, the real price of labour varies with the progress of capital 
and revenue, and the demand for labour compared with supply.
(1) ibid,, pp.294-5.
(2) ibid., pp.325-6. Malthus concedes that in the long-run the cost 
of producing food at the margin will lead to a fall in profit, but 
claims that though this principle is "finally of the very greatest 
power, yet its progress is extremely slow and gradual" (p.312).
In the interim it is supply and demand that are important.
(3) ibid., p.296.
(4) ibid., p.297.
Scarcity of capital compared with the supply of labour ensures a 
high rate of profit, whilst a superfluity of capital compared with the 
supply of labour will ensure a low rate. And thus where investment 
opportunities for capital are closed off, as they would be when all land 
was cultivated, and no more capital could be employed on it, then "the 
competition of increasing capital in manufactures and commerce would 
reduce the rate of profits".''" And thus it is the phenomenon of supply 
and demand that is responsible for the determination of the general
level of profit at any point in time, though the ultimate tendency,
2which may, it seems be repeatedly offset, is for the rate of profit­
ability to be contingent upon the productivity of the marginal invest­
ment in agriculture.3 Again Maithus conflates short term and long
term factors.
Ricardo, as we shall see, ignores the effect of supply and demand 
on profit, except insofar as any alteration in the market rate of wages 
must necessarily involve an alteration in the share of the product 
falling to capital, given the assumption of an inverse ratio between 
profit and wages expressed somewhat mechanistically by James Mill as
the fact that "the share of the one cannot be increased, without a
4corresponding diminution of the share of the other. 12
(1) ibid.. p.305.
(2) By improvements in agricultural technology, and by an increase in 
the personal exertions of the labouring classes, ibid., pp,313-326,
O'Brien, The Classical Economists, p.121.(3)
(4) Mill, Elements. p.79
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Rather, Ricardo focuses on the long-run trend of profits, after market 
adjustments have taken place.
The theory of profits ejqoounded by Ricardo, was aired for the first 
time, publically, in his Essay on Profits, in which he disclaimed the 
(purported) beneficial effects of the Corn Laws, and it is thus to the 
Essay that we first turn.
(a) The Essay on Profits
It is the profits of the farmer that regulate the profits 
of all other trades - and as the profits of the farmer 
must necessarily decrease with every augmentation of 
capital employed on the land, provided no improvements 
be at the same time made in husbandry, all other 
profits must diminish.
The central tenet of the Essay is the idea expressed above, that 
the general profits of stock in all trades, are regulated by the least
t
profitable employment of capital in agriculture. Profit, then, depends
2on the price, or rather on the value of food" . Underlying this is the 
assumption that the mechanism of competition - specifically capital-flow 
- prevents the co-existence of two rates of profit in the market, 
forcing that in the non-agricultural sector to parity with that in 
agriculture. Thus investment in agriculture is fixed by the size of the 
population which produces a totally inelastic demand for corn^ thereby 
preventing an outflow of necessary capital from the agricultural sector. 
In addition, Ricardo also held, at this point that the sole effect of the 
progress of wealth on prices, independent of all improvements, was to 12
(1) Ricardo to Trower, 8 March 1814, Sraffa ed., Works, vol.VI, p.104. 
Maithus' purported position - as cited in this letter - was that 
"the profits of the farmer no more regulate the profits of other 
trades, than the profits of other trades regulate the profits of 
the farmer".
(2) Essay on Profits, p.26.
O'Brien, op.cit., p.123, i.e. an alteration, in price will not 
lead to an alteration in demand.
(3)
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raise the price of raw produce, and labour, leaving all other 
commodities at their original price.1
As the letter to Trower suggests, it was because of the law of 
diminishing returns in agriculture, due to the diminished productivity 
of successive investments of labour and capital on land, that profits
fell. Profits in agriculture, then, were seen to determine the rate of
2profit throughout the economy.
Prior to the emergence of rent, the product of agriculture was
shared exclusively between capital and labour. After the emergence of
rent, only the marginal product is divided exclusively between wages and
profits. Produce on rent-paying land is divided into three shares.
Since the cost of producing the marginal product is seen to regulate
the price of the whole of the agricultural product,1 rent (the excess .
of the produce left after the payment of wages and profit) is transferred
4from the capitalist to the landlord. Rent would "rise on the land
previously cultivated, and precisely in the same degree would profits 
5fall". For a time, as society advances, both profit and rent would 
increase. However, at a later period, "every accumulation of stock” 
will, Ricardo contends, be accompanied by an "absolute, as well as a 
proportionate diminution of profits!'.^ And the reason for this, is 123456
(1) Essay on Profits, p.20. Sraffa notes that this opinion was 
modified shortly after publication. Ricardo came to believe
that the prices of all goods of which raw produce formed a component 
part, would be affected by their increasing costs of production, 
cf., Principles, p.117.
(2) This view is subtley amended in the Principles, and becomes the idea 
that marginal productivity in agriculture determines the profit 
rate in the economy. jj^f., O'Brien, op.cit., p.123.
(3) Since this is the only way to ensure that the requisite supply of 
food is brought to market.
(4) For a fuller discussion of the differential theory of rent, see 
Section 2 of this chapter.
(5) Essay on Profits, p.4.
(6) ibid., p.16.
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the increased expense of producing food. Profit depended on the 
difference between the product of labour at the margin, and the 
subsistence of that labour. As Dobb notes, profit was expressed as 
a "simple product-ratio to wages" - a ratio which declined with the 
extension of the margin and the diminution in the product of a 
day's labour.1 Ricardo's theory can be encapsulated in a statement 
made to Malthus, in a letter of June 1814, that "the rate of
profits and of interest must depend on the proportion of production to
2the consumption necessary to such production", or, in other words, 
profits are, as Thomas de Quincey proclaimed, "the leavings of wages".1 23 45
Profits fall because the "outgoings belonging to cultivation" increase 
as society advances.
To the contention that profits in manufacturing and profits in 
agriculture alternately take the lead in determining profit, Ricardo 
claims that no matter how high profits in manufacture may rise, capital 
will not be withdrawn from the land since the amount of its investment 
is regulated by population size. And since two profit rates cannot 
co-exist, he argues that there will be an inflow of capital from other 
non-agricultural channels into those industries earning above average 
rates of profit, which has the effect of depressing profit to the 
level of agricultural profit. It is, he asserts, "impossible that all
other profits should rise whilst the profits on land are either
4 5stationary, or retrograde". Profit depends on the price of food.
(1) Dobb, Theories of Value and Distribution, p.69. cf.. Sraffa, 
Introd., Principles, p.xxxi.
(2) Ricardo to Malthus, 26 June 1814, Sraffa ed.. Works, vol.VI, p.108 
cf., Sraffa. Introd., Principles, pp.xxxii.
(3) De Quincey, Thomas, The Logic of Political Economy (Edinburgh and 
Tondon, 1844), p.204. Cited in Dobb, op.cit., p.7o.
(4) Essay on Profits, p.26.
(5) ibid., p.26. Ricardo here acknowledges that improvements in the 
productivity of wage goods, in the non-agricultural sector, would 
lead to a fall in wages, and would raise the profits of the farmer 
"and therefore, of all other profits". Though conceding this 
point, he does not consider its implications.
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The theory advanced by Ricardo in the Essay forms the basis of 
his theory of profits in the Principles - though subject to modification, 
as we shall now see.
(b) The Principles of Political Economy and Taxation
The most fundamental assertion of the explanation of profit,posited 
by Ricardo in the Essay, is the notion that "it is the profits of the 
farmer that regulate the profits of arl other trades". In the Principles 
this idea is modified to the much more general assertion that it is the 
productivity of labour on marginal land,that is, no-rent land, that 
regulates general profitability throughout the economy. Thus, "in all 
countries, and at all times, profits depend on the quantity of labour 
requisite to provide necessaries for the labourers, on that land or 
with that capital which yields no rent".''" This is, in many ways, the ' 
core of Ricardian economics.
In the Essay, Ricardo's discussion of rent and profit had been 
conducted without recourse to a theory of value. However the inclusion 
of such a thesis into the Principles enabled Ricardo to show that rent, 
as a price-determined surplus, was extraneous to the formulation of 
value in exchange, and thus allowed him to concentrate on the relation­
ship between labour and capital, particularly the inverse movement 
between wages and profit, which as Winch asserts, is central to Ricardo's 
explanation of the secular decline of profits. 12
(1) Principles, p.126.
(2) Winch, Intro., Principles, Everyman ed., p.xi.
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Ricardo is endeavouring to demonstrate ,. that "profits 
would be high or low in proportion as wages were low and high1','*' 
and that there is an inexorable tendency for profit to fall.
Assuming that money is of invariable value, Ricardo offers 
several examples to support his basic thesis. Remembering that 
the exchangeable value of all commodities is divided exclusively 
between wages and profit, he notes that if corn and manufactured 
commodities were to sell at the same price, then profit and wages 
would vary exactly inversely. Should corn increase in price through 
the expenditure of additional labour on its production, that cause 
alone will not raise the price of manufactured commodities on whose 
production a constant amount of labour has been exerted. If wages 
continued to be renumerated at the same rate, profit in manufacturing 
would also continue steadfast at the same level. However, if, as
Ricardo is certain will happen, money wages increased with the augmentation
2in the cost of growing corn , profits would decline in all sectors.
The rationale behind this assertion is that the product of a stipulated 
quantity of capital and labour always has the same value, regardless 
of its productivity, and thus a change in the rate of remuneration of 
one of these factors necessarily involves a change in the rate of 
remuneration of the other.
As James Mill later notes, the partition of shares between the 
capitalist and the labourer "depends upon the relative abundance of 12
(1) Ricardo, Principles, p.llO.
(2) Still the principal, though not the sole component of the 
wage-basket.
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population and capital, and that population, as compared with capital, 
has a tendency to superabound", and thus the "active principle of 
change is on the side of population", constituting a reason for 
considering population, and hence wages, as the regulator of profits.1
Not only will the profits obtained in manufacturing fall, but also 
those obtained in agriculture. The farmer will not only have to pay 
an increase of wages to each of the labourers employed by him, but he 
will also be compelled to either pay rent or to employ an additional 
number of workers in order to obtain the same produce, "and the rise in 
the price of raw produce will be proportioned only to that rent, or 
that additional number, and will not compensate him for the rise of 
.. 2wages .
A rise in the price of corn, which augments the money wages of
the labourer, diminishes the money value of the farmer's profits.
Thus in every case, agricultural, as well as manufacturing 
profits are lowered by a rise in the price of raw produce, 
if it be accompanied by a rise of wages. If the farmer 
gets no additional value for the corn which remains to him 
after paying rent, if the manufacturer gets no additional 
value for the goods which he manufactures, and if both are 
obliged to pay a greater value in wages, can any point be 
more clearly established than that profits must fall, with 
a rise of wages?
There are, Ricardo alleges, few goods whose prices are not affected 
by alterations in the price of raw produce, because some raw material, 
from the land, will be utilised in their composition. Cotton and 123
(1) Mill, Elements, p.71. Mills argument closely follows Ricardo's 
as we shall see shortly.
(2) principles, p.lll.
(3) ibid., p.115. Ricardo concedes that the labourer may, if 
his wages had been sufficiently high previously, be content 
with fewer enjoyments - and thus money wages will not 
increase in price. This, however, is the exception, rather 
than the norm.
linen will, for example, rise in price with the increased cost of 
wheat - not because more was paid by the manufacturer to his
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employees, but because of the quantity of labour bestowed upon the 
raw material in question.
Ricardo is somewhat grudgingly prepared to concede that, the 
effects produced on profits would have been approximately similar had 
there been a rise in the price of necessaries other than food. But 
an alteration in the value of luxury goods due to an increase in 
labour quantity requisite in production will have no effect on profit.
And since the labourer does not expend his wages on these goods, any 
change in their value will not occasion an increase in wages.1
Throughout his disquisition on profits, Ricardo is speaking in 
generalisations. He accepts that there are temporary deviations from 
the rules he is adumbrating. The market price of an article may indeed 
exceed its natural price, if demand is in excess of supply, in which 
case high profits on the capital employed in its manufacture will 
naturally attract capital to that trade. Once the necessary funds are 
made available, and the supply of the good increased in line with demand, 
price will fall, and profits will again conform with those generally 
earned.
A fall in the general rate of profits is by no means 
incompatible with a partial rise of profits in 
particular employments. It is through the inequality 
of profits, that capital is moved from one employment 
to another. 12
(1) ibid., p.118.
(2) ibid.. p.119.
Thus, in the time it takes profits to adjust to the lower rate 
occasioned by an increase in wages contingent upon the ever-increasing 
difficulty of supplying life's necessities, the profits of the farmer 
may be temporarily above their former level. Ricardo concludes, 
however, that none of this invalidates the general thesis that,
"profits depend on high or low wages, wages on the price of necessaries 
and the price of necessaries chiefly on the price of food", since all 
other requisites may be almost increased without limit.1
The final point in his argumentation concerns the advent of the 
stationary state. Ricardo's general hypothesis is that the natural 
tendency of profits is to fall. Observing that this tendency is 
frequently checked by the improvements in agriculture, both in terms 
of the development of labour-saving machinery, and developments in the > 
science of agriculture, he indicates that the rise in the price of 
necessities, and concomitant increase in money wages is, in fact, 
limited. Once the wages of labour are equivalent to the entire 
receipts of the farmer, there must be an end to accumulation. Capital 
can no longer yield any profit, and no additional labour can be 
demanded, since the funds available to support it are non-existent.
In consequence, population will have reached its utmost limit and 
society will have reached the stationary state. Long before this 
period however, the low rate of profit will already have discouraged 
all accumulation. Accumulation only takes place if there are 12
300
(1) ibid.. p.119.
(2) Capital is conceived as originating in savings from the product 
of labour.
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opportunities for capital investment, and only where there are 
such opportunities is profit affected. The farmer and the 
manufacturer, Ricardo asserts, can no more live without profits, 
than the labourer can live without wages. Their motive for 
accumulation will diminish proportionally with every diminution in 
the rate of profit, and "will cease altogether when their profits are 
so low as not to afford them an adequate compensation for their 
trouble, and the risk which they must necessarily encounter in 
employing their capital productively".^ Before the point of the 
stationary state is reached, almost the entire produce of the country,
after the remuneration of the labouring classes, will belong to the
2landlords, and receivers of tithes and taxes. The state of prices 
would then be permanent. '
Thus Ricardo concludes profitability throughout the entire economy 
depends upon the marginal productivity of agriculture. Clearly this 
means that the effects of accumulation will vary in different countries 
according to the fertility of the land therein. No matter how extensive 
a country may be, if its land is of a poor quality, the most moderate 
accumulations of stock will be attended with great reductions in the 
rate of profit, and a rapid rise in rent; whereas a small but fertile 
country may, especially if the importation of food is freely permitted^ 
accumulate large stocks of capital without incurring either a particularly 
great fall in profits, or a great increase in the rent of land.
(1) Principles, p.122.
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Such is Ricardo's theory of profit. Our next aim in this 
chapter is to consider the development of that theory at the hands 
of Ricardo's two disciples, James Mill and John Ramsay McCulloch.
(c) Profit and Ricardo's disciples. Mill and McCulloch
Both Mill and McCulloch, initially at least, adopt the general 
Ricardian hypothesis that the rate of profit in all fields is determined 
by the productivity of labour on marginal land, with the correlative 
assumption that profits would tend to decline as society advances.
Mill, on the whole, adheres rigidly to Ricardo's format. Rent 
is made a price-determined surplus, leaving the value of any product 
to be divided between wages and profit, with that product specified by 
Mill as the net product remaining after the replacement of the capital 
consumed in production.'*'
Wages, as already mentioned, are rendered the predicating factor
2in the inverse relationship of wages and profit. Profit is, there­
fore, a residual payment. It is what remains of the net product after 
wages have been deducted.
Mill then begins, somewhat pedantically, to clarify his argument.
The share accruing to wages and profit respectively may be 
conceived in one of two ways, either as a proportion of the good created 
by the joint endeavour of labour and capital, or as a quantity of 
commodities.^ 12
(1) Mill, Elements, pp.71-72.
(2) ibid., p.71.
(3) ibid. , p.72
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Any alteration in the proportion of the produce devolving on 
either the capitalist or labourer necessarily betokens a corresponding 
alteration in the proportion devolving on the other; and the 
"proposition that profits depend upon wages, admits of no qualific- 
ation".^
However, a change in the quantity of goods devolving on either 
party does not necessarily indicate, or support, the assertion that 
profits depend on wages. Rather, a deviation in the productive 
power of the instruments of production,leading to an increase or 
diminution in their product, will be sufficient to explain the amendment 
in the amount of produce received by labour and capital respectively.
In the former instance, it is true to say that profits depend
literally, and strictly, upon wages. In the latter instance, however, '
although it might be asserted with some degree of accuracy that there
will be an inverse relation in the distribution of the goods - since
the more received by one, the less remains to the other - there is nothing
to suggest that this will necessarily be so. It is quite feasible
that the amount received by each may have increased in magnitude.
The possibility of an increased share to both parties, in the former
2instance, is, of course, absolutely untenable.
The reason that Mill engages in this laborious explication of the 
terms "alteration of wages, alteration of profits", is to introduce 
the concept of value, and to illuminate the concept of profit as a 1
(1) ibid.. p.72.
(2) ibid.. p.76
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rate of return upon capital investment, and not simply a proportional 
relationship.
Value may refer to either value in exchange, understood as 
purchasing power, "as when we say, that the value of a hat, is 
double that of a handkerchief, if one hat will exchange for two 
handkerchiefs",1 or, to value as cost of production, where "if two 
days' labour went to the production of one commodity, and two to the
production of another commodity ... the two commodities were of equal
2value". The assumption here being that the value of equal quantities 
of labour remains constant, whatever the rate of productivity.
Employing value in the first sense - as value in exchange - 
conforms with the second example of alteration of wages and profit 
mentioned above - where a rise or fall of profits or wages is expressed ' 
in quantitative terms.
When we say that the labourer receives a greater 
quantity of commodities, and when we say that 
he receives a greater exchangeable value, we 
denote by the two expressions, one and the same 
thing. In this sense, therefore, nobody has 
ever maintained that profits necessarily rise 
when wages fall, and fall when wages rise.
However, if the Ricardian scheme is utilised, the case conforms to 
the first example cited, viz.. that of proportions. If what is produced 
by an invariable quantity of labour continues to be divided in the same 
proportions, that proportion may comprise a greater or lesser quantity 
of produce, but it will always be the produce of the same amount of labour. 123
(1) ibid, p.73.
(2) ibid, p.73. This is the mode employed by Ricardo.
(3) ibid, p.74
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and hence represent the same value. In this sense of the word value.
Mill asserts, it is always strictly and undeniably true, that profits 
depend upon wages, so as to rise when wages fall, and fall when wages 
rise, assuming unchanged quantities of labour are necessary for 
production.
However Mill notes, "in the common mode of expressing profits" 
reference is made not to the produced commodity, but "to the capital 
employed in producing it; including the wages, which it is necessary 
to advance, and from which the owner expects of course to derive the 
same advantage as from his other advances".^ Profits are expressed, 
therefore, not in aliquot parts of the produce, but of this capital.
It is not so much per cent.on the produce that a capitalist is said 
to receive, but so much per cent.upon his capital. '
There are ,then, two options in discussing the return to labour 
and capital - proportions or quantities - and Mill counsels it is more 
convenient,therefore, to talk about the rate of profit upon capital, rather 
than of shares of the produce falling to the capitalist, for the simple
reason that the former operates uniformly on all varieties of produce;
2whereas the latter varies as factor mixes differ. Utilising both 
mediums or expressions allows the political economist to illuminate 
different points. The question of proportions enables him to 
illustrate the inverse movement of wages and profit caused by changes 
in the rate or remuneration of wages; whereas the question of quantities 12
(1) ibid, p.75.
(2) ibid., p.76
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enables him to pinpoint changes in the productivity of labour and 
capital.
According as you apply the term value, to the effect, 
the quantity of produce; or to the cause, the quantity 
of labour employed; it will be true, or it will not be 
true, that the value of what is received by the 
capitalist, the labourer (sic) and reciprocates 
along with their shares.
Mill’s aim in the Elements is to present an exposition of Ricardian 
political economy, devoid of all sophistication. McCulloch's aim is 
however, slightly different to Mills. McCulloch is not concerned, 
initially at least, with the issue of terminological exactitude; 
rather, his aim is simply to disseminate Ricardian orthodoxy. Thus, 
he proclaims that
the average value of the returns obtained from capital 
employed in agricultural industry, must always govern 
the average value of those obtained from capital ^
employed in every other department
indicating that again it is the productivity in one sphere - agriculture 
- which regulates profitability throughout the entire economy.
Similarly, McCulloch endorses the notion of an inverse movement 
between wages and profits. Since rent is a price-determined surplus, 
the marginal product can only be partitioned between wages and profits 
with profits dependent upon proportional wages, that is, the share of 
the produce falling to labour - which is itself contingent upon the 
cost of producing food - and not upon wages estimated in money or corn.
McCulloch has, however, moved slightly away from what he conceives 1
(1) ibid., p.79.
McCulloch, "Principles which Determine the Exchangeable Value 
of Commodities and the Rate of Profit", Scotsman, February 21 
1824, p.113. .cf. , O'Brien, J.R.McCulloch, pp.293-4.
( 2 )
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to be Ricardo's position. Ricardo, he alleges, supposes profit to 
connote the real value of the part of produce falling to the capitalist, 
whereas he ought to regard profit as regulated by the magnitude of the 
capital employed in production. Ricardo's emphasis is, it appears, 
mistaken.
The profit accruing to the capitalist is different and 
totally distinct from the proportion of the produce 
... falling to their share. Profits consist of the 
excess of the commodities produced by the expenditure 
of a given quantity of capital over that quantity of 
capital; and are always measured in aliquot parts of 
the capital employed.
Although dissenting slightly from Ricardo on this point, McCulloch
still somewhat contradictorily, given his views upon the role of invention
2and technological progress in economic growth, maintains that diminishing
marginal returns in agriculture account for the declining profit rate. ,
Had it not been for the gradually decreasing productive­
ness of the capital laid out in the cultivation of the soil, 
the productiveness of industry would have increased with 
the various discoveries and inventions for saving labour 
that we may suppose would have been made in the progress  ^
of society.
McCulloch^it is clear, accepted this stagnation thesis in his early
works, but as O'Brien has previously intimated, he ultimately rejects 
4this notion.
Firstly, he appears to doubt the historical accuracy of the claim 
that profits are declining, claiming that the profit rate in the Middle 
Ages was actually lower than it was subsequently. 1234
(1) McCulloch, PP.E, ed.l, 1825, pp.192-3. (Original emphasis) cf.,
pp.193-4. The point is similar to Mills exhortation to consider
the rate of profit and not the proportion falling to profit when 
discussing the return to capital.
(2) O'Brien, J.R.McCulloch, p.294.
(3) McCulloch ed,, Wealth, 1S28, vol.IV, pp.187-8.
(4) O'Brien, op.cit., p.296.
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Secondly, from circa 1830 onwards, he begins a public recan­
tation of the doctrine of the inexorability of diminishing returns.
In Holland, he asserts, the diminution of profit may be seen as partic­
ularly explicable by the massive amount of capital accumulation. This 
suggests, we would contend, that McCulloch is again falling back on 
his Smithian heritage, and adopting the idea that profitability is 
related to opportunities for capital investment; where such opportunities 
are closed off, the rate of profit tends to decline due to the expansion 
of competition amongst capitalists. 1
Another important step in the rejection of Ricardo's thesis was
identified by O'Brien, as the abandonment of the idea that the Corn
2Laws detrimentally affected the price of agricultural wage goods.
Indeed, McCulloch goes so far as to suggest that their effects are not 
"nearly so injurious as is frequently represented", observing that the 
average price of c o m  in Great Britain is, in fact, "rapidly approx­
imating to those on the Continent" . 1 23 4
The vital development in McCulloch's rejection of this hypothesis 
is located, again by O'Brien initially, in the former’s articulation 
of the idea that improvements in agriculture could more than temporarily
4offset the advent of the stationary state. To begin with,McCulloch, 
like Ricardo, had relegated those improvements in technology capable 
of affecting the declining margin to the short term. 5 However, by 1842, 
McCulloch was more optimistic - innovations in agricultural productivity
(1) See Chapter 2, section 3(ii). See also McCulloch, "Rise, Progress 
and Decline of Commerce in Holland", Edinburgh Review, LI, July 
1830, pp.418-43.
(2) O'Brien, op.cit.. pp.297-8.
(3) McCulloch, "Political Economy", EB7, p302.
(4) O'Brien, op.cit., pp.298-9.
(5) McCulloch, "Political Economy", EB6 , p.271.
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might, in fact, greatly retard the decline of profits. "Occasionally,
however, these improvements more than compensate, during lengthened
periods, for the deterioration in the quality of the soils successively
cultivated" . 1 In the following year, 1843, in the Preface to the third
edition of his Principles of Political Economy, he suggests that such
improvements could have long-term countervailing tendencies. Since
"agricultural skill never remains the same for the smallest portion of
time", improvements generated by it may retard "for any given period,
the decreasing fertility of the soils to which recourse is necessarily
2had in the progress of civilisation". Though McCulloch never 
ultimately abandons the doctrine of a falling profit rate, despite 
O'Brien's suggestion, he does modify it sufficiently to imply that 
the stationary state , though inevitable ,is a very long way off. In 
line with his conception of economic growth, McCulloch allows inventions 
and improvements a much wider latitude(in their impact on progress and 
development) than most of his contemporaries.
As we saw in the previous section on wages, McCulloch employs 
a "psychological" concept of subsistence wages. Had he consistently 
appreciated that an increase in agricultural productivity did not 
necessarily entail an increase in population - compelling resort to 
an ever-widening margin - he would have been able to break the link 
between wages - wage goods - and population.1 23 Habituation to a 
higher standard of living, contingent upon improvements in productivity 
and the necessary time-lag between the increase in the demand for
(1) "Political Economy", EB7, p.302 (my emphasis) .
(2) Preface to PPE, ed.3., 1843, pp.xiii-xiv.
(3) O'Brien, op.cit. , pp.298-9.
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of diminishing marginal returns in agriculture.
Part of the problem with the classical economists' scenario for
profit is the identification of wage goods almost exclusively with
the produce of farming. McCulloch admits of the inclusion of products
other than corn into the wage basket, and allows, therefore, for develop
ments in machinery and processes within the manufacturing sector to
reduce the price of goods, and affect the wages of labour.
Though wages should not have done more than preserve 
their former relation to corn ... the condition of the 
labourers may, notwithstanding, have been very 
materially improved; inasmuch as what they have not 
gained or lost in com, they may have more than 
gained in their greater command over the many other  ^
things required for their subsistence and well being.
Two final points should be made about McCulloch's treatment of
profits, and that is, that firstly, an increase in wages may actually
stimulate the capitalist to greater effort, having, therefore, a
2positive effect on growth, and thus prevent a reduction in the profit 
rate through an increase in endeavour, and economy; and secondly, that 
profit rates are not only affected by alterations in the wage level. 
Rather changes in both taxation and productivity are significant.
An alteration in the wage rate affects profits only where "the 
productiveness of industry and the burden of taxation remain stationary" 
In other words, where "the same capital is employed, and the same 
quantity of produce has to be divided between capitalists and labourers", 
the share of one cannot be increased without the share of the other 123
labour and its potential satisfaction— could have abated the problem
(1) McCulloch, "Political Economy", EB8 , p.242. He also notes that 
it is a fallacy that labourers subsist on corn alone.
(2) See, "Philosophy of Manufacturers", Edinburgh Review, Vol.LXI,
July 1835, pp.453-72, cited in O'Brien, op.cit.. pp.298-9. 
O'Brien claims that this suggests that a wage rise is not 
necessarily seen to reduce profit. McCulloch's point, however, 
seems to be, not that wages and profits are not, on the whole, 
inversely related, but that a rise in wages might simply be a 
spur to greater endeavour. f
(3) PPE. ed.5 , 1864, p.458.
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being diminished.1 Discussing profits solely in terms of proportions
is, McCulloch implies, inadequate. Profit should be explicated as a 
2rate, and this rate is affected by productiveness and taxation.
McCulloch exemplifies his position by demonstrating that, if a
capitalist employs £1000 in cultivation of which £500 is earmarked
for the payment of wages, and receives in return a product worth £1 2 0 0 ,
assuming he has no tax to pay, his profits comprise £2 0 0, being at
the rate of 2 0 per cent, and are proportioned to wages as 2 to 5.
On the supposition that there is a universal doubling of the
productiveness of industry, the additional £ 1 2 0 0 earned is divided
between the capitalist and the labourer in the proportion of 2 to 5.
The capitalist receives an additional £343 profit, the labourer an
additional £857 wages, thus indicating that whilst proportions remain
unchanged - 2 to 5 - the rate of profit has actually increased from 
320 to 54 per cent. The rate of capital may, therefore, alter whilst 
the proportionate returns of capital and labour remain unaffected.
From the various amendments made by McCulloch, his theory of 
profit appears much less pessimistic than that of some of his compeers . 
The latitude he gave to the role of machinery, and innovation would
4appear to allow for a long term retardation of the stationary state. 1234
(1) ibid., p.459.
(2) This is the same as Mills point noted earlier.
(3) PPE, ed.l, 1825, pp.196-7.
(4) _cf., Berg, The Machinery Question, pp.108-110.
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Conclusion
In chapter 2 we observed that Adam Smith was concerned, in his theory 
of distribution, primarily with the issue of the pricing of productive 
services, and the mechanism of resource allocation between competing uses; 
and also, though somewhat secondarily, with the question of the division of 
the aggregate product of industry between all those agencies cooperating 
in its production. The classical economists, however, were concerned 
principally with the issue of the sharing of the aggregate physical product 
of industry amongst all those agencies cooperating in its production.
This concern resolved itself into the elucidation of three areas of distribution 
theory: the delineation of a theory of rent, a theory of wages, and a theory
t
of profit.
The primary focus of the classical economists in each of these areas, 
was on the empirical question of how the rates of remuneration of each 
form of income was determined, and not on the more normative question of 
what justified a title to that income in the first place. A concern with the 
grounds of entitlement to income based upon the ownership of economic property 
was not, therefore, a central feature of the classical economists' theory of 
distribution, although as we shall see in Chapter 7 particularly, it did 
form a central theme of the anti-Ricardians' various critiques of the 
prevailing system of industrial capitalism. 1
(1) See below, chapter 7. Cf, also chapter 6.
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The largely empirical theory of distribution was divided, as 
we observed, into three areas: rent, wages, and profit. According to 
the Ricardian system, rental payment was a function of differential 
fertility, and diminishing marginal returns in agriculture. It formed 
a species of income that was deemed to be price-determined, and not 
price-determining, and as such, extraneous to cost of production, or 
value-determination.
This explanation of rent, deriving in part from the simultaneous 
expositions of rent articulated by Sir Edward West and Thomas Malthus, 
and subject to considerable modification by Ricardo, became a central 
feature of the classical economists' theory of distribution.
*Jeunes Mill, as we have demonstrated, largely reiterated, without 
qualification, this argument, whereas John Ramsay McCulloch, whilst largely 
rehearsing Ricardian orthodoxy, did extend the discussion of the impact 
of technological improvement upon the rate of rent, and the issue of 
the interest of the landlord, observing that the holders of the best land 
are disproportionately advantaged when improvements in agricultural 
technique occur, blunting to some degree the argument that saw the interest 
of the landed classes as, in fact, diametrically opposed to that of the 
rest of society.
As we propose to show in chapter 6 , this differential explanation of 
rent was found wanting by Hodgskin, on the grounds that its very empirical 
bias failed to take account of the underlying, unnatural property base of 
that right, and that for Hodgskin,the interests of the landed classes 
were always seen to be in opposition to the interests of the labouring classes, 
depriving the latter,as they do, of equal access to the means of production.
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In section 2 of this chapter we examined the classical economists' 
conception of wage-determination, a conception that was bifurcated to 
a long-term theory of natural (subsistence) wages» and a short-term 
theory of market wages based upon the idea of a wage-fund.
The long-term subsistence theory of wages advanced differed between 
authors in a number of ways. Firstly, the definition of the natural rate 
of wages advanced by Ricardo was largely static, whereas the definition 
offered by Malthus was, in fact, dynamic. Secondly, the concept of 
subsistence employed by Ricardo, and Malthus differed from that utilised 
by McCulloch, for the former regarded subsistence largely in physiological 
terms, whereas McCulloch built into his notion of subsistence an important 
cultural dimension. And finally, the question of the relationship between( 
population growth and subsistence levels received differing treatment, 
with only Malthus and McCulloch taking real account of the time-lag between 
the increase in demand for labour, and the satisfaction of that demand, 
and of the implications of this for habitination to a particular standard 
of living for the labouring classes.
The theory of market wages was principally couched, as we have 
evidenced, in terms of a wage-fund concept. In other words, market wages 
were seen to depend upon the ratio between the capital available for 
production, and the existing working population. As we demonstrated in 
section 2 (ii), the underlying assumption of the wage-fund theorem was the 
idea of "seasonality”, that is, the notion that the annual production cycle 
of agriculture forms the time parameter of the wage-fund. However, as we • 
also demonstrated, the admission of non-agricultural goods into the wage-basket,
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means that account must also be taken of products whose production period 
differs from that of raw produce. The Implication of this move was, of 
course, that the wage-fund could no longer be seen as a fund, but rather as a flc 
of goods. This particular facet of the wage-theorem of classical
political economy was singled out, by Hodgskin, for criticism. As we aim 
to show in chapter 7, Hodgskin's analysis of the claims of capital, in 
Labour Defended Against the Claims of Capital, consisted primarily in a 
refutation of the wage-fund theorem, and the correlative claim that the 
profit of the capitalist emerges, in part, because of the provision of the 
capital requisite to the maintenance of the labourer during production, as 
well, of course, as the provision of the capital necessary to production 
itself. 1
In the final section of this chapter we were concerned with the issue 
of profit determination. Noting that profit was defined as interest, plus 
a risk premium, we observed that the classical economists failed to deal 
with the question of how profit itself emerges, focusing instead on the issue 
of how the rate of profit is determined. For Ricardo, two stages in the 
development of his theory of profit may be isolated. In the Essay on Profits, 
we noted, that the general level of profitability was determined by the rate 
of profit in agriculture; with that rate conceived as a simple product-ratio 
to wages. In the Principles, however, Ricardo modified this to the claim 
that it is the productivity of labour on marginal land - viz, no-rent
(1) See below, chapter 7, section 2(il)b.
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land - that regulates general profitability throughout the economy, 
with the whole analysis framed by a theory of value. Given the assertion 
that there is a tendency for marginal returns in agriculture to diminish 
as society advances, the Ricardians, en masse, subscribed to the view that 
profit will tend to fall as society advances, leading to a variety of 
formulations of the theory of the stationary state, with the view advanced 
by Ricardo more noticeably pessimistic than the somewhat more optimistic 
picture presented by McCulloch. McCulloch, whilst initially of the view 
that the trend of diminishing returns in agriculture was inexorable, gradually 
modified this position, as we noted in section 3(ili)c, thus breaking the 
connection between wages - wage goods - and population, and the impact of 
the three on profit.
Hitherto our consideration of the classical economists has focused on
the empirical factors of value determination and distribution, and has, as
yet, failed to take account, in any great depth, of the proprietary notions
underlying those theories. 1  In the next chapter, we aim to undertake Just
that. Following our consideration of the theories of property advanced by
Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, will be an examination of the ideas about
2property held by the political economists.
Cl) The one exception to this claim is, of course, our concern in chapter 3 (i) 
to outline the links between value and property.
(2) See below, chapter 5, section 3.
Chapter 5; Property and the Utilitarians: Security versus Equality
In legislation, the most important object is security.
Though no laws were made directly for subsistence, it 
might easily be imagined that no one would neglect it.
But unless laws are made directly for security, it would 
be quite useless to make them for subsistence. You may 
order production; you may command cultivation; and you 
will have done nothing. But assure to the cultivator the 
fruits of his industry, and perhaps in that alone you will 
have done enough. 1
Throughout the history of the idea of property the relationship
between labour and property has been variously envisaged by different
2 3authors. Some, such as John Locke , or Thomas Bodgskin , have argued that
only the expenditure of labour can generate an original and just title to
property; whilst others, such as Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, as we shall
see in this chapter, and William Thompson, as we shall demonstrate in 
4Chapter 7, have claimed that only the confirmation of the individual in
5
the entire - or the greatest permissible quantity of the - fruits of his 
labour will produce that pattern of property distribution most conformable 12345
(1) Bentham, Jeremy, Theory of Legislation, ed., Etienne Dumont,translated 
by R.Hildreth, 4th ed., (London, Trubner & Co.,1882),p.98.
(2) Locke, John, Civil Government, II .v. esp.
(3) Hodgskin, Thomas, The Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted, 
cf., Chapter 6 below.
(4) See below Chapter 7, section 1 (ii) .Thompson, William, An Inquiry into the 
Principles of the Distribution of Wealth Most Conducive to Human Happiness, 
(London, 1824) ; and Labour Rewarded; The Claims of Labour and Capital 
Conciliated, (London, Hunt & Clarke, 1827).
(5) This modification is necessitated by Mill's claim that: "The greatest 
possible happiness of society is ... attained by insuring to every man 
the greatest possible quantity of the produce of his labour”, Mill, James, 
"Essay on Government", in Lively, Jack and Rees, John (eds.) Utilitarian 
Logic and Politics, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1978), p.57.
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to utility, and to the greatest preponderant reproduction of wealth.
Thus, some have proclaimed that labour creates, ipso facto, a title to 
the produce of that labour independent of the enris promoted by confirmation 
of that title, whereas others have advanced more "instrumental" or 
"consequentialist" theories, 1  focusing on the ends to be promoted by a 
particular set of property arrangements.
This chapter is concerned explicitly with those ideas about property 
held by the Utilitarians, particularly in respect of the relationship between 
labour and the twin goals of security and equality. He will begin, in section 1, 
with an examination of the views advanced by Bentham himself, concentrating 
upon a number of conceptions: firstly, the interaction between concerns from 
security and equality, already alluded to; secondly, the notion of ,
expectation; thirdly, the status of labour, and finally, the question of 
incentive, relating as it does to an important conception underpinning most 
classical economic writings, viz.,that the efficiency of the economy is 
contingent (in part) upon security of property, which will form part of our 
concern in section 3.
In section 2, we are principally interested in James Mill's pronouncements 
upon the connections between security, property and government. Here 
particular attention will be paid to a number of themes: the relationship 
between labour, production and incentive; the question of security; the 
notion of the harmony of interests secured through market functions; and
(1) Cf.,e.g., Ryan, Alan, Property and Political Theory, (Oxford, Basil
Blackwell, 1984), Introduction, pp.1-13; Reeve, Andrew, Property, 
(Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1986), p.112 ff.
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lastly the question of "desert".
Finally, section 3 of this chapter will be devoted to a survey of 
those ideas about property discernible in classical political economy, 
especially the notion that security of property forms a cornerstone of the 
efficient and optimal functioning of the economy. Also in this sphere we 
will be concerned to demonstrate that it is the essentially conservative 
account of property rights advanced by Bentham and James Mill that informs 
the classical economists' notion of distribution. In this section our 
primary source of material will be the writings of Thomas Malthus and 
John Ramsay McCulloch, although reference will also be made to a number of
other authors
.Section 1; Bentham: Property, Security, and the Satisfaction of Expectations.
...Where the distribution of property and power is concerned, 
to keep things in the proportion in which they actually are, 
ought to be, and in general is, the aim of the legislator.
His great purpose is to preserve the total mass of expectations 
as far as is possible from all that may interfere with their course.
According to the natural rights theorists of the seventeenth and elohteenth 
centuries the right of property was seen to be a right innate
in man (qua “an) , existing anterior to, and independent of law and government. 
p°r Bentham the case is quite otherwise. "Rights", he declares, are "the
fruits of law and of law alone. There are no rights without law - no rights
2
c°ntrary to law - no rights anterior to the law". And property is no
exception: indeed, "property and law are born together and die together".^'
In other words, law alone is constitutive of property.
C e n t r a l  t o  B e n th a m 1s t h e o r y  of p r o p e r t y  a r e  three c o n c e r n s : a c o n c e r n
with the notion of security, and its potential incompatibility with the end
°f equality» a concern with the notion of expectation, or the "disappointment-
4
Prevention principle", and a concern with the establishment of that pattern
(1) stark, W., (ed.), Jeremy Bentham's Economic Writings. (London, Allen &
Unwin, 1952), Vol.3, p.198.
(2) Bentham,“PannomialFragments*', in Bowring, J. (ed.), The Works of Jeremy 
Bentham, H  vols, (Edinburgh, Tait, 1838-43),III,p.221.
(3) Bentham, Theory of Legislation, (ed.) Hildreth, R, 4th ed., (London,
Trubner & Co.,1882), p.113.
(4) «Bentham on Humphreys1 Property Code”, Westminster Review. VI (1826).
in Bowring (ed.), Works, V, pp.413-414. Cited in Rosen, Frederick,
Jeremy Bentham and Representative Democracy: A Study of the "Constitutional
Code'1 234*7, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983), p.lOl.
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of distribution most conducive to both utility and optimum economic 
productivity, which refers, in part, to an argument from incentive.
Our aim in this section, therefore, will be to elucidate Bentham's 
conception of property, with particular reference to the three concerns 
delineated above, examining also, in the process, the question of the 
status of labour within that conception.
Since Bentham's most comprehensive account of the formation of 
property rights is to be found in the somewhat dubious Theory of Legislation, 
it is on this treatise that we intend to focus, referring wherever apposite 
to other relevant works.
In chapter 1 of the "Principles of the Civil Code" , 1  in his discussi'on 
of the general topic of rights and obligations, Bentham begins by observing 
that the creation, by law, of any kind of right inevitably implies the 
correlative creation of a duty or obligation. Whilst the creation of a 
right is the creation of a means of pleasure, the generation of an obligation 
implies the generation of pain. Thus, since the creation of rights and 
duties necessarily entrenches upon liberty, and since any restriction upon 
liberty itself also evokes sentiments of pain, "it follows ... that no
restriction ought to be imposed, no power conferred, no coercive law
2sanctioned, without a sufficient and specific reason". Whilst the pursuit 
of pleasure may be left to the individual, the end of government is to 12
(1) "Principles of Legislation" forms the first part of the Theory of 
Legislation, whilst "Principles of the Civil Code" forms the second.
(2) Bentham, Theory of Legislation, p.94.
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pubinote "the greatest possible happiness of the community”, through the 
minimisation of pain to the individual, which it does exclusively through 
the creation of rights. Legislative Interference accords, then, with the 
principles of utility only when the right created by government confers a 
greater benefit them the non-imposition of the duty or obligation would have 
done . 1  In his exposition of the formation of the right of property, therefore, 
Bentham must demonstrate clearly how that right is seen to benefit society at 
large. As we observed in our Introduction to this chapter, and as will become 
particularly clear in our elucidation of James Mill's views on property, 
theories of property are not only concerned with the just bases of entitlement, 
but also with the more consequentialist question of the goals to be promoted 
by a particular pattern of property diffusion, and Bentham is no exception
#
here, for as we will now demonstrate, he is especially interested in those 
property arrangements most conducive to the maximisation of both utility, 
and production.
The ends of civil law are four-fold: "to provide subsistence; to
2produce abundance; to favour equality7 to maintain security". The 
inclusion of both subsistence and abundance within this short catalogue 
of the constituents of happiness seems to be somewhat superfluous, for, 
by implication, the attainment of abundance means the attainment of subsistence, 
and indeed Bentham seems to acknowledge this point when he declares that 
"subsistence ... is included in abundance".^ However, it quickly becomes 12
1. Ibid.,pp.94-5
2. Ibid.,p.96.
3 Ibid, p.96.
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apparent that the economic, and general utilitarian objectives promoted 
by the pursuit of these separate goals are different.
The acquisition of subsistence is a goal that mankind naturally 
aspires to. Nature itself has created motives sufficient to induce men 
to labour; all that legislation can do is add to "the constant and 
irresistible power of these natural motives", by "protecting men while 
they labour, and by making them sure of the fruits of their labour" . 1  
In other words, as we shall see below, security of property, reinforcing 
man's natural expectation of thè enjoyment of the fruits of his labour,
2generates a sufficient incentive to spur man on to that labour, whatever.
The benefits consequent upon the attainment of abundance are, however,
of a totally different nature. It does not matter to Bentham that the ’
achievement of opulence may be limited to the few, for the advantages
attendant upon that achievement are still of social import. Firstly, a
society in which inequality of property exists is a society which has
sufficient resources to cope in time of crisis. "Countries in which luxury
abounds, and where governments are enlightened, are above risk of famine".^
Secondly, "the laws, in creating riches, are the benefactors of those who
remain in the poverty of nature", for "all participate more or less in the
4pleasures, the advantages, and the resources of civilized life". in other 
words, inequality of fortune, as proof of the operation of the law oT security 1234
(1) Ibid.,p.lOO.
(2) Cf.,ibid.,p.114.
(3) Ibid.,p.102. Cf.,Ryan, Alan, Property and Political Theory,(Oxford.
Basil Blackwell, 1984), pp.95-96. <“
(4 ) Theory of Legislation, n.114.
324
rather than make more miserable the life of the poor man, in fact, places 
him amongst the "candidates of fortune" , 1  by showing him that he too will 
be able to enjoy the fruits of his labour in peace. We will return to this 
link between property and incentive shortly.
As we have observed, underlying both Bentham's considerations of 
subsistence and abundance is a concern with security. Although he proclaims 
the objectives of civil law to be four-fold, it quickly becomes apparent 
that a hierarchy of importance exists amongst those objectives, with 
equality and abundance regarded as somewhat secondary to subsistence, 
and particularly security.
Security is qualitatively differentiated from the three other objectives 
outlined above, for it alone embraces the future. Just exactly what Bentham 
understands by the notion of security will be our next object of inquiry.
In legislation, Bentham asserts, "the most important object is security"
Though no laws were made directly for subsistence, 
it might easily be imagined that no one would neglect 
it. But unless laws are made directly for security, 
it would be quite useless to make them for subsistence.
You may order production» you may command cultivation» 
and you will have done nothing. But assure to the 
cultivator the fruits of his industry, and perhaps in 
that alone you will have done enough. 2
(1) Ibid.,p.114.
Ibid.,p.98. Cf. Schlatter, Private Property, p.246» Ryan, op.clt., 
p.98.
(2)
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This appears as a simple argument from incentive. Secure to 
labour the full fruits of its industry, and you will create a sufficient motive 
for men to engage in that labourious activity to which they are naturally 
averse. 1 For although men may be naturally inclined to seek their own
2subsistence, in the absence of legislation that subsistence may be uncertain, 
and men may in fact neglect their duty to labour,"^ depriving others, through
4force, of the produce of their labours. Law alone, Bentham proclaims,
can "create a fixed and durable possession which merits the name of property”.
It alone can
... accustom men to bow their heads under the 
yoke of foresight ... Nothing but law can encourage 
men to labours superfluous for the present, and which 
can be enjoyed only in the future. 5
6 7 8Unlike authors such as Locke, Hodgskin, and Nozick, who see labour 
as conferring a natural title to property, Bentham sees the distribution of 
property according to labour expenditure as a counsel of utility. Law, 
he declares, does not say "Labour, and I will reward you" - as implied 
in a labour theory of first acquisition - but says:
(1 ) 'Theory Of legislation, p.114.
(2 ) Ibid.,p.lo9
(3) Ibid.,p.lio.
(4) Ibid. ,p.HO. t
(5) Cf.,Locke, Civil Government, ch.v.
(6 ) See below, chapter 6,for a consideration 
theory of property, which begins from an
of Hodgskin's natural rights 
openly anti-Utilitarian stance.
(7) Nozick, Robert. Anarchy. State, and Utopia. (Oxford, Basil Blackwell,1974)
326
Labour, and I will assure to you the enjoyment of 
the fruits of your labour - that natural and sufficient 
recompense which without me you cannot preserve; I will 
Insure It by arresting the hand which may seek to ravish 
it from you. 1
Law will, therefore, secure property. Fundamental to his case is 
the notion of expectation. Man, Bentham observes, is different to the
animals, for man lives not only in the present, but in the future also.
2He is susceptible of pains and pleasures "by anticipation". It is not 
sufficient simply to protect him against present loss, but also to secure 
him against future loss. Law must seek, therefore, to guarantee against 
the disappointment or frustration of expectation. ,
Property, for Bentham, "is nothing but a basis of expectation", 
namely the expectation of deriving certain advantages from our possessions. 
As he observes elsewhere:
Expectation is the basis of every proprietary right:
It is this which affords whatever occasion there can 
be for giving a thing to one man rather than another. 4 1234
(1) Theory of Legislation, p.110 (Original emphasis)
(2) Ibid. ,p.HO Cf_. ,HalSvy, Elie, The Growth of Philosophic Radicalism, 
translated by Mary Morris, (London, Faber & Faber,1928),p.46.
(3) Theory of Legislation, o.ll?.
(4) Bentham,MSS.,University College, London, Box 29,p.6. Cited in 
Long, D.G. “ Bentham on Property", in Parel, Anthony and Flanagan, 
Thomas (eds.), Theories of Property: Aristotle to the Present, 
(Ontario, Wilfrid Laurier UP, 1978),p.226.
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In other words, property Is not a "physical reality but a belief
1 2 set up as a certainty", "an established expectation".
The species of expectation Identified by Bentham are two-fold:
there are those expectations created by law - such as that of property -
and those expectations which exist naturally, but precariously, such as
the expectation of the savage In the enjoyment of the deer he has caught,
provided he can keen that knowledge ouiet. ^ What law does with property,
then, is generate.an expectation of both current and future enjoyment.
Mm  can be induced to labour; he can, as It were, overcome his' natural 
4aversion to labour". If he is secured In the enjoyment of what he creates 
thereby.
Violations of property, productive of insecurity are, Bentham counsels, 
socially and individually debilitating in a number of wavs. Firstly, 
there is the "evil of non-possession", for if the acquisition of a portion of 1234
(1 ) Halevy, op clt.,p.46.
(2) Theory of Legislation, p.112.
(3) Ibid., pp.112-113.
(4) Labouring as an activity was regarded universally by the Utilitarians 
as incurring disutility; it was seen as a necessarily unpleasant task. 
This view of labour may be contrasted with that of John Francis Bray, 
for example, who, as we shall see in chapter 7, section l(i), claimed 
that labouring when based upon natural principles was not the 
debilitating practice it was under the prevailing capitalist system, 
but, in fact, "a blessing","the one great preservative of intellectual 
and corporeal health", Bray, John Francis, Labour's Wrongs and 
Labour's Remedy: The Age of Might and the Age of Plqht, (Leeds,
Green, 1839), pp.43-44. Cf.,Reeve, op cit.,p,122.
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wealth is good, it follows that its non-possession is an evil, and so
the loss of a portion of good, even if we are unaware of that loss, is
still a loss, and denies to us all the happiness that may have resulted from
its possession.^- Secondly, there is the "pain of losing". "Everything
which I possess, or to which I have a title, I consider in my own mind as
destined always to belong to me”, it forms the basis of my expectation,
2and hopes . To lose that property generates pain, and disutility through
the frustration of expectations. Thirdly, the "fear of losing" one's
property can also generate disutility, for feelings of insecurity render
less enjoyable the possession of that property which we still have.^
Finally, and perhaps most interestingly, one reunification of the violation
of security of property, is the "deadening of industry". If a person lacks
certainty in the enjoyment of the fruits of his labour, he will, Bentheun
surmises, seek only to exist from day-to-day. He will desist from labouring
4to secure more them the bare necessities of life.
Of the four forms of violation referred to, the last two have social 
implications, because by both is a general feeling of alarm and fear diffused, 
throughout society. A transitory calamity destructive of the productive 
capital of the nation will not destroy the spirit of industry. However, 
men will be disinclined to labour if the existing right of property is 
systematically violated by the incursions of a "tyrannical government, bad 
legislation, £ p x j an intolerant religion which drives men from the country".^ *2345
Cl) Theory of Legislation, p.115.
(2) Ibid.,p.115.
(3) Ibid, p.116.
(4) Ibid.,p.116.
(5) Ibid., p.117.
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Hitherto, we have focused on the Issue of security and the connection 
between that security and man's incentive to labour, observing that it is 
the institution of the right of property that has overcome his innate 
desire "to enjoy without labour”.^
However, one of the most interesting areas of the Benthamic treatment
of property concerns the tension between the objectives of security and
equality. Before considering that tension, we must examine Bentham's
conception of equality as it relates to property and the enjoyment of wealth.
Whilst one is ultimately compelled by the weight of argumentation to follow,
2as Frederick Rosen notes, A.J.Ayer's assertion that Bentham "held, as he 
must have held to be at all consistent, that the right action was that which 
produced the greatest measure of happiness, no matter how it was distributed",^ 
there is a sense in which to ignore the egalitarian, implications of Bentham's 
rendition of the law of diminishing marginal utility would be to underplay 
an important consideration in his account of future legislation, and future 
expectation.
Equality, Bentham notes in the Theory of Legislation, may be considered
in a number of different lights in relation to the advantages conferred by
law - thus one can examine political equality (or the equality of political
rights) or civil equality (the equality of civil rights). In the Theory,by
comparison, Bentham is concerned with that species of equality relative to
4the distribution of property. 123
(1) Ibid, p.114.
(2) Rosen, Bentham and Representative Democracy, p.211.
(3) Ayer, A.J., "The Principle of Utility", in Keeton, G.W., and 
Schwarzenberger, G., (eds.), Jeremy Bentham and the Law. (London,1948), 
p.250, cited in Rosen, op. clt.,p.211.
(4) Theory of Legislation, p.97n
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Considering three cases of the effect of a portion of wealth upon
the happiness of the individual, Bentham concludes that greater happiness
is achieved where wealth is more evenly distributed. 1  The three cases
are as follows: the first concerns the possession of wealth. "Each portion
2of wealth has", he declares, "a corresponding portion of happiness", 
and thus whoever possesses the greatest quantity of wealth, will possess 
the means to the greatest happiness. Whilst it appears that the accumulation 
of wealth is always capable of increasing the quantity of happiness, the 
relationship between quantity of wealth and quantity of happiness does not 
increase incrementally at the same rate.^ The King with as much wealth 
as that of all the farmers of his Kingdom combined will experience greater 
happiness than the average happiness of the thousand farmers: ,
...but it is by no means probable that it is ... 
a thousand times greater than the average happiness 
of one of them. It would be remarkable if his happiness 
were ten times or even five times greater. 4
A man born to opulence is, Bentham proclaims, less sensible of the pleasures
of that opulence, than he who has acquired it by his own labours.’’ As
Rosen notes, Bentham utilises this argument to demonstrate that the more
egalitarian the pattern of property distribution throughout society, the
greater the preponderance of happiness,for more will approach the situation
6of the artisan, than that of the king. 123456
(1) Ibid, pp.103-109. Cf. Rosen, op clt.,pp.214-216; Halevy, op clt.,pp.48-51; 
Ryan, op clt.,.pp.100-109. •
(2) Ibid, p.103, (Original emphasis).
(3) Ibid.,p.104.
(4) Ibid. ,p.105.
(5) Ibid,,p.105.
(6 ) Rosen, op clt.,p.214.
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With regard to the acquisition of wealth - the second case - Bentham 
makes three points. Firstly, "a portion of wealth may be so far divided 
as to produce no happiness at all for any of the participants'', when 
for example, that portion is less them the smallest coin of the realm .  ^
Secondly, and more importantly from our perspective, the greater the 
equality of distribution in a case where fortunes are equal, the greater 
the total mass of happiness, whereas, (thirdly), in that case where fortunes 
are unequal, the more the distribution of new wealth promotes equality the
greater the resulting mass of happiness. Again, the generation of greater
2equality is seen to create a greater total mass of happiness.
Bentham's final example examines the effects of unforeseen loss. Here 
he argues that:
The loss of a portion of wealth will produce, in the total 
happiness of the loser, a defalcation greater or less, 
according to the proportion of the part lost to the part 
which remains, 3
asserting that»initially , the loss of a quarter of a man's wealth 
will necessarily entail the loss of a quarter of his happiness. This view 
is immediately qualified, however. There are cases in which the loss of 
fortune is not accompanied by a proportionate loss of happiness. If, for 
example, in losing three-quarters of his fortune a man is deprived of the 
means necessary to his support, whilst when deprived of only half of that 
fortune, he is not similarly affected, the defalcation of happiness, instead 123
(1) Theory of Legislation,p.105. (Original emphasis)
(2) Underlying this claim is, of course, the view that the existence of 
diminishing marginal utility renders any ineqalitarian distributive 
practice productive of less proportionate happiness. Cf_ Rosen, op cit,, 
p.215; Halevy, op cit., pp.49-50.
(3) Theory of Legislation, p.106. (Original emphasis).
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of being twice as great in the first case as the second, will, in 
actuality, be much greater. Circumstantial considerations must, therefore, 
be taken into account. Assuming that this first proposition is tenable, 
and assuming equality of distribution, Bentham concludes that the greater 
the number of persons amongstwhom this loss is shared, the less the sum 
of the defalcation of happiness. If those party to the loss are of a 
sufficient number, then reduction in the sum total of happiness will be 
almost impalpable. 1
Similarly, and finally,
Fortunes being unequal,, the loss of happiness produced by
a given loss of wealth will tend to become less in proportion
as the distribution of__the loss shall tend towards the production
of an exact equality. , 2
Abstracting from the issue of either security, or the disappointment 
of expectations, Bentham is able to demonstrate that the propensity of 
mankind to derive quantitatively equivalent amounts of happiness from the 
same amount of wealth means that the greatest happiness principle is 
best promoted by an egalitarian distribution of wealth. The problem is, 
however, what to do about the inherently inegalitarian pattern of property 
prevailing in society at present, for as we have seen property generates *2
Cl) This leads him to look favourably upon those policies of insurance 
which distribute losses among such a large number of associates as 
to make such losses very light. Ibid.,p.lQ7.
(2) Ibid., p.106. (Original emphasis).
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expectations, both present and future, which must not be disappointed 
if that security of property is to prevail which provides the only sufficient 
incentive to production.
Any redistribution of income, in favour of equality, which requires 
that the gain of one individual is the loss of another, is productive of 
disutility, Bentham urges, for the disappointment of loss is greater than 
the pleasure of gain.^ According to security, the legislator ought, 
therefore, (with regard to existing property) to maintain the distribution 
as it is actually established.
There is nothing more different than the state of property 
in America, in England, in Hungary, and in Russia. Generally, 
in the first of these countries, the cultivator is a proprietor; 
in the second, a tenant; in the third, attached to the glebe; 
in the fourth, a slave. However, the supreme principle of 
security commands the preservation of all these distributions, 
though their nature is so different, and though they do not 
produce the same sum of happiness. 2
This counselling against governmental (or legislative) interference 
with the existing pattern of distribution echoes Bentham's view in 
Supply Without Burthen; or Escheat Vice Taxation , (1795), where he 
declares a "revolution in property":
It is an idea big with horror ... it involves the idea 
of possessions disturbed, expectations thwarted; of estates 
forcibly ravished ... of the fruits of industry made the 
prey of rapacity and dissipation. 3 *2
U) Cf. Ibid.,p.108.
(2) Ibid.,p.119.
(3) Stark (ed.), Economic Writings, I, 318. Cited in Long, art.clt.,p.226
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Wherever security and equality are in conflict, therefore, equality 
must yield, for on security does the foundation of life depend. Only 
where property is secure will industry be secure, and only where industry 
is secure will the welfare of society be secure. Although the goals of 
security and equality are apparently in conflict in present circumstances, 
Bentham argues that there is a means of uniting them, namely in the "epoch 
of death” . 1  Time, it appears, is the only mediator between these contrary 
interests:
When property by the death of the proprietor ceases 
to have an owner, the law can interfere in its distribution, 
either by limiting in certain respects the testamentary 
power, in order to prevent too great an accumulation of 
wealth in the hands of an individual; or by regulating 
the succession in favour of equality in the cases where the 
deceased has left no consort, nor relation in the direct 
line, and has made no will. 2
In this instance no expectations are being frustrated for there is 
no one who has anticipated the enjoyment of this property. Government 
interference with property is justifiable, then, only when such interference 
cannot thwart existing expectations. Thus, changes in the constitution of 
property will only take place at a future point in time when the conditions 
giving rise to current expectations no longer prevail. 1  12
(1) Theory of Legislation, p.122.
(2) Ibid.,p.122.
Cf., Ibid.,.pp.148-149.(3 )
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Do you find it necessary to establish a law contrary 
to the actual expectations of men? If it is possible, 
you should so arrange matters that this law will not 
begin to take effect except at a remote period. The 
present generation will not feel the change, and the rising 
generation will be prepared for it ... Everything will 
become easy to you, because you will have prevented the 
birth of those expectations which otherwise you would have 
been compelled to contradict.
Bentham does not preclude, therefore, the possibility that at some future
date property may be distributed according to more egalitarian principles.
He simply contends that under current circumstances security of property
depends upon confirmation of existing expectations. ,
One final point needs to be made before moving on to consider James
Mill's ideas about property, namely, that whilst generally opposed to
governmental interference with the prevailing pattern of distribution,
Bentham is prepared to countenance it under the guise of collecting revenue
for the functions of government. Though the extraction of part of labour's
product for that end is mildly productive of disutility, the fixed,
regular and anticipated intervals at which it takes place prevent this
2practice operating as a disincentive to industry, for clearly security of 
property is contingent upon the existence of governmental organs to protect 
that property, and to punish those who transgress that right. 1
(1) Ibid.,p.149.
Ibid.,pp.124-126.(2)
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Labour in the Benthamic account of property, is rewarded, as 
we have seen with the full fruits of its endeavour for the express 
reason that such an attribution of property alone can maximise both 
utility and production. Labour, per se, has no special proprietary 
status.^- We will see, in the following section, a similar argument 
deployed in Mill's "Essay on Government", and it is to this that we now turn.
(1) Cf_., Ryan, op cit.,p.!10
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Section 2: James Mill: Conceptions of Property In the ’Essay on 
Government"
Of the laws of nature, on which the condition 
of man depends, that which Is attended with the 
greatest number of consequences, Is the necessity 
of labour for obtaining the means of subsistence, 
as well as the means of the greatest part of our 
pleasures. 1
James Mill was concerned In the "Essay on Government" to show that 
the existence of scarce resources, the necessity of labour to obtain 
those resources, and the inherent propensity of the strong to both 
oppress and expropriate the weak, required the Inauguration of government, 
for only under a system of law and order could utility - "the greatest
t
2happiness of the greatest number" - be oromoted, and production ensured. 
How Mill arrived at that conclusion provides the focus of our analysis.
In this section, therefore, we will be concerned to examine Mill's 
explanation of the origin of government concentrating soeclflcally upon 
the role of property within that explanation.
Man, as we discovered from our treatment of Bentham's theory In 
section 1 , is rendered, in utilitarian philosophy, as the slave of two 
principles - pain and pleasure.'* He is motivated in his conduct by a 
desire to maximise his pleasure and to minimise his pain. His happiness - 123
(1) Mill, "Essay on Government", p.56. The edition of the "Essay" 
referred to throughout this dissertation, is, unless otherwise 
specified, the 1824-5 edition. Cf■ Lively and Rees, Introduction to 
Utilitarian Logic and Politics, pp.51-52.
(2) Ibid., p. 55.
(3) Cf., Bentham, Morals and Legislation, (Bums and Hart edn.) p.ll.
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or welfare - corresponds, therefore, "with the decree In which 
his pleasures are qreat and his pains are small".
Since the world of economic resources which man Inhabits Is 
not a world of plenitude and abundance, but a world of scarcity, he 
must, as the quotation at the beqinnlner of this section suggests, engage 
in laborious undertakings if he is to acquire the stuff of his pleasure. 
Moreover, since the materials of pleasure are scarce, it is inevitable 
that men will come into conflict as they compete to appropriate as 
much as they can. This scenario introduces us to two important points:
(i) a concern with the nature of labour and the conditions under which 
maximum labour may be marshalled in order to ensure continued production; 
and (il) a conception of human nature necessarllv involving contrariety , 
and ambition at its centre.
We observed in the previous section that labour was regarded by
the Utilitarians as necessarily irksome, a source of pain, and, as such,
2productive of disutility for all those compelled to submit to it.
The problem for Mill, then, is to demonstrate how the disutllitv of labour 
may be overcome in order to use, to maximum efficiency, the scarce 
resources of nature.'* In other words. Mill must show how sufficient 
labour may be acquired in order to ensure that mankind may "obtain all 123
(1) Mill, "Essay on Government", p.56.
(2) Cf., Bentham, Theory of Legislation, pp.113-114.
(3) Cf., Reeve, Property, pp.116-117
the objecta of desire in the greatest possible quantity” . 1 He
must, as it were, reveal the "means for the insurinq of labour". 
Discounting the use of force, on the qrounds of its production of 
preponderant disutility, 3 Mill argues that only "allurement" is 
sufficient to overcome man's natural aversion to labour.
2
To obtain all the objects of desire in the 
greatest possible quantity, we must obtain 
labour in the greatest possible quantity» 
and to obtain labour in the greatest possible 
quantity, we must raise to the greatest possible 
height the advantage attached to labour. It is 
impossible to attach to labour a qreater degree of 
advantage than the whole of the product of labour ... 
The greatest possible haopiness of society is, 
therefore, attained by insuring to every man 
the greatest possible quantity of the produce of 
his labour. 4
The only Incentive, therefore, caDable of subjugating man's 
innate disinclination to labour is the enjoyment of an exclusive right 
of property in the fruits of his labour. To distribute property in a 
fashion other than according to exertion would be to create disutility, 
for "if you give more to one man than the produce of his labour, you can 
do so only by taking it away from the produce of some other man's labour".
(1)
(2)
(3)
Mill, "Essay on Government", p.57 
Ibid., p.56.
Ibid., pp.56-7.
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In terms, therefore, of ensuring optimum utility - in this case,
guaranteeing the welfare of society - securitv in the produce of
industry alone is caDable of achieving that goal. It is important
to make, briefly, two observations: firstly, that the remuneration
of labour according to its expenditure is not an argument from
"desert” - Mill is not proclaiming that labour has anv claim to
remuneration purely because the labourer deserves reward; and that
secondly, although the language seems to imply it, Mill is not suggesting
that the labouring man has a right to the whole produce of his labour.
In fact, Mill, in a letter to Brougham, does just the opposite, referring
to the nonsense“about the right of the labourer to the whole produce
of the country”, propagated in socialist thinking and the working-class
press.^ As we shall see shortly, the notion of the security of property,
which is fundamental to Mill's argument, is a notion which applies just
as strictly to the propertv of the capitalist and the landlord as it does
to the property of the labourer, and this feature is directly related to the
classical economists' general belief in the harmonisation of the varying
2interests of society through the mechanism of the market.
Earlier we mentioned that Mill was concerned not only with the 
problem of the mobilisation of labour, but also with the issue of the 
conflict generated by resource scarcity, and it is on this latter point 
that we now intend to focus. According to Mill man is motivated by a desire 12
(1) Mill to Brougham, 3 Sect.,1832, cited in Lively and Rees (eds), 
Utilitarian Logic and Politics, p.47.
(2) Ricardo forms an obvious exceotion here. See above, chapter 4.
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to maximise hla own welfare. One conclusion of this is, as we have 
just seen, that man's incentive to labour is proportioned to the degree 
to which he receives the produce of his efforts - to the degree to which 
he is secure in his expectation of the enjoyment of that produce.1 
The problem is, however, that there is an innate propensity in mankind 
for the strong to oppress the weak : man is under a continual temptation, 
in his acquisitiveness, to take those objects of desire he wants from 
those, weaker than himself, who already possess them. We are dominated, 
it appears, by that "grand, governing law of human nature", which declares 
that we are activated by a desire to amass a sufficiency of "that power
which is necessary to render the persons and properties of human beings
2subservient to our pleasures". >
Obviously there is a possible tension here between the labour-incentive 
theory adumbrated by Mill, which is founded uoon an argument from 
security; and this conception of human nature, which implies that, unless 
otherwise restrained, man will tend to act in such a way as to generate 
insecurity.
Security of property, the mobilisation of labour, and indeed the 
very continued existence of society,^ depend upon curbing this ambitious 
propensity of mankind, and, in Mill's opinion, the only organ capable of 123
(1) Cf., Ryan, Alan, "Two Concepts of Politics and Democracy: James and 
John Stuart Mill", in Fleisher, Martin, (ed.), Machlavelli and the
Nature of Political Thought, (London, Croom Helm, 1973), pp.83ff.
(2) Mill, "Essay on Government", p.P3. .
(3) Ibid., p.62.
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such restriction is government. And so it seems that the exoress end 
of government is the maintenance of property. Indeed, in the 1820 
edition of the "Essay", for the Supplement to the fifth edition of 
the Encyclopaedia Britannica, Mill observes, in a footnote, the 
conformity of his view with that of John Locke:
It may be remarked that the conclusion to 
which we have thus arrived coincides exactly 
with the doctrine of Locke:- "The great and 
chief end", says he, "of men's uniting into 
Commonwealths, and putting themselves under 
Government, is the preservation of their 
property" ... This the more certainly appears, 
when it is considered that by far the greater part 
of injuries to person, committed by human beings, 
are, in some way or other, on account of property. 1
Only the operation of government can secure that pattern of property
distribution most conducive to social welfare and optimum utility. Before
reviewing briefly Mill's theory of representation, however, we propose to
consider a number of themes pertinent to his ideas about property,
beginning with the notion of security.
Security formed the cornerstone of the Benthamic system of property 
2delineated abovej and as we saw then, security, in part, was seen to 
consist in the absence of thwarted expectations. Indeed, property, for 12
(1) Ibid., p.57n.
(2) Cf., Section 1
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Bentham, was largely conceived as founded in expectation. The aim of 
the legislator was to "preserve the total mass of expectations as far 
as is possible".*
Although James Mill does not couch his account of property in the 
language of expectations, it is clear that it is that notion which 
underwrites his argument from incentive. Labour will only be 
forthcoming if the benefits attached to its expenditure are guaranteed. 
If those expected gains are frustrated, labour's motivation will be 
destroyed. Thus, Mill observes:
It is sufficiently obvious, that, if every
man is liable to be deprived of what he
possesses ... the existence of property is
Impossible; and, if the existence of property
is impossible, so also is that of labour, of
the means of subsistence for an enlarged community,
and hence of the community itself. 2
Mill is here concerned, not only with Individual depradatlons on 
the property of others, but also with governmental incursions upon the 
property of the governed. Unlike Bentham, who actually counsels government 
against any levelling redistributive practices,* Mill is less explicit, 
though no less strongly attached to security. Any Interference with 
security of property - even governmental - is potentially destructive of *23
Cl) Stark, (ed.), Jeremy Bentham's Economic Writings, vol.3, p.198.
(2) Mill, "Essay on Government", p.62.
(3) See above, section 1.
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motives to produce, and ultimately of society, and thus to be avoided.
The second point of note relating to Mill's account of property 
concerns the doctrine of the harmonisation of interests throuqh the 
mechanism of the market. The question here lss How can the potentially 
conflicting interests of all the individuals comprising society be 
accommodated in order to ensure optimum utility and the maximum reproduction 
of wealth? The answer is provided by the doctrine of the identity of 
interests commonplace in classical economic thought.
Initially, Mill's announcement that the greatest advantage attachable 
to labour is the enjoyment of "the greatest possible quantity of the 
produce of ... labour"1 seems to be an eqalltarian doctrine. To the 
modem reader it may well suagest that the labouring classes should 
receive the full fruits of their exertions, (l.e., the whole of the 
national product), a view which necessarily conflicts with the position of 
classical economics that the whole produce of industry is annually divided 
between labour, capital and land. However, it is important to note, 
first, that Mill's belief in the security of property, and in the 
non-interference of government in the property system, led him to sanction
the existing pattern of distribution; and second, that Mill, whilst
2acknowledging that those who labour most frequently receive least, 
actually felt that the interests of all were harmonised under the present 
system. The market, it appeared, already had the capacity to reconcile 
competing interests. Thus, as Ryan has shown, according to classical 12
(1) Mill, "Essay on Government", p.57.
(2) Cf., Ryan, Property and Political Theory, p.91.
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political economy, in a perfect market, all factors would be (and were) 
rewarded precisely according to thelrworth in the market at large - abstracting 
the case of rent - so that only a free market could ensure to every 
individual the proper share of the fruits of his industry.^ This 
point can be illustrated by a brief consideration of the view of the 
relationship between capital and labour espoused by Mill in the Elements.^  
Although later writers were to regard labour's reliance upon capital for the 
exercise of its industrious caoacity as necessarily exploitative, and 
as evidence of an inherent conflict of interest,3 James Mill saw this 
relationship as one of reciprocity, with the prosperity of each class 
necessarily interlocked with that of the other. As we noted in Chapter 4, 
classical political economists advanced a conception of market wages which 
treated capital as demand for labour; thus labour was dependent upon 
capital for its employment, and since only am Increase in capital, deriving 
from profit, could lead to an increase in wages, the fortunes of the 
labourer were inextricably allied with those of the capitalist. If the 
rate of capital accumulation was slower than the rate of population growth,
4the market wages of labour would drop unavoidably to mere subsistence level. 1234
(1) Ryan, "Two Concepts of Politics",p.84.
(2) Cf., Lively and Rees, Introduction to Utilitarian Logic and Politics, 
pp.45-46» and, Mazllsh, Bruce, James and John Stuart Mill, (London, 
Hutchinson, 1875), p.lol.
(3) Cf., Macpherson,C.B., "The Economic Penetration of Political Theory",
JHI, 39 (1978), pp.101-118. Macoherson endeavours in the article to 
argue that Mill was actually aware of the exploitative nature of market 
society, and that although not made explicit in the Elements does, in 
fact, underwrite Mill's conception of wages (pp.110-111). Although Mill 
does make an Important comparison between wage labour and slave labour 
(see above, chapter 4, section 2). Macpherson's claim seems a little too 
radical for anything found elsewhere in the Elements.
(4) Mill, Elements of Political Economy, (1844, repr.), pp.8-19.
Cf., Lively and Rees, op clt., p.46.
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The labourer has, therefore, an Interest In the capitalist's acquisition 
of profit, and the preservation of the exlstlnq pattern of propertv 
distribution can be seen to be in the interests of all. Both the 
labourer and capitalist are allocated their due rewards accordinq to 
prevailinq market conditions.
Our final remark conceminq property is an attempt to reinforce a 
point made earlier with reqard to Bentham, namely, that the concept 
of desert or just reward p’.ava little or no part in Utilitarian accounts 
of property.1 Mill's contention that the best way to motivate an 
individual to labour is to quarantee to him the maximum permissible 
proportion of the produce of his labour is not to claim that labourinq 
ipso facto creates a title to that prooertv. The importance accorded ' 
to labour in proprietary considerations was simply a consequence of Mill's 
concern with the attainment of that pattern of property distribution.most 
conducive to utility, which, of course, includes continued production.
Havino focused hitherto on the role of ideas about property in Mill's 
analysis of the reasons for qovernment, it is our aim now to consider, 
briefly, Mill's theory of representation, since it was Mill's assertion 
that only throuqh the system of representative qovernment could the system 
of property be secured.
It was Mill's contention in the "Fssav on Government" that every man 
was motivated by a desire to acquire that power requisite to subordinate 
the possessions and persons of others to his will. The problem is, of 
course, if this is true of mam per se, will it not also be true of
(1) Ryan, Propertv and Political Theory, p.91.
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governments?
Whatever would be the temptations under which 
Individuals would lie, if there was no Government, 
to take the objects of desire from others weaker 
than themselves, under the same temptations the 
members of Government lie, to take the objects of 
desire from the members of the community. If they 
are not prevented from doing so. 1
Mill's problem is, therefore, to show how government may be restrained 
from such depredations. His answer lies in the concept of representation,
2and a belief in the necessary identity of interest between rulers and ruled.
Mill begins by rejecting direct democracy. Even though the interests 
of the governed and the governors are necessarily one and the same, direct
t
democracy is Impractical in modern society. The performance of its 
legislative, judicial and executive functions would be rendered operose 
by the very size of the popular assembly.1 23 4 Mill then discounts aristocratic 
and monarchic forms of government for the very reason that both develop 
"sinister Interests" contrary to those of the governed, and tend therefore
4to act in opposition to the interests of the community.
Mill's conclusion is that the only form of government capable of both 
restraining the avaricious propensities of its citizens, and capable itself 
of being restrained, is representative democracy, in which the elected 
delegates are accountable to the people - defined as a fairly narrowly 
enfranchised electorate - at regular electoral intervals.5 He is
(1) "Essay on Government'*, p.58. ,
(2) Cf., Lively and Rees, op cit., p.8.
(3) Ibid.,p.59.
(4) Ibid.,pp.59-61.
(5) Mill spends a considerable amount of time debating both franchise 
qualifications and the duration of the term of office of the elected 
representatives. Ibid.,pp.77-87.lt is Jack Lively's contention, however, 
that Mill was assumed by his contemporaries, to be advocating universal 
(male) suffrage. Cf.,"Introduction? Utilitarian Logic and Politics,pp.38, 
43.
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proposing as it were, a plan of "permanent service with perpetual power 
of removal".  ^ Government would be prevented from abusing the powers 
invested in it through a system of checks founded upon the frequent 
re-election of its members. Depending upon their performance in the 
interval between elections, in promoting the common Interest of society, 
representatives would either be returned to, or ousted from, power, so 
that only those acting in conformity with the general utility would be 
allowed to govern.
The question of the electoral franchise is an interesting one. As we 
noted briefly, it is explicit in Mill's scheme that the electorate should
have interests identical with those of the rest of the community. A too
#
restricted franchise would thus encourage sectarianism, whilst a too 
extended one would simply be unnecessary, for all those oersons whose:
... Interests are Indisputably Included in those 
of other individuals, may be struck off without 
inconvenience. In this light may be viewed all 
children,up to a certain age, whose interests are 
involved in those of their parents. In this light, 
also, women may be regarded, the Interest of almost 
all of whom is involved either in that of their fathers 
or in that of their husbands. 2 12
(1) Ibid.,p.77.
(2) Ibid.,p.79. Cf., Thompson, William, An Appeal of One-half the Human 
Race, Women, against the Pretensions of the Other Half Men, to Retain 
Them in Political, and thence in Civil and Domestic Slavery, (in 
collaboration with Anna Wheeler), (London, 1825 - reprinted by Virago 
Books, London, 1983).
Whilst the argument about a limited franchise is obvious, this
latter notion of virtual reoresentation is less so. Whilst it does not
appear that Mill was opposed to universal suffrage (per se), he is
apparently satisfied that a more restricted electorate could in fact
satisfy the criteria of an identity of interest between government and
the governed, and that, as such, women did not require the vote in order
to ensure the representation of their interests.
Having reduced the potential electorate to men of an age regarded
as sul juris. Mill proceeds to try to further reduce the franchise. His
solution is to conceive of an electorate of men over forty who satisfy
a minimum property qualification - designed to cover a large part though
*
not all of the population. This electorate, largely the middle classes,satis­
fying / Mill's notion of rationality and educational attainment would, he 
believed be capable of leading the working classes, for it was the opinions 
of the middle classes that Mill considered were formative of the opinions 
of the lower ranks of society.^ In times of crisis and potential upheaval, 
with a middle class to emulate and admire many of the potential sources,
conflict arising from the working class would, Mill implies, be diffused by
2the leadership of an exemplary middle class.
In this section we have concentrated upon elucidating James Mill's 
conception of property, and the relation of that conception to government.
In what follows, we intend to examine the similar, though distinct argument 
from incentive which, it is our contention, underlies the political economic 
theories of distribution of the early nineteenth century. 12
(1) Ibid.,pp.94-95.
(2) Ibid., pp. <34-9 5.
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Section 3: Classical Political Economy: Security and Orowth, 
J.R.McCulloch and T.R.Malthus.
Scattered throughout the literature of political economy are 
Innumerable remarks to the effect that security of property Is fundamental 
to the efficient functioning of the economic system In terms of both 
continued production, and qrowth. Thus we find David Ricardo wrltlno 
In 'Observations on Parliamentary Reform',^ that:
... the quantity of employment In the country must 
depend, not only on the quantity of capital, but 
upon Its advantageous distribution, and, above all, 
on the conviction of each capitalist that he will 
be allowed to enjoy unmolested the fruits of his 
capital, his skill, and his enterprise. To take
from him this conviction is at once to annihilate ,
half the productive Industry of the country, and would 
be more fatal to the poor labourer than to the rich 
capitalist himself. 2
Security in the expectation of deriving benefit from property provides,
it appears, the only sufficient Incentive to induce the capitalist to
contribute "his capital, his skill, and his enterprise" to the productive 
3process. 123
(1) Ricardo, David, art■clt.,Scotsman, 24 April 1824, reprinted In Sraffa 
ed.,Works, pp.495-503.
(2) Ibid.,p.501.
(3) The context of this argument Is provided by a brief- discussion of the 
question of the introduction of universal suffraqe. Ricardo is opposed 
to universal suffrage - though not a more limited extension of the 
franchise - on the grounds that the enfranchisement of the unpropertled 
would somehow lead to a violation of the prevailing right of private. , 
property. Ricardo is here assuming that since those without property 
cannot necessarily be conceived to have a vested interest in the 
maintenance of existing proprietary arrangements, that insecurity would 
result from the Inevitable invasions of the property of the wealthy.
He thus counsels that"only those who have a sacred regard to the rights 
of property should have a voice in the choice of representative"
Ibid.,pp.501-502.
Similarly, Charles Knight declares, in The Rights of Industry
not only that "the security of individual property is the foundation
of all social improvement",^ but that where there is no security of
private property, there is "no exchange, no capital, no labour, no 
2production".
"Immediately that this principle (the security 
of individual property) is established", Knight 
pronounces, "labour begins to work profitably, 
for it works with exchange. If this principle 
of appropriation were not acted upon at all, 
there could be no exchange, and consequently 
no production..." 3
In other words, security of property is again viewed as the onlv 
institutional arrangement capable of generating a sufficient motive to '
continued production.
The aim of this section will be to illustrate our contention that 
the conception of property underwriting classical political economy was 
a conception derived not from the luristic tradition of John Locke, but 
from the consequentiallst/Utilitarian tradition of Jeremy Bentham. We 
Intend to show, then, that the classical political economists did not 
believe that labour was naturally, or necessarily, entitled to the product of 
its labour; that rather these writers were concerned, in a very limited way, 123
(1) Knight, Charles, The Rights of Industry, 2nd edn.(London, Society for 
the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge, 1831) p.42.
(2) Ibid., p.24.
(3) Ibid.,pp.23-24.
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with an explanation of how security of property conduced to a 
particular end: the efficient and optimal functioning of the economy; and 
that as such, they did not advance a justificatory theory of entitlement.
In order to illuminate our claim, we will concentrate primarily upon the 
opinions of two authors - John Ramsay McCulloch, and Thomas Robert Malthus - 
although reference will be made to other authors where appropriate.
Before beginning our treatment of McCulloch, however, we propose to 
make a number of observations about Charles Knight's pamphlet. The Rights 
of Industry. This pamphlet was essentially a defence of the claim of capital 
to a share in the product of industry, prompted by the publication of
Thomas Hodgskin's works, Labour Defended Against the Claims of Capital, and
*
Popular Political Economy. -As we shall demonstrate in chapter 7, Hodgskin 
had argued that the capitalist's title to profit rested upon the 
abrogation of the natural, juristic, rlerht of labour to the full fruits 
of its endeavour. In these conditions where capital was owned by a 
non-producer, the capitalist in question had no rightful title to demand 
payment for the use of that capital by a labourer. Thus Hodgskin complained:
... the labourer is not allowed to work, unless, 
in addition to replacinq whatever he uses or 
consumes, and comfortably subsisting himself, 
his labour also gives a profit to the capitalist 
on all the capital which he uses or consumes, while 
engaged in producing. 1 1
(1) Hodgskin, Popular Political Economy, cited, in Knight, op clt. ,pp.56-7*.
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It was Knight'g contention, however, that (1) "the principle upon
which all accumulation depends, that cf gecuritv of property, being
destroyed, the accumulation would be degtroyed".  ^ So that were the
labouring claggeg to use thlg capital without payment for that use
they would be violating security of property, and causing accumulation
to cease. And (ii), that "if some capitalist did not receive a profit
upon the employment of the capital, it would remain unemployed - it would 
2be useless". The capital would be left to deteriorate. The only 
incentive the capitalist has, then, to preserve and maintain items of 
capital, is the promise of profit.
Where Hodgskin is concerned to demonstrate the bases of legitimate 
entitlement, Knight, like the other political economists considered in 
this section is interested only in illustrating what would happen if 
existing property institutions were tampered with. Thus, Hodgskin develops, 
as we shall see in chapter 6, a Justificatory theory of property - employed 
largely as a yardstick against which to measure prevailing proprietary 
claims - whereas Knight (et al) extends explanatory theories of the goals 
to be promoted by a particular set of property arrangements. Like 
Ricardo, therefore, Knight views security of property as basic to continued 
production, and growth.
( 1 )
( 2 )
Ibi£. ,p.56.
Ibid., d p . 56-57
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In our exposition of the Ideas of Jeremy Bentham and James Mill
on the question of property,earlier in this chapter,^- we Indicated
that a theory of property was not necessarily concerned with the question
of original entitlement. It could, quite justifiably, concern itself
with the objectives to be Dromoted by a particular arranqement of
property institutions. Thus, we noted, that James Mill was of the
opinion that in order to mobilise labour in sufficient quantities to ensure
the production of enough subsistence to enable the community to survive,
every mem had to be ensured "the greatest possible quantity of the produce 
2of his labour”. The Utilitarian end of the "qreatest happiness of the 
greatest number" would best be served, then, by a property structure based 
on incentive.^
Although McCulloch did not systematically articulate a theory of
property in any particular work, it is our claim that his ideas on prooerty
are informed by the approach adooted by Bentham and Mill - to specify - albeit
sketchily - that pattern of proprietary arranoements oroductive of (in
McCulloch's case) optimum economic growth. Although he denies the necessity
of "entering into any statements explanatory of the advantages resulting
4from the establishment of a right of private propertv", or of embarking 1234
(1) See above, pp.320-349.
(2) Mill, "Essay on Government", p.57.
(3) That security of prooerty was regarded as fundamental to both the 
supply of effort and the supply of capital was a standard assumption 
of the classical political economy of the authors under study in this 
dissertation.
(4) McCulloch, J.R.,A Treatise on the Succession to Property Vacant bv Heath, 
(London, 1848), p.2.
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on "disguisitions with respect to the origin...of the right of private 
propertv",  ^since "these are obvious, and have been universally admitted", 
he does in fact furnish his reader with some account of the advantages 
deriving from the institution of property. He observes, for 
example, that without "a right of private property in land and in the 
the various products of art and industry, there could be neither wealth nor 
civilisation in the world".3 Similarly,he notes that:
Nothing could ever tempt anyone to engage
in a laborious employment; he would neither
domesticate wild animals nor clear and cultivate
the ground, if, after months and vears of toil,
when his flocks had become numerous, and his harvests
were ripenina for the sickle, a stranger were allowed
to seize uoon the produce of his industry. 4
(
This view is clearly resonant of the claim of both Bentham, and 
Mill, that production will only be continued if the producer feels secure 
in the enjoyment of his property. And indeed, McCulloch freguently cites 
Bentham in support of his case.5 Before examining the concept of security, 
and the role of that concent within McCulloch's political economy, we intend 
to examine McCulloch's conception of the relationship between labour and 
appropriation.
The activity of labouring is seen largely in instrumental terms. In other
(1) McCulloch, J.R., The Literature of Political Economy, (London, 1845). 
(Henceforth "Lit. of Pol. Ec.)
(2) Succession to Property, p.2
(3) Lit, of Pol. Ec., 0.307.
(4) Succession to Property, p.2.
(5) cf., e.g., Political Economy", EB6, p.24Q and PPE (1), pp.50-51.
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words, labouring is regarded as a painful necessitv fundamental to the 
satisfaction of needs.'' Indeed, McCulloch observes: "the eternal law 
of providence has decreed that wealth can onlv be orocured bv the
intervention of industry", with wealth defined in Smithian terms as
2command over the necessaries and conveniences of life.
Place us on the banks of a river, or in 
an orchard, and we shall infallibly perish, 
either of thirst or hunger, if we do not, 
by an effort of industry, raise the water 
to our lips, or pluck the fruit from its 
parent tree. 3
4Labour is regarded as an effort; as an activity producing disutility. 
Hut man must, it appears, "earn his bread by the sweat of his brow".6 He
t
must, like Adam after the Fall, engage in the burdensome task of labouring
if he is to survive.6 As such, the production of wealth forms the "constant
7and principal object of the exertions of the human race”.
The primary question we must ask, then, is how does this conception of 
labour relate to McCulloch's views on orooerty? And is it consistent with 
his conceptualization of labour as the orlncinallv dehumanized activity 123456
(1) This can be distinguished from the expresslvist notion that labouring is 
an essentially creative or developmental activity.
(2) Political Economy, EB6, p.218.
(3) Ibid., p.235 (Original emphasis)
(4) See above, chapter 2, section 2 (ill), p.98 and chaoter 3, section 3, p.182 
for a consideration of some links between labour as disutility, and the 
question of value.
(5) Political Economy. EB6, p.218. Cf.,PPE(5) ,pp.25-6.
(6) Cf..Genesis, 3.19. "in the sveat of they face shalt thou eat bread". 
Political Economy. EB6, p.218.(7)
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discussed in the labour theory of value?*'
If labour is reqarded as fundamentally onerous, then clearly one 
may surmise that in order to ensure its mobilisation 9ome sort of incentive 
or benefit scheme is probably necessary. For McCulloch - like Mill -
the best available incentive was the attribution to labour of the product
2of his industry. The existence of security of property had, McCulloch 
claimed,
... subdued the natural aversion of man to 
labour, given activity to indolence, and armed 
the patent hand of industry with the zeal to 
undertake, and the perseverence to overcome, 
the most difficult and disagreeable tasks. 3
t
In other words, security of property forms the "first and most
4indispensable requisite to the production of wealth". To ensure the 
continued industry of an individual all that is necessary, McCulloch 
counsels, is to "secure him the peaceable enjoyment of the fruits of his 
industry".^ Or, as he somewhat quantifiedly asserts, in the fourth edition 
of the Principles of Political Economy, the first requisite of growth is the: 12345
(1) Cf., above chapter 3, section 3, pp.187-191.
(2) By "labour" McCulloch means both that of the labourer and the capitalist.
(3) Political Economy, EB6, p.218. Cf., Ibid.,p.24Q.
(4) PPE (1), pp.45-6.
(5) Political Economy, EB6, p.273
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... establishment of a right of property, or 
the securing to every individual the quiet 
enjoyment of his natural powers, and of the 
products, lands, and talents he may have 
inherited, or honestly acquired. 1
That such a pattern of distribution serves not only the interests of 
utility, but also those of reason,is evidenced in McCulloch's claim that 
it is axiomatic that the labour of a man's bodv and the work of his hands 
are his own. Clearly, the idea that the labour of a man's body and thence 
the produce of that labour, are his own is a Lockean notion. However, it 
would be a mistake to see McCulloch as a Lockean in relation to his theory
of property. Locke advanced a natural rights theory of property entitlement;
*
he was concerned with the iust bases of property acquisition. McCulloch,
by contrast, is not interested in illuminating the conditions for legitimate
appropriation, but rather the conditions necessary to economic growth, of
which security of nroperty is the Drinclpal one.
The sense in which the above Lockean notion is employed most frequenly
in political economy, is not as an argument for appropriation, but as an
argument aqainst policies and practices desiqned to direct or restrict
labour or production - such as monooolies or aoorenticeshins. An individual's
right of property was seen by McCulloch to relate most intrinsicallv to the
2faculties of his mind and the powers of his body . Whenever, then, he was 
interdicted from engaging in a particular business, his right of prooerty 
was seen to be abrogated. This is especially important in the case of the 12
(1) PPE (4), p.SO.
(2) PPE (1), p.47. (Original emphasis), Cf. ,PPE(5), pp.28-9.
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working classes, for McCulloch observes, "capacity to labour is to the 
ooor man what stock is to the capitalist".^ Just as restrictions on the 
use of capital are seen as violations of the right of propertv of the 
capitalist, so too are restrictions on the disposal of labour conceived 
as violations of the right of oropertv of the labourer. Security of 
property is violated, then, not only when "a man is deprived of the oower 
of peaceably enjoying the fruits of his industry", but it is also violated 
when i
... he is prevented from using the powers 
with which nature has endowed him, in any 
way, not injurious to others, that he considers 
most beneficial to himself. 2
t
McCulloch is not espousing a labour-based theory of propertv rights. 
The activity of labouring is not accorded any special oroprietary status. 
Rather, as we can observe from the modified definition of (security of) 
property given above, McCulloch extends the notion of security bevond the 
produce of human industry to include the enjoyment of man's natural powers, 
his lands and talents. Although there is no attempt to dehumanize "labour” 
at this juncture, McCulloch does not Invest it with any soecial proorietary 
title.
Another point of note concerning McCulloch's conception of property is 
that it is a fundamentally individualistic right. 12
(1) Essay on Wages, pp.185-6. Cf.,above, chapter 2, section 2(iv),p.l04.
(2) PPE (1) , p. 47.
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If a number of individuals be set down 
together on the shore of an unoccupied and 
unappropriated island, each will have quite 
as good a right as another to take the game 
and fruit. But those who do so ... will 
obviously be entitled to the exclusive use 
of such portion. 1
McCulloch is, he claims, unable to determine whether or not there exists 
a principle Innate in man which suggests that he respect such individual 
property, but, he concludes:
... it is sufficient to know that briefest 
experience would point out to everyone the 
necessity of establishing and respecting 
such a principle. 2
f
Although the law may sanction, and institutionalize the right of
property as Paley suggests? McCulloch prefers to see its emergence as
natural and gradual. Property, he declares, is "perfected only by 
4slow degrees". Here, McCulloch's aoproach is very similar to that of
Smith. Like Smith, McCulloch presents a conjectural picture of historical 
development structured about a four-stages paradigm. However, where Smith 
concentrated in great depth upon the relationship between the evolution of 
property and the four-stages theorem,5 McCulloch only refers to that 1234
(1) PPE (4), pp.80-8. (My emphasis)
(2) Ibid.,pp.80-81.
(3) Cf.,PPE (1), p.46.
(4) PPE (4) , p.80.
See above, chapter 1, pp.10-75.(5)
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relationship in passino. Thus, he observes, for example,that:
... among hunters the ferae naturae on 
which they subsist ... are, so long as thev 
run wild in the forest, the common property 
of the tribe, and only become private property 
after they have been captured ... As socletv 
advances the rioht of propertv expands ... 
the modem Tartas .. . estimate their wealth 
by the number of their cattle ... The moment, 
however, that men beet an to renounce the 
pastoral for the agricultural mode of life, 
the right of property in land had to be 
established ... 1
Each stage in societal evolution can, it appears, as with Smith, 
be characterised according to the pattern of property differentiation 
prevalent therein.
t
However, the main thrust of McCulloch's limited pronouncements upon 
property, is to demonstrate the essentiality of the institution of private 
property for efficient economic functioning. Property, he declares, in
edition one of the Principles, is "the foundation on which almost all
2the other institutions of society rest". ‘ Until property was guaranteed,
conflict over scarce economic resources would ensue. Once security of
property is established, however, not only is production guaranteed, but
more importantly, so too is accumulation.
Where the right of property is vigilantly 
protected, an industrious m m ,  who produces 
as much by one day's labour as is sufficient 
to maintain him two days, does not lie idle the 
second day, but accumulates the surplus produce 
above his wants as capital ... But, wherever 
property is Insecure, we look in vain for the 
operation of the principle of accumulation. 3 123
(1) PPE (4),pp.80-81.
(2) PPE (1) , p. 46.
(3) Political Economy, EB6, p.738. Should the general interest require the 
expropriation of some property in order, for example, to construct a 
canal, firstly, the advantages of the scheme must be established before a 
"competent tribunal", and secondly, those dispossessed must be fully 
compensated. PPE(4),p.89.
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Security of the exclusive right of private pronertv ensures, 
therefore, continued production, and accumulation, or, in other words, 
guarantees the supply of effort and the supply of capital. Furthermore, 
the sacrosanctity of private prooertv has been responsible for the 
emergence from barbarism of all nations. "The right of propertv has 
not made poverty^as Rousseau and Beccaria allegey1, but it has made wealth".3-
Malthus, like McCulloch, was concerned with the prerequisites of growth, 
and similarly identified the sanctity of the existing property system as
essential to that end. Thus he observes "the laws of private property ...
2are the grand stimulants to nroduction". Security of property provides,
therefore, a necessary and sufficient encouragement to production.3
However, the most interesting aspect of Malthus' ideas about property does
not relate so much to the links between property and growth, as to the
connection between property and inequality. After making a few preliminary
points relating to general features of Malthus' theory of property, we
shall turn to this relationship between property and inequality.
Firstly, Malthus, akin to all the other authors studied in this
4chanter, is Interested in a right of private property. Secondly, it is 
to this individualistic riqht of orooertv, in combination with the principle 
of self-love, that mankind is indebted for all the "noblest exertions of
(1) Political Economy, ET»6, p.240.
(2) Malthus, A Summary View of Population, pp.245-6.
(3) Principles of Pol.Ec. ,p,.346.
(4) Summary View, p.245.
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human genius", for "everything, indeed, that distinguishes the civilized 
from the savage state".^ Like McCulloch, Malthus sees the operation of 
a right of pronerty as a civilizing mechanism within society raising men from 
the condition of a primitive, savage society, to that of a civilized, 
commercial society.
Thirdly, security of pronerty - the spur to industry - "depends mainly
upon the political constitution of a country, the excellence of its laws
2and the manner in which they are administered". Related to this is Malthus' 
assertion that, even allowing that the right of property is the "creature of 
positive law", this law must be ;
*... so early and so imperiously forced on 
the attention of mankind, that, if it 
cannot be called a natural law, it must be 
considered as the most natural as well as the 
most necessary of all positive laws ... 3
The rationale behind Malthus' claims is that the law of pronerty 
tends to promote the general good whilst the absence of such a law tends 
to degrade man to the level of the animals, and that, as such, if it is 
not a natural law, it must, given the end it fosters, represent the most 
essential of all positive laws. The happiness of society depends then, 
upon the existence of a right of pronerty. 12
(1) Essay on Population, p.08 (Pelican edn.),pp.176-177.
(2) Principles of Pol.Ec.,p.346.
(4) Summary view, p.269.
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The problem with Malthus' conception of property concerns the 
links between property, and inequality. The world that Malthusian man 
inhabits is a world of scarce resources, and a world in which population 
is constantly pressinq against the means of subsistence. As Malthus 
observes, in this condition, "man cannot live in the midst of olentv.
All cannot share alike the bounties of nature".^ Since Nature is nlcrqardly 
a system of property administration is required, in order to resolve 
conflict over scarce resources. It had been William Godwin’s opinion 
that the institution of property represented an "evil” in society. Malthus, 
in an attempt to refute that hypothesis, alms to show that private property 
is a "good".
In conditions of plenty, it would be, Malthus argued,
I
... of little consequence who laboured the 
least, or who possessed the least, as every 
man was perfectly willing and ready to supply 
the wants of his neighbour. 2
However, in conditions of extreme scarcity, Malthus observes, the situation 
changes. The question becomes not "whether one man should give to another 
that which he did not use himself", but "whether he should qive to his 
neighbour the pod which was absolutely necessary to his own existence".’* 
Clearly in such a situation the property-holders would desire to retain their 
propertv, and so Malthus concludes; 123
(1) Essay on Population,1798, (Pelican edn.),p.l34.
(2) Ibid.,p.140.
(3) Ibid. ,p. 140
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It seems highly probable .. . that 
an administration of property, not very 
different from that which prevails in 
civilized states at present, would be 
established, as the best, thouoh inadequate, 
remedy for the evils which were oressinq on 
the society. 1
Malthus, believinq that the rival claims to subsistence, particularlv 
acute in times of qreat scarcity, could not all be accommodated, favoured 
a system of property which would, first, secure present possessors in
their possession, but secondly, and more Importantly, prevent the poor
2and needy having any claim on that property. ' This harsh scenario is 
possibly best exemplified by a passage from the second Essay on Population 
(1803), which was withdrawn from later editions of that Essay.  ^ Herein
t
Malthus declared that:
A man who is b o m  into a world already possessed, 
if he cannot qet subsistence from his parents on 
whom he has a just demand, and if the society do 
not want his labour, has no claim of right to the 
smallest portion of food, and, in fact, has no 
business to be where he is. At nature's mighty 
feast there is no vacant cover for him. She tells 
him to be gone, and will quickly execute her own 
orders, if he does not work upon the compassion of 
some of her guests. 4 1234
(1) Ibid. ,p.141.
(2) Cf. , Hont and Ignatieff, "Needs and Justice", in Hont and Ignatleff 
(eds), Wealth and Virtue, pp.lff, for a discussion of the tension between 
the demands of the poor and the rights of the rich in times of scarcity, 
from ancient thought on.
(3) The passage was first omitted from the 1806,3rd edn. of the work.
(4) Cited in James, Patricia, Population Malthus, p.lOO.
366
This question of intergenerational riqhts is interesting.
All those b o m  after the approoriation of the means of subsistence 
are able to survive only if they are supported by their parents; can 
gain employment, since labour is the "only wav a poor man has of supporting 
himself in Independence"/or, are able to claim charity off sympathetic 
persons if all three alternatives fail, the person in question is, Malthus 
argues, doomed to die. In many respects, Malthus is claiming that such a 
person has no right to live, having been born into an already over-populated 
world, if those presently inhabiting the world are prepared to support 
such persons, they are seen, by Malthus, to be acting contrary to the dictates 
of Nature.
The guests learn too late their error in 
counteracting those strict orders to all 
intruders, issued by the great mistress 
of the feast, who ... knowing that she could 
not provide for unlimited numbers, humanely 
refused to admit fresh comers when her table was 
already full. 2
Obviously Malthus' argument is underwritten by his concern about the 
population question, and the potential disaster that could befall the 
human race if it did not take action aqalnst the tendency of population 
to increase at a pace far ahead of that of subsistence. However, Malthus’ 
solution - that all latecomers should be left to starve, effectively - 
bears stark contrast to the analysis developed by Herbert Spencer, in 
Social Statics, of a similar scenario.^ 123
(1) Essay on Population, (17Q8), p.177.
(2) James, Population Malthus, pilOO.
(3) Spencer, Herbert, Social Statics .(London, Chapman, ISSI)
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Spencer, claims that "equity ... does not oermlt property in land". 
In order to illustrate his argument, he notes,
Supposing the entire habitable globe to 
be so enclosed} it follows that if the 
landowners have a valid right to its 
surface, all who are not landowners, have 
no riqht at all to its surface. Hence, such 
can exist on the earth by sufferance only.
They are all respassers. Save by the permission 
of the lords of the soil, they can have no room 
for the soles of their feet.... 2
Exclusive possession of the soil infringes, Spencer declares, the
"law of equal freedom", and is, as such, both unnatural and illegitimate.
The only system of ownership of the soil that is consistent with equity and*
civilisation is, Spencer concludes, that of "co-heirship". He favours, 
therefore, the nationalisation of land, and payment of rent for its usage.^ 
Thus, Malthus and Spencer, from the same position of considering how the 
claims of the unpropertled may be balanced against those of the existing 
property owners develop radically different theories to settle that 
question. Spencer subjects the prevailing property system to critical 12
(1) That is, privately owned.
(2) Social Statics, pp.114-115
(3) See below, chapter 8, section 1, for a brief review of the comparisons 
between Spencer and Hodgskln on the ownership of land.
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appraisal according to the tenets of equltv, and finds it wanting, whilst 
Malthus proclaims, that something akin to the current pattern of 
property arrangements would be instituted in order to protect the haves 
from the have-nots.1
In this section we have been primarily concerned with the notion of 
"security" within the writings of the classical economists. Observing 
that there was a general belief in the fundamentality of security of 
property for the efficient functioning of the economic svstem, we 
concluded that the classical economists' ideas about property were 
informed more by notions derived from Utilitarian philosophy, than by 
concepts derived from the pages of Locke.
(1) Explicit within Malthusian political economy is the belief that 
society would necessarily, and justifiably, be divided into a 
class of proprietors and a class of labourers - since not all could 
be proprietors. Cf. ,e.g.,Essay on Population (1798), pp,177ff.
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Conclusion
It was the ideas about prooertv found In Utilitarian and classical 
economic literature that formed the substance of this chapter. Here we 
were principally - thouqh not exclusively - interested in the relationship 
between labour, security, and where apposite, eoualitv. it was our 
conclusion in this chanter that both the Utilitarians and the classical 
political economists, had develooed explanatory, rather than justificatory, 
theories of property. Both croups had been concerned to demonstrate how 
a particular set of property arranqements would conduce to a particular 
end, and the maximisation of utllitv, which Included (most significantly 
for the economists) the idea of the maximisation of wealth. They were not 
concerned with the question of the oriqlns of a legitimate, or just title 
to property. They ignored, therefore, the question of entitlement. This 
approach may be contrasted with that of Thomas Hodqskin, whose natural 
rights theory of property forms the basis of chapter 6. Hodgskin, unlike 
Bentham, Mill et al., develops his theory of prooertv as a theory of the 
just foundations of original individuation. Armed with the normative- 
prescriptive criteria on which a natural (that i9, legitimate) title to 
property ought to be based, Hodgskin - as we shall demonstrate in chanter 7 
is then able to illustrate how the workings of the present property system 
actually violate the grounds of just acquisition. His justification theory 
of property becomes a yardstick against which to measure current practices.
The utilisation of a theory of property - whether an explanatory or 
justificatory theory - as a tool of critical analysis is not really a 
central concern of the Utilitarians considered in this chanter, nor of
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the classical economists. However, because it was not a concern of 
these authors does not necessarily mean that Utilitarian accounts of 
property could not be used in this critical fashion. Indeed in chanter 7, 
we shall see just such an account from utility employed as a critique of 
capitalism - namely, William Thompson's eqalltarian-Utllitarian theory.^
In section 1 of this chapter, we concentrated on the writings of 
Jeremy Bentham, focusing on the Theory of Legislation. We concluded that 
throughout Bentham's account of property was a tension between concerns 
from equality and those from security, and that Bentham's overriding 
belief in the need for security in the property svstem led him to an 
essentially conservative position. Confirmation of property in the hands 
of those who expected to receive it, took precedence over any redistributive
t
policy structured to foster equality. The claim from equality - based 
on the idea that equal portions of wealth generate (the means to) equal 
quantities of happiness, and the theory of diminishing marqinal utility - 
would only, we observed - be promoted in future times. The reason for 
this aspect of futurity within Bentham's schema relates to the second major 
question we addressed - the notion of expectation. Property, for Bentham, 
represented, we concluded, the fulfilment of an expectation. Expectations 
were of two kinds - natural, and legal. Thus the possibility that the 
legal system was able to influence expectation meant, for Bentham, the 
possibility that it could alter, over time, people's expectations about the 1
(1) See below, chapter 7, section'1 (li) especially.
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rewards deriving from the oronerty system. In this way equality may 
ultimately be made (more) compatible with security. Government could, 
however, never intervene to forcibly redistribute wealth, since such 
action produced disutility. Our final conclusion in this section was 
that Bentham's account of property was desiqned as an explanation of 
the type of property arrangements most conducive to the attainment of 
the greatest happiness. Since wealth formed the primary means to the 
attainment of that happiness, his account is also an explanation of how 
to ensure maximum reproduction of wealth. From the premise that labour 
is onerous, Bentham demonstrated that continued production requires security 
in the expectation of enjoying the benefits of that labour - in other words, 
an efficient economic system is contingent upon 3ecuritv of property.
In section 2 we discussed James Mill's attempt to address the problem 
of how the disutility incurred in the activity of labouring could be overcome 
in order to ensure continued production. Economic resources. Mill had 
declared, were scarce» and the goods most necessary to human existence 
required labour in their acquisition. Like Bentham, Mill regarded labour as 
onerous. His account of property was, we concluded, like Bentham's, an 
attempt to find that system of property productive of maximum utility and 
wealth. This led him to an aroument from incentive. Labour, Mill asserted, 
would only be acquired in sufficient quantities if the reward attached to 
that labour was the highest available - the full (or the maximum possible) - 
fruits of human industry. The Dattem of property most conducive to the ends 
outlined by Mill, was a pattern founded on labour - by which Mill meant 
also the work of the capitalist - incentive. The second focal point of
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this section was Mill's theory of representation. We demonstrated here, 
that Mill regarded the natural propensity in man to dominate his 
fellows as necessitating government by representation since this system 
alone could guarantee an identity of interests between the governors and 
the governed. We also noted in this section Mill's concept of virtual 
representation, the rather unusual argument that the interests of some 
sectors of the population are so automatically coincident with the interests 
of other sectors that the representation of all is not necessary. During 
this part of our argument, we recognized the claim advanced by Jack lively, 
that despite Mill's pronouncements in the Essay on »Government, Mill did in 
fact favour universal suffrage - albeit of men only.
t
In section 3, we turned to the ideas about property underlying 
classical political economy. It was our principal conclusion in this 
section that those ideas derived not from Lockean thought, but from the 
tradition of Utilitarianism. Thus security of property as the basis of 
growth, founded upon a view of labour as a curse, formed a major assumption 
of the classic economic authors. This thesis, we argued, was best 
exemplified in the work of John Ramsay McCulloch. Of McCulloch's conception 
of property, we observed that it was an individualistic right; that the 
gradual emergence, and diversification of property, was discussed within 
the framework of a Smlthianesque four-stages model of societal evolution; 
and that such a right was integral to societal advancement, to continued 
production, and, most significantly for McCulloch, for accumulation, thence 
growth.
*
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A consideration of the views of Malthus on property followed 
the above discussion. Here we concluded that Malthus, like McCulloch,
Ricardo et al, also regarded security of propertv as essential to both 
production and growth, to the sunply of effort and the suoplv of caDltal. 
However, our dominant interest in Malthus' ideas about property concerned 
his views on intergenerational claims to subsistence - the problem of the 
rights of those born posterior to a division of the earth. Comparing 
Malthus' thesis with that developed by Spencer in Social Statics (1851), 
we observed that where Spencer perceived the monopoly ownership of land, 
and the ensuring dependence of non-landowners (for subsistence) on the 
sufferance of the landed classes, as the grounds for an indictment of 
the prevailing propertv system, Malthus simply concluded that the 
"latecomers" had no claim to subsistence - indeed no right to life. Unable 
to gain employment, or to derive subsistence from parents, or charitable 
fellows, their only alternative was to starve. Malthus' general opposition 
to charity is based, we noted, upon his theory of population. If population 
was allowed to grow, unchecked by prudential restraint, then man would be 
subject to a life of misery. The existence of more guests than there are 
"vacant covers” at Nature's "mighty feast" testifies, as far as Malthus is 
concerned, only to the failure of people to realise the necessity of 
keeping population down to the level of subsistence, and was, as such, 
worthy only of contempt.
Having established how the Utilitarians and classical political 
economists regarded the role and function of property, we shall, in chanter 6 , 
consider the natural rights' theory of pronerty develoDed by Thomas Hodgskin.
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Chapter 6 . Thomas Hodqskln: A Natural Right of Property
The principal claim of the anti-Ricardians - Hodgskin, Thompson,
Gray, and Bray - was the notion that the labourer Is entitled to the full 
fruits of his endeavour, and that under the prevailing system of industrial 
capitalism, he was being systematically denied those fruits. In order to 
substantiate these claims, the authors in question had to demonstrate 
just exactly how and why labour alone generated a legitimate title 
to property, and why the existing claims of land and capital were 
illegitimate. This led William Thompson, for instance, to develop 
an egalitarian utilitarian doctrine of property rights, founded on the 
belief that, since all men are similarly created physiologically, and 
since all are, in consequence, capable of experiencing the same degree »
of pleasure from an equal quantity of wealth, that according to the 
dictates of utility, the distribution of wealth most conducive to 
human happiness, and the greatest reproduction of wealth, was distribution 
according to labour expenditure.^ Hodgskin, however, adopts a different 
position, planting himself firmly within the natural rights tradition of 
John Locke. Property, for Hodgskin, derives from the expenditure of 
labour, because of the property a man has invested in his person by 
Nature, or God.
The objectives of this chapter, then, are three in number. In 
section 1, we will examine Hodgskin's version of the natural rights 
doctrine of property, focusing upon the philosophical basis of that 
right; the various meanings with which Hodgskln invests the term 
"natural"; and the status of labour. 1
(1) See below, chapter 7, section l(ii)
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In section 2 we will be concerned to elucidate the connections 
between the natural and artificial rights of property in land.
This discussion will entail an analysis of three questions: firstly, 
the question of the implications of the Lockean "use", or"sufficiency" 
proviso as a limit to the extent of permissible landholdings: 
secondly, the issue of the compatability of Hodgskln’s essentially 
Lockean account of the origins of property in land, and the stadial 
framework, derived from Smith, within which that account is deployed: 
and, finally, the question of the ramifications of Hodgskin's 
account of the unnatural acquisition of land through conquest for 
current distributive practices, especially the question of the origin 
of rent.
In section 3, we will discuss Hodgskin's claim that the natural 
right of property has an innate capacity to, and repeatedly does in 
fact, undermine the operations of the artificial right, and that 
evidence of this undermining, and of the powerlessness of the legis­
lating classes to halt this process, can be discerned in the abolition 
of slavery, and the inexorable rise of the middle classes.
Consideration of Hodgskin's critique of the claims of capital, 
and the issue of natural and social value determination will be left 
to the next chapter^ Similarly, consideration of Hodgskin's views on 
how the natural right of property was to find expression in future 
society will be deferred until chapter 8 , where we intend to examine
the schemes developed by the antl-Ricardians, en masse, for the
2reconciliation of labour with its product. 12
(1) See below, chapter 7, sections 2, and 3, resDectively.
(2) See below, chapter 8 , section 1.
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Section 1: The Natural Right of Property Defined
A common theme in all Hodgskin's writings is the distinction, 
deriving from Adam Smith, between "natural circumstances" and "social
regulations",* and The Natural and Artificial Right of Property
2 . . .Contrasted is no exception, for here Hodgskin is attempting to contra­
distinguish the "natural" from the “ artificial" (or socially regulated) 
right of property. His attempt begins with a refutation, on the grounds 
of absurdity, of the utilitarian view of the origin of rights and duties.
In contrast to the doctrine of natural rights which Hodgskin 
supports, the Utilitarians founded the origin of rights on the dictates 
of positive law. Where Hodgskin was to claim that Nature had endowed 
man with certain natural and inalienable rights of which one was an ,
innately individualistic right of property, the Utilitarians had 
already proclaimed that the right of property could not exist antecedent 
to, or independent of,positive law. As Bentham declares, "La propriété 
et la loi sont nées ensemble et mouront ensemble. Avant les lois, 
point de propriété. Otez les lois toute propriété cesse".^
(1) H. S. Foxwell suggests that Hodgskin's discinction derives from 
that postulated by Smith, between "human institutions", and the 
"natural order of things", in WN. Ill.i. Given Hodgskin's 
reliance on material culled from the Wealth, this seems likely.
H. S. Foxwell, introd. to Anton Menger, The Right to the Whole 
Produce of Labour, (London MacMillan, 1399) pp.lxii-lxiii.
See for example, Popular Political Economy, (London, Charles Tait; 
1827) Chapter 1 where Hodgskin establishes that the laws governing 
production and distribution are natural laws, pp.1-44, esp. pp.29ff; 
and Travels in the North of Germany, describing the present state 
of the Social and Political Institutions, the Agriculture, 
Manufactures, Commerce, Education, Arts and Manners m  that 
country, particularly in the Kingdom of Hanover. (Edinburgh, 1820)
2 vols. cf-.vol I, p.466ff.
(2) The Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted, (London, *34
B. Steil 1832) .
(3) Hodgskin is criticizing, in particular, Bentham’s Traites de 
Legislation, and Mill's "Essay on Government".
(4) Traites de Legislation, cited p.13, Nat. & Artif.
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For Hodgskin this system deserves only censure, for it implies 
that prior to the law "men ... had no right even to life ... and that no 
one was under an obligation not to kill another till the legislator
created this right and imposed this duty",^ a position "as mischievious 
2as it is absurd". Extending this view slightly further, Hodgskin 
observes that the denial of natural rights to man implies that he may,
be experimented on, imprisoned, expatriated 
or even exterminated, as the legislator 
pleases. Life and property being his gift, 
he may resume them at pleasure; and hence he 
never classes the executions and wholesale 
slaughters, he continually conmands, with 
murder - nor the forcible appropriation of 
property he sanctions, under the name of taxes,  ^
tithes etc., with larceny or high-way robbery.
Positive law becomes, therefore, something beyond both the reach and ,
redress of the individual. Where natural law operates according to the
dictates of equality, positive law is necessarily injurious and
sectarian, comprising simply "a great scheme of rules, intended to
preserve the power of government, and to secure the wealth of the land-
4
owner, the priest, and the capitalist".
Whilst the existence of positive law is fundamental to the 
Utilitarian position - a kind of necessary evil - its existence for 
Hodgskin is construed as both superfluous and obstructive - more a kind 
of absolute evil. Hodgskin adopts this standpoint because of his belief 
in Natural Law.
(1) Nat. & Artif., p.20.
(2)
(3)
(A)
ibid., p.2 1 . 
ibid., p.2 1 . 
ibid., p.2 2 .
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The material world, he argues, represents "the result of the 
wisdom of nature, and not of human contrivance";^ it is regulated by a 
system of inherently beneficent and immutable laws. All social regul- 
ations, however, "like the giant rocks which hem the river's fertilizing
flow, inform us, terribly indeed, by poverty, misery, and social
3
convulsions, of the interruptions to the course of nature". Human law 
is not only superfluous and obstructive, then, but also the fount of 
all social misery, hindering rather than promoting societal advancement, 
and the artificial right of property is no exception. Property, founded 
on correct principles, represents a socially cohesive force; but 
"wherever this foundation is rotten, freedom cannot exist, nor justice
4
be administered".
Hodgskin's aim in The Natural and Artificial Right of Property 
Contrasted is, therefore, to elucidate those laws governing property 
which are agreeable to "nature and justice";"’ that is, to establish in 
his opinion, that "Mr. Locke's view is... more correct than Mr. Bentham's", 
and to show that "a right of property is not the offspring of legislation", 
but the offspring of nature. 123456
(1) Pop. Pol. Ec.. pp.24-25.
(2) Natural laws are analogized to "a deep and mighty river".
Pop. Pol. Ec.. p.38.
(3) ibid., p,38.
(4) Nat. & Artif.. p,12. Hodgskin expressly distances himself from
those writers, like Saint-Simon and Rousseau, who view all societal 
ills as emanating from a right of property, per se; whereas 
Hodgskin views societal ills as deriving only from the existence of 
an artificial right of property. Ibid.. p,24.
(5) ibid., p.5. The quote is from Dugald Stewart's Elements of the 
Philosophy of the Human Mind, 2nd ed., vol I, p.251.
(6) ibid., p ,17.
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His analysis of the legitimate basis for the natural right of
property begins with a definition of that right:
"I look on a right of property - on the right 
of individuals, to have and to own, for their 
own separate and selfish use and enjoyment, 
the produce of their own industry, with power 
freely to dispose of the whole of that in the 
manner most agreeable to themselves, as 
essential to the welfare and even to the 
continued existence of society". 1 .
As this definition advises, the right of property is an innately 
individualistic, and exclusive,right. More than that, however, the 
natural right of property is grounded, as we shall see, in the expenditure 
of labour.
Quoting from Locke, Hodgskin notes that: "Every man ... has a '
property in his own person that nobody has any right to but himself.
2The labour of his body and the work of his hand are his property."
Whatever man "mixes"his labour with, by that process is removed from
the common, and becomes his property. And thus "For the labour being
the unquestionable property of the labourer, no man but he can have a
3
right to what that is joined to". Because the capacity to labour is 
personal, so too is the product generated by the expenditure of that 
labour. Just as nature gives man his body, so too it gives him only 
what the labour of that body can produce. In appropriating something 
from the common, therefore, man is mixing something of himself with 
that item, which mixing generates a right of property. Not only is the 
process of labouring in some way inherently self-expressive, then, but 
it is also instrumental in satisfying ma n ’s needs. Restating the 123
(1 ) ibid., p»24.
(2) ibid., p.25. From John Locke, Civil Government, Book II,
ch. 5 , 4  28.
(3) Nat. & Artif., p.25 (Hodgskin’s emphasis). C£, Labour Defended 
Against the Claims of Capital (London, 1825; reprinted by Hammersmith 
Bookshop Ltd., London, 1922, ed. G. D. H. Cole), pp.82-3.
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Lockean position, Hodgskin notes that:
The power to labour is the gift of nature 
to each individual; and the power which 
belongs to each, cannot be confounded with 
that which belongs to another: The natural 
wants of man, particularly of food and 
clothing,are the natural stimulus to exert 
this power; and the means of gratifying them 
which it provides, is the natural reward for 
the exertion. 1 .
Since nature has enjoined that man must labour in order to live -
2("if we do not labour, we can have no food, and must inevitably perish" ),
it has both endowed him with "a productive power comnensurate to his 
3wants", and established, as a law of nature, that labour ought 
exclusively to be rewarded with the products of its endeavour. As:
I
It is a law of our being, that we must eat 
bread by the sweat of our brow; ... (so) it 
is reciprocally a law of the external world; 
that it shall give bread for our labour, and 
give it only for labour. 4.
The extent of property-holdings ought, therefore, to be regulated
according to the extent of the expenditure of this labour. 123455
(1) Nat. & Artif., pp.26-27.
(2) Pop. Pol. Ec., p.27.
(3) ibid., p.27. This capacity is sufficient to support a man, his 
family, and a number of others, and forms the basis of "individual 
opulence and of national greatness".
(4) Pop. Pol. Ec., p.28 (my emphasis).
(5) Locke, as we know, recognised two important restrictions upon 
the extent of legitimate individuations from the common, namely 
the 'use' and 'sufficiency' conditions. (Civil Government. it S
27, 31). Although Hodgskin mentions these conditions in his 
delimitation of the natural right of property, he defers 
consideration of limitations upon individual appropriation to 
his discussion of the origin of a natural right of property in 
land, simply focusing on the notion, here, that reward is 
limited by exertion. For a brief treatment of these limiting 
contingencies, see section 2  below.
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Nature's bequest to labour is, then,a selfish and exclusive 
bequest. In addition to the right of property being a selfish and 
exclusive right, it is also a natural right. Since Hodgskin appears to 
employ the term "natural" in a number of different ways, we now propose 
to explore these different meanings.
The first, and principal, connotation of the term natural 
employed by Hodgskin, refers to the instrumental aspect of his theory 
of property. The right of property conferred by labour is natural 
because it is a necessary by-product of Nature’s injunction to man to 
labour in order to live which, when contrasted with the artificial 
right of property based on conquest, forms the most important aspect 
of "naturalness" utilized by Hodgskin.
Secondly, and correlatively, natural also implies just. Only 
distribution commensurate to exertion complies with the commands of 
natural law. Hodgskin's critique of the existing property system is, 
as we shall see, founded upon the assumption that the abrogation of the 
natural right of property is inherently inequitable and unjust. Where 
"the law of the land is to give wealth to idleness, and (to) fleece 
industry till it be destitute", "the law of nature is that industry 
shall be rewarded by wealth, and idleness be punished by destitution."^
Hodgskin also utilises an argument from psychology to bolster 
up this hypothesis. Private property - created by labour - is an 
extension of individuality. Just as man has an awareness of his own 
physical and mental identity, as distinct from that of others, so he 
extends that awareness to the product of the labour of his own physical 
being, and then, gradually to the produce of the labour of other 
people's physical beings.
(1) Nat. & Artif., p.154
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"As nature gives to labour whatever it 
produces - as we extend the idea of personal 
individuality to what is produced by every 
individual - not merely is a right of property 
established by nature, as we see also that she 
takes means to make known the existence of 
that right." 1 .
In fact, so fundamental is the awareness of this natural right 
of property to mankind's make-up and being, that "it is as impossible 
for men not to have a notion of property, as it is for them to want the 
idea of personal identity. When either is totally absent, man is 
insane". Such ideas about property, are, therefore, instinctive, and 
are acquired prior to, and independent of, any cognizance of human law.
Hodgskin's conception of "naturalness " extends beyond this
t
psychological dimension, also, to cover the notion of universality.
That the labour-based right of property is natural is evidenced by its
3 .universal operation, he declares. Now, this claim is patently ambiguous 
given Hodgskin’s allegation that the legal right of property, albeit 
continually subverted by the natural right, actually succeeds in 
depriving the worker of the fruits of his industry in current circum­
stances. Hodgskin cannot be arguing, then, that labour actually 
receives its due reward, since distribution is presently not according 
to right, but if we understand by his statement that "nature bestows
4
on ... labour ... whatever it can produce", the idea that labour alone 
is productive^ and thus capable of appropriating the fruits of the earth 
or of producing any kind of new wealth,** then it is possible to see how 
Hodgskin might conceive of the natural principle of appropriation as
(1 ) Nat. & Artif.
(2 ) ibid., p .30.
(3) ibid., p.36.
(4) Nat.S Artif.
(5) Cf./ Lab. Def. where Hodgskin refutes the claim that capital is 
productive. (6) i.e. manufactured goods.
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universally operative. This would entail, of course, a different 
connotation being given to the notion of appropriation. Appropriation 
would cease to represent the generation of a legitimate title to 
property, but simply signify acquisition or production. Since Hodgskin 
was adamant that only labour could be regarded as productive, this 
interpretation may not be that far-fetched.
The distinction we are making is, therefore, between the manner 
in which wealth is initially acquired and the manner in which it is 
subsequently distributed after that acquisition.
Hodgskin also regards a right of property as universal, in a 
more traditional sense, namely that every race has some conception of
t
property based on labour individuation, supplemented by an awareness 
that to take from others is, generally speaking, wrong, which relates 
back, of course, to his conception that an awareness of proprietary right 
in others forms part of man's perception of self-and other-identity.^
The final connotation given to the concept of 'natural' by 
Hodgskin refers to the sense in which the natural right of property 
comprises a self-evident right. Contrary to the proposition advanced
by Bentham, that the law alone can generate a secure expectation of the
oderivation of the "appropriate advantages from the things we make" , 
Hodgskin believes that this expectation is inherent in the process of
labouring, forming a "component part of the idea of individual
3production". The expectation of enjoyment operates as universally as 12
(1) Hodgskin cites the example of the Eskimos who, whilst respecting 
the rights of property of their compatriots, did not extend that 
respect to the property of their European visitors, Nat. & Artif..p«38.
(2) ibid., p.33 Bentham, Traites de Legislation cited by Hodgskin.
No page ref.
(3) ibid., p.33
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the principle of labour individuation, and provides the prime motive 
for that individuation, furnishing a natural, not legally sanctioned, 
basis for production.
A labour-based right of property is natural, therefore, in a 
number of ways: it is instrumental to man's existence as enjoined by 
Nature, it is just, it is inherent in his make-up, it is universal, 
and it is basic to the continuity of production.
Just as nature establishes the right of property, so too does 
it provide the means for securing that property once acquired. By 
creating mankind approximately equal in bodily strength, skill and 
capacity, and by endowing them with similar facilities for acquiring 
knowledge, Nature has provided that it "must be at all times more 
difficult for one man to take, by force, from another what the latter 
has already made, than to make something similar for himself".*' In 
the former instance man has to overcome the opposition of his fellow; 
in the latter, simply to co-operate with a compliant Nature.
Man's capacity to defend his acquisitions is, according to Hodgskin, 
normally proportionate to his productive capacity.
The same strength or skill which enables one 
man to catch more game or fish, or create more wealth 
than his less skilful or weaker compatriot, will 
enable him to defend his acquisitions. 2 .
Most theories of property are, therefore, concerned not only 
with the manner in which a title to property is generated, but also with 
the issue of how that right, once created, may be protected, an issue 
which frequently relates to the role of government. For Adam Smith, 1
(1) Nat. & Artif., p.30.
(2) ibid., p .31
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the answer lay in the necessary (and inevitable) institution of govern­
ment, and the development of various forms of coercive law enforcement.^
Similarly, for the Utilitarians,security of property necessarily
2required the operation of positive law. Hodgskin, however, with his 
anathema of social regulation, founds the security of property upon 
the natural equality of man. Nature furnishes man not only with an 
innate conception of property, but also with the means for securing 
that property. Any socially constructed apparatus for its preservation 
is then, at best, superfluous, and,at worst, positively iniquitous.
The question of the relationship between government and property
in Hodgskin is interesting. Hodgskin derives his conception of the
origin of property from Locke. Now, Locke was of the opinion that "The'
great and chief end ... of Men's uniting into Commonwealths, and putting
3
themselves under Government, is the Preservation of their Property", 
for only under conditions in which men have an "establish'd, settled, 
known Law",^  a "known and indifferent Judge",^ and the "Power to back and 
support the Sentence when right, and to give it due Execution",*’ will 
security of property be guaranteed. Hodgskin, however, adopts a 12345
(1) See above, chapter 1, section 4(ii) , pp. 54-70.
(2) See above, chapter 5, section 1, D p . 3 2 0 - 3 3 6 .
(3) Locke, Civil Government,5 124 (original emphasis), By 'property' 
Locke here signifies "Lives, Liberties and Estates", not simply 
lands and goods.
(4) ibid., % 124 (original emphasis)
(5) ibid., %  125 (original emphasis)
(6) ibid., 5^ 126 (original enphasis)
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different standpoint. The chief object of positive law is not, he 
alleges^ the preservation of property (according to natural right), but 
the enforcement of obedience to the legislator. Indeed, Hodgskin even 
goes as far as to identify the law with the "will of the law-maker", 
that is, with the "expression of his desire to have wealth, and retain
power and dominion".^ Government becomes, therefore, merely an instru-
2 . .ment of economic domination; as such it "produces nothing ... all its
3
revenues are exacted by violating the natural right of property".
The law represents, thus, the means to "appropriate to the law-makers
4
the produce of those who cultivate the soil."
Far from law and government preserving man's natural right of 
property, they function by systematically abrogating that right. Thus:’
Under the false pretence of protecting them 
in the use and enjoyment of the produce of 
their labour, it takes so large a portion of 
it for those who make and administer the law, 
that what it leaves, did it secure that, would 
be scarcely worth having; but the system, for 
administering which payment is demanded, is so 
completely one of extortion that the actual 
labourer is only allowed to retain for his own 
use as small a portion as possible of the munificent 
gift with which nature rewards his exertions. 5
As we shall see below, it is this very institutionalized abrogation 
of the natural law of appropriation that forms the basis of Hodgskin's 
critique of the prevailing capitalist mode of production.^ Was the law 
of nature to operate unrestrained, then property would be distributed 
according to industry and skill. Before considering by what means the
(1) Nat. & Artif., p.47.
(2) Cf., Halevy, Elie, Thomas Hodgskin, ed., Taylor, A. J. 
Ernest Benn Ltd. , 1956) p,121.
(3) Nat. & Artif., p.50.
(4) ibid., p,47.
(5) ibid., p.54.
See below, chapter 7,
(London,
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violation of the natural right of property perpetrates the exploitation 
of the labouring classes, we must first examine Hodgskin's treatment of 
the origin and development of the natural and artificial rights of 
property in land respectively.
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Section 2: The Natural and Artificial Right of "ronertv in Land 
Contras ted
Hodgskin's consideration of the origin of Drooertv in land is 
significant in two respects: principally, because Hodgskin adopted the 
stadial hypothesis presented by Smith in the Wealth, modifying it in 
the light of the Lockean "use" proviso alluded to previously;^ and 
secondly, because of his adherence to the view that the present pattern
of property distribution in land, emanates from the Norman conquest of
_ 2 Europe.
3The natural boundary to the extent of individual use-rights
in land is, a la Locke, set by "as much land as a man tills, plants,
and improves, cultivates, and can use, the product of so much is his
4property." In other words, the parameters of such individuated 
shares relate to the extent of man's labour, and his capacity to utilise 
the produce of that land. The genesis of this "use" requirement can, 
quite obviously,be traced back to Locke, who had argued that the size 
of property-holdings was contingent upon two factors: that there be 
"enough, and as good left in common for others",'’ and that man ought 
only to appropriate "as much as (he) ... can make use of to any 
advantage of life before it spoils".*’ Why Locke should be so concerned
(1) Cfc, Section 1 above.
(2) This idea may also be discerned in the works of, e .g.,Tom 
Paine and William Thompson.
(3) Nat. & Artif., p.36. Hodgskin here declares that "the right 
to own land is in fact only the right to own what agricultural 
or other labour produces". As we shall see shortly, there is 
some ambiguity as to Hodgskin's position on the issue of 
property in land; he appears to vacillate between a full right 
of ownership of the land, and a right of usufruct.
(4) ibid.. 0.61 .
(5) Locke, Civil Government, “Sj 27
(6 ) ibid., 31.
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with the limits on permissible appropriation from the common it is 
not our purpose to explore.^ However, what is important is the both 
implicit and explicit inclusion of these limiting clauses within 
Hodgskin's theory of property.
As we have already seen, the quantity of land capable of 
permissible individuation is determined bv labour-capacitv, and use.
Clearly, this "use" proviso would seem to derive from the spoilage 
limitation identified by Locke, Man's primary duty is to self-oreservation; 
since he requires subsistence, this necessarily involves him in appro­
priation, in enclosure from the common. However, since all men are equal, 
each has an equal right to appropriate in order to survive. Unlimited 
appropriation resulting in waste necessarily denies to some individuals 
the fulfilment of their natural rights and duties, and is, therefore, 
contrary to the law of nature. By enioining against waste,
Locke is endeavouring to ensure that artificially created conditions of
2scarcity cannot arise.
Since Hodgskin also believes that it is everv man's primary duty 
to preserve himself, and since the bequest of the earth to mankind in 
common is a bequest open to the eniovment of all, then it is perfectly 
feasible that he should regard evidence of spoliation as evidence of the 
contravention of natural law, and that it is this concern that underlies 
the stipulation from use derived from Locke,
Keen to establish, therefore, that multiple "use-rights" in 
land may be satisfactorily accommodated as society advances, and 
population increases, Hodgskin builds other conditions into the 12
(1) CJ[, e ,g.i Harry. o p , cit., no.49-61 ; Macnherson, C.B., The 
Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, (Clarendon Press, 
Oxford, 1962) pp.194-222: Rvan, on.cit. , no.14-48; Waldron, Teremv, 
"Enough and as Oood Left Por Others", Philosophical Quarterly,
Vol. 29, 1979, pp.319-28.
(2) Cf., Civil Qovernment.S$ 26-48,
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essentially Lockean framework within which he is working. Firstly, in 
recognition of the variable fertility of land, Hodgskin asserts that "the 
quantity necessary for each individual, ... must vary with the qualities 
and situation of the soil"; and secondly, that the extent of such property- 
holdings must vary with the "skill and knowledge of the people".*'
With regard to the first of these additional clauses, Hodgskin 
appears to be interpreting the "sufficiency" proviso in qualitative terms. 
The leaving of "enough, and as good" for others impliesfto Hodgskin, 
not the leaving of a quantitatively equivalent amount of land, but 
rather a qualitatively equivalent amount. Clearly the quality of land 
can be altered and improved through technological advance and advances 
in cultivation technique, and so Hodgskin makes allowance for this ,
possibility in his second additional proviso, namely, that the quantity 
of land necessary to the support of life is regulated according to the 
"skill and knowledge" of the population.
Before examining the manner in which these conditions are to
operate in practice, it is worth highlighting the standpoint adopted by
the author on the question, and function,of population growth. Malthus
had argued that the apparently inexorable tendency of population growth
to outstrip the capacity of the means of subsistence to support that
growth, would, unchecked, necessarily entail the impoverishment of a
growing number of people. Population growth was, therefore, something
2to be restrained. 12
(1) Nat.& Artif., p.62.
(2) Cf., Malthus, Thomas Robert, An Essay on the Principle of Population 
as it affects the Future Improvement of Society, with Remarks on
the Speculations of Mr, Godwin, M. Condorcet, and other writers, 
(London, 1798); An Essay on the Principle of Population; or, a 
View of its Past and Present Effects on Human Happiness; with an 
Inquiry into our Prospects respecting the Future Removal or 
Mitigation of the Evils which it occasions. (London, 1803); 
"Population", in the 1824 Supplement to the Encyclopaedia Britannica; 
and a Summary View of the Principle of Population,(London,lb!lO). 
Malthus envisages both the operation of natural restraints.famine,wars 
and plagues,and moral or prudential restraints.
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In contradistinction to Malthusian orthodoxy, Hodgskin held the 
belief that population increase was actually the dynamic of change in 
society. So: "As the world grows older, and as men increase and multiply, 
there is a constant, natural, and necessary tendency to an increase in 
their knowledge, and consequently in their productive power".*
It is necessity that compels them to develop new techniques and 
modes of subsistence. Knowledge is generated, therefore, as a by-product 
of necessity. By adopting this viewpoint Hodgskin is challenging Smithian
orthodoxy which regarded division of labour as the source of the development
2 . . . .  of skill and invention. In formulating this challenge, and in illuminating
the manner by which a legitimate, and limited,right to property in land
tmay be engendered, Hodgskin utilises the Smithian format of a four-stage
. . 3theory of societal evolution.
With regard to the pattern of necessity, Hodgskin observes that 
initially men subsist by gathering the spontaneous produce of nature.
Once such produce had been exhausted, then "hunger stimulated the 
ingenuity of man", directing him to seek subsistence through hunting and 
fishing. The growth of population rendering these resources insufficient 
leads men on to farther improvements", beginning with a rudimentary form 
of agriculture, through primitive manufacturing, and terminating finally 
in the "refined cultivation, and ... wonderful inventions of our own 
times". And thus: 1234
(1) Pop. Pol. Ec., p. 95 (original emphasis).
(2) Cf.. ibid., pp.77-83.
(3) For a consideration of Smith's treatment, see above, chapter 
1
(4) Pop. Pol. Ec., p,85. Cf.. Stark, W., The Ideal Foundations of 
Economic Thought (London, Kegan Paul, Trench, Trubner and Co. 
Ltd., 1943), pp.87-89.
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that same power which has established 
a right of property in what individuals 
create or produce, has also provided for 
the continual multiplication of the species, 
which multiplication affects the right of 
property in land. 1 .
It is man's capacity to labour, then,that both generates a right of 
property, and ensures that alternative means of subsistence will be 
generated in times of scarcity produced by population growth.
This link posited, by Hodgskin, between labouring capacity and the 
means of procuring subsistence must take account of the relationship between 
labouring and land. The argument developed by Hodgskin to support his 
case that natural law sanctions a right of property in land, must be
i
capable, therefore, of demonstrating how such a right is compatible with 
the provision of sustenance for a constantly increasing population. He 
has, as it were, to disclose how nature can ensure to men the provision of 
subsistence once exclusive (use-) rights to land have been established.
The basis of his argument is grounded in the assumption that the labour- 
expenditure, and "use" requirements, previously adverted to, together with 
the assumptions concerning necessity and knowledge, will necessarily alter 
the quantitative dimension of land-holdings through time so that there is 
always sufficient land, or access to land, to support the population.
What Hodgskin asserts, then, is that as society develops, and as population 
increases, a progressively diminishing amount of land will suffice to 
support the individual. In order to demonstrate how such a practice
functions, Hodgskin has recourse to the Smithian theory of stadial
2development, modified in the light of the Lockean "use" proviso. 12
(1) Nat.& Artif., p.62.
(2) Hodgskin's version of the stadial hypothesis is different to Smith's 
in that it is directed esclusively to the origination of property in 
land, and ignores the question of the other forms of property, 
characteristic of the pre-agricultural stages.
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The first stage in societal evolution is that of the hunters.
Here men roamed the earth seeking subsistence wherever it was available.
Under such circumstances, though no individual 
could possibly care much for any particular 
spot of ground, yet to each one it must have 
appeared, - and in fact it was, - necessary to 
have an extensive district, wherefrom to obtain 
wild animals, or wild fruits. 2 .
Thus, according to the Lockean use proviso,man is entitled, by nature, to use
a greater quantity of land than will suffice for his subsistence in a
more sophisticated age.
From the age of hunters, man progresses to the age of shepherds. On
the assumption that shepherds are itinerant creatures, Hodgskin notes that
"even in this condition they required extensive territories, though not «
3equal to those required by the hunters." The amount of land necessary 
for existence is gauged, therefore, according to the "quantity necessary
4
for the pasturage of ... cattle."
In both of the above instances, it is clear that no individual is 
actually enclosing any portion of land from the common. The rights which 
man has to the land are, as it were, rights of usufruct. The land itself 
remains common, held by a kind of universal and inclusive right. One 
obvious reason for this lack of individuation derives from the fact that, 
in both of these early stages, movement is necessary to the pursuit of 
subsistence; in other words, hunters and shepherds are, ipso facto, nomads, 
travelling through the land in order to procure subsistence. The portion 
of land they utilise today may well be different from that which they will 
utilise tomorrow. 1234
(1) And fishermen, although for the purpose of property in land, conr 
sidération of such men is irrelevant.
(2) Nat. & Artif., p.64.
(3) ibid., p.64.
(4) ibid., p.65.
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For the agriculturist the case is, however, different, for:
in order to prosecute his art, he was 
obliged to remain in one spot. That 
spot, within which he limited his labours; 
that small spot, which he and his family 
cultivated, he called his. 1 .
The application of labour directly to the land, and the necessity
for fixed habitation, means that as the quantity of land requisite to
subsistence has diminished, so the right of property has become more
absolute. Portions of land have been individuated from the common. Thus;
it is the application of labour that generates the title to the land in
question contingent always upon the parameters defined by the usage clause.
Whether this application of labour generates simply an individuated use-<
right to the land, and exclusive title to its produce, or whether it
actually generates an exclusive right of ownership to the land, remains
somewhat obscure. All that Hodgskin actually argues is that, in the age
of agriculture,a man is naturally entitled to "till, plant and cultivate"
2only as much land as will "supply his family with food", which suggests 
an individuated use-right. This view is reinforced by the definition of 
property outlined by Hodgskin, which stipulates that a right of property, 
is a right to the "separate and selfish use and enjoyment, (of) the produce 
of ... (man's) own industry", and given added credence by the fact that 
improvements in agricultural technique rendering a smaller extent of land 
adequate to the support of man would necessarily entail an actual reduction 
in the landholdings of all. If we assume that the gift of the earth to
(1 ) ibid., p.65
(2 ) ibid., p. 65
(3) ibid. , p .24
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the use and enjoyment of mankind in common implies equality of opportunity 
for that use, then the title to land must imply simply a right of use, and 
not of ownership. As we can see from his treatment of the actual evolution 
of a right of property in land, and the subsequent development of rental 
practices, it is the fact that the appropriation of vast tracts of land 
precludes the opportunity of access to that land, that forms the basis 
of his critique. However, the point remains ambiguous.
It has been our claim, in interpreting Hodgskin's treatment of the 
natural right of property relative to land, that he incorporates both 
Smithian and Lockean notions into his theoretical framework. There is, 
however, an analytic incompatibility between this essentially Lockean
*
account of appropriation and the Smithian stadial hypothesis into which 
it is fitted.
Locke's treatment of property rights moves from the appropriation of 
the spontaneous produce of nature to the exclusion from the common of 
land. In many respects his primary focus is, in fact, the development 
of property in land. His explanation of the pattern of this appropriation 
moves from that stage in which the parameters of landholdings were defined 
by the "sufficiency" and "spoilage" conditions, to that in which such 
natural circumscribing conditions could, in fact, be abrogated, and an 
unlimited right to property in land be legitimated. The justification for an 
individual, exclusive and potentially unlimited title to property in land is
therefore, the crux of Locke's theory of property.
Smith's concern is, however, somewhat different. He is concerned 
with both the gradual extension of the powers inherent in a right of 
property - the right of inheritance, for example - and with the extension 1
(1) In other words although the rights are limited (bv the "spoilage"/ 
"use" provisos), monev makes those limitations potentially 
avoidable.
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in the range of objects capable of appropriation, all of which is 
set within the framework of a theory of stadial develoDment.
Where Locke jumps from the gathering stage to the agricultural stage, 
Smith takes account of the intermediate sheoherd stage, defined in 
terms of the ownership of herds and flocks, and characterised by 
the emergence of a right of property, j=er_ se, and the development 
of rights deriving from accession.1
Hodgskin, whilst acknowledging that society evolves through this 
intermediate stage, is guided by a Lockean concern with the just 
parameters of permissible landholdings, to ignore the differentiating 
proprietary characteristics of the age identified by Smith, and to 
concentrate upon the problem of the extensiveness of the land required ( 
for grazing. The two traditions sit, therefore, somewhat uneasily, 
since in their initial formulations they were concerned with different 
questions.
The key to Hodgskin's treatment of the evolution of a natural
right cf property in land is, thus, regulated by the idea that
the size of legitimate landholdings ought to diminish in the advance-
2ment of society, and in accordance with developments in technology. 
However, although nature prescribes such a policy, artificial law 
effectively denies its operation. The lawgiver, in order to preserve 
the existing distribution of power and privilege in society, has 
enacted positive laws in direct contravention of this natural law, 12
(1) See above, chapter 1, section 2.
(2) This functions both between and w ithin stages, thus improvements 
in agricultural technique lead to a greater labour-intensiveness 
of cultivation, leading Hodgskin to assert that: "as agriculture is 
improved, the quantity of land necessary to supply each individual 
with the means of subsistence diminishes", ibid., cJO.
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hence, for example, the generation of the laws of primogeniture and 
entail governing the bequest of landed estates in modern society.
Hodgskin explains the reason for the divergence between the actual 
pattern of property in land characteristic of modern Europe, and that 
path ordained by Nature, in terms of the actual historical development 
of Europe. The artificial right of property in land emanates, he 
declares,from the forcible usurpation of the land of the Roman 
Empire during the Norman Conquest.*- Ignorant of the natural principles 
regulating the acquisition of property in land, these conquering 
tribes transposed their own ideas about property - derived predominantly 
from the age of hunters, or the age of shepherds - on to an embryonic 
system of agriculture.
t
Knowing very little of agriculture, 
their ideas of property in land were 
derived, from a state of society in 
which ... each man required a 
comparatively large quantity of land 
to provide the means of subsistence. 2
Land was, through ignorance, therefore, apportioned according 
to retrograde parameters of use. More than simply determining the pre­
vailing pattern of landholdings, the conquerors, from their position 
of power, were also able to determine legislation. "They did not", 
as it were, "lay down the sword the instant they had overrun the land", 
but, "kept it drawn in their hand, and engraved with it laws for the 
conquered", and, thus, "power so acquired, and privileges so established, 
were the basis of the present political and legal, not social, edifice 
of Europe".'* And so, Hodgskin concludes,”on conquest/has^all the leqis- 123
(1) Cf., ibid., p.73
(2) ibid., p.70. Hodgskin quotes extensively from the Wealth of Nations 
(WN.Ill.i-iv) in support of his case.
(3) Nat. & Artif., p>73.
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lation of Europe“been founded, and in consequence, only "conquerors and 
their descendants have been law-makers".^
In addition to the unnatural acquisition(through conquest) of 
vast landed estates, the barbarian invaders of Europe also acquired, 
pari passu with that development, the inhabitants of those lands, 
since agriculture, within the Roman Empire, was the province of 
slave-labour. This act has significant implications for Hodgskln's 
critique of rent. As we observed in chapter 4, the classical
economists regarded rent as a legitimate return to the owner of the
2factor land. The landlord received rent because of the superior 
productivity of the land he owned, over that of marginal land.
Hodgskin, in a letter to Francis Place, sets about criticising this 
theory. "I do not", he declares:
in the first place deny that there 
may be a difference in different soils 
which may make the produce of some 
greater than others - that the necessity 
of having recourse to these worse soils 
has increased rent in modern times - nor 
that Mr. Ricardo's doctrines do not very 
happily explain the great increase of 
Rent within this last half century.
But I deny that Rent originated in 
this difference of soil and that the 
Rent which is now paid is nothing but 
the difference between the produce of 
equal quantities of capital employed 
on soils of different powers of 
production. For Adam Smith said, and 
he said truly, that men pay a rent for 
fish ponds, for rivers, for gathering 
kelp, and for barren moors. Or, what 12
(1) ibid., p.73
(2) See above, chapter 4, section 1
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is the same thing, they pay some 
monopolists for permission to 
fish in rivers (etc.,) ... It
is an undoubted fact that land, 
and with that every means of 
subsistence, was overrun and 
monopolised by a few persons 
in every state of Europe. 1.
The purpose of Hodgskin's criticism is not to deny that, 
in actuality, differential fertility may determine the rate at which 
rent is paid on land; but to demonstrate that the Ricardian thesis is, 
both defective and incomplete, in terms of its explication of the 
origin of that rent. The differential theory propounded by Ricardo, 
inter alios, explicated only how rent may be calculated; ignoring the 
issue of why rent emerges in the first place; and also had the added 
advantage, since rent was made extraneous to cost of production, of 
not appearing to be a source of immiseration, an assumption generated
by Ricardo's belief that the natural wages of labour are regulated
2according to subsistence requirements.
It is Hodgskin's view, however, that rent emerges because of 
the violation of natural law, through usurpation and conquest; and 
through the prior existence of slave labour upon the land thus unnaturally 
acquired. The thesis Hodgskin is attempting to explicate may be seen in the 
following statement, —  he is "disposed to believe such a thing as 
Rent would never have existed had there never been Slaves." ^
The genesis of the development of rent is traced accordingly: 
in appropriating the land, the few conquerors also appropriated the 
slaves working upon that land. At first, they employed and fed these 123
(1) Hodgskin to Francis Place, 28 May 1820, B.M.Add. MSS. 35, 153,
f. 142ff., cited in Halevy, op. clt., pp.6 8 , 71, (original emphasis).
(2) ibid., pp.68-72. Cf., Hodgskin, Labour Defended Against the Claims of
Capital, pp£9-32. ' —
(3) Hodgskin to Place , op. cit . , t^ 72. (original emphasis)
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slaves, appropriating to themselves the produce of their labour, but
after some unspecified period of time, they sold or exchanged this
"power over their slaves" to other persons who released the slaves
from personal service, but still compelled them to labour on terms
stipulated by the landlord, thus commuting into corn duties, and later
money rents, those previously operative personal services. "It is",
thus, "for a portion of this power over an already appropriated land
that rent is paid in Europe".^ In other words, it is because land,
a means of production, is monopolised by the few that rent must be
paid for its use. The implications of the payment of rent for the
natural law of appropriation will be deferred until the next chapter,
when we consider the theories of exploitation expounded by the
anti-Ricardians, including Hodgskin, in their respective critiques of
2the prevailing capitalist system.
Having observed, therefore, that the rules governing the regulation 
of land emanate directly from conditions of conquest, and represent 
evidence of the functioning of the artificial right of property,
Hodgskin sets out to explore the means by which this artificial right is 
being gradually, though inexorably subverted in the progress of society. 
To do this he focuses upon, inter alia, two areas, namely, the abolition 
of slavery, and the gradual rise of the middle classes, which treatment 
will form the substance of the next section. 1
(1) ibid., p.72, (original emphasis). Cf., opJl-72.
( 2) See below, chapter 7, section 2.
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Section 3: The Abolition of Slavery and the Inexorable Rise of the Middle 
Classes.
It is Hodskln' s contention throughout the Natural and Artificial 
Right of Property Contrasted, that the artificial right of property Is 
being continuously undermined bv the almost Imperceptible, but Inexorable 
operation of the natural law of property, and this, he argues, is evidenced 
by the abolition of slaverv, and the rise of the middle classes, processes 
both contrary to the Interests of the landed classes.
As we have seen, when the barbarian invaders conquered Europe they 
seized not only the land, but also the inhabitants of that land, who 
became slaves. Hodgskin is subscribing, then, to the myth of Anglo-Saxon 
freedom before the Conquest. Since slavery and serfdom have now disappeared, 
however, he is concerned to ascertain whether this was at the express tyehest 
of the legislating, landowning classes, or, whether It had occurred despite 
their contrary machinations.
Hodgskin's answer to this question involves the development of a 
principle of interest for our understanding of the relationship of natural to 
positive law, and of the means by which the natural right of property is 
able to continually assert, and reassert itself, namely, the notion that 
the legislative recognition of the processes in question, was dependent 
upon man's prior and actual attainment of those rights in practice. The 
right of the serf to "personal freedom, and his right to own what he 
couH earn were ncrt reaJgnised either by the common or written law, till 
he had obtained freedom and wealth" ? 1 or, in other words, until he had acquired 
the actual power and means to assert and defend those riqhts against his former 
master. This suggests that the legislator is frequently compelled simply to cop 1
(1) Nat. & Artlf., p.9n. (My emphasis).
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and give official sanction to,existing usage. He does not originate 
these rights in the first place, but is simoly unable to resist 
their evolution. In order to comprehend why such rights evolve 
irresistibly, we must consider Hodgskin's conception of the relationship 
between property rights and material development.
In his endeavour to demonstrate the inevitability of the subversion 
of artificial law, Hodgskin considers the case of the abolition of 
personal slavery, and the ensuing growth of the middle classes, 
pinpointing the source of these two occurrences in the advancement of
science and art, and in the introduction of commerce and manufacturing
2consequent upon population expansion. Thus, he declares, the multi­
plication of traders, manufacturers, and artisans, together with the
*
development of cities, has "worked a conspicuous alteration in all the
moral relations of society, gradually mastering the landed aristocracy,
and gradually tending to extinguish it."'* So, it is the inevitable
tendency of mankind to progress that acts as the catalyst for change
in society, altering both the socio-political environment, as well as
the moral, by altering material circumstances, and the pre-existing
pattern of human relationships. As he observes, although
we may not be able to forsee the moral
effects of the splendid mechanical inventions
of modern times, yet we may be sure that
they are the harbingers of a more extensive
change in the moral condition of society,
than was ever effected by political institutions. 4
Obviously, this suggests a materialist base to Hodgskin's perception
of the way in which the natural right of property undermines the artificial 123
1
(1) ibid., pp.105-130.
(2) Cf., Adam Smith, WN.III., whom Hodgskin cites as an authority in 
this sphere.
(3) Nat.a Artif., p95.
(4) ibid., r 91
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right; and, a materialist account of societal evolution, a view 
reinforced by his explanation of the rise of the middle classes.
As men increased in number, new businesses and arts were generated; 
which, in turn, gave rise to the formation of new wants, and to the 
development of new luxuries to gratify those wants. This process necess­
arily entailed the creation of a new class of men, and, more importantly, 
led to the creation of new species of wealth which simultaneously 
generated new rights of property. Clearly, Hodgskln does not mean by 
the creation of new rights of property, a new appropriative principle, 
but rather the generation of new, as opposed to pre-existing, claims 
on that property. Where land was monopolised by the descendants of 
the conquerors, and where anything affecting land would necessarily 
affect the property rights and interests of that class, the generation 
of innovative kinds of wealth cannot affect those old rights, but 
instead relates to new sources of property, and power. This is 
elucidated by the author in the following way:
The idea of property seems formerly to have 
been limited to land, or what the gentlemen 
of your profession still call real property.
In fact, even yet, much confusion exists from 
many persons still speaking of property as 
if there were only real property. Because 
the soil is appropriated by one class of men, 
the labourers have a claim on them for relief; 
and this was formerly confounded with the 
appropriation of property. At present the 
idea of property is much more extensive, and 
the labour employed about land supplies but 
a part of the wealth of the community. 1
The right to this new property is now, he notes, generally 
recognised to be as sacred as the landed property of yore, though, 
initially it was not. This change in the idea of what could legitimately 
constitute property, not only modified perceptions of property, but, in 1
(1) ibid., p95.
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addition, led to the recognition of another class, with the potential 
to undermine the seemingly unassailable position of the landed aristocracy, 
and whose power and privilege were dependent on an alternative form of 
property. Ultimately, however, the growth of the middle classes can 
be attributed to recognition of the individual's natural right to the 
product of his industry.
When Hodgskin discusses the middle classes, he is usually referring
to the capitalist class. Now, the capitalist, for the author, was
originally a labourer. Having wrested his liberty from his master,
by compelling the latter to respect his right to use the produce of his
own industry, the capitalist was able to earn a profit on what he could
save from that product, by inducing the landowner to buy from him. So
the capitalist, once emancipated, could transfer the use or loan of the
"new property the slave1 had the skill to create, and the economy to
2spare", to the landlord. The natural and inevitable development of 
capitalism arises, therefore, out of the ultimate human propensity to 
acknowledge, "that great natural principle, the foundation of all 
property, that each individual has a right to the free use of his 
own limbs, and to the produce of his own labour."1
It is because man, through his capacity to labour, which forms 
the foundation of his appropriative right, is able to generate new 
kinds of wealth, that he is able both, to alter the material conditions 
surrounding him, and, thereby, to give rise to the circumstances in 
which the artificial right is undermined by the natural right of property. 12
(1) The slave in question being the capitalist prior to his emancipation.
(2) Nat. & Artif., r 99.
(3) ibid., n99
405
The landlord wag, thus, effectively displaced in the power hierarchy 
of the country by the capitalist, because the latter qradually acquired 
the means and power capable of supporting his position aaainst the landlord, 
and as a consequence, the law came to recoanise and protect the riqht of 
the latter to his property. That the capitalist was, in fact, acquirinq 
additional property by unnatural and illegitimate means, seems not .to have 
troubled Hodgskin at this point.1 He is concerned here only to demonstrate 
that in spite of the wishes of the landed (legislatino) classes to the 
contrary, they are always ultimately compelled to recognise riqhts of 
property - generated naturally - to forms of wealth other than land. This 
process, for Hodgskin, reflects the insidious and universal operation of 
the natural law of property.
*
The natural riqht, existing at all times, 
gradually supersedes the law of the land, 
and effectually secures those new rights 
belonging to individuals, which, as men 
multiply, are continually created. 2
Having illustrated the contention that the natural riaht of property 
has a perpetual and unremittinq tendency to invalidate the artificial right 
of property. Hodgskin moves on to consider the basis of obedience to law, both 
natural and artificial, which centres on two notions: the idea of mutual 
respect, entailed by man's recognition of the property rights of others, as 
an aspect of their otherness as individuals; and the idea that public opinion 
provides a sufficient basis for the protection of the riqht of property. 
Consideration Of these twin elements of his thought will be deferred until 
chapter 8, where we examine how Hodgskin conceived the origin, operation, and 
protection of the natural right of property, and consequently the means by 
which the labourer could be reconciled with his product.3
(1) See below. chapter 7, section 2
(2) Nat.. & Aktif,, p.10?.
(3) See below, chapter 8, section 1
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Conclusion
Thomas Hodgskin was a natural rights theorist. For him, property 
represented a natural, Inalienable right existing indeoendently of, and 
anterior to, legislation or government. Like Locke, his mentor in this 
respect, Hodgskin conceived of this right of property as natural in the 
sense of given by Nature (or God) to all men, and as relying upon the 
expenditure of labour for its embodiment. Thus, following Locke,
Hodgskin grounded this natural right of prooerty in Nature's investiture 
of a right of property in man's person, thence in his labour, and thence in 
the produce of that labour. In addition to this, and unlike Locke, 
Hodgskin, as demonstrated in section 1 above, also employed the term 
"natural", to cover a broader conception than that outlined above. Thus,
t
the individualistic right of property characterised by Hodgskin as a 
natural right of property, was natural in four other senses. Firstly, 
"natural" implied just, so entitlement grounded in labour expenditure 
was just, not the unnatural, and therefore unjust, right of prooerty 
founded upon conquest. Secondly, "natural" also implied psychologically 
innate, thus ideas of proprietary distinction formed an inherent part of 
man's mental composition. Thirdly, "natural" signified universal.
Finally, "natural" signified the notion of indispensability to continued 
production. The idea that labour forms the only original legitimate mode 
of acquiring property is, of course, fundamental to all this. This view 
led Thomas Hodgskin to champion the claims of labour.
The historical framework for the enunciation of this natural rights 
doctrine of appropriation is set, in great part, by the argument devised 
by Locke in the Two Treatises. However, that is not to say that Hodgskin 
was simply a Lockean, for as we observed in section 2, much of the
information marshalled in his critique of the evolution of the artificial
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right of property in land, founded upon conquest, was derived from 
Smith. But, as we concluded above, the incorporation of the paradigm of 
the hypothetical four stages (designed by Smith as a referential frame­
work for his inquiry into the nature, origin, and development of property 
rights, per se) into the essentially Lockean account of the extent of 
permissible property holdings in land, governed, in Hodgskin's case, not 
only by conditions of "use" or "sufficiency", but also by population and 
technological contingencies, led to a certain degree of analytical 
tension. In addition to our comments upon Hodgskin's treatment of the 
just parameters for individuated (use-) rights in land, we also observed, 
in this section, Hodgskin's critique of the Ricardian differential theory 
of rent, that it was inadequate to explain the origin of a title to rent, 
was a product of his belief that conquest seized not only the land but 
also its inhabitants. Further consideration of Hodgskin's views on land, 
and the problem of rent, will be reserved until the next chapter, in 
which we examine the refutations of the claims of land and capital 
advanced by the anti-Ricardians.1
Our main concern in section 3 of this chapter, was Hodgskin's 
conception of the process by which the artificial right of property was 
being continuously and irrevocably undermined by the workings of the 
natural right of property. Here we concluded that Hodgskin enunciated 
a materialist explanation of socio-political development, arguing that 
advances in production techniques, generating new species of wealth, led 
to an alteration in the types of property right recognised by law and 
government; and, that such legal and governmental recognition was always 
posterior to, and consequent upon, prior technological progress.
(1) See below, chapter 7, section 2.
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As we noted at the beginning of the chapter, our analysis of 
Hodgskin's ideas about prooerty was confined to an elucidation of those 
views articulated in The Natural and Artificial Right of Prooerty 
Contrasted. Hodgskin did, however, compose a number of other radical 
economic tracts of significance, namely. Labour Defended Against the 
Claims of Capital (1825), and Popular Political Economy (1827) . An 
examination of the principal ideas of those tracts will be offered in 
chapter 7, in which we propose to illuminate the views of the anti- 
Ricardians about both the just bases of entitlement, and the defects of 
the prevailing system of industrial capitalism. Whilst it is important 
to note that, terminologically and philosophically, the framework of the 
natural rights account of property is largely absent from these two 
tracts - possibly because both were written prior to Hodgskin's composition 
of The Natural and Artificial Right - both are underwritten by the 
contrast between "natural circumstances" and "social regulations" 
delineated at the beginning of this chapter.1 That contrast is a direct 
corollary of the notion of natural rights articulated in Hodgskin's 
1832 work.
It is Hodgskin's exposition of a natural rights explanation of the 
origin of property, which renders him of special note in the period 
under study, for he is the only author to advance such a theory.
Although other anti-Ricardian writers are led to similar conclusions, 
namely that only the exclusive allocation of wealth (or property) to 
those who produce it - be it individually, or collectively - is consonant 
with justice and legitimacy, the philosophical bases of these labour- 
based theories of entitlement are somewhat different to Hodgskin's
(1) See above, section 1, p.376.
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natural rights doctrine. Thus, William Thompson, for examnle, esnouses 
an Utilitarian defence of the claims of labour to the entire fruits of 
its industry, whereas John Francis Bray and John Gray ground their 
separate, but similar, defences in an argument from equality.^- Amongst 
the anti-Ricardians, therefore, Hodgskin is the only one to follow in the 
natural rights tradition of Locke.
Whilst there is no complete replication of this natural rights 
argument of property amongst the authors dealt with in this thesis, it 
is important to observe the relationship between Hodgskin's The Natural
and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted, and Herbert Spencer's work
2Social Statics, for there is considerable similarity between the two
works. This is noticeable in their shared antipathy towards Utilitarianism,3
4in their dependence upon Locke for the derivation of their ideas, and 
in the bases of their critiques of the prevailing system of land ownership. 
Both men argue from natural rights, identifying the property vested in a 
man's body, and thus his labour, as the source of property in the Droduce 
of that labour; and both men develop an inherently individualistic 
account of property rights, employing arguments from laissez-faire to 
sustain that argument. There is, however, one fundamental difference 
between the two - the status of land. Whereas Hodgskin desires the 
accessibility of land to all, he is not prepared to countenance any 
interventionist schemes to secure that accessibility, SDencer similarly 1234
(1) See below, chapter 7, section 1.
(2) Spencer, Herbert, Social Statics; or the Conditions Essential to 
Human Happiness Specified, and the First of Them Developed, (London 
Chapman, 1851).
(3) c£., Hodgskin, Nat. & Artlf., pp.12-14, 16-22, 24-25; Soencer,
Social Statics, pp.16-24, 103-109. £f., Francis, Mark, "Herbert
Spencer and the Myth of Laissez-Faire", Journal of the History of 
Ideas, vol. 39, 1978, pp.317-328, and Halevy, oo.clt., pp.142-3, 167 
169, 171. Both Halevy and Francis observe that Hodgskin and Spencer 
were writers for the Economist at the same time, and that there was 
frequent, intimate communication between the two, but that any intellectue 
debt that Spencer may have owed Hodgskin went unacknowledged.
(4) Cf., Hodgskin, oo.cit., pp.23-43; Soencer, oo.clt., d o ..126-135.
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expounding the need for access of all to the land - the common heritage 
of all men - favours land nationalisation, and the lease of that land 
to individuals for rent.^ Since we propose to consider Hodgskin's 
views on how the natural right of proDerty functions in future society 
in chapter 8, further remarks about the comoarisons and contrasts
between Hodgskin and Spencer on this point will be reserved until 
2then.
In this chapter, we have focused principally upon the normative 
bases of Hodgskin's theory of nroperty. We propose, in chanter 7, to 
consider, inter alia, Hodgskin's analys of the unjust workings of the 
prevailing economic system. 12
(1) cf., Spencer, op.cit., pp.119-125. c£., also Hodgskin, op.cit.,
pp,61-75 passim; Spencer, on.cit., pn.114-125.
(2) See below, chapter 8, section 1
Chapter 7. Labour, Property, and Exploitation: the Anti-Ricardians 
and the Claims of Labour.
In chapter 4, we observed that, the Ricardian school of classical
political economy was typified by its general lack of concern with the
issue of the nature and origin of the rights of property, preferring,
instead, to assume the prevailing pattern of property as
data, and to focus on the empirical aspects of income distribution.^
For the anti-Ricardians, Thomas Hodgskin, John Gray, John Francis Bray,
and William Thompson, however, the question of the legitimate basis of
appropriation is fundamental to the issue of income distribution, as,
without some standard of just individuation, it would be impossible to
evaluate the workings cf the prevailing capitalist system. This just >
standard is uniformly represented by these authors as labour-based,
encapsulated most famously in the statement that, "the whole produce of
labour belongs to the labourer". It will be the principal aim of this
chapter, therefore, to examine both the general justificatory theories
of property advanced by the authors in question, with the obvious
exception of Thomas Hodgskin, whose theory of appropriation formed the
3subject of the preceding chapter, and the grounds upon which they 
determined that the system currently in operation was inherently 
exploitative, since each subscribes to the view that the labourer is 
being systematically denied the full fruits of his endeavour. 123
(1) See above, chapter 4.
(2) The phrase derives from Adam Smith, WN.I.viii .2.
(3) See above, chapter 6.
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As we shall see shortly,labour expenditure not only formed the 
primary identifying feature in the derivation of rights of property, 
but also formed the key determinant in the creation of value, a view 
which led Noel Thompson, in his book, The people's science, to argue 
that the anti-Ricardians founded their theories of exploitation on the 
basis of the labour theory of value, concluding that it was through the 
violation of the natural law of value that exploitation was being 
perpetrated.* However, it is our contention that, whilst the question 
of value is obviously central to the issue of exploitation, and the 
immiseration of the labourer, it is, principally, in the abrogation of 
the natural laws of appropriation and distribution, through the monopoly 
ownership of the means of production, that the source of exploitation1is 
located.
This chapter will be divided, therefore, into three sections. In 
section 1, we will examine the question of the just grounds of entitle­
ment, as envisaged by the anti-Ricardians, beginning in section l(i) 
with an examination of the labour theories of individuation expounded 
by John Gray, and John Francis Bray, with a summary recapitulation of 
the juridical thesis espoused by Thomas Hodgskin; and proceeding, in 
section l(ii), with an appraisal of the egalitarian utilitarian doctrine 
of property derivation outlined by William Thompson. Having considered 
the grounds of legitimate appropriation, we will move on, in section 2, 
to the question of the refutation of the claims of land and capital,
concentrating primarily on the treatise Labour Defended Against the
2Claims of Capital, by Thomas Hodgskin. In section 3, we will extend 
our discussion of the illegitimate grounds of proprietary reward, by
(1) Thompson, Noel W., The people's science. The popular political
economy of exploitation and crisis 1816-34, (Cambridge, CUP. T984), p. 90.
(2) Hodgskin, Thomas, Labour Defended Against the Claims of Capital, 
(London, 1825).
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examining the relationship between the nonopoly ownership of the means 
of production, the determination of value, and the question of unequal 
exchange as the mechanism of exploitation.
Before going on to consider the theories of appropriation
advanced by the authors dealt with in this chanter, some explanation of
our usage of the term "anti-Ricardians" to describe the writers,
Hodgskin, Gray, Bray and Thompson, was thought necessary. Traditionally
these writers have all been denominated "Ricardian Socialists",^
regarded as deriving their labour economics, especially their conception
of value, straight from Ricardo's Principles of Political Economy and
Taxation. More recently, however, a number of writers, building on
2the suggestive comments of earlier interpreters, have challenged this,
orthodox view, proclaiming that this group are, more strictly speaking,
3Smithians, deriving their inspiration from the Wealth.
Whilst the appellation "Smithian Socialist" is to be preferred to 
the appellation "Ricardian Socialist", on the grounds that the anti- 
Ricardians did in fact develop their economic thinking more in the 123
(1) cf., Foxwell, H.S., Introduction to Menger, Anton. Right to the 
Whole Produce of Labour, ¿London, Macmillan, 1899;; Hovell, Mark,
The Chartist Movement, (Manchester, MUP, 1925) p.38; Gray, Alexander, 
The Socialist Tradition: Moses to Lenin (London, Longmans, 1947) 
p.262; Roll, Eric. A History of Economic Thought, p.247; Beer,
Max, A History of British Socialism, (London, Bell and Sons Ltd., 
1929), vol I, p.218.
(2) cf., Lowenthal, Esther, The Ricardian Socialists, (New York,
Columbia UP, 1911), p 14 and Douglas, P.H., "Smith"s Theory of 
Value and Distribution", pp.128-133.
(3) cf., Hollander, Samuel, "The post-Ricardian dissension: a case 
study in economics and ideology", pp .376-389; Thompson, N.W., 
"Ricardian Socialists (Smithian Socialists: What's in a name," 
Faculty of Economics and Politics Research Paper, University of 
Cambridge, pp.1-26, and The people's science, pp .82-110.
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context of Smithian, than Ricardian theorv, (witness, for examole, the 
distinction made by Hodgskin between "natural" and "social" price and 
the treatment of labour quantity and cost-of-production explanations in 
the Wealth) it is our contention in this thesis, that the appellation 
"anti-Ricardian” is more suitable still, ''or, although deriving much 
positive content from Smith, the main thrust of anti-Ricardian literature 
is directed against Ricardian orthodoxy. So, for instance, Hodgskin 
develops his refutation of the claims of capital from a critique of the 
works of Ricardo, Mill and McCulloch,^ whilst John Cray, in the Social 
System, compares his own views and those of the Ricardians on the nature 
of the laws regulating production, distribution, and exchange in an 
attempt to show that he alone has addressed the oroblem of finding an
t. . 2effective and practicable remedy for the evils of commercial society.
In addition, the identification of this group as either Ricardian 
or Smithian "Socialists" seems questionable on two counts: initially, 
because it suggests that all the writers dealt with were, in fact, 
socialists, a point particularly debatable vÌ3-à-vis Hodgskin; and 
secondly, and relatedlv, because it implies that these writers were 
united as much in their ctiticism of the defects of capitalism, as in 
their identification of the circumstances requisite to remedy those 
defects. But, as we shall demonstrate in chanter 8, the policy pres­
criptions of the anti-Ricardians were, in fact, many and varied.
(1) See below, section 2(ii).
(2) c f_. , Gray, The Social System, (London, 1831) op. 226-299.
(3) This point will become clearer in chapter 8, section 1.
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Section 1: The Just Title to Property
(1) The Labour Theory of Propertyi John Pray and John Francis Hrav
Hodgskin, as already outlined1 23-, constructed a natural rights theorv 
of property based on the Lockean notion that nature had Invested man
with a property In his body, and his labour, and that as such "what he
2can make or obtain by his labour naturally belongs to him". Distribution 
of reward proportionate to labour expenditure ought to form the only basis 
for the partition of wealth or property. Thus, Hodgskin oroclaims in 
Labour Defended, "the product of labour ought to belong to the labourer".3 
This juridical thesis would apply to both Individually-produced «
4goods and those resulting from social production. In the case of 
socially-produced goods the product would be apportioned to each of the 
coooerating parties according to the "unfettered judgements of the 
labourers themselves".3 Legal, or other, interventions would be unnecessary.
Indeed, Hodgskin is of the firm opinion that prooerty is best secured 
in the absence of all man-made contrivances, favouring, as we shall observe 
in the next chapter, not the active reconstruction of society along lines 
designed to secure labour its entire product, but rather, the removal, or 
abolition, of all such regulatory phenomena.
(1) See above, chapter 6.
(2) Nat. & Artlf.,p.2G.
(3) Lab.Def., p.83.
Cf., Lab.Def., pp.82-86; Nat. & flrtlf., p.35n(4)
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John Gray, in his treatise, A Lecture on human Happiness, 
adopts a similar Lockean framework to Hodrjskin, in the enunciation of the 
right principles of appropriation, noting that since a man has a right of 
property in his person - "Is a man's right hand his own?" - which may
be extended to the "labour of his hands” , the expenditure of that labour
2will generate an original title to propertv.
Where Hodgskin had argued that this right to property is a natural 
and inalienable right of man, Gray, at this point, appears merely to be 
employing an argument from justice. Thus:
In the rudest ages of antiquity, a man who 
killed an animal for food would look upon it 
as his property. Should another take it from 
him, it would be looked upon as an act of 
injustice, and the attempt to do it would 
instantly be resisted. 3
To deprive the labourer of his produce is, therefore, unjust. Given
Gray's concern to demonstrate the inaccuracy of the notion that "hanpiness
4consists rather in the oursuit than in the nossession of any object” and 
to establish the oattern of aopropriation, distribution, and consumption most 
conducive to the happiness of the individual in society, this might lead us 
to the conclusion that his conceotion of justice is founded in utility. So 
justice would be served in nrooertv allocation when the labourer is 
accorded the full fruits of his endeavour, since to do otherwise would be to 123
(1) Gray, John, A Lecture on Human Happiness, (London, 182S).
(2) Ibid., p.28.
(3) Ibid.,p.28.
(4) Ibid. ,p.<3
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cause creator pain than pleasure, and thus to commit Injustice. Rlthouoh 
he does pay lip-service to the areatest happiness principle, he does 
not explore its philosophical bases in any depth. Rather, Gray limits 
himself to a very circumsDect attemot to establish that since labour 
is the "exclusive source of property" so too is it the "exclusive 
foundation of it".*
Labour is the source of property because its expenditure is
instrumental in acquiring that property; indeed, Gray conceptualizes
2property as "nothing more than accumulated labour". Labour is the 
foundation of property, not for purely instrumental reasons, however, but 
because the propertv a man has in his person, which extends to his labour, 
somehow generates a title to whatever that labour produces or procures.'
Where Hodgskin, in addition to employing Locke’s mixing metaphor, denotes 
the ways in which labour expenditure naturally and legitimately entitles maul 
to the full fruits of his endeavour. Gray falls to do anything, at this 
stage, beyond the above pronouncements. Although, the "mixing” notion may 
be implicit in his argument, its very lack of articulation makes it 
difficult to discern whether he believed the right to property derived 
from natural rights or from utilitarian prescriptions. Assuming that his 
views on entitlement did not alter too radically between the publication 
of the Lecture and his later monetary reform tracts,1 23 then the
(1) Ibid.,p.28 (Original emphasis).
(2) Ibid.,p.28.
(3) The Social System: A Treatise on the Principle of Exchange, (Edinburgh 
1831); An Efficient Remedy for the Distress of Nations, (Edinburgh, 
London, 1842); The Currency Question; A rejected letter to the Times, 
(Edinburgh, London, 1847); Lectures on the Nature and Use of Money, 
(Edinburgh, London, 1848).
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answer to this question concerning the theoretical framework of his 
elucidation of the just origins of pronerty may be supplied by the 
following statement derived from An Efficient Remedy for the Distress of 
Nations \  that:
... the rights of all men are by nature 
equal, and the first and most inalienable 
right of man is the possession, use and ,,
enjoyment of the produce of his own industry.
in other words, the basis of Gray's la hour theory of prooerty 
resides in an argument from natural or equal rights. It is because Nature 
has created men equal, and endowed them with the same rights, of which 
the primary and most important is an Inalienable right of property, that 
labour generates such a title.
we shall return to Gray's account of the formation of property rights 
shortly, when we consider the import of his conceptualization of property 
as "accumulated labour" for the problem of property rights in land.^ 
Suffice it to say at present, however, that like his compeers. Gray 
evaluated contemporary distributive practices according to their grounding 
in labour expenditure.
For John Francis Bray, also, legitimate property acquisition was 
related to labour expenditure. Like Gray, the theoretical framework for 12
(1) (London, 1842) .
(2) Efficient Remedy, pp.125-6.
(3) See below, section 2, pp.437-444.
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Bray's analysis of the just principles of entitlement Is provided by 
an explanation derived from equality. In Labour1s Wrongs and Labour1s 
Remedy; or the Age of Might and the Age of Right,^ Bray outlines four 
propositions concemlno man, relevant to appropriation, viz, that:
1. All men are alike, in regard to their 
substance; their creation, and t.helr 
preservation; therefore the nature of
all is the same, and the absolute wants of 
all are the same.
2. ... as the life o^ no human being can be 
maintained without a due provision of food, 
clothing, and shelter, and as these cannot be 
procured without labour, it follows that every 
human being ought to labour.
3. As the nature and wants of all men are alike,
the rights of all must be equal; and as human 
existence (is) dependent on the same contingencies 
it follows that the great field of all exertion, and 
the raw material of all wealth - the earth - is the 
common property of all its inhabitants. 2
4. As self-preservation is the end of all labour, and
as a general natural equality ... prevails amongst 
men, it should follow, that all those who perform 
equality of labour ought likewise to receive equality 
of reward. 3
Four factors are of importance here: firstly, man's natural 
equality with man; secondly, the duty of all men to preserve themselves? 
thirdly, the assumption that the earth must remain common property; and
(1) (Leeds, 1839).
(2) Labour's Wrongs, p . 17. (Original emphasis)
(3) Ibid., p.30., (Original emphasis).
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finally, the requirement of labour in order to secure self-preservation. 
Where Thomas Hodqskln qrounded the riqht of property in a natural 
riqht existing independently of society, or government, Bray adopts 
an instrumental theory of property grounded in human equality. It is 
simply a logical consequence of the fact that all men are eoual, and that 
all must labour in order to live,that dictates that the fruit of labour 
should be ascribed to the producer of it, whilst the ^leld upon which that 
produce is grown should remain common. Thus, the reward of labour ought to 
be commensurate with labour expenditure. To denv labour the full fruits 
of its endeavour is to deny it its lust deserts.
Implicit in this philosophy of equal rights is the notion of equality
Iof duty. If three men are placed on a desert island, and each renders an 
equal portion of labour for the common good, and receives in return an 
equal reward, the communion is beneficial. Distribution will be consonant 
with first principles. All have laboured, and all have received a reward 
proportioned to that labour. But:
... if one of the party, by force or fraud, obtain 
double allowance of produce for only single work, the 
union cannot longer be equally beneficial to all three.
If, again, the same man compel his fellows to give him 
double allowance of produce for no labour whatever, 
every shadow of equalitv and justice vanishes at once. 1 1
(1) Ibid., pp.22-3. (Original emphasis)
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The absolute dependency exlstlncr between life, the duty to labour, 
and subsistence, means that the avoidance of labour on the part of any 
individual will result either in his death bv starvation; or in a 
compensatory increase in the amount of labour performed by the remaining 
body of men, without, of course, any additional reward for their increase 
in effort, in order that the non-labourer mav subsist.
Given that all men are equal, their rights are also equal, Bray 
argues. And since those rights are natural and inalienable, they can only 
be limited by the equal rights of every other man. Thus every man may be 
said to have "a right to do what he likes - provided the so-doing interferes 
not with the EQUAL rights of his ^ellow-man".^
Clearly the avoidance of labour on the part of the non-labourer 
affects no one but himself so long as it results merelv in his
non-acquisition of subsistence. However, if, in suite of the fact that
2he is not labouring, this oerson is still able to acquire (roods, then it 
is obvious, Bray claims, that he is breaking his obligation to his fellows 
to labour in order to live; and also, that he is violating the natural 
principles of appropriation. The means by which such violation may be 
perpetrated are two-fold: monopoly ownership of the means of subsistence - 
land (or capital) - or the operation of an unjust exchange mechanism, 
both of which will be considered below.^ 123
(1) Ibid.,p.32. (Original emphasis)
(2) This excludes invalids, the aged, and children,of course.
(3) See below Section 3.
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From his propositions concerning equality, therefore, Brav 
concludes that, in a well-regulated society, the competing claims of 
all men to sustenance would be compatible. The exercise of such equal 
rights, Bray somewhat naively avers, can never lead to conflict or 
injury. "Every man has an undoubted right to all that his honest labour 
can procure him. When he thus appropriates the fruits of his labour, he 
commits no Injustice upon any other human beinq",1 for he interferes not
with the "other man's right of doing the same with the produce of his
2labour". In a society based upon inequality, and ownership of land, 
upon, as it were, "the institution of property as it at present exists".^ 
conflict and misery would be unavoidable.
With the labouring classes denied adequate means to attain utility, 
or "what is essential to the support, comfort, and pleasure of human life", 
the non-labouring, capitalist class prospers. Indeed, for Bray, it 
is the very bifurcation of society into two classes, a class to labour and 
a class to control labour, that typifies societies founded uoon the 
systematic abrogation of the natural law of appropriation.'’ Once acrain, 
therefore, as with Hodgskln and Gray, the first title to property is 
contingent upon the expenditure of labour.
(1) Labour's Wrongs, p.33 (Original emphasis)
(2) Ibid.,p.33.
(3) Ibid.,p.17. (Original emphasis).
(4) Tbid.,p.42.
(5) Cf.,Ibid.,pp.10,42.
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It has often been asserted that a revolutionary interpretation of 
utilitarianism provided the basic ohilosoohical framework for the 
economic and oolitical writinqs of the "Ricardian Socialists" . Whilst 
it is true that each, in a qeneral sense, considers man's actions to be 
motivated by a desire to maximise oleasure and minimise oaln, acceDtina, 
as it were, the utilitarian postulate of the qreatest happiness of the 
greatest number, only William Thomoson actuallv enqaoes in a thorough­
going exposition of utility. As we noted in chanter 5, Benthamite 
utilitarianism was a fundamentally conservative doctrine. The sacro- 
sanctity of private property, the ore-eminence of considerations from 
security over those from equality,lead to support for the existing pattern 
of propertv distribution, despite the fact that the doctrine of diminishing 
marginal utility tends to presume in favour of equal possessions. Bentham
counsels that redistribution of wealth is only acceotable in so far as
2such redistribution does not disappoint pre-existing expectations.
William Thompson, however, whilst still concerned with the compatibility 
of the ends of security and equality, endeavours to develop a theory of 
egalitarian utilitarianism designed, in part, to serve as a critique of 
caoitalism» in part, as a justification of equalitv of oossession: and 
in part, as a critique of the doctrines of the classical economists who 12
(1) See, e.q. Roll, Eric, A History of Economic Thought (New York, lBSS) 
pp.245-50; Stark,Ideal Foundations, p.52; Bray, op.clt.,p.42.
The sense in which the utilitarianism of the "Ricardian Socialists" may 
be said to be "revolutionary" is that it aimed at establishing the 
hanpiness of the labourer specifically.
(2) See chapter 5, section 2, d p .320-336.
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employed the utilitarian belief in the security of existing property,
in their defences of laissez-faire, and market economv.1 Contrary to
Benthamite utilitarianism, which was directed at the ouestion of the
ggoals to be promoted by the lerral system, the utilitarianism of William 
Thompson primarily - though not exclusively - addressed the issue of the goals t 
be promoted by the economic system in the distribution of wealth; Thompson 
wanted to establish the conditions most conducive to both, the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number,1 23 and the greatest reproduction of wealth.
It will be the aim, therefore, of the next sub-section to consider Thomoson's 
analysis of property in relation to utility.
(ii) William Thompson: an Egalitarian Utilitarian - the Natural Laws of 
Di strlbutlon.
Acknowledging his debt to Bentham, Thomason notes at the outset of 
An Inquiry into the Principles of the Distribution of Wealth (1824) that:
UTILITY, calculating all effects, good and evil, 
immediate and remote, or the pursuit of the greatest 
possible sum of human happiness, is the leading 
principle constantly kept in view, and to which 
all others are subsidiary, in this lnouiry, In
(1) Pankhurst, Richard, K.P., William Thompson (1775-1833), Britain's 
Pioneer Socialist, Feminist, and Cooperator, (London, Watts & Co., 
1954) , p.20.
(2) Ryan, Alan, Property and Political Theory, p.95.
(3) It is my contention that Bentbam and Thompson interpreted this slogan 
differently. For Bentham the 'greatest number' was deduced by adding 
up units of utility - the fellcific calculus - whereas for Thompson, 
this unitary analysis becomes confounded with the notion of the 
'greatest number' as a majoritarian principle.
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Bentham's "Introduction to the Prlncloles of 
Morals and Legislation" ... this principle ... is 
developed and established forever, to the exclusion 
of all other pretended tests of morals. 1
Like Bentham, happiness is defined by Thompson as pleasure, or the
avoidance of pain. "The object to be aimed at", in all human endeavour
2is, "the greatest quantity of happiness, (i.e. pleasures ...)".
Where Bentham's objective had been the manner in which legislation
could promote utility,Thompson was specifically concerned with the issue
of distribution. He wanted to establish which system of distributing
wealth would lead to "its greatest reproduction and to the greatest
preponderant happiness"; 1 23 or in other words, to "reconcile egualltv with
4security", and "just distribution with continued production". With
this objective in mind, he sets out to discover the 'natural laws of 
distribution'.
Men, he argues, are all senient beings, susceptible to both the 
experience of pleasure, and of pair. As self-interested creatures they 
are always inclined to act in order to increase their command over pleasure. 
The only rational motive for exertion, beyond the appropriation of the 
necessities of life, is, therefore, the maximisation of happiness. Wealth,
(1) Thompson, William, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Distribution 
of Wealth Most Conducive to Human Happiness, (London, 1824), p.l.
(2) Ibid., p.15. Cf. Bentham, Theory of Legislation, e.q.p.2.
(3) Inquiry, p.582.
(4) Ibid.,p.xiv
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throuqh its use or consumption, provides a source of such haopiness
and ought, therefore, to be distributed in a manner productive of the
maximum benefit to the oroducers of it.
Since all men, "being similarly constituted in their Physical
organisation", are capable of experiencing equal enjoyment from equal 
1 2portions of wealth, i* similarlv treated from birth, then wealth ought 
to be allocated as evenly as 'security' allows for. '"his distributive principle 
not only accords with nature’s flat, but also with the utilitarian concept of 
diminishing marginal utility, as aduntorated by Bentham.^
It is a fact always recurring, and what we call a
law of nature, that the nerve excited beyond a certain
time, or a certain degree loses its power of enjoyment, <
til relieved by rest and abstinence. 4
Thus the additional benefit or utility a person derives from a given 
increase in wealth will, after some point, actually diminish with each 
successive increment. Therefore, to continually add to the wealth of the 
few is productive of less aggregate utility - in the long run - than could 1234
(1) Ibid., p.17, Cf., also p.21.
(2) Following Robert Owen, Thompson felt that man was capable of being 
influenced by his environment. His goals and desires are, therefore, 
socially determined. Thus the psychological dimension of utilitarianism, 
concerned with how neople do in -Pact behave, must accommodate this issue 
of socially created desires, if it is to be rendered consistent with
the ethical, prescriptive element of utilitarianism or how society 
ought to be regulated so as to maximise this happiness. Rentham 
appears to ignore this issue; whilst Thompson attempts to deal with 
it to some degree. See, Hunt, E.K., ’Utilitarianism and the labor theory 
of value: a critigue of the ideas of william Thompson', HOPF, 11, 1970, 
op.545-571.
(3) Rentham,Theory of Legislation, pp.102-109.
(4) Inouirv, p.144.
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be achieved by a more even distribution of wealth. Indeed, Thomoson 
actually felt that wealth over a certain maximum would result 
in disutility to its owners.^
Allied to these "psychological" aspects, was another factor which 
Thompson considered pertinent to the education of the natural, viz 
non-artificial, laws of distribution, and that is the fact that labour
alone is productive of wealth. "Wealth is procured by labour; no other
2ingredient but labour makes any object of desire an object of wealth".
It Is the expenditure of labour in appropriating an object which renders 
that object an object of wealth. Thus:
Droves of horses ... abounding in regions thinly
peonled, are not gbjects of wealth any more than
the air or light. There are more of them than
are wanting for use: no human exertion has produced
them: whoever will employ the labour necessary to
appropriate any of them, becomes their owner: and
the mere labour of accruisition makes that an object of
wealth which before was merely an object of possible desire.
A right of property derives, therefore, from the expenditure of labour. 
Since wealth is a source of happiness, and since all human exertion is 
directed towards the pursuit of happiness, it follows that the labour 
necessary to procure that wealth ought to be exclusively rewarded with it. 1234
(1) Hunt, op.clt.,p.550. Cf., Ingulry, p.Ql.
(2) Inquiry, p.3. I will look at the question of value a little
later.
(3) Thomoson here follows standard classical economic theory in viewing 
those spontaneous products of nature existing in (comparative) abundance 
as free goods.
(4) Inquiry, p.7 (original emphasis).
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Thompson is concerned not only with the question of the attainment 
of that distribution of wealth most conducive to the qreatest haopiness 
of the greatest number - in a majoritarian sense^ - but also with that 
most conducive to the greatest reoroduction of wealth.
In terms of producing the greatest happiness an approximated equal
distribution appears to be the most pertinent, given the constitution of
2man. The question is, however, what can provide a sufficient stimulus 
for continued exertion?
Benthamas we saw in Chanter 5, itemises four fundamental "principles
of distribution" - aburidance, subsistence, security and equality. Dispensinq
quickly with the first two principles, he focuses almost entirely upon the
*
tension between security and equality, assiqninq pre-eminence to the former 
over the latter; Thompson adopts a similar position. The labour of the 
savage, who merely exerts himself to satisfy his basic needs as and when they 
arise, is necessarily sporadic, and produces little wealth. The
civilized man,however, appears to have developed the habit of labouring; with 
him,production is more or less a continuous process, and yet optimum 
wealth is not being produced, for at present;
Force has been substituted for voluntary motive, 
and the dread of pain, compulsion, have been 
made to produce the stunted limitations of healthful 
voluntary exertion. In an economical point of view, 
this labour has been proved to be the most expensive,
/i.e. because the least productive jf. In a moral point 
of view it abstracts from the mass of human happiness. 3 123
(1) That the sense is majoritarian is evidence bv Thompson's claim that in 
a conflict of interests the lesser interest should alwavs yield to the 
greater (with due compensation), and that therefore, the happiness of 
the greater number - the needv - should always override that of the 
lesser interest - the wealthy few. Inquiry, pp. ?4-?8.
(2) See op of this section.
(3) Inquiry, p.34.
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Labouring, for the utilitarians generally, was regarded as an 
averse, but necessary task. It provided the only means by which subsistence 
could be acquired. The onlv incentive for continual labour resided in the 
right of property. Thus Bentham notes that "it is that right which has 
vanquished the natural aversion of man to labour".^ Again, James Mill, 
similarly proclaims that "the greatest possible happiness of society is,
therefore, attained by insuring to every man the greatest possible quantity
2of the produce of his labour".
Thompson adopts a similar stance, noting that in order to promote
both happiness, and achieve the greatest preponderant reproduction of
wealth and most egalitarian distribution of that wealth, "'security' i n the
3 <ENTIRE USE of the products of labour to those who produce them" is 
absolutely necessarv.
The willingness to labour derives almost exclusively from the 
expectation of obtaining, hence enjoying, all the benefits consequent on 
property in the fruits of one's labour. The labour mode of entitlement 
is sanctioned because of the utility function promoted thereby. Security 
in the full fruits of one's labour will alone produce the greatest preponderant 
happiness, and the greatest consequent reproduction of wealth.
Security again seems to form the cornerstone of yet another utilitarian 
account of property rights, just as it had for James Mill and Jeremy Bentham. 123
(1) Benthara, Theory of Legislation, p.114. McCulloch repeats this argument - 
and phraseology - frequently. Cf. (e.g.), "Political Economy"EPS p. 240.
(2) Mill , Essay on Government, p.57.
(3) Inquiry, p.35. (Original emphasis)
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However, there is a difference between the account of property espoused 
by Thompson, and those developed by Mill and Pentham, and this concerns the 
role of equality, as we shall observe below.
From the assumptions that men are approximately equal, and that the 
enjoyment that each derives from an approximately eoual share of wealth,
'is also approximately eoual, 'Thompson educes three natural laws of 
distribution:
First, All labour ouqht to be free and voluntary 
as to its direction and continuance.
Second, All the products of labour ouqht to be 
secured to the producers of them.
Third. All exchanoes of these products ouqht to «
be free and voluntary. 1
To these three laws, he adds a fourth contingency that, althouqh
equality is always limited by security, "wherever equality does not lesson
2production it should be the sole oblect pursued". So, for example,
reqardinq the spontaneous products of nature, an equal partition of ¡-roods is 
required by utility. In addition to this, Thompson observes that should 
any departure be made from the principle of security, "that departure 
should always be in favour of equality", and not in order to promote 
or increase inequality. Only a deviation from the principle of security 
that favours eauality can be leqitlmately sanctioned insofar as that 
deviation does not produce either disutility or disincentive to labour. 
Where such deviation generates disutility or disincentive, then it is 
illegitimate, for: 12
(1) Ibid., pp.5-6. (Oriqinal emphasis).
(2) Ibid., p.91. (Original emphasis) .
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... the security og acquired property, the 
produce og labour, Is only a branch of the 
security of labour; and the security o*’ 
labour is only a branch of general security, 
guarantying (sic) equal rights to all ■.. 
founded on their similar organisation, and 
the egual utility of these rights to all. 1
Thompson is led to make this concession to eoualltv over security -
with the contingency that such concession is still compatible with
utility and the greatest reproduction of wealth - because he has to 
establish a just basis for the communal or collective ownership of wealth, 
since the basis of his utilitarian account of property rights derives 
from observations about the individual, his motives to labour, and the 
enjoyment he is capable of experiencing from the produce of his labour.
In other words, Thompson has to make an essentially individualistic 
theory of entitlement into a justification for collective ownership,
by revealing that the latter is not only more favoured hv the utilitv principle
2but also more egalitarian.
This concern with the compatibility of security and eauality resurfaces 
in Thompson's treatment of the status of that property already acauired 
under the prevailing system of force and fraud prior to the operation of 
the natural laws of distribution. According to these laws, property may 
be legitimately acquired onlv by either labour expenditure directly, or 12
(1) Ibid.,p.149. (Original emphasis).
(2) See below, chanter 8, section 2(li), op.505-525.
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throuqh the process of equitable exchanae - anv other means are 
illeaitimate. However, the problem arises as to whether or not 
previously (illeqltimatelv) acquired prooertv is to be secured under 
the same conditions as prooertv acauired under the natural laws of 
distribution. Thus, Thompson asks:
If acquisition, by means of free labour and
voluntary exchanges ... (is) to be the sole
useful, and therefore the sole Just and moral,
title to the possession of the articles of wealth,
or property, what is to protect the actual possessors
of wealth, particularlv of the masses of hereditarv
land, in the enjoyment of their revenues? Would not
such principles unhinqe the riqhts of property? .1
Since such lands had normally been acquired bv fraudulent means 
their oriainal title is, of course, illeqitimate: and prooertv could 
never be acquired in such a wav under the natural laws of distribution.
Only labour or equivalent exchances would qenerate a title to prooertv 
then: and thus the "utility of the acquisition" - the fact that it is 
based on principles conducive to both optimum happiness and optimum 
production - would suffice to Justify property so acquired.
This Justificatory process is, however, more intricate when it 
comes to unnaturally individuated property. Then it is the "utility of the 1
(1) Inquiry, op.268-9. (Oriqinal emphasis)
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actual distribution" that must be demonstrated. This requires that If 
the injuries and evils of insecuritv deriving from the oricrinal, unjust 
acquisition can be shown to have ceased,and thatflf'the present proprietors 
can demonstrate their preparedness to abide bv the leqitimate rules of 
acquisition henceforth, then the original acaulsition will be allowed to 
stand. Security of property rights will prevail. However, the mechanism 
whereby such vast accumulations of wealth could be illegitimately amassed 
must be abolished. Thompson, like Bentham previously, favours the 
confirmation of the present proprietor in his possession wherever possible, 
since such a procedure will reinforce the principle of securltv bv avoiding 
the disappointment of expectations conseouent upon anv expropriative act - 
whatever the underlying motives. Thus, like the utilitarians and the 
classical economists generallv1, securitv of property becomes the mainstay 
of the efficient functioning of the socio-economic and legal system.
In his enunciation of the three natural laws of distribution adumbrated 
above, Thompson is not only premissing this enunciation upon concerns from 
utility and equality, but also upon quite an extensive conception of oropertv, 
which he defines as:
... the free use and direction of your labour 
and all your faculties (not interfering with 
similar rights in others), and the riqht of 
voluntary exchanges for the products of that labour. 2 12
(1) See above chapter 5.
(2) Inouirv, p.148.
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When discussing the distribution wealth it is obvious that he is 
using a more limited concention of propertv as the produce of labour.
However, when talking of the disposition of pronerty generally, he is 
concerned with both man's labour and ^acuities, and his goods. In 
section 3 of this chapter, we intend to exnlore this concention further, 
forming, as it does, the basis of Thompson's critique of the capitalist 
system, which is condemned not only for violating the orlncioles regulating 
the just distribution of wealth, but also for rendering the labour of man 
distinctly unfree, and involuntary,in respect of "direction" and "continuance".1
Before moving on to consider the ways in which the accounts of legitimate 
property derivation discussed in this chapter were employed, together with 
other arguments, to refute the claims of land and capital, two final points 
of comparison between Thompson and Bentham should be made. Firstly, Thompson 
categorically rejects the Benthamite doctrine that propertv is the creature 
of law. Bentham had argued that "Propertv and law are born together, and
die together. Before laws were made there was no property: take awav laws,
2and property ceases". Indeed, Bentham can envisage no circumstances in
which legislation and the coercive machinerv of protection would be 
unnecessary in securing property - law alone can guarantee its security.
Law, for Thompson, however, merely sanctions a pre-existing right of property: 
"The mind of man is the parent of law, as his labour is of property".1 23
(1) See Section 3, below, pp.
(2) Theory of Legislation, p.113
(3) Inquiry, p.26B
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So it is labour that creates a title to property - not law. Thompson 
even goes on to argue that the need for leaislation may be negated 
altogether under two sets of circumstances: the first, where private 
vigilance and strength is sufficient to protect possessions: and the 
second, where knowledge and private morals are so improved as to nullify 
the need for punitive measures designed to protect property."
The second point of note relates to the first and concerns the 
comparative status of labour in the Benthamite and Thompsonian schemas.
Bentham declared that:
Law does not say to man, Labour, and I will reward <
you; but it says: Labour and I will assure to vou
the enjoyment of the fruits of vour labour - that
natural and sufficient recompense which without me
you cannot preserve: I will Insure it bv arresting
the hand which may seek to ravish it from you. 2
Although this suggests that labour was regarded as pre-eminent in 
creating property, Bentham was also prepared to sanction alternative modes 
of acquisition - first occupancy, prescription, and accession. There is, 
as Ryan notes, nothing "special" about the reification of the labour of 
one's body in external objects.^ For Thompson labour clearlv was "special". 
Other modes of founding a title to an object are neglected altogether.
Labour expenditure comprises the onlv natural and legitimate appropriative 
medium. 123
(1) Inquiry, pp.278-315.
(2) Bentham, Theory o* Legislation, p.llO. Cf. Mill,"Essay on Oovernmentjp.57.
(3) Ryan, Property and Political '"heorv, p.99
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Section 2: Refutations of the Claims of Land and Capital.
In the last section we focused on the normative bases of leaitimate 
appropriation, observing that the antl-Rlcardians, Hodcrskin, Grav, Pray 
and Thompson, all enunciated labour theories of aDpropriation - albeit all 
grounded In different philosoDhlcal systems - and that all, in consenuence, 
subscribed to the view that the labourer ought to be secured the entire 
fruits of his labour. In order to substantiate the claims of labour, and In 
order to demonstrate that the nrevailing system of industrial capitalism 
which was depriving the labourer of the full fruits of his endeavour was 
actually functioning against natural law, equity or utility, the anti-Ricardians 
had to establish that the claims of the landlord and capitalist to a sha.re in 
the product of labour, were, in fact, illegitimate. This Involved then in 
two ventures: firstly, thev had to show that payment for the use of land was 
contrary to the labour theory of individuation; and secondlv, they had to 
refute the claims of the classical political economists that profit was a 
legitimate return for the Drovision of caDital on account of the oerformance 
of that capital in the oroduction orocess. As we shall discover below, the 
first venture led the anti-Ricardians to deny the justice of a right of 
ownership over the land and the second led Hodgskin and Bray, specifically, 
to deny the nuroorted functions of capital. Once these two themes
were established, the anti-Ricardians could then demonstrate the mechanism 
by which the landlord and the capitalist were able to intervene between the 
labourer and his oroduct, therebv breaking the coincidence between labour 
expenditure and approDriation.
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It will be the purpose of this section to elucidate the types 
of proprietary right in land consistent with the just principles of 
appropriation (section 2(i)); and secondly, to analyse Hodqskin's and Bray's 
refutation of the claims of capital (section 2 (li)) , before movlnq on 
(in section 3) to consider the mechanism by which the labourer was being 
systematically defrauded. We begin with an appraisal of the problem of 
land.
(i) Land: The Just Bases of a Proprietary Right.
In this sub-section we are primarily interested in the question of 
the types of property holdinqs deemed permissible according to the rioht 
principles of appropriation, deferring until the subsequent section our 
analysis of the impact of the abrogation of those principles upon the 
labourer, and the mechanism by which such abrogation is achieved.
Hodgskin, as we demonstrated in the previous chapter, believed that 
land had been donated by God to the use of mankind (in common). According 
to the premise that man must, as a law of his being, labour in order to live, 
Hodgskin surmised that individuated use-rights in the land were permissible 
according to natural right, provided that (1 ) the extent of those individuated 
holdings was limited by labour-capacity, and usage; (li) that qualitative 
differences in the fertility of the soil were compensated for in quantitative 
terms; and (ill) that the size of those land-holdings diminished as the level 
of skill and knowledge of the people increased.^- 1
(1) See above, chapter 6, section 2, pp.398-396 esneclally.
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According to natural law, therefore, anv title to land is based 
upon and limited by labour expenditure. Any individuation of the land 
that did not conform to the provisions laid out above was deemed 
illegitimate. As we observed in chanter 6 , the pattern of landholding 
characteristic of modern Europe was founded upon the abrogation of natural 
law, since (1 ) the extent of landholding is no loncer regulated by labour 
capacity, usage, or subsistence requirements; (1 1 ) developments in the 
level of skill and knowledge of the community are no longer influential 
in determining the size of permissible landholdings; (ill) an exclusive 
and monopolistic right of ownership has been established over the land; and
(iv) as a consequence of this monopolisation, access to the land on the 
part of the prooerty-less can only be acquired upon payment of rent. In 
addition to this, and perhaps most siqnificantly, the land is held by 
non-producers in direct contravention of natural law.
In Hodgskin's view, therefore, the onlv form of permissible landholding 
consistent with natural law and the natural right of property is a limited 
right of use to the land vested in the individual. Now, John Grav, whilst 
similarly claiming that the only legitimate oropertv right in land is a 
right of use, vests this right in mankind at large. The earth, Grav 
declares, is:
... the habitation, the natural inheritance of all 
mankind: of ages present and to come; a habitation 
belonging to no man in particular, but to every man; 
and one in which all have an equal right to dwell. 1  1
(1) Lecture on Hu.uapp., o.2Q (original emphasis)
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in other words, the earth belongs in common to mankind in its 
entirety. Exclusive aopropriation of the land is not permissible. The 
only ways that property can be rightfully acquired are: "by making it"; "bv 
purchasing it"> or "by donation from another, whose property it was".''
Since the earth was not created bv man, nor purchased by him, nor, indeed, 
donated to him by another, then, exclusive propertv in the land is illegitimate.
However, the "right to the use and possession of land" requires that man
2has "property upon it"i that is, the right to use and possess the land
is meaningful only if man can be shown to have a title to the produce of that
land, since he cannot legitimately have a title to the land itself.
If a number of men inhabited a desert Island, each would, on arrival, feel
$
an equal right to partake of whatever fruits he found upon it, but no one
would consider the unqathered fruit as his own. Only that which necessitated
the effort of labour would constitute property, and the labourer "would
feel and know, that he had more right to it them anv of his fellows".^
By the same rule, Gray alleges, no one would think o* calling the uncultivated
4earth his property, "while the whole of it remained in a state of nature".
The rule in question, and the proposition concerning the state of nature, 
relate to the application of labour, since it is that which differentiates 
the individual from the common. Since Gray has already declared that land 1234
(1) Lecture on Hu.Happ, p.29.
(2) Ibid.,p.29.
(3) Ibid.,p.29.
(4) Ibid., p.30
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cannot becorr>e private oronertv, he mu3t he making a ooint about the 
expenditure of labour, the yield of a crop, and the title to that cron - and 
not the generation of a proprietary title to the land - for he continues:
Let /a man7 ... cultivate that land; let him clear it 
and plough it; let him sow it with seed; and let that 
seed oroduce a crop; and who would say of that cron 
"it is not his" , ... It would be known that it was bv 
his labour that it was produced. 1
On the assumption, therefore, that the earth is the common heritage 
of all mankind, and that prooerty can only be acquired (originally at least) 
by labour expenditure as a kind of creative process, Gray argues that the 
only permissible right of property in the land is a right of use. Once 
labouring ceases upon the land, so too does the individual's use-right,’ 
although the previous possessor is entitled to compensation for imorovements
executed on the land, or, in other words, for the labour invested in the
2cultivation and improvement of that land.‘ Gray does not, however, exolain 
how such compensation will be financed - whether by government, or the 
new possessor.
Claims to ownership of the land based upon a "collection of parchments" 
prove nothing, he declares. Private property in the land can arise only 
by illegitimate means, with rental payments, a necessary consequence of 
such illegitimate appropriation, as we shall see below.
Just as Grav had regarded the earth as the common property of all 
mankind, so too did John Francis Bray, asserting, as the third of those *7
(1) Lecture on Hu.Happ.,p. 30 (original emphasis)
(7)  Cf., ibid.,p.31. Gray notes that such comnensation is determined
by "the value of that quantltv of manure, and of the cruality of labour 
which would be required to convert the land from the quality it was to 
the quality it now is".
441
laws (or ^irst orinclples/'promulgated In the great book o^ Mature", 
that:
As the nature and wants of all men are 
alike ... the great field of all exertion, 
and the raw material of all wealth - the 
earth - Is the common property of all Its 
Inhabitants. 1
Since man's first duty is to self-preservation, and since the 
expenditure of labour is necessary to that preservation, but since the 
earth is the common Droperty of all mankind (both present and future 
generations) the only type of prooertv right in the land consistent with 
these considerations is a right of use. Every man has, as it were, "the
right of appropriating to himself the various necessaries of life which’ he
2can, by his labour, compel the earth to yield"; however, no man has a 
right to establish individual dominion therein.
If any individual appropriate to himself the ^leld
on which all labour is exercised - if he attempt to
set up a claim to any part of the earth - he clearly
does that which is unjust, and contrary to the common
equality of rights, for he Interferes with the egual
right ot everv human being to appropriate that same
particular soot. 3
Two or more claims to exclusive possession of any plot of land cannot 
co-exist, and since all natural rights have this facility of co-existence, 
the private ownership of land, whether established bv first occunancv or
(1 ) Labour''s Wrongs, p.28.
(2 ) Ibid., pp.32-33.
(3) Ibid., p.33. (Original emohasls).
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prescription, must of necessity be in violation of such rights. 1 All 
that man has is an exclusive right of orooertv in the fruits of his 
labour. This denial of the legitimacy of private orooerty in land has a 
generational dimension. Mot only do generations co-exist, but;
As the lives of all are held by the same tenure, 
and are dependent unon the same contingencies, 
the absolute rights of all to life and sustenance 
must necessarily be equal. 2
Then the only way that those rights cam be exercised, throughout time, is 
if the earth remains common to all. Hence, it is the absolute equality 
of man with man, which proscribes an individual riqht of propertv in land. 1 23 
Any individuation of the land is, therefore, contrary to the first principles 
adumbrated by Nature for man's existence.
Where Hodgskin was prepared to countenance a limited, individual 
use-right in the land ; and where Gray and Bray conceive of the land as common
(1) Bray anplies a similar logic to the question of political authority, 
arguing that the obedience of one man to another is in contravention 
of natural law. since all men are equal they are under no compulsion 
(other than force perhaps) to abide by rules drafted bv others. Consent 
cam form the only legitimate basis for such obedience, ibid., pp.34-37.
(2) Ibid. ,p. 33.
(3) Esther Lowenthal claims that Bray derives from the equal rights of man 
the necessity for equal wealth. If bv equal wealth he understood
the same quantum of wealth for all, then this interoretation is clearly 
misguided. Bray did not envisage that each would receive the same 
reward - rather, he aroued that property would be apportioned 
according to labour expenditure. This could of course lead to 
disparities in wealth, since men vary in physical and bodily powers, in 
their sustenance requirements - as Bray observes (ibid., p.29). Where 
cooperative production is envisaged, reward - i.e. wages - would be 
equal, where the man hours worked were equal; nothing more. Cf., 
Lowenthal, Esther, The plcardlan Socialists, (New York, Columbia, U.P. , 
1911. Reprinted bv Augustus M.Kellev Publishers, Clifton New Jersev, 
1972), p.8 8 .
property, accessible to all, but appropriable bv none, belonqing to 
society at large. 1 Thompson has little to sav about the source of 
legitimate rights of property in land. It is possible to surmise, however,
that given his claim that the Doverty of the labourer is principally due to the
2fact that he finds "everything around him appropriated", and his suggestion
that "even the very mountain bristling with rocks and repelling the tools and
toils of cultivation is fenced round by the claims of ownership" , 1 23 4 Thomoson
probably felt that the kind of property-holding in land most consistent with
maximum utility and maximum reproduction of wealth was either an individuated
use-right a la Hodgskin,or the communal ownership of land a la Owen,with
4labour expenditure regulating property in the produce of the land. This 
interpretation of Thompson is lent greater credence by the fact that he 
regarded the prevailing system of ownership as essentially illegitimate.
Like his compeers, Hodqskin, Gray and Bray, Thompson located the source of 
this illegitimacy in the acguisition o^ the land through conquest.*’
Having demonstrated, in their various ways, that the only type of 
property right in land consistent with the natural laws of appropriation 
and distribution was a limited use-riqht - whether individual or 
collective - the anti-Ricardians were in a position to show
(1) The administration of land might of course be on a community basis - but 
the main point is the fact that individuals were denied private rights 
in that land.
(2) Inquiry, p.164.
(3) Ibid., pp.39-40.
(4) See below, chanter 8 , section 2(ii), for an examination of these schemes.
Cf., Thompson, Inquiry, pp.38-40; Podqskin, Hat. & Artlf, pp.61-75, 
passim; Lab.Oef., pp.70-71; Gray, Lecture on Hu.Happ.,p.2P; Brav,
Labour1s Wrongs, pp.34, 54. See above chapter 6 , section 2, pp.388-400.
(5)
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that the extraction of rent baaed as It was uoon the institution of 
private oronertv in land was, in -Pact, in contravention of these laws.
Before tumino to the antl-Ricardian crltloue of rent, however, we must 
consider the wav in which the claims of caoital were rebutted. The primarv 
text here will be Thomas Hodaskln's tract, Labour Defended against the Claims 
of Capital.
(ii) Caoital: A Rejection of the Claims of the Classical Political 
Economists.
For the antl-Ricardians, la hour alone was regarded as productive
of wealth, and so their literature is permeated with such comments as (
1 2 "wealth is created by labour": "labour is the source of wealth"; and
wealth "is any object of desire produced by labour"? All these pronouncements
are underpinned by the Smithian claim that labour is "the oriainal ourchase-
4money that was naid for all things". Land, for example, assisted in 
production only to the extent that its powers were either subdued, or 
called forth by the labour of man. Whilst technically productive, 5 the 
fact that the application of labour is reouired to guide that productivity 
means that rental claims based on the simple ownership of the land are, in 
fact, illegitimate. 12345
(1) Hodgskln, Po p .Pol.Ec.,p.!9 (original emphasis)
(2) Gray, The Social System: A treatise on the Principle of Exchange, (1831) 
p. 18.
(3) Thompson, Ingulrv, p.6 .
(4) WN.I.v.2. This notion is undoubtedly the basis for Hodgskin's distinction 
between natural and social price. Cf., Thompson, The People's Science, 
p.92.
(5) Cf., Stark, The Ideal foundations of Economic 'thought, pp.S4 ff.
Now, according to the classical political economists, the notion 
of caoital productivity underlay the claims of the capitalist to his 
profit. The classical economists regarded capital as indispensable to 
production in two wavs; firstly, through the provision to the labourer of 
a stock of pre-accumulated wage goods, designed to sustain him through 
the time-consuming process of production - in other words, "the LABOURER is 
enabled, h£ being assured of his present subsistence, to direct his power 
to the greatest advantage"; ^and secondly, by directly increasing the
productive power of labour through the medium of machinery and other items
2of fixed capital.
In addition to the claims about the role of capital, Ricardo et al
had also argued that profit and wages were Inversely related. As the
share of one increased, that of other necessarily fell. Hodgskin
perceived in this proportional relationship, combined with the tendencv for
the labourer only ever to be remunerated with subsistence wages - the wages
of slavery - the mechanism by which the labourer was kept in indigence.
Thus it is "profits, or the capitalist's share of the national produce, which
is opposed to wages, or the share o<r the labourer".
Rent as the differential of the produce of superior over inferior lands
is viewed merely as a transfer of profit, seemingly unrelated to the problem
of labour remuneration. As Hodgskin argues at the beginning of Labour Defended,
the production of his surplus does not "break the hack" of the labourer, nor
4its allocation "break the heart of the labourer". 123
(1) Hodgskin, Lab.Def.,p .36. (original emphasis)
(2) See chapter 4, section 2(ii).
(3) Hodgskin, Lah.De^.,pp.27-R.
(4) Ibid.,pp.30-31
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It was Hodgskin's aim in Labour Defended, therefore, to refute 
the claims of the classical economists for caDital and to demonstrate 
that, in fact, the title to profit rested upon a violation of the natural 
law of appropriation. 1
Capital, he declared, is only the "produce ot labour", "is commodities",
2"is the food the labourer eats, and the machines he uses": or, as Pray
observes, "no more than the unconsumed nroducts of former labour" . 1 23 4what,
therefore, are "the wonderful properties" of caoital, for the use of which
4"the labourer pays so exorbitantly"? In order to undermine the claims of
Ricardo et al., Hodgskin begins with a rebuttal of the wage fund theorem 
which underlay the former's theory of market wages.
Fundamental to this theorem was the idea that the production Drocess 
determining the accumulation of wage-ooods - viz., that of agriculture - 
was of one year's duration. Given this annual period between harvests it 
was surmised that sufficient goods must be set aside to maintain labour until 
the following harvest. 5
(1) John Francis Bray substantially reproduces this argument in Labour's 
Wrongs, pp.46-7> 59-61. On this tooic Cf.,Hollander, Samuel, ’""he 
Post-Ricardlan Dissension", pp.380-382; Hunt, E.K., "Value Theory and the 
Writings of the Classical Economists", HOPE, 9, 1977, pp.327-345, and 
"The Relation of the Ricardian Socialists to Ricardo and Marx”, Science 
and Society, 44, 1 9 8 0 , op.177-198; King, J.F., "TJtopian or Scientific", 
pp.354-355.
(2) Hodgskln, Lab.Def.,p.31.
(3) Bray, Labour's Wrongs, p.46.
(4) Hodgskln, Lab.Pet.,p.32.
(5) Cf. Chanter 4, section 2 ( i i )  above.
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Hodaskin refutes the validity of the wane-fund hynothesis on a 
number of grounds. Firstly, the labourer's assurance of maintenance 
derives not from the existence of a nre-accumulated stock of goods, since 
on the whole the caoitalist does not own such a stock, but from the 
operations of co-existino labour From "svnchronized activity" . 1 Secondly, 
all that the labourer receives is monev to purchase the necessities of life 
and not wage-goods. Thirdly, the annual production period characteristic 
of agriculture is not in fact reoresentative of the oroductlon processes 
of other industries» there,time-Deriods mav overlan. And, finally, the 
specialization of individuals in specific occuoatlons is made feasible, and 
operative by the conviction that their fellows are simultaneously encaged in 
production. "Every snecies of labourer does constantly, and at all times,
2depend for his supplies on the co-existinc labour of some other labourers".
The canitallst extracts a nrofit, therefore, not for providing the
wage-goods necessary to support the labourer whilst he is workinc; rather
"it is by the command the capitalist possesses over the labour of some men . ..
3that HE is enabled to support and conseguently emplov other labourers".
This command derives as we will see from the capacity of the capitalist
to intervene between the maker of capital and the employer of it. With
regard to the purported attributes of fixed capital, both Hodgskin and Pray
4are willing to concede that fixed capital mav enhance labour productivity, 1234
(1) The term is Hollander's. See art.clt.,p.380. see Lab.Def.,p.47 e.g.
(2) Lab.Def.,0 .4 5 .
(3) Ibid,,p.52. (original emphasis).
(4) Ibid.,p.57. Pf. pp.52-3, and Hrav, Labour's wrongs, pp.46-7.
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but are reluctant to accept this as an explanation of the oriqln of 
profit.
Fixed capital, accordino to Hodgskin, has no worth, exceot insofar 
as labour is applied to it. It is simoly the oroduce of labour.
"Do they, or do they not” he asks of items of fixed 
caoital, "constitute an efficient means of production, 
seoarate from labour? Are they or are they not, so 
much inert decavino and dead matter, of no utilitv 
whatever, possessina no productive power whatever, 
but as they are puided, directed and applied by skilful 
hands? 1
The political economists argue, Hodpskin asserts, that fixed capital 
is the produce of previous labour, and is entitled to a profit, as
Icompensation for havinp been saved or stored up. This he denies. Firstly, 
the productivity of fixed capital is entirely contingent upon its alignment 
with labour. IndeDendent of that labour it can produce nothino, but would 
merely decay.
Secondly, fixed capital is not stored un after it is made. It is 
employed. Again the application of skilled labour is necessary, not only 
to render productive the fixed capital, but also to maintain it. The
"constant repairs" required by a road, for instance, "are a continual
2making". Thus its manufacture, is "quite as uninterrupted as the manufacture 
of food and clothino".^
The labour required to utilise, and make productive, fixed capital is 
always skilled labour. 123
(1) Ibid.,p.S3. C*. Hrav, oo.clt.,0.48.
(2) Ibid.,p.5Q.
(3) Ibid.,p.54.
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A steam-enaine also Is a most complete Instrument, 
but alas! for the capitalist, It does not go o f .
Itself. A oeculiar skill is required to make it 
and put it un, and oeculiar skill and labour must 
afterwards direct and requlate its movement ...
Its vast utllitv does not denend on stored-uo iron 
and wood, but on that oractical and living knowledoe 
of the oowers of nature which enable some men to 
construct it, and others to quide it. 1
All that is required before a nation can have fixed canital, surmises 
Hodqskin, is not a caDitalist class with the nower to accumulate, but
three circumstances: (1 ) the knowledqe and ingenuity necessary for
2inventinq machines: (li) The manual skill and dexteritv for executing
those inventions: 3 (iii) the reouisite skill and labour to utilise these 
4implements once made. Savina is irrelevant. '
Bray, who follows Hodqskin closely in the rest o f  his arqument, adopts 
a different viewooint with reqard to -Fixed capital. Fixed caDital, he 
argues, i3 siraplv the "unconsumed oroducts of former labour", 5 and as such 
is an inheritance of nast generations left in trust to oresent and future 
generations.
(1) Ibid.,p.61.
(2) Ibid.,pp.63-4
(3) Ibid.,p.64.
(4) Ibid, d o .64-5
(5) Bray, o n  cit.
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Every aeneration thus receives a greater or 
less amount of accumulated wealth from those 
which preceded it: therefore, in equity, everv 
generation is bound to provide for its successors 
in at least the same ratio as itself was provided 
for: and as copulation is ever on the increase, so 
likewise ouqht accumulations to be alwavs on the 
increase. 1
Were wealth to be distributed according to Nature's injunction, 
savino would not be the prerogative of the capitalist class, who by their 
present ownership of capital are able both to avoid labour, and to usurp 
the products of the labouring classes, through a system of unequal exchanges.
Bray, it seems, identifies capital accumulation specifically with the 
capacity to save. Hodgskin concludes, from his discussion, that:
I
Fixed capital does not derive its utility from 
previous, but present labour; and does not bring 
its owner a profit because it has been stored-uo, 
but because it is a means of obtaining a command 
over lahour. 3
All the advantages previously ascribed bv the classical economists to 
capital, be it fixed or circulating, actually emanate from the work of 
simultaneously present skilled labour.
As Hunt observes, capital represents,for the author of Labour Defended, 
"merely so many different aspects of the process of labouring, the relations
4among labourers, and the products of labour". 1234
(1) Ibid., p.47
(2) Ibid., p.47. Hneciual exchanges is the topic of the next sub-section.
(3) Labour Defended, p.55.
(4) Hunt, "Value 'T’heorv", p.343.
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The orofit of canital Is not, therefore, a leoltimate return *or 
the provision of a service necessary for production, but income deriving 
from exploitation - from the ownershlo of capital bv a non-labouring 
class.^
On its own Hodgskln's demonstration of the non-renroductivltv of 
capital reveals little about the way in which the capitalist actually 
manages to extract nrofit from the nroduce of labour. In order to 
demonstrate the illegitimacy of the claims of capital Hodgskin, and his 
fellow anti-Rlcardians,developed embryonic theories of exoloitation founded 
upon ideas concerning the ownership of the means of production, value 
regulation, and the question of unequal exchange. It will be the aim 
of the next section to examine those theories.
(1) Labour Defended, p.70.
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Section 3; The Bases of Exploitation: Monopoly Ownership of the Means 
of Production and Unequal Exchanges
In the last section we observed how the anti-Ricardians, indivi­
dually or collectively, had attempted to undermine the foundations of 
the landlord and capitalist's respective claims to factorial income (as 
currently distributed), by demonstrating, firstly that the extent of 
permissible landholdings according to the just principles of appro­
priation is determined by rights of use, and that those rights are
equal for all; and, secondly, by attributing to labour the benefits
1purportedly derived from the employment of capital in production. Under­
lying both these conclusions, we contend, is a belief that currently 
rent and profit, as returns originating in the ownership of the factors 
land and capital, are based on a violation of the natural laws of 
appropriation.
Now, Noel Thompson,in his book The people's science, has argued 
that the "Ricardian Socialists" based their explanation of the exploit­
ation of labour upon the concept of the abrogation of the natural law 
of value consequent upon the accumulation of capital and appropriation 
of land. Hitherto value had been calculated according to the relative 
quantities of labour expended in production; henceforth it was calculated 
by adding together wages, profit and rent; goods then "exchanged
according to the labour they commanded rather than the labour they
2
embodied". As Thompson demonstrates, the paternity for such an argument - 
if legitimate - is Smithian rather than Ricardian. 12
(1) This view is mostly limited to Hodgskin and Bray, though 
Thompson does, on occasion, make use of its argumentation.
cf., Thompson, Inquiry pp.90-116; Labour Rewarded, p.114 (eg).
(2) Thompson, N.W., op.cit., pi89.
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Persuasive though Thompson's argument is, his explanation of 
the theories of exploitation developed by the anti-Ricardians fails to 
take account of the labour theory of individuation which is, in our 
belief, central to an understanding of how these authors regarded the 
perpetration of exploitation. Indeed, it is our contention that, whilst 
the question of value is important to the issue of the extractive 
operations of the capitalist economy, it is in the abrogation of the 
natural laws of appropriation and distribution that the source of 
exploitation is located. The labourer ceases to receive his whole 
product to the degree that the originally prevailing laws of property 
are violated, and these are violated to the extent that capital and 
land are privately owned by non-labouring members of society,*' who «
are enabled thereby to extract a portion of the produce of labour as 
payment for the utilisation of these factors. Indeed, it is also our 
contention that the anti-Ricardian concern with the just terms of 
exchange is also underwritten by a concern for the just bases of 
entitlement, such that an exchange is equal, not only when the quantity 
of labour embodied in commodities is equal, but also when the exchange 
is between those with a legitimate title to the goods exchanged.
It is still possible, and indeed just, to see the primary influence
in the delineation of the above thesis as Smithian rather than
Ricardian, since it is Smith who actually observes that deductions from
the whole produce of labour begin at that point in time when land
2becomes private property, and capital accumulates. 1
(1) This qualification is necessary, because both Hodgskin and
William Thompson held the view that the ownership of capital by 
the producers of it, entitled them to some kind of remuneration 
for its use by others.
cf., WN.I.viii. 1-8 and above, chapter 1, section 2(iv).(2)
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It will be the aim of this section, therefore, to examine the 
question of exploitation - or the degree to which the labourer is 
denied the full fruits of his labour, considering, in the course of 
our discussion, the themes of value, monopoly ownership of the means 
of production, and unequal exchange (including the problem of the 
relationship between labour and the money supply).
Hodgskin's primary focus in the area of exploitation falls 
upon the question of the extent to which ownership of the means of 
production violated the natural rights theory of property outlined in 
the previous chapter. As we saw there, Hodgskin believed that current 
property in land was based upon usurpation and conquest, with rent 
emerging as a necessary payment for the utilisation of that land.^ 
Similarly, capital, when owned by any non-productive member of 
society, was also deemed illegitimate, with profit again emerging as 
a payment for use dependent upon monopoly ownership.
The key to understanding Hodgskin is to realise that he believed 
that labouring ought to be a universal activity, and an activity alone 
which conferred a legitimate title to property. Thus, the expenditure 
of labour, combined with requirements from population size, and 
sufficiency, is still sufficient to generate an individuated use-right 
to the soil. Similarly, Hodgskin's individualism leads him to the view 
that capital could belong to a man or class other than the employers 
of that capital, and that this ownership would ipso facto entitle the 
proprietor to a share in the product of the co-joint operation of 
capital and labour provided that the owner of the capital was the 
producer of it. 1
(1) See above, chapter 6 , section 2, pp398-400 for a more searching 
analysis of the origin of rent.
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Thus:
He who makes che instruments is entitled, 
in the eye of justice, and in proportion 
to the labour he employs, to as great a 
reward as he who uses them; but he is not 
entitled to a greater ... 1 .
That the arrangement is satisfactory to both is assumed by the 
long-continuance of the relationship between the men, or classes in 
question. For:
He who makes the capital finds this employment 
productive to him, or he would not continue it; 
and he who uses the capital finds that it 
assists his labour, or he would give nothing 
for it. 2 .
The essential point, according to Hodgskin, is, however, that "he' 
who neither makes nor uses them has no first claim to any portion of
3
the produce". Mere ownership, if not grounded in labour expenditure, 
does not create a sufficient title to a share in the product.
This view of Hodgskin's is interesting for his conception of 
value. Although Hodgskin pays little attention to the issue of 
exchange generally, he does make a pregnant distinction between natural 
and social price .developed out of a consideration of the relative views 
on value and price of Smith and Ricardo.
Natural price represented "the whole quantity of labour nature
4required from nan, that he may produce any commodity". "Labour was the 
original, is now and ever will be the only purchase monev in dealing 
with Nature",^ and, as such, sufficient to acquire property.
(1 ) Lab. Def.> P. 71.
(2 ) Pop. Pol. Ec. , p .244.
(3) Lab. Def. . P* 7, cf., Poo. Pol. Ec. , p.245.
(4) Pop. Pol. Ec. p.219.
(5) ibid. , p .220.
Contrasted with natural price, however, is social price, or 
exchangeable value, namely "what another will give or is obliged to 
give for this commodity when produced, (which) mav or may not be equal
to the quantity of labour employed in its production".^ This is,
2"natural price enhanced by social regulations". These social regul­
ations imply specifically for Hcdgskin, the extractive phenomena of rent 
and profit. To acquire any commodity in the market, therefore, the
labourer is required currently, through the unnatural - that is, nor.-
3labour based - manner in which land and most capital are held, to pay 
an enhanced price.
All price is paid by labour. Now Rent is a
part of the produce of labour, taken by a >
person who does not labour, and, of course,
if the labourer wishes to obtain for his own
use a quantity of produce equal to the quantity
obtained which he shared with the lord, he must
double, treble ... his labour ... to obtain it.
Rent, therefore, enhances price, by the 
whole of the amount of rent. Profit, being 
in like manner a diminution4 to the labourer 
of the value of his produce, enhances the 
price of everything into which it enters to 
the labourer.
Here Hodgskin is employing the pattern of historical value deter­
mination adumbrated by Smith in the Wealth, arguing that Smith is 
right to claim that, once land is appropriated, and capital accumulated 
in the hands of the few, the price of any good to the labourer is 
calculated by adding together rent, profit and wages. The basis of 
this adding-up hypothesis is, of course, the notion that rent and profit 12345
(1) Hodgskin to Place, 28 May 1820, B.M. Add. MSS. 35, 153, f. 142 ff, 
cited in Hal6vy, op■ cit., p.75. £f ., Lab. Def. pp.75-76;
Pop. Pol. Ec. pp.219-235.
(2) Pop. Pol. Ec. p.220.
(3) Both originate in the usurpation of land through conquest.
(4) In the sense, initially, of a deduction from the produce of labour.
(5) Hodgskin to Place, 28 May 1820, cited in Haltsvy, op.cit., p.73 
(my emphasis).
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were both deductions from the produce of labour (for goods acquired in 
production) since the labourer is compelled, through the artificial 
right of property, to pay for the use of the factors land and capital; 
and enhancements of the price of goods (acquired in the market), since 
what it would cost the labourer to acquire those goods from nature is 
less than it costs him in the market, after profit and rent have been 
added to the price of the commodity in question.^
According to Ricardo, however, labour cost always determines 
value. And so Ricardo fails to differentiate between natural price
and exchangeable value. Both, he asserts, are regulated by the labour
2required to produce a commodity. If this were so, Hodgskm asserts,
then "the wages of labour would always be equal to the produce of '
labour",^ and the natural law of property clearly operative. However,
since the wages of labour are not equal to the produce of labour,
because of the operation of an artificial right of property, Ricardo's
account of value in exchange is at fault, for it fails to take account
of the degree of deviation between natural price and social price,
4
generated by the extractive nature of rent and profit.
For John Gray, as we saw in section 2(i), the only way in which 
property may be legitimately acquired is through production, purchase, 
or donation.^ Appropriation through production rests upon labour 
expenditure, whilst appropriation through purchase rests upon the 12345
(1) See above, chapter 2, section 2(iv),
(2) ibid., pp.74-75.
(3) ibid., p.75. Thompson op.cit., pp.92, 93-4; Hollander, art.cit., 
p .¿79. Ricardo is condemned as it were for failing to recognise
the exploitative nature of rent and profit; and King, J. D. "Utopian 
or Scientific, A reconsideration of the Ricardian Socialists",
HOPE, 15, 1983, p.349.
(4) Ricardo is criticised, as it were, for making rent extraneous to cost.
(5) See above pp,439-440.
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exchange of equivalents and, since there is, a la Smith, a propensity 
peculiar to man to "exchange labour for labour", a propensity which 
forms the "basis of society" upon which "all other institutions 
amongst men arc built",* it is just as important for utility that 
equitable principles of exchange be restored as the natural law of 
property acquisition be reinstituted. Grav's concern with exchange is 
significant, as we shall see later in the chapter, to his conception of 
money.
Gray, constructing an elaborate classification of species of 
unproductive labour, notes, early in the Lecture on Human Happiness, 
that "every necessary, convenience and comfort of life is obtained by , 
human labour. 1 st by labour in cultivating the earth itself. 2nd by
labour in preparing, making fit. and appropriating the produce of the
2earth to the uses of life." Every member of society not engaged in
one of these occupations is necessarily an unproductive member of
. _ 3society.
Every unproductive member of society is a 
DIRECT TAX upon the productive classes.
Every unproductive member of society is 
also a USELESS member of society, unless 
he gives an EOUIVALENT for that which he 
consumes. 4.
Property, according to Gray, can only be legitimately acquired by 
either the expenditure of labour, or the exchange of equivalents, and 
yet the landlord, who does not labour, can still command subsistence 123
(1) Lecture on Hu. Happ., p.3 (original emphasis).
(2) ibid., p.ll.CAU other species of labour are "useless".)
(3) Gray, utilising Colquhoun's statistical work on the Wealth and 
Resources of the British Empire, identifies 51 species of 
unproductive idler; ibid.. pp.12-24.
(4) ibid., p .1 1 .
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goods - and more - because of Che illegitimate ownership of land, 
whilst the capitalist, living off the interest of money, manages 
similarly to both evade the obligation to labour, and the obligation 
to render an equivalent for the labour he receives. Requiring interest 
for the use of money is an illegitimate source of wealth, for all just 
contracts are founded in the obligation to exchange "equal quantities of 
labour", and yet the custom of receiving interest for the use of money 
enables the lender to obtain double or treble what he lends, a clear 
breach of equivalence.
What does the productive labourer obtain for 
that portion of the produce of his industry, 
which is annually taken from him by incomes
obtained by the lenders of money. He obtains ,
NOTHING! Then we ask, is a man the natural 
proprietor of the produce of his own labour?
If he is not, what foundation is there for 
property at all? 1 .
According to the just principles of appropriation, labour ought 
to receive the full fruits (or the equivalent) of its labour. Under 
present circumstances, it is obvious, from the existence of rent and 
profit (or interest) as defined above, that this just principle is 
being violated. The question is how?
"The persons who furnish the subject of our present 
consideration", Gray writes, "are living upon 
property which is not naturally their own. They 
are living upon property, of which the productive 
classes are the true proprietors, and of which 
they have been deprived by the force of circum­
stances . The property thev live upon is not 
theirs: they did not create it: thev have given 
no equivalent for it. We defy them to show, bv 
any principle of justice, that thev have any right 
whatever to it. 2 .
The "force of circumstances" alluded to by Gray is the system of
competition which requires the capitalist to deceive his customers, by
3
deliberately misrepresenting the quality and value of his produce; 12
(1) Lecture on Human Happiness, p.32 (original emphasis).
(2) ibid., pp.43-44 (original emphasis). (3) ibid., cp.35-36.
460
compete with his fellow capitalist to find the most profitable outlet 
for investing his capital; and by depriving the labourer of the "greatest 
possible proportion of the produce of their labour".*'
2As we saw previously, the labourer, under capitalism, is being 
denied his just desert3 ,through the intervention of capital and land 
between the labourer and his product. This intervention rests on the 
monopoly ownership of the means of production by the capitalist and 
landlord. However, just as the landlord and capitalist deprive labour 
of its just rewards, so they too suffer by the system of capitalism 
under which they operate.
Naturally, there exists two limits to production: the exhaustion #
of man's productive powers; and the satisfaction of his wants. In the 
present capitalist state of society, however, a third limit exists, 
competition. "The interests of men, in their mode of employing capital,
and in the distribution of the produce of their labour, are at variance
3with each other", he declares.
Demand, Gray asserts, is composed of the aggregate quantity of 
wealth which the labour, services, and property of the whole community 
can command, which aggregate is composed of the labour, services and 
property which the individual can command. Competition at present 
circumscribes the quantity obtained by each, to the least acceptable 
amount. The existence of a body of unemployed labourers seeking work 
ensures that the remuneration received by the labouring classes is 
reduced to the lowest level consistent with the subsistence and 123
(1 ) ibid., p.50 (original emphasis).
(2) See above, sections 1 and 2(i).
(3) ibid., p.50.
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reproducción. That the labourer does not receive more, nor demand 
more, is explained by the existence of what might be seen as a pre­
cursor of Marx's "industrial reserve army". Similarly, the wealth of 
the tradesman is circumscribed by the amount of profit he is able to
command; and competition amongst traders ensures that this is at its
2lowest possible limit.
Thus competition limits the quantity of wealth 
obtained by individuals: the quantity obtained 
by individuals collectively composes the 
aggregate quantity obtained by the whole 
community: This aggregate quantity forms the 
demand, and demand limits production. 3.
Only when competition is eliminated, and production rationalized 
will capital be used most efficiently, and labour reap the full fruits , 
of its efforts.
In his later works, Gray abandons to some extent his criticism of
competition to concentrate on theorizing about the manner in which "the
production of goods" could become "the unfailing cause of a demand for
them". A defective system of exchange, founded on the present limitations
on the money supply, is regarded as the source of the artificial 
. . 4restriction on demand. The intention of Gray's thesis is to prove 
that aggregate over-production would never exist in a free society 
founded on the right monetary principles. He is, as it were, extending 
Say's thesis that aggregate demand and aggregate supply are co-extensive. 1234
(1) ibid. , pp.52-53.
(2) ibid. , pp.52-53.
(3) ibid. , p.53 (Original emphasis).
(4) See Gray, John, The Social System: A Treatise on the Principle of 
Exchange(1831); An Efficient Remedy for the Distress of Nations 
(1842); The Currency Question. A rejected letter to the Times,(1847) 
Lectures on the Nature and Use of Money (1848), p p 64-102.
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Reiterating,in An Efficient Remedy for the Distress of Nations, 
the labour theory of appropriation, Grav observes that "man cannot 
live like a bird, or beast, or fish, upon the direct results of his 
own industry: he is by his nature an exchanging animal".* Under current 
conditions, not only is man denied the full fruits of his labour 
through a violation of the labour theory of individuation on the part 
of the capitalist and landed classes, but he is also defrauded through 
the process of exchange - specifically, through the prevailing system 
o f money.
The basis of a iust and equitable exchange is equivalence.
Labour not only creates wealth, endowing it with value, via the trans­
formation of raw materials into consumable produce, it also comprises '
2the determinant of value in exchange. Thus:
the general principle which regulates the 
quantity of one thing which is commonlv 
given in exchange for another thing, is 
the relative quantity of capital, skill 
and labour employed in its production. 3
so that the "utmost an operative can enioy is the whole that, under 
the most favourable circumstances, he may be able to create".^
In an advanced economy however, man cannot exist simply bv 
barter: the extent of specialisation and variety of goods produced 
lead him to introduce a circulating medium as a means of facilitating 
exchange. 5 Money becomes, therefore, the medium in which the value of 
commodities are estimated. Exchanges can onlv be equitable when money 123*5
(1) Efficient Remedy, pp.95-6. £f., Soc. Svst., p,20.
(2) Nat, and Use of Money, p.155.
(3) ibid.. p.33.
(A) Efficient Remedy, p.99.
(5) (If., Soc. Svst. . pp.58-62. Monev has the advantages of 
divisibility; durability and portability.
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represents exactly the labour value of the commodities in question.
As such money must itself not be subject to variation in its value.
It can, as it were, "never by any possibility be itself valuable".^
The quantity of money, in the market at any one time, must therefore 
represent the total labour value of all commodities produced.
Since Gray identifies the deficiency of effectual demand as the 
cause of mass poverty, and since money represents the power of purchasing, 
or effectual demand, he concludes easily that effectual demand is 
deficient because the money supply is not regulated by the volume of 
production. Money "of the existing character cannot by any possibility
increase as fast as the apparent aggregate of other commodities is
2capable of being increased". '
As Bray similarly observes:
Money is to capital, or real wealth, what
the alphabet is to written languages; but
the money in existence will no more represent
all that should be thus personified, than
can the letters £ o be made to spell good. 3.
Both men perceive a reformation of the system of exchange, and
the nature of the prevailing currency,as basic to the restoration of
4the natural law of property and value.
Provided that it was possible to ensure that "the quantity of 
money in circulation would at all times be equivalent to the nominal 
or money value of the property in store", fraudulent exchange and 1234
(1) Efficient Remedy, Pp.9'5-6.
(2 ) ibid., p . 2 (original emphasis).
(3) Bray, Labour's Wrongs, p.141 (original emphasis).
(4) See below,chapter 8,for details of both Gravfe and Brav's schemes 
for monetary reform.
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exploitation of the working classes could be prevented. In his 
early work, therefore, Gray is more concerned to locate the sources 
of exploitation in the capacity of the landlord and capitalist to 
deprive the worker of his ;ust (labour) deserts through their 
illegitimate ownership of the means of production and subsequent 
capacity to derive income from the use of that property, whereas in 
his later works the emphasis shifts more to the problem of under­
consumption as it relates to the deficient and defective money supply 
prevailing under industrial capitalism. In both instances, however, 
Gray's purpose is ^ ‘'reconcile* labour with the full extent of its 
product.
William Thompson, like both Hodgskin and Gray, similarly 
conceives of exploitation as the deprivation of labour of the entire 
fruits of its endeavour, locating the source of this exploitation in 
the capacity of the landlord and capitalist to intervene between labour 
and its product and to demand a share in that product, thus breaking 
the coincidence between labouring and appropriation.
According to the natural laws of distribution formulated to 
accommodate equality and security, all labour ought to be free and 
voluntary; all the products of labour secured to the producers of them; 
and the exchange of those products founded on the principles of freedom 
and voluntariness, for such laws alone will guarantee both maximum 
happiness and maximum reproduction of wealth. Currently under the system 
of insecurity, however, each of these laws is being systematically 
violated. The basis of this violation resides in the mononolv ownership
of the means or production. In civilised societv, Thomnson surmises,
2the labourer finds "everything around him apnrooriated". Unlike the 12
(1) Gray, Soc. Svst., o,6 6 .
(2) Inquiry, p.164.
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savage who has :,onlv to out out his hand and gather" the materials 
of nature, "and transform them bv labour into consumable or exchangeable 
wealth",^ the civilised labourer finds that "all the materials to work 
UDon are appropriated by previous labour, force or fraud". Indeed,
"even the verv mountain bristling with rocks and repelling the tools
2and the toils of cultivation is fenced round bv the claims of ownership".
The labourer, with no means of production at his disposal, has onlv
one choice, therefore; he can either starve, or accept whatever wage
3and working conditions the capitalist offers him. His labour is, in 
consequence, neither free nor voluntary in regard to direction or 
continuance.
(A)s long as the laborer stands in societv 
divested of everv thing but the mere power 
of producing, as long as he possesses neither 
the tools nor machinerv to work with, the land 
or materials to work upon, the house and 
clothes that shelter him, or even the food 
which he is consuming while in the act of 
producing; as long as any institutions or 
expedients exist, bv the open or unseen 
operation of which he stands dependent ... 
on those who have accumulated those necessary 
means of production, 4 ,
the idle few will be enriched at the expense of the mass of producers.
In order to render his labour productive therefore, the 
labourer must recompense the capitalist and landlord for the opportunity 
they afford him of access to the means of production. Thompson, from
(1) ibid., pp.39-40.
(2) ibid., pp.39-40.
(3) Hunt, "Utilitarianism and the labor theorv of value", p.552.
Cf. , Pankhurst, op.cit., po.48-53.
(4) Inquiry, p,590.
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his utilitarian position of an emphasis on security, is compelled to 
accept the prevailing pattern of property distribution as a given, 
although a given based on uniust principles,^ and thus is unable to 
suggest the forcible redistribution of property (in the means of 
production) concentrating instead on the elucidation of those 
principles guiding exchange most comformable with utility. "Doubtless
the laborer must pay for the use of these (i.e. land and capital), when
2so unfortunate as not himself to possess them"; the question is how 
much should be pay?
The landlord, Thompson argues, rather than sell his land for an 
equivalent in labour, determines to rent that land "getting in return 
every year so much labour, measured by its products, so much of the ’ 
increase of the soil as may be deemed as equivalent", whilst the 
capitalist also requires compensation for the use of his capital:
A universal and always vigilant conspiracy of 
capitalists, of necessity the most intelligent, 
exists everywhere, because founded on a universally 
existing interest, to cause the laborers to toil 
for the lowest possible, and to wrest as much as 
possible of the products of their labour to swell ^ 
the accumulations and expenditure of capitalists.
In considering how much of the product of labour ought to be 
subtracted for the use of capital, Thompson notes that "two measures of 
the value of this use" exist according as the problem is viewed from 123
(1) Cf., section l(ii) above where Thompson considers the problem 
of the "utility of the actual distribution", and the "utility 
of the acquisition",
(2 ) ibid. , p .167.
(3) ibid., pp,39-40.
(4) ibid., pp.170-171. Cf., Smith, WN.I.viii. 11-13.
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the perspective of worker or employer respectively. These two 
"measures" of value also offer alternative explanations of the origin 
of profit and surplus value.
Given the assumption that labour alone is productive of value, the 
labourer would argue that, "the materials, the buildings, the machinery ...
can add nothing to their own value. The additional value proceeds from
2labour alone". Capital is merely "the creature of labour and materials",
3not their creator, and, as such, "the dead material is nothing"
. 4without the application of labour. And since this is so, all the
additional value, accruing from the combined efforts of labour and
capital, ought to devolve on the labourer, except for the subtraction
I
of sufficient to cover the depreciation costs of the capital used, and' 
sufficient to pay wages to the owner of that capital, to enable him to 
live "in equal comfort with the more actively employed labourers".^
Profit is viewed, therefore, as the "surplus product of a man's labour",*’ 
whose source is "the value added to the unwrought material by the labour 
guided by the skill expended upon it".^
From the perspective of the capitalist, however, the demand is 
that he should appropriate all the "additional value produced by the 
same quantity cf labour in consequence of the use of machinery or
g
other capital". The additional value accuring to the combined efforts 12345678
(1) ibid., p.167. Cf., Gray, Alexander, The Socialist Tradition: 
Moses to Lenin ,~TLondon, Longmans, 1947 ed.) p,274.
(2) Inquiry, p.166.
(3) Labour Rewarded, p.114.
(4) Inquiry, p.90, c_f. Hodgskin, Labour Defended.
(5) ibid., p.167.
(6 ) ibid., p,52.
(7) ibid., p,166, cf..King, "Utopian and Scientific", p.350.
(8) ibid., pp.167-8.
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of labour and capical is being imputed to the productive power of 
capital. A simple test will isolate the source of this sumlus value, 
claims the capitalist. "Before the invention of machinery ... what was 
the amount of produce which the unaided cowers of the labourer produced? 
Whatever that was, let him still eniov".^ The whole of the 'surplus 
value' ought to - and in fact does - devolve upon the capitalist, "for
his superior intelligence and skill in accumulating and advancing to the
2labourer his capital or the use of it".
And so it is that "the productive labourers 
stripped of all capital, of tools, houses, and 
materials to make their labour productive, toil 
from want, from the necessity of existence, their 
remuneration being kept at the lowest compatible j  
with the existence of industrious habits ...
Although Thompson proffers these two explanations of the origin «
of profit, it is clear - even given the ambiguities in his presentation
4of value - that Thompson conceives labour to be, both the only source 
of wealth, and the measure of value.^
Originally the land was valueless; only labour 
had made it valuable. The first settler cleared 
the timber, erected a shed and affixed the value 
of his labour to that Dart of the soil on which 
it had been expended ... A second settler, paying 
for the labour under the name of the land, added 
to its value bv expending more labour upon it, 
clearing a larger space ... (etc) ... Thus is a 
piece of land, which was a few years ago an 12345
(1) ibid., Dp.168-9.
(2) ibid., pp.167.
(3) ibid., p .170-171.
(4) Thompson regarded value as the labour embodied in a good, the labour 
they saved, and as the utility of the commoditv (Inquiry, pp.7-17). 
Whilst this seeming lack of consistency in Thompson's theory of value 
has led a number of authors to claim that he was confused, Thompson's 
differentiation between labour embodied and labour saved can, in
fact, be quite simply viewed as a recasting of the Smithian distinction 
between the "real price of everything", and the real worth of a 
commodity once acquired, which does not undermine the claim that labour 
is the source or measure of value. The question of utility,however, 
remains somewhat unresolvable. (c_f, Thompson,N.W. op■cit. pp.90-91; 
Hunt, "Utilitarianism and the Labor Theory of Value",pp »549-651, for 
criticisms of Thompson's concept of value).
(5) Cf. , Inquiry, op.3, 10 e.g.
M M k
466
his utilitarian position of an emphasis on security, is compelled to 
accept the prevailing pattern of property distribution as a given, 
although a given based on uniust principles,^ and thus is unable to 
suggest the forcible redistribution of property (in the means of 
production) concentrating instead on the elucidation of those 
principles guiding exchange most comformable with utility. "Doubtless
the laborer must pay for the use of these (i.e. land and capital), when
2so unfortunate as not himself to possess them"; the question is how 
much should be pay?
The landlord, Thompson argues, rather than sell his land for an 
equivalent in labour, determines to rent that land "getting in return
every year so much labour, measured by its products, so much of the '
3increase of the soil as may be deemed as equivalent", whilst the 
capitalist also requires compensation for the use of his capital:
A universal and always vigilant conspiracy of 
capitalists, of necessity the most intelligent, 
exists everywhere, because founded on a universally 
existing interest, to cause the laborers to toil 
for the lowest possible, and to wrest as much as 
possible of the products of their labour to swell ^ 
the accumulations and expenditure of capitalists.
In considering how much of the product of labour ought to be 
subtracted for the use of capital, Thompson notes that "two measures of 
the value of this use" exist according as the problem is viewed from 123
(1) Cf., section l(ii) above where Thompson considers the problem 
of the "utility of the actual distribution", and the "utility 
of the acquisition",
(2) ibid.. p .167.
(3) ibid., pp.39-40.
(4) ibid., pp.170-171. Cf., Smith, WN.I.viii. 11-13.
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the perspective of worker or employer respectively. These two 
"measures" of value also offer alternative explanations of the origin 
of profit and surplus value.
Given the assumption that labour alone is productive of value, the 
labourer would argue that, "the materials, the buildings, the machinery ...
can add nothing to their own value. The additional value proceeds from
2labour alone". Capital is merely "the creature of labour and materials",
3
not their creator, and, as such, "the dead material is nothing"
4without the application of labour. And since this is so, all the 
additional value, accruing from the combined efforts of labour and
capital, ought to devolve on the labourer, except for the subtraction
/
of sufficient to cover the depreciation costs of the capital used, and' 
sufficient to pay wages to the owner of that capital, to enable him to 
live "in equal comfort with the more actively employed labourers".^
Profit is viewed, therefore, as the "surplus product of a man's labour",^ 
whose source is "the value added to the unwrought material by the labour 
guided by the skill expended upon it".^
From the perspective of the capitalist, however, the demand is 
that he should appropriate all the "additional value produced by the 
same quantity cf labour in consequence of the use of machinery or
g
other capital". The additional value accuring to the combined efforts
(1) ibid., p.167. Cf., Gray, Alexander, The Socialist Tradition: 
Moses to Lenin,~~TLondon, Longmans, 1947 ed.) p.274.
(2) Inquiry, p.166.
(3) Labour Rewarded, p.114.
(4) Inquiry, p.90, c_f. Hodgskin, Labour Defended.
(5) ibid., p.167.
(6) ibid., p,52.
(7) ibid., p,166, cf.,King, "Utopian and Scientific", p.350.
(8) ibid., pp.167-8.
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of labour and capical is being imputed to the productive power of 
capital. A simple test will isolate the source of this surolus value, 
claims the capitalist. "Before the invention of machinery ... what was 
the amount of produce which the unaided powers of the labourer produced? 
Whatever that was, let him still enioy".^ The whole of the 'surplus 
value' ought to - and in fact does - devolve upon the capitalist, "for
his superior intelligence and skill in accumulating and advancing to the
2labourer his capital or the use of it".
And so it is that "the productive labourers 
stripped of all capital, of tools, houses, and 
materials to make their labour productive, toil 
from want, from the necessity of existence, their 
remuneration being kept at the lowest compatible j 
with the existence of industrious habits ...
Although Thompson proffers these two explanations of the origin •
of profit, it is clear - even given the ambiguities in his presentation 
4of value - that Thompson conceives labour to be, both the only source 
of wealth, and the measure of value.^
Originally the land was valueless; only labour 
had made it valuable. The first settler cleared 
the timber, erected a shed and affixed the value 
of his labour to that oart of the soil on which 
it had been expended ... A second settler, paying 
for the labour under the name of the land, added 
to its value bv expending more labour upon it, 
clearing a larger space ... (etc) ... Thus is a 
piece of land, which was a few years ago an 1234
(1) ibid., pp.168-9.
(2) ibid., pp.167.
(3) ibid., p .170-171.
(4) Thompson regarded value as the labour embodied in a good, the labour 
they saved, and as the utility of the commodity (Inquiry, pp.7-17). 
Whilst this seeming lack of consistency in Thompson's theory of value 
has led a number of authors to claim that he was confused, Thompson's 
differentiation between labour embodied and labour saved can, in
fact, be quite simply viewed as a recasting of the Smithian distinction 
between the "real price of everything", and the real worth of a 
commodity once acquired, which does not undermine the claim that labour 
is the source or measure of value. The question of utility.however, 
remains somewhat unresolvable. (cf, Thompson,N.W. op.cit. pp.90-91; 
Hunt, "Utilitarianism and the Labor Theory of Value'1 ,pp .549-551, for 
criticisms of Thompson's concept of value).
(3) £f., Inquiry, op.3, 10 e.g.
469
object of wealth. What has nature done towards 
this conversion? Nothing. What has man, what 
has man's labour done? Everything. 1.
The problem is, of course, that although labour creates all value, 
and all wealth, and is according to the tenets of security entitled, 
naturally, to all that it produces, under the current system such 
"defalcations* as rent and Drofit are deducted from that product. In
fact, on average, such "defalcations" appear to "subtract at least one-
2half of the products of labour from the use of the producer".
Alongside restrictions on the free use and direction of labour, 
which effectively deny to the labourer the full fruits of his labour, 
through the deduction of rent and/or profit, the labourer is also 
subject to unjust exchanges. '
The question of just exchanges gains prominence in Thompson's 
later work, Labour Rewarded. Then he declares that: "forcible seizure,
fraudulent or voluntary exchanges, have always been, and still are, the
3only efficient means of acquiring large masses of wealth". Ir. fact,
By unjust exchanges ... supported by force or 
fraud, whether by direct operation of law, or 
by indirect operation of unwise social arrange­
ments are the products of the labor of the 
industrious classes taken out of their hands. 4.
An unjust exchange, for Thompson, clearly signifies one in which 
the commodities swapped are not of equivalent worth:
As soon as any laborer effecting any exchange 
receives more than a just equivalent, more than 
will replace to him the original material (or 
the labor of its production) which he gave in 
exchange; that moment the laborer assumes, for 
so much, the character of capitalist: he lives
for so much on the labor of others without real
equivalent. 5
(1) ibid., pp,10-11 (2) Inquirv, p.126.
(3) Labour Rewarded, p. 11 (4) ibid., p,12.
(5) ibid., p .16.
■■m
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It is this lack of equivalence, Thompson assercs, that explains 
the means of capital accumulation. The capacity of the capitalist to 
command more than he gives enables him to appropriate part of the 
produce of labour. Reconciliation of labour with its product requires, 
therefore, rationalisation of the means of exchange.
Thompson's treatment of the mechanism of exchange is far from 
comprehensive or systematic*, forming only one part of his explanation 
of the origins of exploitation, John Francis Bray, however, was more 
categoric in his assertion that all wealth had been taken from the
working classes through "the fraudulent and slavery-creating systems
2of unequal exchanges", based as this was upon the division of society
t
into a class to labour and a class to control labour, a necessary
3
consequence of "the institution of property as it at present exists".
Bray's criticism of the present unnatural system focusses on
4dispelling a myth propagated by a "political economist", that
Society ... both in its rudest form, and its 
most refined and complicated relations, is 
nothing but a system of exchanges. An 
exchange is a transaction in which both 
parties who make the exchange are benefitted, - 
and, consequently society is a state presenting 
an uninterrupted succession of advantages for 
all its members. 5.
The production of wealth is contingent on three circumstances - 
the existence of labour; an accumulation of capital; and exchanges. 1234
(1) See chapter 8 for a further consideration of the question of exchange.
(2) Bray, Labour's Wrongs, p. 57.
(3) ibid., p.17 (original emphasis).
(4) Namely, Charles Knight.
Labour's Wrongs., pp.41-2.(5)
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Labour., as we have already seen,was not, at present, universal; 
whilst the accumulation of capital bequeathed by past generations of 
labourers to their progeny - the labouring classes - has been usurped 
"by particular individuals and classes."^
Exploitation, for Bray, is rooted in the violation of the labour- 
based principle of appropriation, and perpetuated by the phenomenon of 
unequal exchanges. An exchange, he declares, is purportedly "a 
transaction between two parties, in which each gives the other something
which he has not so much desire for, as he has for the article which
2he receives in return".
The labourer, for example, exchanges his labour for a sum of money,
rather than remain idle or starve; whereas the capitalist prefers to
give his money for labour, rather than live off it: "for he sells or
exchanges the produce of such labour for a greater sum than the labour
originally costs him and by these means he is enabled not only to live 
3
in idleness”, but also to accumulate wealth. Clearly, the exchange 
in question is not founded upon labour equivalence.
According to justice, exchanges should always be mutually beneficial 
and since man has only two things to exchange, viz., his labour or the 
products of that labour, a just exchange will be an exchange of labour 
for labour. More than this, however, "equal values should always4
exchange for equal values". Under the present system the capitalist
(1) ibid., pp.46-7
(2) ibid., p.47.
(3) ibid., p, 47.
(4) ibid., P'48.
is able to buy the labour of a year for the value of half a vear. The 
degree of difference between the value of his outlay, and the value of 
the product - "labour power" to cite Marx - signifies both the 
capitalist'8 profit, and the degree of exploitation of the worker. 
However, to label such an arrangement an "exchange" is, Brav argues, 
somewhat misleading as there is in fact no exchange at all, for the 
capitalist gives nothing: he gives no labour, for he does not work; and 
he yields no capital, for his stock of that is constantly accumulating. 
What he does do is "give the working man, for his labour of one week, 
a part of the wealth which they obtained from him the week before'."^
The whole transaction is, therefore "a palpable deception, a mere 
farce", in fact, nothing more than "bare-faced, though legalised, '
robbery".^
Although there are suggestions in the above nassages of Karl
Marx's concept of surplus value, reinforced by such phrases as "the
working class perform their own labour, and support themselves, and
likewise perform the labour of the capitalist, and maintain him into 
3
the bargain!" , the principal difference between the two appears to be 
concerned with the manner in which that value was believed to be 
appropriated.
Marx locates the origin of surplus value in the "sphere of 
production". It is appropriated at source. The capitalist purchases 
labour power (potential labour) and sells the commodity in which labour 
(actualized labour power) was embodied during production. The origin of 
profit is the extent of the difference between the value of labour power 3
(1) ibid., p.49.
(2) ibid.. p .50.
(3) ibid, p.153. (original emphasis)
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and the value created in the process of converting that labour power 
to actual labour embodied in a saleable commodity.^ The rate of
exploitation can be determined by the ratio of surplus value to 
2variable capital. Conflict is quite clearly at the heart of this
3process - wages and profit are inversely related.
In contrast to this is the view that profit originates in 
alienation - that is, profit is the gain to be derived from buying 
cheap, and selling dear. Exploitation, in this theory, is located in 
the sphere of circulation, or exchange. Thus, surplus value - perhaps 
in its differentiated forms of profit and rent - is something added to 
labour cost in the market. This, Noel Thompson asserts, is the view 
advanced by the anti-Ricardians, who, he alleges, posit that the 
natural (labour embodied) law of value is abrogated, and replaced in
contemporary circumstances by a cost of production hypothesis, a la
4 . . . . .Smith, and who, in consequence, see the key to eliminating exploitation
as lying in the rationalisation of exchange, rather than in any direct
appropriation of the means of production.^
As already noticed, for Bray, the "exchange" incorporated in the 
wage contract was, in fact, not an exchange at all. Though the labourer 
is benefitted to the extent that he receives employment, he is not 
bene fitted to the extent that he receives an equivalent - in terms of 
labour - for that employment. Rather, it seems that the 12345
(1) Hunt, "Value theory in the Classical economists'', pp 330-331.
(2) Cohen, G. A. "The Labor Theory of Value and the Concept of 
Exploitation", Philosophy and Public Affairs, 8, 1979, pp.340-341.
(3) Hunt, art.cit., p.331.
(4) Thompson, The people's science,pp .82-110.
(5) ibid., p.110. Whilst accepting that the anti-Ricardians did not 
claim that exploitation originated in the sphere of production, to 
claim, as Thompson does, that thev had no interest in the ownership of 
the means of production is, in our opinion, a mistake.
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capitalist extracts more than he surrenders, and is enabled directly 
to avoid his own obligation to labour by so doing. Several remarks 
made by Bray suggest that this additional value is extracted directly 
at source - that is, in production - tending to support the hypothesis 
advanced by James P. Henderson, that he advances a theory of surplus 
value directly anticipatory of Marx.^ The main problem with such a 
rendition is that Bray fails to differentiate between the realm of 
production and the realm of exchange; and sees the rationalisation of 
the system of exchange explicitly as sufficient to re-unite labour and 
capital, attain maximum production, and secure the fruits of labour to 
their rightful owners, suggesting that he is the advocate of a profit- 
upon-alienation concept of exploitation. '
Fundamental to his assertion that inequality of exchange is 
responsible for depriving the labourer of his rightful fruits , is the 
idea that the gradation of classes - the existence of two separate and 
antagonistic powers, a class to labour and a class to control labour - 
based on the monopoly ownership of the means of production is funda­
mental to labour exploitation. Inequality of possession per se is 
quite natural. It is the existence of such inequality contingent upon
unequal exchange and the opposition of labour and capital that Bray
2objects to. Capital is not "self-existent"; it depends for its 
creation upon labour and this labour alone is entitled to appropriate 
that capital. However, the fact that the capitalist alone has the 
means to employ labour,through his possession of capital, means that 
any additional capital generated in production is automatically appro­
priated by the capitalist, and the labourer is left solely with subsis­
tence wages. 12
(1) Henderson, James P. "An English Communist, Mr. Brav (and) his 
remarkable work", HQPE . 17, 1985, op.73-95; esp. pp.80-87.
(2) Labour1s Wrongs, p, 50.
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Under the present social system, the whole of 
the working class are dependent uoon the capitalist 
or employer for the MEANS OF LABOUR, it is 
dependent, likewise, for the MEANS OF LIFE ...
Inequality of possessions give man this dominion 
over his fellow-man, and therefore inequality 
of possession ... constitute the great evil: 1.
Part of the "great armoury from whence the capitalists derive
2all their weapons to ... conquer the working classes", is the system 
of banking, or the creation and issue of money.
Hitherto, Bray has focused almost entirely on the premiss that
3equal labour ought to exchange for equal labour; however, once money 
is introduced into the picture, it becomes more apparent how the 
exchange mechanism constitutes a means of depriving the labourer of
i
the full fruits of his labour. Not only is labour denied its iust 
deserts through the extraction of profit and rent, but also through the 
inherently inequitable monetary system.
4
Money, Bray asserts, is merely a "representative of real capital". 
Intrinsically, paper money is of no worth, its value derives merely 
from conventional usage. However, at present it operates as "a chain 
of communication between the positive and the negative - between those 
who produce everything, and those who produce nothing".^ The problem 
arises because the money supply is too deficient to represent all the 
capital in existence. For the supply of money to be a iust and 
accurate supply, it must be calculated according to the existence of 
actually available produce. At present, however, much capital is not 
represented by money. 1234
(1) ibid., p.52.
(2) ibid., p.146.
(3) A point which leads him to reiect inequality of remuneration for 
different occupations, once the rationalisation of exchange is 
executed, ibid., pp.44-46, 63.
(4) ibid., p cl40 (original emphasis). (5) ibid., p.153.
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The comparatively small amount of money in existence,compared 
with produce, explains in part the inequality of man. Cost of 
production, the true determinant of value in exchange, does not at 
present determine price - "the value of things is regulated by the 
greater or less quantity of money there is in circulation".* At 
present, therefore, social evils such as unemplovment depend upon the 
existing scarcity of money. "Thousands are now idle and poor because
no person can set them to work ... because themselves and others are
2destitute of the requisite money".
The power of the banker to issue money, and to lend that money
(at interest) to the capitalist,means that both - through their indirect
and direct command over labour respectively - are enabled to acquire ’
3vast fortunes without the necessitv of labouring. 'For:
The persons who borrow the notes - whether trades­
men or speculators - set other men to work by 
means of this money, or buy commodities with it 
at a low price and sell them at a high price; and 
thus, no matter whether it be by giving a low 
price for labour and selling its produce at a 
high price, or by purchasing commodities cheap 
and selling them dear, the tradesmen and speculators 
are not only enabled to give the banker £110 for 
the £100 borrowed from him, but thev are also 
enabled to live in affluence with little or no 
labour of their own. A.
In addition to this, the monoDolisation of the banking sector by
a particular class, relating as it does to the quantity of national 
capital available for production, ensures that working-class demands for
reform can, on the whole, be ignored, since as long as the capitalists
(1) ibid., p-142.
(2) ibid., p.145.
(3) ibid., p . 149.
(4) ibid., P'149.
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have this mighty engine of good or evil 
at their disposal - so long as the power 
of making and issuing monev is usurped 
by particular classes, independent of 
other classes - the noneyd class can bid 
defiance to political associations, and 
trades' unions, and all similar institutions 
having for their object the amelioration of 
the condition of the working class, and the 
effecting of their deliverance from the chains 
of capital.'-
Bray's solution to the problems of exploitation required, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, a re-instituion of the natural labour 
law of appropriation, founded upon common ownership of the means of 
production, and the reform of the monetary system. 1
(1) ibid.. p.146. Further consideration will be given to Brav's 
views on money in the next chapter. c_f. , Lowenthal, op.cit.. 
pp .94-97; and Henderson, art.cit .pp.87-92 where he considers the 
relationship between Marx's views on money and capital as 
compared with Bray's.
\
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Conclusion
The anti-Ricardians, it is argued in this thesis, could be differ­
entiated from their classical economic counterparts by their concern 
with the conditions legitimating the acquisition of property. The 
political economists, we observed in chapters 3 and 4, failed to consider 
the proprietary bases of income distribution, neglecting almost completely 
the question of how such factorial returns may be justified.^ On the 
whole, the classical economists, with their implicit assumption of the 
sacrasanctity of private property, simply accepted as given the pre­
vailing system of property allocation, and focused on the technical 
aspect of how the rates of remuneration to such factors were determined.
t
The anti-Ricardians, however, in their championship of the claims of 
labournhad to demonstrate both the grounds of the claims of labour, and 
just exactly how those claims were being denied under the prevailing 
economic structure of industrial capitalism. As we demonstrated in 
this chapter this involved the anti-Ricardians in three pursuits: firstly, 
the presentation of the foundation of iustifiable appropriation; 
secondly, the refutation of the claims of land and capital; and finally, 
the consideration of the bases of exploitation. Thus we observed in 
section 1 that both John Gray and John Francis Bray delineated (instru­
mental) theories of property grounded in the expenditure of labour, 
both developed from the stance of the equality of human rights; and 
that William Thompson, premissing his theory upon the utilitarian 
calculus of the maximisation of pleasure, and concerned with the twin 
ends of the production of the greatest happiness of the greatest number 
and the attainment of the greatest possible reproduction of wealth 1
(1) There are some obvious exceptions. £f., James Mill, Essay on Govt. 
See above chapter 5, section 2.
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consistent with utility, enunciates an egalitarian utilitarian theory 
of property, ascribing a central role to the expenditure of labour in 
that enunciation. Taken in conjunction with our analysis of Hodgskin's 
views on property in chapter 6, we established that the central theme 
of the anti-Ricardian literature on property was the assertion that the 
entire produce of industry ought to be secured (singly or collectively) 
to the producers of it.
In Section 2 we focused upon the question of how the anti-Ricardians 
dealt with the claims of land and capital. With regard to land we 
demonstrated that all the anti-Ricardians, with the exception of 
William Thompson^defined the extent of permissible holdings in land 
according to the requirements of use, denying, ipso facto, the private ' 
appropriation of vast tracts of land. Thus Hodgskin, for example, 
whilst accepting the individuation of land from the common, makes the 
process of individuation contingent upon copulation size, the level of 
technology and skill of a country at any point in time, and the 
condition of "sufficiency" derived from Locke, making the property right 
in land a use-right, rather than a right of dominion. William Thompson, 
per contra, from the perspective of utilitarianism is, however, compelled 
to acknowledge security of property in the prevailing system of landed 
property, whilst tempering his position by an argument from the "utility 
of the acquisition" for all acquisitions of land after the inauguration 
of the natural laws of distribution.
Refutation of the claims of capital was primarily the province of 
Thomas Hodgskin, though similar arguments were also adopted and developed 
by, inter alias. Bray and Thompson. Hodgskin's main aim, as we 
illustrated in section 2(ii) was to rebutt the claims of the classical 
economists that capital was requisite to production in two ways:
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initially, in the form of a wage-fund,*' furnishing the labourer with 
all the goods necessary to sustain him throughout the production process; 
and secondly, in the form of fixed capital, abridging and assisting 
labour. It was, as already noted, Hodgskin's contention that both of 
these putative benefits of capital could be assigned to labour: in 
both instances, to the operations of simultaneously existing labour - 
either in terms of synchronized production activity, ensuring a
continual flow of wage-goods, or in terms of the labour necessary to
2render fixed capital productive.
In the final section of this chapter, we were interested in how the 
anti-Ricardians dealt with the problem of exploitation, conceived 
solely in the sense of depriving labour of the full fruits of its 
endeavour. Central to their treatment of exploitation were two themes: 
the problem of the monopoly ownership of the means of production, and 
the question of inequality of exchange. It was our conclusion in this 
section that the anti-Ricardians, whilst concerned with the issue of 
valuation, at a quite rudimentary level, located the source of exploitation 
principally in the abrogation of the natural laws of appropriation and 
distribution, even regarding the foundation of the inegalitarian 12
(1) For a consideration of the classical economists' view of the wage-
fund, see chapter A above, section 2(ii). , also chapter 2,
section 3(i).
(2) Partly in response to Hodgskin's work Labour Defended, Samuel Read 
published his: Inquiry into the Natural Grounds of Right to Vendible 
Property (London, 1829) where, in the course of his delineation of 
the title to property conveyed bv ownership of the factors labour, 
land and capital, he observed that Hodgskin was mistaken in 
attributing to co-existing and skilled labour all the benefits of 
capital for two reasons: for without the co-operation of capital in 
production the synchronized activity purportedly characteristic of the 
process of producing wage-goods could not function (pp.125-7), and 
secondly, because, although labour "constitutes an efficient means of 
production without capital", capable of producing something without 
capital - whereas the reverse is not true, its greater efficiency depends 
upon the degree to which it relies upon capital in production (pp.127-132). 
cf.. above, chapter 5, section 3.
481
mechanism of exchange as grounded in a violation of these laws. 
Following on from this, in the next chapter, it will be our endeavour 
to show how the entire produce of industry was to be secured to labour 
(either individually, or collectively), or how the iust principles of 
appropriation were to become operative, considerations which required, 
the universalisation of labour, the common (or national) ownership of 
the means of production,and rationalisation of the process of exchange
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Chapter 8: Anti-Ricardian Schemes for the Reformation of Society, or 
How to Reconcile Labour with Its Product.
Abrogation of the natural laws of appropriation and distribution 
represented, for the anti-Ricardians, the source of the impoverished 
condition and exploitation of the labouring classes: only the recon­
ciliation of labour with its product, on the basis of the just, labour- 
based principles of appropriation, and valuation, could restore the 
labourer to his rightful position, and undermine the extractive base of 
capitalism. The principal aim of this chapter is to examine the schemes 
devised by the anti-Ricardians to reconcile labour with its product, 
which schemes varied from the removal of all artificial restrictions ' 
upon the free operation of the natural laws of appropriation and dis­
tribution; the institution of communities founded upon the principles 
of co-operation; and plans for the reform of the currency system. 
Important in the intellectual heritage of the reformatory schemes 
developed by the anti-Ricardians was the communitarianism of Robert 
Owen, which comprised both directives for the establishment of "villages 
of unity and mutual co-operation", and an embryonic blueprint for the 
reform of the monetary system along the lines of a national banking 
system founded upon labour-value principles.
This chapter will be divided into three main sections. In section 
1, we will examine Thomas Hodgskin’s picture of society based upon the 
natural right of property, and natural laws of distribution. It is 
worth noting at the outset that there is a qualitative difference 
between the schemes devised by the other anti-Ricardians, and Hodgskin’s 
conception of future society, for Kodgskin eschews any formulation of a 
blueprint for change regarding the power of the natural right of property
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as sufficient to assert itself without human intervention. He fails
x
to develop, therefore, a plan for the reconstruction of society a la 
Owen, et.al.
In section 2, our attention is directed to the question of communi- 
tarianism. In section 2(i), we will examine, in outline, the scheme 
developed by Robert Owen for the foundation of communities of co-operation 
in section 2(ii), we will consider William Thompson's adoption, and 
adaptation, of that scheme, observing, in passing, the grounds of 
Thompson's rejection of Hodgskin's purported system (as allegedly 
developed in Labour Defended) of competition; whilst in section 2(iii) we 
will focus on John Francis Bray's scheme for the establishment of a #
joint-stock modification of the principles of co-operation, as a pre­
liminary to the inauguration of the fully-fledged system of community.
In the final section of this chapter, we propose to review the 
option of monetary reform, as a means of rationalising exchange, and 
thus uniting labour with the full value of its product. In section 
3(i) we will again examine the influence of Robert Owen, adumbrating 
briefly the scheme proposed by Owen for the reform of the monetary 
system, before elucidating in section 3(ii) the more comprehensive, 
and fully-developed,scheme of currency reform advanced bv John Gray.
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Section 1: Thomas Hodgskin and the Independent Artisan
As we demonstrated in chapter 6, Thomas Hodgskin advocated a 
juridical theory of property rights, founded upon the belief that the 
labourer has a natural, and individual,title to the entire fruits of 
his endeavour. However, Hodgskin believed that under the currently 
prevailing system of capitalism, the existence of a market in wage- 
labour, together with the monopoly ownership of the means of production, 
were systematically denying the labourer those fruits. An obvious 
question for us, then, in our examination of Hodgskin's conception of 
property, is to ask how the labourer could be reconciled with his 
product. Did Hodgskin develop, as did some of his fellow anti-Ricardians, 
communitarian schemes for that reconciliation? Or did he advocate a ' 
different system? Our main concern in this section is, therefore, to 
examine Hodgskin's conception of that future society in which the natural 
law of property would operate unfettered. It is our contention in this 
regard that Hodgskin's conception of future society must be constructed 
from the scattered remarks he makes about the inequities of the 
prevailing system, from his silences, and from his condemnation of 
alternative schemes for the unification of labour with its just desert. 
Following Mark Francis, then, we are of the opinion that, like Herbert 
Spencer, Hodgskin did not have "a theory of social action".*
At the beginning of chapter 6, we observed that Hodgskin made, in 
all his writings, an important distinction between "natural circumstances" 
and "social", (i.e., man-made Regulations, commenting that social 
regulations were alone responsible for all the "poverty, misery, and
o
social convulsions" with which the life of man is cursed.“ In his 12
(1) Francis, Mark, "Herbert Spencer and the Myth of Laissez-Faire", 
JHI, 39 (1978), p.322.
(2) See above, chapter 6, section 1. cf pop. Pol. Ec., p.38.
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were systematically denying the labourer those fruits. An obvious 
question for us, then, in our examination of Hodgskin's conception of 
property, is to ask how the labourer could be reconciled with his 
product. Did Hodgskin develop, as did some of his fellow anti-Ricardians, 
communitarian schemes for that reconciliation? Or did he advocate a ' 
different system? Our main concern in this section is, therefore, to 
examine Hodgskin's conception of that future society in which the natural 
law of property would operate unfettered. It is our contention in this 
regard that Hodgskin's conception of future society must be constructed 
from the scattered remarks he makes about the inequities of the 
prevailing system, from his silences, and from his condemnation of 
alternative schemes for the unification of labour with its just desert. 
Following Mark Francis, then, we are of the opinion that, like Herbert 
Spencer, Hodgskin did not have "a theory of social action".*
At the beginning of chapter 6, we observed that Hodgskin made, in 
all his writings, an important distinction between "natural circumstances" 
and "social", (i.e., man-made)regulations, commenting that social
regulations were alone responsible for all the "poverty, misery, and
o
social convulsions" with which the life of man is cursed.“ In his 12
(1) Francis, Mark, "Herbert Spencer and the Myth of Laissez-Faire", 
JHI, 39 (1978), p.322.
(2) See above, chapter 6, section 1. cf pop. Pol. Ec.. p.38.
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conception of the environment within which his individualistic right of
property could flourish, therefore, it is unsurprising that he should
reject the Co-operative Socialism of the Owenites.
A complete community of goods, of food, 
clothing, dwellings, instruments, weapons, 
and utensils, or of all the produce of 
labour, never has existed, and never could 
exist, even in a family much less in a 
community ... The approximations to a 
community of goods among some religious, 
and some political societies, have always 
been the constrained and unhappy results 
of positive institutions, which have 
neither been of long duration, nor generally 
advantageous. 1.
His objection to the scheme was two-fold: initially, he rejected
the artificiality of the arrangements, rendering both the making and ,
enjoyment of property social not individual; and secondly, he castigated
the scheme for its dependence upon a plethora of "rules, laws, and what
is called order", for its efficient functioning. The second of these
points is quite straight-forward: it relates to Hodgskin's anti-Benthamite
objection to anything requiring legislative or governmental intervention
3to support or promote it. The first point is, however, of more interest.
Kodgskin espoused a natural rights of doctrine of property. Now
this right for Hodgskin, was an innately individualist right. As he
remarks in The Natural and Artificial Right of Property Contrasted.
I look on a right of property - on the 
right of individuals, to have and to own, 
for their own separate and selfish use and 
enjoyment, the whole produce of their 
industry ... as essential to the welfare ... 
of society. 4. 1234
(1) Hodgskin, Nat■ & Artif., p.41.
(2) Cited in Halevy, Thomas Hodgskin, p. 38.
(3) c_f, chapter 6, above, section 1.
(4) Mat. & Artif.. p. 24 ( original emnhasis).
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In addition, when referring to communitarianism, Hodgskin also 
observes that the "use of such things" - the common property of the 
inhabitants - "like the making of then, must be individual, not 
common, selfish, not general".^
The author seems not only to envisage, then, that the right of 
property is a right of individual, selfish enjoyment, but that somehow 
the process of production - or appropriation - generating the object 
of that property right is somehow innately individualistic. Hodgskin
seems to be implying, therefore, that under natural conditions, men
2would produce as independent artisans.
One problem here is, of course, that division of labour prevents <
any individual creating an entire product on his own. In the production
of cloth, for example, each contributing labourer:
produces only some part of a whole ... 
there is nothing on which the labourer 
can seize and say: "This is my product, 
this will I keep to myself". 3
How the end product is divided, Hodgskin asserts, is calculated 
according to the "unfettered judgements of the labourers themselves", 
and by the "higgling of the market".^ Hodgskin is distinctly ambiguous 
about this point, offering no explanation of the principles which might 
guide the labourers in their judgement - though it may, given Hodgskin's 
views on the concept of natural price, be possible to surmise that he 
would consider measurement of labour-input in man hours the best rule- 12
(1) ibid., p.41.
(2) cf„Reeve. Property, pp.128, 130, 132.
(3) Lab. Def.. p.85.
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of thumb. All the way throughout the process which leads to the 
production of cloth (for instance), different occupational specialists 
transform an existing resource (yarn, for exanmle) into an alternative, 
marketable resource (cloth). The product of each specialist artisan 
is, therefore, separable and identifiable. The quantity of labour 
invested in production is also calculable, and, therefore, assuming 
that Hodgskin believes in the operation of the natural principle of 
exchange, the resource, when transferred from one labourer to the next, 
is transferred according to labour worth.
As Andrew Reeve notes in his book, Property, the "pure independent 
artisan model" shows most clearly the links between labour and entitle-
*
ment, for the assumption underlying this model is that both the initial 
product and all the resources necessary to transform that product are 
already the property of the labourer before he applies his labour.* In 
Hodgskin's case, therefore, the spinner, buying his materials from the 
merchant importer transforms raw material into yarn. He owns the raw 
materials prior to production, and is entitled, through this ownership 
and the expenditure of labour, to the yarn generated by that production.
This he can, in a market economy (which is the economy envisaged by
2Hodgskin ) sell to a weaver. This weaver, purchasing the yarn, is 
entitled to utilise it as he sees fit. This he does by transforming 
it into cloth. Again labour input, together with ownership of the 
requisite productive resources, generates a title to the produce 
created thereby. 12
(1) Reeve, op. cit., p.128. c^ ., Hodgskin, Lab. Def.. pp.83-86.
and Nat. & Artif., p.35n.
(2) Hodgskin favours an exchange market for goods, but not a labour 
market.
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Strict conformity to the natural law of appropriation means 
that labour alone generates a title to property. Those who do not 
labour are not, therefore, entitled tc a reward. This belief led 
Hodgskin to question, as we saw in chapters 6 and 7, the ownership of 
the means of production by those who do not labour. Such ownership, as 
we have previously demonstrated, was seen to be illegitimate. In 
Hodgskin1s new world, then, capital would be owned by the artisan, and 
access to land ought to be guaranteed to all who want it.
Considering the role of capital first, it is important to note 
that Hodgskin contemplated three scenarios for the accumulation of 
capital, only the first two of which could prevail in his "natural" 
society. Firstly, capital could be made and used by the same person; 
secondly, it could be made and used by different classes of persons, 
dividing between them "in just proportion the produce of their combined 
labour", and finally, it could be owned by a class of persons neither 
making or using it.^
Clearly, the first arrangement is that usually assumed by the 
artisanal model attributed to Hodgskin in this dissertation, although 
the second arrangement is also compatible with that model, whilst the 
third - the arrangements prevailing under competitive capitalism - is 
not. Obviously, the unrestricted operation of the natural right of 
property requires that this third set of arrangements be abolished - or 
dispensed with in some way. Hodgskin, however, fails to adumbrate just 
how this transformation of capitalist circumstances may take place, 
though, as we shall see shortly, he does believe in its inevitability.
(1) Pop. Pol. Ec.i p,243. cf., pp.243-6.
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As we observed in chapter 6 (Section 2), Hodgskin believed that 
only a limited and individuated (use)-right in the land was compatible 
with the natural right of property. Now an interesting comparison can 
be made between Hodgskin and Herbert Spencer with regard to the 
question of land, however. Both Spencer and Hodgskin followed 
natural rights accounts of property formation. Both men denied the 
legitimacy of private property in land,* but both reacted differently 
to the issue. Hodgskin, although recognising that the monopolisation 
of land denied free access to all those who did not own land, offered 
no solution to the problem, prefer^«1 from his non-interventionist 
stance, to proclaim that the natter would resolve itself aright.
i
Spencer, on the other hand, develops a scheme of agrarian communism,
. . 2or land nationalisation to combat the inequities of the private
ownership of land. Observing that the exclusive rights of property
in land of the few, effectively denied access to that land, to the
many (except upon receipt of permission by the landowning classes),
Spencer claims that only the resumption of the ownership of that land
by "the great corporate body - Society", is compatible with the
principles of Equity.
Instead of leasing his acres from an 
isolated proprietor, the farmer would lease 
them from the nation. Instead of paying his 
rent to the agent of Sir John or his Grace, 
he would pay it to an agent ... of the 
community ... A state of things so ordered 
would be in perfect harmony with moral law.
Under it all men would be equally landlords;  ^
all men would be alike free to become tenants.
Compensating equitably the current proprietors, society could 
appropriate all the land of the country, restoring to mankind at 
large "their rights to the soil".*’ 12
(1) cf,f Nat. & Artif.. pp.61-75 and Spencer, Social Statics, pp,114-115.
(2) c_f.(Halevy, op.cit. , pp.142-3. (3) Social Statics. , p.123.
(4) ibid., p .123, cf.,pp.124-5.
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Hodgskin, in his review of Spencer's Social Statics, for the
Economist in 1851, is quick to condemn Spencer's scheme. The argument
he employs to attack that scheme comes directly from his juridical
conception of property rights:
his (Spencer's) plan of giving the land to 
the public, and making those who cultivate 
it pay for its use, would be in fact to take 
away from the cultivators a part of the produce 
of their labour ... It would be a violation 
of property, and a terrible check to industry ...
What is usually called the produce of land is 
the produce of labour applied to the land; and 
to take away the produce of individual labour ... 
or any part of it, and give it to the public, 
is a violation of the right of property in 
labour and in its products. 1.
Whilst apparently prepared only to adopt a laissez-faire stance ' 
with regard to societal improvement, Hodgskin is quick to condemn 
schemes for the restructuring of society based on positive, and 
deliberate human, and particularly governmental, intervention.
Having considered briefly what form Hodgskin's future society 
might take - namely, a society of independent artisans - it is time 
to examine the conditions which Hodgskin felt would be most conducive 
to its inauguration.
Hodgskin rejected, as we noted earlier, the co-operative socialism
of the Owenites. In the Natural and Artificial Right he discounts the
2effect of political and legislative reform as ineffectual and futile, 1
(1) Hodgskin, The Economist, 8 Feb. 1851, pp.149-151, cited in
Halevy, op. cit., p.143. It is important to note that Kodgskin does 
to some degree modify his radical stance after the publication of the 
Natural and Artificial Right. Though still advocating a laissez-faire, 
anti-Ricardian view of political economv, on the whole, his Economist 
writings show a tendency to be tolerant of the profit of capital; and 
to condemn worker combinations for example. However,since he had never 
been an advocate of government intervention,or a proponent of a socialist 
reformatory plan of society,many of the modifications he makes are far 
from consequential. c_f. Halevy,op.cit., pp.l27ff; Stark.Ideal Foundations, 
pp. 97-103 esp.
Hat. & Artif., p.172. Hodgskin is criticising the Reform Bill 
Movement.
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whilst in Labour Defended, Hodgskin's belief that government is princi­
pally a tool for economic domination, leads him, as G. D. H. Cole 
surmises, to be chary of the effectiveness of the working class demand 
for votes, or the benefits of political action,^or any scheme relying 
upon governmental or legislative co-operation and assent.
However, in Labour Defended, he does display some sympathy with
the cause of trade-unionism, which leads G. D. H. Cole to note that
Hodgskin was distancing himself from pure individualism by his "strong
2advocacy of Trade Unionism". This represents, in our opinion, however, 
an overstatement of the strength of support for combinations displayed 
by Hodgskin in this tract. His principal hope for the gradual reinsti-
t
tution of the worker's right to the whole produce of his labour, 
resides, in fact, in his belief in the over-riding efficacy of education, 
significantly at this stage, the dissemination of knowledge via the
Mechanics' Institutions, the London branch of which he had helped to
3establish.
As the labourers acquire knowledge, the 
foundations of the social edifice will be 
dug up from the deep beds into which they 
were laid in times past, they will be curiously 
handled, and closely examined, and they will 
not be restored unless they were originally laid 
in justice, and unless justice commands their 
preservation. 4. 1234
(1) £f Cole, G. D. H. Introduction to Lab. Def. , (London, Hammersmith 
Reprints, 1922; 1964 repr.) p.14.
(2) Cole, op. cit., p.14. £f. also, Stark, op. cit., p.73n. See Driver
C.H. "Thomas Hodgskin and the Individualists", in Hearnshaw, F.J.C. 
(ed.) The Social and Political Ideas of Some Representative Thinkers 
of the Age of Reaction and Reconstruction, 1815-1865. (New York, 
Barnes & Noble 1949) pp.197-8.
(3) See Halevy, op. cit., pp.87-89. Hodgskin's co-founder was a 
Scotsman, called Robertson. CjF. also, Driver op. cit■ , p. 198.
(4) Lab. Def.. p.102.
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This belief in the power of opinion to change things, if founded 
on knowledge and the right principles, pervades all Hodgskin's writings.
In a letter to Place in September 1820, prompted by the publication of
» "1James Mill s Essay on Government, Hodgskin argued that:
2If opinion is capable of constituting, of 
restraining and of giving every government 
particular powers in proportion as opinion 
varies, I am at a loss to tell why opinion 
could not, in the first instance, protect 
property (the end for which Government is 
instituted) without the intervention of such 
an operose machine.
In other words, if public opinion is sufficient to constitute
government, "why should not this same public opinion, without any
constitutional mechanism, be sufficient to establish a stable society?^
Following Godwin, and anticipating Spencer, Hodgskin appears to adopt
an anarchist stance, seeing Government, merely a tool of economic
dcmination, as unnecessary to the smooth running of society. The 
. 4dictates cf natural law alone are ultimately sufficient.
The foundation for Hodgskin's conception of the power of popular 
opinion as the sufficient base for the operation of natural law derives 
from one sense in which a right of property was regarded as a natural 
right, namely that it was a right which men implicitly recognise.
Considering the issue of man's rights, in a broader sense, Hodgskin 
notes that the greater part of them are not protected by law at all; in 
fact their security derives from "the mutual respect of man for man, or 
the moral feelings of individuals".^ Provided such rights conform 12345
(1) Hodgskin to Place, 17 SeDt. 1820, B. M. Add. MSS. 35, 153, f.l69ff.
(2) Government derives its powers from public opinion, Hodgskin declares.
(3) Halevy, op. cit., p.56 (original emphasis).
(4) Francis, art, cit., pp.322-323.
(5) Nat. & Artif.. p.136.
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with the dictates of natural law, their protection ought to be automatically 
guaranteed and legal sanction would then be unnecessary. However, the 
establishment of a right contrary to custom, or popular opinion, can
only operate if "made the rule of their (the people's) conduct by force
1 2 of arms". Law itself represents merely a "piece of parchment", without
sanction, operating by human sufference only. Positive laws, thus,
depend on our will; they are suffered to remain 
by us ; they are kept up and preserved by our 
moral sentiments, and cannot possibly have any 
greater power, or give any greater security 
than those sentiments from which their force 
is derived. 3.
Whilst man is ignorant, therefore, of natural law, he may suffer 
legislative practices which are contrary to his interests. Once he is ' 
aware of the dictates of natural law, of the operation of new rights of 
property founded in labour expenditure, his tolerance of inequitable 
laws will disappear, and positive law will - as demonstrated in chapter
6 - be forced to follow those changes in public opinion generated by
4changes in the material circumstances of society.
Changes in the natural right of property in the best of all 
possible worlds, would be automatically accorded popular respect 
because the circumstances giving rise to the change in that right are 
also those giving rise to respect for the developments prompted by that 
change. Mutual forebearance, based on equality, would ensure, therefore, 
the mutual guarantee of the rights and enjoyments of all. A natural 
right would require, then, no legitimation or reinforcement in human 
law. Its enforcment would reside in popular willingness to obey 
natural law. So: 1234
(1) ibid., p.116.
(2) ibid., p.133.
(3) ibid., p.135.
(4) See above, chapter 6, section 3.
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The persuasion that we shall enioy what we 
produce, and the industrious habits consequent 
on that persuasion are not, in these cases, it 
is plain, the produce of the law - for that, 
let it never be forgotten, does not guarantee 
to each can what he produces - but of the mutual 
respect for claims and rights which naturally 
grows up among individuals, and extends, as 
they multiply, through all their complicated 
relations to one another. 1.
Once circumstances prevail in which the labour title to property 
is allowed to operate unimpeded, then human law would be superfluous, 
for inbuilt in the notion of property is a conception of mutual 
respect for the rights of others. That natural law is being violated, 
under current conditions, is reflected in the need for positive legis-
#
lation, but since positive legislation is effective only to the degree 
Chat people are prepared to obey it, it follows that once that prepared­
ness has gone - that is, once people are in a position to disobey - 
then the basis on which positive law is founded has been subverted, 
and the power of the legislator undermined.
Hodgskin's purpose in the development of this concept has been to 
show, therefore, that natural law will operate best in conditions of 
absence of government and positive law. He believed, unlike his compeers, 
that it was in conditions of non-intervention by government or mankind, 
that the natural right of property would assert itself. By implication, 
this suggests that the way of creating conditions most conducive to the 
assertion of this natural right is to desist with legislation, removing, 
as it were, the obstacles to the free operation of natural principles.
In many respects Kodgskin appears as a descendant of the laissez-faire 
tradition of the classical economists. Only the free-play of natural law, 
independent of social regulation and governmental interference, will be 1
(1) ibid., p.144.
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sufficient to allow the natural right of property to overcome the 
artificial right, systematically bolstered up by the prejudices of a 
sectarian and partial legislative and governmental class.
From Hodgskin's non-articulation of a constructive scheme for 
the reform of society and reconciliation of labour with its product, 
we move on to the articulation, by Owen, Thompson et al, of just such 
constructive schemes, in the form of plans for the reorganisation of 
society upon the basis of communitarianism and co-operation.
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Section 2 : Co-operation and the Communitarian Ethic
You look forward to a better state of 
society, where the principle of bene­
volence shall supersede that of fear; 
where restless and anxious individual 
competition shall give place to mutual 
co-operation and joint possession ... 
where perfect freedom of opinion and 
perfect equality will reign amongst 
the co-operators; and where the children 
of all will be equally educated and 
provided for by the whole... 1.
so writes William Thompson to Anna Wheeler, and in so-doing, 
encapsulates both the faith and the commitment of many of the early 
English Socialists in the communitarian ethic. The doctrine of 
communitarianism derived largely, in this country, from the works 
of Robert Owen. ,
Fundamental to this philosophy are a number of common themes: 
firstly, a belief in the spirit of co-operation and a reaction against 
individualism; secondly, a belief in the common ownership of property,
and a reaction against individual ownership; and finally, a belief in
. . . . 2 communitanamsra, as a method of social reform.
In this section we are concerned with the last aspect of 
communitarianism, namely, the notion that it represented a species of 
social reform adequate to the transformation of society away from an 
atomistic, competitive system founded upon the violation of the first 
principles of appropriation, to a co-operative and communal system 
in which labour would be reconciled with its entire product. With 12
(1) William Thompson to Anna Wheeler, cited in Taylor, Barbara,
Eve and the New Jerusalem: Socialism and Feminism in the 
Nineteenth Century (London, Virago Press Ltd., 1983) p ix.
(2) C£., Harrison, J.F.C., Robert Owen and the Owenites in Britain 
and America (London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969) p 47; 
Garnett, R.G., Co-operation and the Owenite Socialist Communities 
in Britain 1825-45, (Manchester, Manchester UP.. 1972) p 29.
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this in mind, in section 2(i), we will examine, in outline, the scheme 
devised by Robert Owen for the establishment of communities of co­
operation; whilst in sections 2(ii) and 2(iii) , we will centre on the 
development of that scheme in the works of William Thompson, and John 
Francis Bray respectively.
(i) The Influence of Robert Owen (I): Communities of Co-operation.
Although Robert Owen, with his avid interest in the impoverished 
condition of the labouring classes, contributed quite voluminously 
to the anti-capitalist literature of the period,^ it is not with his 
critique of the workings of industrial capitalism that we are 
concerned in this section, but rather with the scheme devised by 
Owen to combat the evils of competition, viz., the establishment of , 
communities of co-operation.
The reasons for our concentration on this latter aspect are two­
fold. Firstly, Owen, whilst denouncing the private monopoly ownership 
of the means of production, bases his critique of capitalism not upon
the abrogation of the natural labour-based right of property, as did
. . . . . 2 the anti-Ricardians, but upon the misapplication of machinery; and
secondly, because it was in his formulation of the idea of communitarianism 12
(1) Cf e.g. Owen, Robert, "An Address to the Inhabitants of New 
Lanark", (1816); "An Address to the Working Classes", in the 
Star newspaper, April 15, 1819, and the Examiner, April 25, 1819; 
"Report to the County of Lanark of a Plan for Reliavigg Public 
Distress" (Glasgow, 1821); A Development of the Principles and 
Plans on which to establish self-supporting Home Colonies (London, 
1841); What is Socialism? (London, Home Colonization Society, 1841); 
"The Signs of the Times s or the Approach of the Iller.iuiu"
(London, 1841) ; The Book of the New Moral World containing the
the Rational Systems/Society, (London, 18?2-44); The Revolution 
in the Mind and Practice of the Human Race, (London, 1349); and 
The Life and Times of Robert Owen (written by himself), 2 vols, 
(London, 1857-1858).
(2) Cf., Thompson, The People's Science, pp.73ff; Burkitt, Radical 
Political Economy, pp.llff.
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that many of the anti—Ricardians, particularly Bray and Thompson, 
saw the means to reconcile labour with its product, and so developed 
similar communitarian schemes of their own.
Owen, as we suggested above, saw the "immediate cause of the 
present distress" of the labouring classes, as the "depreciation of 
human labour" through its application in competition with machinery.*
The spread of mechanisation throughout industry had, Owen declared, 
generated a "most unfavourable disproportion between the demand for 
and supply of manual labour". As the mass of mankind rely for their 
subsistence upon the receipt of money wages, and as the rate of those 
wages is contingent upon the demand for and supply of labour, the 
introduction of mechanisation, when applied in competition with labour,' 
as an alternative, more efficient and more economic means of production,
leads to a fall in the rate of wages at best, and to unemployment at 
3worse.
Thus, as J. E. King argues, "the progressive displacement of 
human labour by machines, Owen believed, reduced not only the
4
manufacturers' wage-bill but also the demand for his products".
It was, therefore, the primary cause of over-production. The employ­
ment of machinery in production generated a greater product, but was 
not paralleled by a comparative increase in the power of purchasing. 1234
(1) Owen, Robert, "Report to the Committee for the Relief of the 
Manufacturing Poor", (18A), in The Life of Robert Owen., vol 1A, 
Appendix I, p.54.
(2) Owen, Robert "Two Memorials on behalf of the working classes", 
(1818) ibid., vol 1A, p220. Cited in Thompson N.W., op.cit., p,74.
(3) C£., "Report to the County of Lanark", (1821); pp.246-8 
especially; Self-Supporting Home Colonies.
(4) King, J. E. "Perish Commerce! Free Trade and Underconsumptionism 
in Early British Radical Economics", Australian Economic Papers, 
vol 20, 1981 (pp 235-57), p,241; £ f ., Thompson, The People~rs 
Science, pp„158ff.
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Underconsumptionism is, identified as a necessary by-product of the 
irrational extension of mechanisation, and provides the underlying 
theme of Owen's critique of the prevailing system of competition.
Far from denouncing technological advance, however, Owen 
believed that, taken as an auxiliary power to assist labour, its 
benefits were potentially enormous. The problem arose because such 
technology was privately owned, representing a circumstance whereby 
one class gained power over another to gain profit,*' and because the 
owners of that technology, nurtured in the environment of competition, 
were ignorant of the most rational, social and utilitarian mode of 
employing it.
Underlying this latter claim is the view that human nature is 
malleable; "its organisation and existence, are consequently
compound of natural faculties at birth, which may from that period
2be well or ill-directed by society". Hitherto they have been ill- 
directed. Society founded upon the system of competition has made 
men self-interested rivals, anti-social in their actions, and 
individualistic in their pursuits. Nothing less than an alteration 
in their environment, founded upon the basis of a rational system of 
education, disseminating the tenets of the "science of Human Nature", 
will serve to undermine this competitive instinct, and replace it 
with characteristics conducive to happiness.
The attack levelled at the system of competition, and the 
solution proposed to replace that system,has two dimensions: one 12
(1) Burkitt, op.cit., p.ll.
(2) Owen, The Revolution of Mind and Practice of the Human Race,
p.59 (original emphasisV. _
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moral, one economic. The moral dimension, as already suggested, 
relies upon the inauguration of a rational plan of education^, the
reconstruction of knowledge, and the inculcation of the spirit of
3co-operation and union; the economic dimension is founded upon the 
establishment of a co-ooerative system of production and distribution, 
and the restoration of the labour standard of exchange value.
Owen's scheme centred upon the institution of a network of 
small, self-governing, multiple producer co-operatives with their
economic basis in agriculture. Each community would comprise approx-
L,imately 2000 to 2500 people, living as a kind of universal family in 
specially designed buildings.^ Child care and education, for example,
t
were to become the collective responsibility of the community - with
the establishment of collective nurseries, community schooling and so
on;^ »omen were to be unshackled from family responsibility, and
enabled to participate, as equals, in the laborious processes operating 
7within the community;' and everyone would be united in labour. 1234567
(1) £f., Yeo, Eileen, "Robert Owen and Radical Culture", in 
Pollard, Sidney and Salt, John (eds.), Robert Owen: Prophet of 
the Poor (London, MacMillan Press Ltd.j 1971), p.85.
(2) c_f. , William Thompson: Much of the Inquiry is directed to the 
question of the ends of education in respect of character form­
ation, pp.272-362.
(3) £f., A New View of Society; or Essays on the Principle of the 
Formation of the Human Character, Essay I , (1813), p.18.
(4) The figure varies: occasionally it is between 1000 and 1500, at 
other times, 2000 to 2500 people.
(5) Owen was particularly concerned that the physical environment 
within which such communities were to be established, was 
suitable. c f _. , Self-Supporting Home Colonies, op.37-40.
(6) cf:. , Taylor, Eve and the Hew Jerusalem, pp. 51ff.
(7) Here Owen explains in great detail the tasks to be performed 
by each member of the community, according to age.
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More importantly for our purposes, however, such communities 
were to be self-supporting. Community of prooerty in the means of 
production, and the rationalisation of production would ensure that 
"communities would create their own perfect markets in sharp contrast 
to the imperfectly competitive conditions prevailing outside."^ The 
quantity, and type of commodities produced within each community would 
be consciously regulated according to the needs and wants of the entire 
community. Production would be geared to the provision of that wealth
which is "consistent with the health and happiness of the producers",
2and would be distributed the "most beneficially and iustly for all". 
Wealth would, as it were, be distributed "beneficially" when promotive 
of the greatest utility, and "justlv" when shared amongst the producers 
of it without any abstraction, for, as we shall demonstrate in section 
3(i), integral to this view is the idea that labour represents the 
natural standard of value in exchange.
With machinery employed as a giant auxiliary to labour, the amount 
of wealth generated would be in excess of the consumption requirements 
of the inhabitants of these communities, thus leading to an amelioration 
in the condition of the labouring classes. In such circumstances, 
both the ends of utility, and the maximum reproduction of wealth will 
be served.
The most fundamental attribute of such communities is, therefore, 
that all the necessary land and capital form a communal asset both 
belonging to and employed bv the inhabitants of the community. In 12
(1) Garnett, R. G., "Robert Owen and Community Experiments", in 
Pollard and Salt (eds.), Robert Owen, p^42.
(2) Owen, Book of the Moral World, Book III, o,35.
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this way a co-operative community could be contrasted with a ioint 
stock company:
composed of unselected persons, residing 
in dispersed and isolated dwellings, employing 
other people to do their work ... and meeting 
only occasionally to divide the profits ...
The essential externals of community are 
closely connected residences and constant, 
intimate, and familiar association ... (in 
which) the work of moral and intellectual 
training must be systematic and unremitting, 
and of a higher character than that which 
can at present by anywhere pointed out.. 1.
Thus, not only would Owen's communities transform the mode of
production and distribution typical of contemporary society, but also
2the pattern of social relationships found within those communities.
The problem is, though, how were such communities, based on 
common ownership of the means of production, to be established when 
clearly the labouring classes, ipso facto, did not possess the where­
withal to purchase or even rent those factors,
Owen's solution to this problem relied fundamentally upon two 
proposals: firstly, to attract sufficient investment from philanthropic 
capitalists; and secondly, to petition government to support the 
foundation of his scheme.
Initially, in outlining his plans for these "Villages of Unity 
and Mutual Co-operation", Owen advertised his scheme as a profit-making 
venture. All capital invested would, he declared, "return five per
3
cent interest". This would not only benefit the capitalist, therefore 
but also the country, for: 123
(1) Article by a Birmingham Socialist, in the iournal The Mew Moral 
World, (Manchester), 12 May 1838, cited in Taylor, op.cit., p,242.
(2) c_f., Taylor, op.cit., p.242.
(3) Owen, Robert, "A Further Development of the Plan ... For the Relief 
of the Manufacturing and Labouring Poor", contained in. a letter to 
the London Newspapers, Julv 30, 1817, cited in The Life and Times 
of Robert Owen, vol. 1A, p.73.
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these establishments offer means for the 
investment of capital on security that 
ought to be considered of the highest 
value to the country. 1.
The inhabitants of the community, through the increase in 
production consequent upon co-operative labour, would be enabled to
repay the interest of the capital expended in buying the establishment,
2out of the surplus generated by their labour. As Garnett notes, the 
very promise that an investor would receive adequate dividends in the 
interim period until communal assets were acquired by the tenants on
an "amortisation basis out of expected surplus", was designed to
3attract maximum support.
In Self-Supporting Home Colonies, Owen makes this point a little;
more clearly himself. Here he declares that the establishment of joint-
stock companies (of capitalists) is a necessary preliminary to the
inauguration of the communitarian system. These companies, it was
argued, would purchase the land, and erect upon it all the requisite
buildings, before leasing the whole to a company of tenants. This
latter group would, it is claimed, "gradually ... fine down the rents,
and ultimately ... become the owners, at a stipulated price, to be
4agreed on between parties." Again Owen assumes that the revenue to 
repay the joint-stock capitalists would derive from the surplus-to- 
needs wealth generated through united labour.
In addition to his attempts to attract capital investment, Owen 
also persistently petitions government to sponsor the institution of 
his parallelogram scheme. Thus, in The Revolution in the Mind and 
Practice of the Human Race, he exhorts the British Government to 123
(1) ibid., p .73.
(2) ibid., p.70. c_f also, Garnett, op.cit. , pp 43ff; Yeo art.cit., 
pp 84ff; Thompson, N.W. op.cit.. np.78-9; Burkitt, op.cit., 
pp»12-13; Taylor, op.cit., pp.238ff.
(3) Garnett, op.cit., p.43. (4) Self-Supporting Home Colonies, p.37.
recognise that it has now:
the most simple and plain common sense measures,
thus , to change all that is now wronj? in societv.
and gradually and peaceably to supersede it by
all that is right and most 'beneficial for every one
Similarly, in Book 7 of The Book of the New Moral World, he 
declares that the "Rational System" can only be inaugurated when 
government is convinced of the principles upon which it is based, for:
without this base, on which to raise the 
superstructure, there can be no solid 
foundation; but once convince the 
governors ... of the truth of the principles, 
and the incalculable benefits to be derived 
from their universal adoption in practice
(will become apparent),2 ... and they will <
not hesitate to adopt the right course.
In other words, presumably by Act of Parliament, Government
could, Owen believed, once informed of the benefits of his scheme,
establish, through the provision of land and capital, a number of
4villages of unity and mutual co-operation.
In addition to the reconstruction of society along the lines of 
communities of co-operation, Owen also developed a plan for the 
rationalisation of the system of exchange, based upon monetary reform. 
Consideration of this aspect of his thought will, however, be deferred 
until Section 3(i). Now, we propose to proceed to a consideration of 
communitarianism at the hands of William Thompson. 1234
(1) op.cit., p. xvii (original emphasis).
(2) Owen, The Book of the New Moral World, Book VII, p.46.
(3) ibid., p.30.
(4) c_f. , "An Address Delivered at the City of London Tavern on 
Thursday, August 21st, and published in the London Newspapers of 
August 22nd, 1817", cited in The Life and Times of Robert Owen, 
vol. 1A, pp,108ff.
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(li) William Thompson: The System of Security Under the Scheme og 
Mutual Cooperation.
The present great obiect of human pursuit 
ought to be to find out those Institutions 
and arrangements, which would make that 
magnificent prodloality of means, of mechanical 
and other physical improvements which we possess, 
tributory to those great social improvements, on 
which alone human happiness can securely reoose. 1
G.J.Holyoake once described William Thompson as the "first systematic
2writer" on the topic of communities of cooperation, whilst for R.K.P.
Pankhurst, Thompson was "Britain's Pioneer Socialist, Feminist, and
Cooperator".  ^ That Thompson's contribution to the literature of the
4cooperative socialist movement was great is undeniable; that he was an
t
unremitting advocate of the communitarian scheme for societal reconstruction 
is, however, only a partial truth. For as Thompson himself observes in 
Labour Rewarded, he Initially regarded the system of cooperation developed 
by Owen as little more than an "improved system of pauper management", 
dependent for its inauguration upon the "patronage of the non-representative 
law-makers of nations ... The Leagued Oppressors of their Fellow-creatures".^ 12345
(1) Thompson, William, Labour Rewarded. The Claims of Labour and Capital 
Conciliated, (London, Hunt & Clarke, 1827), p.36.
(2) Holyoake, G.J., A History of Cooperation, (London, George Allen 8 Unwin, 
1906), no page reference. Cited in Pankhurst, R.K.P., William Thompson 
Britain's Pioneer Socialist, Feminist and Cooperator, (London, Watts
8 Co., 1954), p.129.
(3) The phrase derives from the title of Pankhurst's book.
(4) Cf., Thompson, William, An Tnguirv into the Principles of the Dlstrlbutlor 
of Wealth, (1824); Labour Rewarded, (1827) ; Practical Directions for the 
Speedy and Economical Establishment of Communities on the Principles of 
Cooperation, United Possessions and Equality of the Means of Enjoyments, 
(London, 1030)» Practical Education for the South of Ireland (n.p.)(1819) 
Unfortunately, in the course of research for this dissertation, I have 
been unable to gain access to either of the last two tracts
(5) Thomnson, oocit.,0 .8 8 .
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And, indeed for most of his first work - the Inquiry - the system he 
favours as an alternative to the existinq system of Insecurity, is a 
system of individual competition founded uoon the principles of security.
It is worth notinq at this point, that Thompson defines three 
alternative systems of production and distribution: the system of insecurity 
founded upon force and fraud; the system of individual competition founded 
upon the principles of security; and the system of "labour by voluntary 
mutual cooperation".^ The purpose of this classification is to provide 
Thompson with models of socio-economic arrangements which he can then 
evaluate in terms of the principles of utility, in order to ascertain that
system most conducive to the attainment of both maximum happiness and the
2maximum reproduction of wealth. ,
In this section, therefore, we shall concentrate upon Thompson's 
treatment of the two schemes he outlines which satisfy the criteria 
of utility and security, or the "securing to labour of the whole products 
of its exertions"  ^- that is, the system a? individual competition and 
the system of mutual cooperation. Our principal concerns are three in numbers 
First, to examine the system of individual cooperation developed principally 
in the Inquiry; second, to examine the grounds for Thompson's ensuing 
critique of that system; and third, to elucidate his scheme for the 
establishment of the system of voluntary mutual cooperation formulated 
primarily in Labour Defended. Here we shall also observe the role of 
trade-unions in preparing the labouring classes for the subsequent 
foundation qf .communities of cooperation, as well as examining Thompson's 12
(1) Ibid.,p.9Q.
(2) Ibid.,p.99.
views on previous "palliative" schemes devised to advance the claims 
of labour.^-
We shall beqin, then, with Thompson's svstem of security and
Individual competition. The structure of the Inquiry was set, as we
demonstrated in chapter 7, by Thompson's undertakinq to illuminate the
conditions under which both maximum happiness and maximum wealth
could be produced. This led Thompson to two important conclusions.
Firstly, that "all sane individuals are capable of equal enloyment from
2equal portions of the objects of wealth. And, secondly, that:
The stronqest stimulus to production (and 
that which is necessarily to the greatest 
production) that the nature of thinqs will 
permit, is "security" in the ENTIRE USE of 
the products of labour, to those who produce them.3
Under a system which prescribes that the labour should be allocated 
the full fruits of its endeavour, there exists a potential tension between 
the claim from security - particularly influential in terms of the 
continued production of wealth - and the claim from equality. As J.F.C. 
Harrison has observed: if perfect equality is to prevail, some labourers must 
receive more, and some less than the full produce of their labour, since 12
(1) These include parliamentary reform, emiqration, repeal of the Corn 
Laws, and population checks.
(2) Thompson, Inquiry, p.?l. (Oriqinal emphasis).
Ibid.,p.35.(3)
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productivity between individuals is likely to vary. This arrangement 
would clearly breach the principle of security. However, if perfect 
security is to prevail, then the full enjoyment by each Individual of 
the unequal product of his labours denies equality of wealth.*- The
problem then is, "how to reconcile equality with security; how to
2reconcile just distribution with continued production".
Like Bentham, Thompson recognises the pre-eminence of security over
equality. However, unlike Bentham, Thompson denies that security is being
fostered in current conditions. Bentham, as we observed in chapter 5,
section 1, had assumed that the existing system actually furnished adequate
security for property, and had argued that the goal of equality could be
promoted simply through a series of (prospective) piecemeal legal reforms.'*
Thompson had, however, deduced different conclusions from his analysis of
the prevailing socio-economic system. As we demonstrated in the previous 
4chapter, he regarded the system of emergent industrial capitalism as 
founded upon the systematized violation of the principle of security.
Labour was, thus, denied the full fruits of its endeavour through the 
operation of a fraudulent exchange mechanism, and the monopolv ownership, 
by individuals who do not labour, of the means of production - land and 
capital. Thompson's solution to the inherent ineqalitarianlsm and 
insecurity of the prevailing system is, unsurprisingly, much more radical 123
(1) Harrison, Robert Owen and the Owen1tea, p.76.
(2) Thompson, Inquiry, p.xiv.
(3) See above, chapter 5, section 1. Cf., Hunt, "Utiliarianism and the 
Labor Theory of Value", pp.551-552.
See below, chapter 7, sections l(li), 2(1), and 3 particularly.(4)
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than Bentham's.  ^ Th® first solution oroposed by Thompson relates 
to the fundamentally individualistic system of competition based upon 
security. Since the system of insecurity effectively deprived the 
labourer of the full fruits of his endeavour, what was required was 
a means of reconcilinq labour with its product.
We observed in the previous chanter that Thompson's egalitarian - 
Utilitarian philosophy rested upon three tenets: that "all labour should 
be free and voluntary, as to its direction and continuance", that all the
fruits of labour "ought to be secured to the producers of them", and
2that all exchanges ought to be "free and voluntary" What Thompson
proposed, therefore, was that all restrictions upon the free movement
of labour, and upon the free operation of the allocation of resources,
commodities, and incomes by the market, should be removed.^ Thus, Thompson
favoured the abolition of all those laws and institutions restricting
or directing production - monopolies, guilds, corporations, apprenticeships
4and bounties, inter alia. In other words, labour should be free to 
employ its productive capacity in whatever industry it preferred; and 
should be allowed to freely, and equitably, exchange the produce of its 
labour as it so desired.^ 1234
(1) Hunt, art.clt.,pp.551-552.
(2) Thompson, Inquiry, p.6. (Original emphasis). See above, chapter 7, 
section l(ii).
(3) Hunt, art, clt.,p.555.
(4) Cf., Thompson, Inquiry, pp.103-144.
Exchanges would, presumably,be regulated according to labour cost.(5)
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Fundamental to this desire that labour should be free to guide 
itself, is the notion that "all productive labourers should become 
capitalists, that labour and capital should be in the same hands".1 
In other words, in order that all labour is both "free and voluntary 
as to its direction and continuance", it must either own, or have access 
to all the resources (capital included) requisite to production. Where 
access to capital that is currently monopolised by a non-producer is 
concerned, the labourer must - according to the dictates of security - 
reimburse that non-producer for such access, but at a fair, and not a 
monopoly price. This fair price is delimited by Thompson as that 
which would:
*
... replace the waste and value of the 
capital, by the time it would be consumed, 
with such added compensation to the owner 
and superintendent of it, as would support 
him in equal comfort with the more actively 
employed productive labourers. 2
All else would accrue to the labourer. In this way Thompson envisaged 
that ultimately all labourers would become independent labourer-capitalists.
The system here adumbrated by Thompson is founded upon the principles 
of laissez-faire: what E.K.Hunt has dubbed "market capitalism ... without 
the capitalists".^ All individuals would be able to engage in whatever 
productive activity they desired, free of all those allurements and 12
(1) Thompson, Inquiry, p.590.
(2) Ibid., p.167.
(3) Hunt, art.cit.,p.555
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prohibitions which had oreviouslv directed lndustrv under the system 
of force and fraud.
Initially it appears that Thompson envisages the market as effecting 
a harmonisation of competing interests, such that all producers would 
benefit by this freedom from interventionist practices.^ However,
Thompson almost immediately casts doubt upon the beneficent effects of this 
competitive, and fundamental!/ individualistic market system. The system is, 
he declares, flawed. Whilst undoubtedly superior to the existing system 
of insecurity founded upon force and fraud, the system of individual 
competition based upon security contains a number of features which 
effectively debar it from being that system most conducive to the 
achievement of maximum happiness, and to the reproduction of the greatest 
possible quantity of wealth. These disabling features are five in numbers
First, it retains the principle of selfishness so characteristic of the
2system of insecurity, for each person in society is engaged in the pursuit 
of their own happiness through the exclusive enjoyment of Individual wealth. 
Every individual sees a competitor or rival in every other individual 
engaged in the same trade. Similarly rivalry also exists between the 
public and every profession. This latter point can be exemplified by 
the relationship between the medial profession and the public. It is, 
Thompson proclaims, "in the interests of all medical men that diseases 12
(1) Thompson appears to be simply reformulating the Smithian doctrine 
of the invisible hand which underlay most classical political 
economy during this period.
(2) By which Thompson means "man". See the second point of his critique of 
the individualist system of security which follows.
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should exist and prevail, or else their trade would be decreased".1 
As such, physicians tend to neglect preventive medicine, it is, 
however, clearly in the interests of the public that oreventlve medicine 
should be promoted. The self-interestedness which guides men in their 
choice of their profession represents simultaneously a source of rivalry.
Second, the system of individual competition effectively paralyses
2the productive power of women. The individual (nuclear) familial 
arrangements required by the individualistic competitive pursuit of 
wealth confines women to domestic drudgery.^ An obvious remedy to 
this situation can be found, Thompson asserts, in coooeratlon. If a 
number of adjoining families formed a "common fund for preparing their 
food and educating their children", then women could be relieved, in part
i
at least, of their drudgery, and would be enabled, thereby, to assert their
4equality, and to embark on useful pursuits. The problem is, of course, 
that whilst individuals are motivated bv selfish ends in all other areas 
of their life, the sentiments requisite to such a cooperative enterprise 
could not be presumed to prevail. However, were it possible to establish 
a communal arrangement of this kind, then, Thompson somewhat contradictorily 123
(1) Thompson, Inquiry, p.371.
(2) Ibid.,pp.371-3.
(3) Thompson's interest in the question of "feminism" is further evidenced 
by the publication of the tract, Appeal of One-Half the Human Race..., 
written in conjunction with Anna Wheeler. See above, chapter 5, 
section 2, where it was observed that Thompson composed this pamphlet 
in response to James Mill's dismissal of political representation for 
(apparent) women in the 'Essay on Government' , Of., Taylor, Eve and the 
New Jerusalem, pp.23-24, passim.
(4) Inquiry, pp.371-2.
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asserts, a spirit of "mutual benevolence” would be engendered which 
could form the basis for a future system of "mutual coooeration and 
equality of enjoyment of the products of united labour".^
The third "evil" of the system of individual competition based on
security was that it led to unprofitable species of employment, "from
2the limited field of judgement open to individual minds". Individuals 
could, from error of judgement, mistakenly engage in occupations yielding 
no profit.
"What individual", Thompson asks, "can judge 
whether the market, frequently at a great 
distance, sometimes in another hemisphere 
of the globe, is overstocked, or likely to be 
so, with the article which inclination may 
lead him to fabricate?" 3
Although free to direct his labour, at will, into any productive channel, 
the individual is not necessarily ensured of success. Indeed, as Hunt 
reflects, the system of laissez-faire here favoured by Thompson could 
result in "the anarchy of the market" - the misallocation of resources
4and periodic crises or depressions.
The fourth disadvantage of this system of individual competition 
was that it furnished no adequate scheme of provision for the old, the sick, 
or "fer the numerous accidents incident to human life".5 Additionally, the 1234
(1) Ibid.,pp.371-2.
(2) Ibid.,p.374.
(3) Ibid.,pp.374-5.
(4) Hunt, art.clt.,p.558. cf., Pankhurst, op clt.,p.55.
(5) Thompson, Inquiry, p.375.
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selfish ethic prevailing throughout the system precluded the development 
of the sentiment of benevolence necessary to take care of those disabled 
from production. Reviewing a plan devised by Condorcet for a system 
of social Insurance, Thompson observes that even such a plan would be 
inadequate to the ends for which it was established, for three reasons:
(i) the expense of management costs, (il) the risk - however small - of 
the failure of the fund, and (ill) the risk of accidents befalling 
non-subscribers.^ Again, he concludes, that only under a system of 
cooperation could this problem be resolved.
Finally, Thompson observes, the pursuit of knowledge, and the
development of improved techniques in the arts and sciences are made
2"tributary to individual gain". Everyone, under individual competition,
t
employs their mental and physical capacities in order to increase wealth. 
Since the benefits of innovation dependent principally upon the degree 
to which knowledge of that innovation is restricted, "concealment ... of 
what is new and excellent" must, Thompson surmises, of necessity "accompany 
individual competition".^
In addition to the five "evils" outlined above, Thompson, in 
Labour Rewarded, develops a supplementary point of criticism of the 
system of individual competition, albeit that system as purportedly 
developed at the pen of Thomas Fcdgskin. Discussing Hodgskin's pamphlet, 123
(1) Ibid.,p.37P.
(2) Ibid.,p.378.
(3) Ibid.,p.380. Cf., Hunt, art.clt.,p.559.
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Labour Defended Against the Claims of Capital, Thompson observes 
that the economic system favoured by Hodgskln as remedial of the 
defects of the prevailing svstem was a species of the system of "Labour 
by Individual Competition".^
It was Hodgskln's contention, in his theorv of property, that 
labour ought to receive the entire fruits of its endeavour. The problem 
of how that could be accomplished in cases of social production - that is, 
where more than one individual was engaged in the production of a
particular commodity - was one that was only unsatisfactorily answered
2by Hodgskin. The orinciple that Hodgskin had identified as (possibly) 
adequate to this end was the "higgling of the market" . This orinciple 
presupposed, however, that labour was free, and that there existed n6 
prejudice in the estimation of the value of various species of labour.
In other words, what was required was "perfect freedom ... of labour, 
and equal knowledge".  ^But, Thompson asks, "Is not the Competitive Svstem
itself an insurmountable bar to this perfect freedom of labour and to
4this equal diffusion of knowledge?" According to the author of Labour
Rewarded, therefore, the system of individual competition is not only 123
(1) Labour Rewarded, p.4. Labour Rewarded was written in Dart as a 
response to a number of claims advanced, or allegedly advanced, by 
Hodgskin, in Labour Defended.
(2) See above, section 1.
(3) Thompson, Labour Rewarded. C f . Hodgskln, Labour Defended.pp.83-85.
(4) Labour Rewarded, p.5
516
flawed In the five ways outlined in the Inquiry, but is also incapable 
of promoting the conditions necessary to the Just "higgling of the market".
Having adumbrated the disadvantages of the system of security and 
individual competition in the Inquiry, Thompson poses the question:
... May there not be found a mode of labour 
consistent with security, which will not only 
obviate the evils of individual competition, 
but which will afford its peculiar benefits - 
abundant production and development of all the 
faculties - to a greater, an incalculably greater 
extent, than the best arrangements of Individual 
competition could afford?
His answer is primarily to be found in labour Rewarded and Practical 
Directions, though he does consider the advantages of the system of mutual 
cooperation in the Inquiry. Our analysis of this aspect of Thompson's 
thought will begin with a brief resume of the principal characteristics 
of the system of community, and will be followed by a consideration of 
his views on the means by which such a scheme could be implemented in 
practice.
Each community within this system of "Mutual Cooperation, Joint
2Possession, and Equal Distribution" should consist, Thompson argued, 
(following broadly the lead of Robert Owen) of between 300 and 2,000 
people.3 The system would be based on the common ownership of land 123
(1) Inquiry, pp.366-367. Cf.,Hunt, art.clt.,p.556, Pankhurst, op.clt.
pp.102-114; Harrison, op.cit.,pp.76-77.
(2) Labour Rewarded, p.114. (Oriqinal emphasis).
(3) Inquiry, p.387. Cf.,Ibld.,p.lll.
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and capital.1 Production would he cooperative, geared primarily to
subsistence, but later allowing the possibility for a system of exchange
2of surplus-to-needs, or specialized, produce between communities.
Since the producers in such communities would also be the consumers, 
production would be rationalized according to community needs, thus 
"affording an unfailing market to each other, an always egual supply and 
demand".1 The overproduction, and crises, characteristic of economies 
founded on competition could be avoided. Machinery would be used as a
4mere auxiliary of labour, and not as a replacement for that labour.
Distribution would be "just and egual". Everyone would get food and 
clothing from a common store.1 2345 67 Children and young people would sleep in 
common dormitories, whilst adults would live in small apartments.^ 
Childcare would become a communal responsibility freeing women from the 
oppression characteristic of competitive arrangements.
"UNITE IN TARGE NUMBERS; and render women",
Thompson urges, "like men, independent of 
individual support, - the creature of Individual 
Competition, and the parent of individual despotism: 
render them by egual development and Improvement of 
mind and body, egually useful with men, bound by egual 
duties, subject to egual restraints, partaking of egual 
joys, free-agents like yourselves. "• 7
(1) Labour Rewarded, pp.lll, 115. How that was to be acquired will be 
discussed below.
(2) . Ibid.,p.109., Ingulry, p.387. Cf.,Pankhurst, op clt.,p.129
(3) Labour Rewarded, p.lo9. (Original emphasis). Cf.,Inguiry, pp.421-429.
(4) Ibid.,pp.109-110. Cf.,above section 2(1)» and Harrison, o p clt.,pp.69-70.
(5) Labour Rewarded, p.ll); Ingulry, pp.387-388, pp.408-414.
(6) Inquiry, p.389.
(7) Labour Rewared, p.112. (Original emphasis), Cf.,Ihld.,pp.38Q-9o, 
pp.430-432.
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Mutual cooperation, leading to an Increase In levels of productivity, 
would automatically provide a system of insurance for the young, old and 
disabled, and for the community in general, in times of*'accident and 
disease, fire, flood, and famishing seasons" 1 Education would be
2universal; there would be complete freedom of religion and thought.
Government of the community "inherent in itself, in all its adult male and
female members", would operate by either a system of election, rotation
or seniority - that is, in any manner that is agreeable to the community 
3per se.
These self-governing, economically self-regulating communities would
thus supersede "almost all the present institutions relating to law".
*
Removing all the causes of crime, force and coercion would no longer 
be necessary to domestic peace. Laws would "executive themselves" as all
4cooperate in the furtherance of the common interest. Similarly, as Pankhurst 
observes, as the "passion for Individual accumulation and display of wealth" 
receded, "almost all the ordinary functions of government would have 
ceased".  ^ Government (and the state) would thus be superseded by the 
"voluntary discharge of such of those duties as were found necessary within 
each separate community for its own benefit",*’ a view which has led Pankhurst 12345
(1) Labour Rewarded, p.112.
(2) Ingulrv, pp.389-90, d o .429-430.
(3) Ibid.,p.390. Cf.,Hunt, art.cit.,p.560.
(4) Ingulry, pn.233, 511-514, 533-535, 563-571, 578.
(5) Pankhurst, op cit.,p.l31, citing Thompson, Ingulrv, p.578. 
Ibid.,p.578.(6)
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to surmise that in his discussion of the state Thomoson is not only 
arguing "more or less along Godwinian lines" but also that he "anticipates 
the Marxian thesis of the withering away of the State".*
Hitherto we have focused upon Thompson's depiction of the system 
of Mutual Cooperation, Joint Production, and Equal Distribution. It is 
now time to turn to the question of how that svstem was to be instituted 
in practice.
We have already established that Thompson, whilst recognizing the 
benefits of happiness attendant upon an equal distribution of wealth, 
was predisposed to maintain that the principle of security was of ore- 
eminent importance. This meant, of course, that he was not preoared to 
countenance any species of redlstributionfounded upon the use of force.
t
By such a practice,
... the unconvinced possessors of the real wealth 
would suffer more than the majority would gain, 
the sense of Injustice neutralizing the pleasures 
of the majority, and increasing the oain of the 
privations of the oppressed. 7
Similarly the employment of force in the initial inauguration of
these cooperative communities would generate fear and suspicion that force
might again be employed at a later date.
If force ... were used in the formation of the new 
arrangements of society, what guarantee could be given 
that force would not be used by every succeeding majority, 
leading to the annihilation of lndustrv and production. 3 123
(1) Pankhurst, op clt.,p.131.
(2) Thompson, Inquiry, p.599.
(3) Ibid.,p.599. Thompson's reference to the "majority" is, of course, to the 
working classes.
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Communities of mutual cooperation could only be established, then, 
on voluntary grounds. Althouoh labour might, under the system of 
"Individual Competition", be secured In the "right" to the whole products 
of its exertions, there is no reason, Thompson affirms, why It may not:
... in order to ensure a vast increase of 
production and enjoyment to everyone, as 
well as mutual insurance from all casualties, 
voluntarily agree before production to equality 
of remuneration. 1
The "right" of each Individual labourer to the fruits of his exertions can, 
it seems, be transformed, throuqh voluntary agreement, into a right of the 
labouring classes to the entire fruits of their collective exertions.t
The apparent tension between the twin goals of security and equality 
previously alluded to can be resolved, under the cooperative system, by 
promoting social, rather than Individual, security in the produce of 
labour. With the entire produce of industry guaranteed (collectively) 
to the creators of it, maximum happiness can be achieved through equality
of remuneration. Everyone would receive an equal portion of wealth, and
2thence the means to the enjoyment of an equal amount of happiness.
Whilst the benefits of this system are obvious to Thompson, it is 
clear that the population at large must learn of the advantages of 12
(1) Labour Rewarded, p.37.
(2) Cf.,Harrison, oo.cit.,pp.72-3.
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cooperation. Since communitarlanlsm cannot be Imposed from without - 
whether by government or working-class Insurrection - Thompson claims 
Its advantaoes must be demonstrated through persuasion and example.
Men must ... be governed by their reason, contemplating 
their Interest. These communities must not (then) 
be formed, and ought not to be formed, by enthusiasm, 
any more than by the arm of authority. Everv individual 
cooperator must be, and ought to be, convinced. 1
Thompson regarded, therefore, worker education as fundamental to
the foundation of communitarianism, and saw the Mechanics' Institutes of
his day as potentially capable of diffusing the knowledge requisite to
enable the working classes "to acquire the art of judqlnq correctly, (and)
2of verifying every proposition presented to them". This dissemination 
of knowledge, he believed, would ultimately persuade all the working classes 
of the advantages of cooperation. The rich minority who might not see it 
to be to their advantage to participate in such a scheme, Thompson felt, 
would ultimately be compelled to accept the supremacy of this system 
over all others in the achievement of happiness, for two reasons. First,
... where there is public opinion founded on  ^
knowledge, a minority can never long resist it.
(1) Thompson, Inquiry, p.57Q.
(2) Labour Rewarded, p.45. Thompson lists a series of measures which 
would improve the service to the working classes provided bv the 
Mechanics' Institutes, such as the proliferation of those organisations 
in small towns, and in the countrvside, the development of regular 
courses of education for children and so on. Cf., Ibid.,pp.45-46.
. Inquiry, p.5oc*.2
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And second, because the small capitalist minority,
...whether convinced, sympathizing, prudential, or 
not, would, under such circumstances, find no other 
use for their capital than making it instrumental to 
bring about the new order of thinas qenerallv desired.
The abolition of all the conditions productive of insecurity would
disable the capitalist class from profiting at the expense of the labouring
class.
As we noted above, Thompson believed that the advantages of 
cooperation must be demonstrated through persuasion and example. In
order to demonstrate by example, he favoured the establishment of prototype
*
communities. We shall now examine how such show-case communities were to 
be established, and how ultimatelv the system of mutual cooperation was to 
be established. tbroucrhout the countrv as a whole.
Thompson's denial of the use of force in the establishment of 
communitarianism, meant that the land and capital necessary to the 
formation of such a scheme had to be acquired with the consent of their 
present proprietors. This necessitated that the labouring classes somehow 
acquire sufficient funds for the purchase or loan of these necessarv 
factors.1 As Thompson observes in Labour Rewarded, capital must be created 
from the "saving of wages". A central role was allocated, therefore, to 
the trade union organisations of his day. Already based upon cooperation, 
and upon the principle of the common and equal good of all, Thompson saw
(1) Ibid. ,p.599
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the union movement as a natural choice in mobilising support and funds 
for the establishment of communities of mutual cooperation. In Labour 
Rewarded he exhorted the working classes to unite and form "Agricultural 
and Manufacturing Associations"1- 234. The funds for this purpose may, he 
declared, be acquired in one or two ways - by means of the Unions, or as 
the result of individual savings unconnected with the unions. Where funds 
are provided by unions, these, Thompson declared,simply constitute loans 
repayable out of the produce of labour based upon cooperation.
These funds, repaid by one set of individuals
out of the produce of their united labour,
made universally skilful and productive, and
freed from the trammels of competition and
the defalcations of exchange and distribution,
might be immediately lent to another set of '
individuals, anxious like their predecessors to
enjoy the whole products of their united labour ...2
This process of loan and repayment would, Thompson speculated, 
continue until "Industry by Mutual Cooperation, or the Union of Large 
Numbers, every where superseded Industry by isolated exertion and 
Individual Competition".
In addition to the role of the union, was the function o* the London
Cooperative Society in setting up cooperative communities. Their object
was, Thompson announced, the acquisition and diffusion of "information as to the
most efficient mode of attaining this great end, 'securitv to labour the whole
4products of its exertions'". They were thus to be instrumental - as an
(1) Labour Rewarded, p.lo2.
(2) Ibid.,p.103.
(3) Ibid. , p.103.
(4) Ibid.,p,10P
advisory body - in setting up communities, the members of which shall 
be themselves "the sole proprietors of every thing requisite to make their 
labour productive".^ In order to facilitate the formation of such communities 
the London Cooperative Society framed "Articles for Aqreement 'For the
Formation of a First Community of Mutual Cooperation, Joint Possession,
" 2and Equal Distribution' ...
The primary medium for the establishment of the system of mutual 
cooperation are the Unions, who toqether with the London Cooperative Society 
would furnish the funds and information vital to the foundation of 
communitarlanlsm. Unlike Owen, therefore, Thompson did not favour the 
sponsorship of such schemes by wealthy philanthropists,^ nor their 
Instantiation by qovernment.
One final point should be made about Thompson's conception of reform,
before we move on to consider John Francis Bray's blueprint for the
inauguration of the "Age of Riqht", and that is, that Thompson reqarded
those schemes outlined by "political economists, and political moralists,
4to improve the situation of the Industrious Classes", as mere "palliatives", 
designed to remedy the superficial ills of the existing system, without 
attackinq the main source of that ill. Althouqh some, such as the 
establishment of simple representative institutions,^ could be harnessed by 12345
(1) Ibid.,p.106.
(2) Ibid., p.107.
(3) Ibid.,pp.98-99.
(4) Ibid.,p.vii.
(5) Cf., also societies and organisations for the diffusion of knowledge 
Cf., Ibid., pp.44-46.
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the cooperative movement after the establishment of some initial 
communities since they themselves formed secondary goals to be promoted 
by the communitarian ethic, they were, on the whole, regarded with 
disdain.^
We shall now proceed to an examination of the reformatory ideas of 
John Francis Bray.
(1) Cf., Thompson's. treatment of the Corn Laws, pp.56-57» and the employment 
of machinery, pp.57^.
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(iii) John Francis Bray: The Inauguration of the "Age of Right"
We are a numerous people, and we want strength!
We have an excellent soil and we are destitute 
of provision! We are active and laborious, 
and we live in indigence! We pay enormous 
tributes, and we are told that they are not 
sufficient! We are at peace without, and our 
persons and property are not safe within! ^
What then is the secret eneny that devours us?
In the previous chapter we observed that Bray identified the 
prevailing institution--of property as the root cause of oppression and 
exploitation of the working classes. On the assumption of human equality 
Bray deduced a number of "first principles" or "natural laws" — viz., 
that labour ought to be universal, that the earth ought to be the 
common property of all its inhabitants, and that equal effort ought to
t
3be equally recompensed. In addition to these first principles, Bray 
also examined the practical criteria for the attainment of utility, as 
stipulated by the "political economists": namely, there shall be labour, 
accumulations and exchanges. Operating universally,and upon an egalitarian 
basis throughout society, these conditions would be perfectly consistent 
with the first principles postulated by Bray. However, under present 
circumstances, the institutionalised infraction of these conditions 
consequent upon the private ownership of land and capital, generates 
gross inequality of wealth, and serves only to perpetuate the prevailing 
division of society into two classes — a capitalist and a labouring class.
Society properly conceived ought to serve to neutralise the natural 
mental and bodily inequalities of man, and to equalise the benefits 
accruing from the "wise and judicious" application of labour, capital and
4
machinery. The question is, therefore, how can the prevailing operations 123
(1) Bray, Labour's Wrongs, p-14.
(2) Cf., chapter 7, section 1(1), pp.415-424 of this thesis.
(3) Labour's Wrongs, pp.28, 30.
(A) ibid., p .95
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and institutions of society be made to conform with the normative 
principles outlined above, and embodied in the slogan "UNIVERSAL LABOUR 
and EQUAL EXCHANGES"?1
Bray's response is, in fact, quite categoric. "If we would end 
our wrongs and our miseries at once and for ever, THE PRESENT ARRANGEMENTS 
OF SOCIETY MUST BE TOTALLY SUBVERTED".2 Only a complete change of system 
can inaugurate the age of right and ensure equality of exchanges, with 
this change of system based principally upon the abolition of private 
property in the productive resources of the nation.
The major problem with all the remedies previously devised is that
they fail to strike at the cause of the problem, the economic foundation
of society2, treating only its superficial, secondary effects, merely
altering "the appearance and ... form of the Great Wrong - leaving
4
untouched its very essence." Such remedies represent simply the "partial 
amelioration of the condition of the working class as a working class".2 
The solutions advanced by political associations, trades unions, and reform 
societies, such as that lobbying for a legal limitation on working hours^, 
assume as given the employer-employee nexus,2 and the prevailing pattern 
of class division. 123456
(1) ibid., p.75.
(2) ibid., p.17.
(3) Henderson, J. P. "An English Communist", HOPE, 1985, for one 
interpretation of the relationship between Bray and Marx.
(4) Labour's Wrongs, p. 97
(5) ibid., p.100
(6) ibid., p.101. Cf., pp.98-101.
(7) Gray, Alexander, The Socialist Tradition, p.287.
528
This particular propensity can be illustrated by reference to the 
reform movement for the abolition of the Corn Laws. The adherents of this 
movement assume that simply by opening up the market to cheap foreign 
corn, the huge burden imposed upon the productive classes through the 
extraction of enormous rents will be alleviated. Here Bray dissents.
It is the ownership of the land by a class, enabled thereby to determine 
the conditions upon which and the extent to which food shall be produced, 
that explains the oppression of the working classes.^
The exclusive possession of the soil by
particular individuals is a social arrangement
which has been proved to be productive of evil
under all circumstances; and, in countries
where the land is very limited in extent and
unequal in fertility, individual possession
gives rise to institutions of the grossest ,
vileness and injustice ... 2
There is wanted (therefore), not a mere govern­
mental or particular remedy, but a general remedy - 
one which will apply to all social wrongs and 
evils, great and small. 3
and this is provided by the "social system of community of possessions", 
wherein "labour shall be universal ... land and all productive property 
shall be held and enjoyed in common", and in which the rights and duties 
of all individuals will be founded upon egalitarian principles.^ Man 
will live in a kind of universally (or at least nationally) extended 
family; an "equal brotherhood of love" united by a common and indivisible 
interest.^
On the assumption that the structure of economic organisation 
determines the political superstructure^ so the transformation of the 
production and exchange process will lead to an alteration in the
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
ibid., pp .181-3 
ibid., p.182 
Labour1s Wrongs, p,8. 
ibid., pp.123-4
ibid., p.121. ^  ibid., pp .17-22; 36-37; 95-107; 124-6, passim.
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distribution of political power. Political power emanates from economic 
power, based on the acquisition and monopoly ownership of wealth, thus 
the emanicipation of the labouring classes from the prevailing system of 
competitive capitalism will, through its equitable distribution of 
wealth, lead to a wider dispersal of the powers of government.
The formal structure for this scheme of community of possessions, 
would be provided by the establishment of a plethora of communities 
comprising between 1000 and 5000 inhabitants working together in special, 
functionally-designed surroundings.^
This communitarian scheme bears only a passing resemblance to that 
advocated by Owan,and substantially reproduced by Thompson, however. As
I
we previously observed, Owen viewed each community as an independent, 
self-sufficient and self-governing producer co-operative. Each community 
would, as a community, own all the productive resources necessary for its 
efficient operation. Owen also believed that it was possible, through 
the setting up of one isolated, experimental community, to lead by 
example. Thus he envisaged the gradual extension of communitarianism 
through society, until a network of such communities of mutual cooperation 
were established.
Bray, however, views communitarianism slightly differently. Firstly,
individual communities were not necessarily self-sufficient. Allowing
some latitude to geographic contingencies, he recognises that some degree
of specialisation would, in fact, be inevitable. This would simply
2result m  a vast exchange network.
Secondly, he seems to assume that the productive resources of the 
nation will be the common property of all its inhabitants as a nation, 
and simply available for use by each community. How the capital generated 12
(1) ibid., p.124
(2) ibid., p,132 (3) ibid., pp.46-8; 178; 179 passim.
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by each individual community should be distributed is an issue Bray fails 
to consider, though his previous reasoning would probably lead him to 
regard it is a national asset.transferable, if necesary, to those 
locations most necessitous of it.
Finally, Bray does not regard such communities in the same exemplary 
light as Owen. He dissents from the view of their gradual introduction 
throughout society as the working classes slowly acquire the requisite 
capital and land, arguing alternatively for a two-stage plan. The trans­
formation of society would commence with the gradual setting-up of joint- 
stock companies, and progress, once all the nation's land and capital 
were secured, and the populace accustomed to the principles and practices 
of harmony and cooperation, to the ideal of community of possession!*"
Arrangements for the organisation of such communities were three-fold: 
arrangements for: "the production and equable distribution of an unlimited 
quantity of wealth", the "physical, moral and intellectual culture of
2every member of society", and "the proper government of society at large",
• • • 3with this latter category covering all aspects of societal regulation.
The basic principle upon which such communities are to be founded 
is the concept of cooperation.
Man is by nature a social being, governed inexorably by the 
"indestructible but directable principle of self-love'.'^ Depending on 
prevailing social circumstances, this principle may be made to benefit an 
individual directly, without benefitting his fellows; to benefit an 
individual directly whilst simultaneously benefitting his fellows; or to 
benefit him indirectly through the medium of others.5 The "first mode of
(1) Cf., Edwards, John,"John Francis Bray", The Socialist Review,1916, pp 329-41. ---------------------
(2) ibid., p.125.
(3) E¿., foreign trade, the settlement of disputes, and the protection 
of property and persons.
(4) Labour's Wrongs, p.lll. (5) ibid., p.lll
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operation" is, Bray declares, "incompatible with personal safety and 
social peace", the second "unfavourable to the growth of individual 
charity and general love", and the third alone "contains within itself 
the elements of safety,charity and peace".^
The worthiness and workability of any form of society is contingent 
upon the manner in which this principle of self-love is harnessed. 
Currently it is left to function in an innately selfish and egoistic 
manner. Each individual acts only to promote his own selfish interest.
In consequence society is divided into an oppressed labouring class, and 
a parasitic owning class.
Subscribing to Owen's philosophy that society — its organisation and 
institutions - is the formative influence par excellence of the human 
character Bray notes that:
Such, then, being the nature of man, and such 
the influences of circumstances upon him, his 
destiny is placed within his own hands; and 
it is in the power of society, as a whole, to 
determine, by the establishment of particular 
social institutions, what shall be the general 
character and habits of its individual members.
Thus the evils of every kind now endured may 
not only be alleviated, but totally removed. 2.
The various controllable circumstances pertaining to the happiness 
of man are of two kinds: the physical - concerned with the production of 
wealth for the satisfaction of human wants — and the moral - relative to 
his intellectual and moral cultivation.
In respect of the former, wealth is at present subject to the 
operation of two principles — competition and cooperation. Whilst com­
petition is an inherently divisive principle, cooperation properly.-* 1
(1) ibid., p.lll.
(2) ibid., p.113
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directed is capable of conferring enormous benefits on mankind collectively. 
The means of undermining competition are two-fold: First, the subjection 
of man to a peculiar course of moral training inculcating him with 
"higher feelings and actions", and secondly, the creation for all of a 
sufficiency of commodities thus neutralising the incentive to competition. 
Only under the social system of community of possessions and equality 
of rights sketched by Bray, will both these objectives be fulfilled.
The transformation of existing societal arrangements faces two 
difficulties. The first concerns the logistics of acquiring all the 
requisite land and reproducible wealth necessary to establish this system 
of communities. As Bray somewhat cursorily observes at this juncture, 
this is to be effected by an enormous act of purchase. However, the 
impecunious condition of the labouring classes precludes them from 
establishing the system of community on a large scale.^
2Secondly, and relatedly, man "as he is at present", nurtured in
the atmosphere of competition,seems an unlikely candidate for a system
founded upon harmony and equality. Community of possessions represents
for Bray "the most perfect form of society" capable of human institution,
and one which requires, therefore, a "corresponding degree of excellence
3in the character and qualities of all who enjoy its influence."
We might as well expect to behold the fly 
to spring up at once from the maggot, as expect 
that man can go, by one remove, from the present 
system into one so dissimilar in all its parts 
as in the system of community. 4. 1
(1) Cf., ibid., pp.127-129.
(2) ibid., p.129 (original emphasis).
(3) ibid.. p.133
(4) ibid., p-133. £ f ., p 130 where Bray notes that previous communistic 
experiments failed because of this lack of excellence.
i
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Man is, however, perfectible. All that is required is the time 
and circumstance to effect the necessary transformation. Bray advances 
two options here. Either sufficient capital funds must be made available 
to support mankind until the process of regeneration is accomplished; 
or else, a transitional 'half-way house scheme', "fitted to take society 
as it is, and to prepare the way for other and better changes",* must
be devised. Bray prefers the latter option, and sets about detailing
2the "joint-stock modification of society." This transitional scheme 
will combine "individual property in productions" with "common property 
in productive powers - making every individual dependent on his own
exertions", whilst simultaneously "allowing him an equal participation
3 »in every advantage afforded by nature and art".
The details of the scheme are quite straight-forward. The entire
working population of the United Kingdom - currently estimated at five
million - is to be formed into a number of joint-stock companies, each
containing between 100 and 1000 men. Each joint-stock company will
contain members of a single trade, specialising in either the production
or distribution of a particular commodity. Each company will have for
use, either by "hire or purchase" the requisite land and fixed capital
of the country. The flotation of each company will be brought about by
the issue of a circulating bank-note capital equivalent to £100 for 
. 4each associated member, of the community, which, since it also
comprises the women and children connected with the five million producers -
a further fifteen million people - will provide a capital of £200,000,000.^
ibid., p.194. Cf.,Gray, Alexander, op.cit., pp,287-8. 
ibid., p.161.
ibid., P*194 (original emnhasis).
The problem of currency and banking will be considered shortly. 
Labour's Wrongs p.157.
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
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The affairs of these companies would be regulated by local and 
general boards of trades, elected by the associated members, respon­
sible for the regulation -of aggregate levels of production and dis­
tribution. Together with the managers and overseers in charge of 
each company, the boards would determine the quantity of various goods 
required for consumption; the relative value of all commodities; the 
number, and description of labourers required in various trades, and 
all production and distribution related issues.^
Each associated member would receive a weekly wage for his labour,
determined according to the number of hours worked. "If one person
worked a whole week, and another worked only half a week, the first
would receive double the remuneration of the last". Ultimately
however, everyone will work the same number of hours (optimally 5 hours
a day) and receive a uniform wage. In this way, the labourer will
2"ultimately receive the whole fruits of his labour". The underlying
3
assumption of Bray's scheme is that all who are able must labour.
Since the joint-stock scheme preserves the individual right of property 
in the produce of labour, individuals would be able to accumulate as 
much of their produce as they desired, and inequality of wealth 
consequent upon such accumulation would be a natural and harmless 
feature of society contingent as it is upon the imperative to labour,
4and the equality of exchanges.
Just as remuneration is calculated according to labour expended 
determined by man hours, so cost of production would always determine 
value, with equal values exchanging for equal values.”* 123*5
(1) ibid.. pp.157, 160, 162, 180, passim.
(2) ibid., p.160.
(3) Bray makes special concessions for the old, infirm and young, 
etc., unable to work, as we shall see.
(A) Labour1s Wrongs, p.168.
(5) ibid., p.160.
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Bray is quite emphatic that this joint-stock modification represents 
only a preparatory step on the road to full community. One advantage 
of the scheme is, that by founding the reward of labour upon egalitarian 
principles, time is afforded for the acquisition of the requisite 
moral and social habits necessary for communities of possession, via 
the extended diffusion of knowledge, and the practice of greater 
co-operation.^
This, in broad outline, is Bray's scheme for the functioning of
joint-stock companies, a scheme anticipating in a number of ways the
2philosophy of Guild Socialism promulgated in Britain in the 1900s.
Common to both philosophies is a belief in the titlecf labour to the 
full fruits of its endeavour; in the provision of worker control over 
production; in the ownership by the community at large of the means 
of production,allied with the belief in the day-to-day authority over 
economic processes being attributed to the respective joint-stock 
company or Guild; and finally the view that producers are eligible 
for remuneration irrespective of factors such as health, trade
conditions, and bad harvests which may interfere with their capacity
3to labour, but over which they have no control.
One major difference between the two philosophies relates to the
status of exchange. The Guild Socialists argue that the organisation
4of production is of utmost importance, whereas Bray believes that 
the rationalisation of production - though occasionally this differ­
ential is lost sight of. 1234
(1) ibid., p.160.
(2) Edwards, art.cit., p.333. Cf., (e.g.) Burkitt, Brian, Radical 
Political Economy, pp,121-l7f on Guild Socialism.
(3) Burkitt, op.cit., pp.122-123
(4) ibid., p.121.
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The means of actually setting up his scheme of joint-stock companies, 
and acquiring the requisite real capital,still requires consideration.
As Noel Thompson notes, this was to be effected by a "colossal 
act of equitable exchange".^ Preliminary to this exchange is, 
however, a reformation of the basis of the prevailing monetary system
of the country, redolent of that espoused by Owen, but more particularly
_ 2 Gray.
As we observed in the last chapter3, the deficiency of currency 
relative to capital was cited by Bray as one reason for the existence 
of widespread unemployment, and formed, together with the credit
system, the "great armoury from whence the capitalists derive all their*
weapons to fight with and conquer the working classes."^
Like Gray, Bray proposes that the issue of money should be consequent 
upon the prior existence of actual produce.^ It should exist in 
sufficient quantity to represent the entire amount of capital available 
for production at any one time. As a representative of existing capital, 
there is no need for the substance nominated as money to have any 
intrinsic worth of its own. Its value derives only from its conventional 
usage. It must possess the characteristics of inimitability 
portability, devisibility and durability.
The new medium of exchange,devised to supercede the prevailing 
medium, consists of paper money and pottery coinage, bearing two 1
(1) Thompson, N.W, op.cit., p.98.
(2) See section 3, pp.540-543 and pp.544-555-
(3) See chapter 7, section 3 , pp.452-477.
(4) Labour'8 Wrongs, p-146.
(5) ibid., p.145.
(6) Presumably the imposition of a stamp, or other identifying insignia.
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denominations - the amount of labour and the amount of sterling.
This new currency is to be generated by a national bank, and issued 
to the various joint-stock companies in proportion to the number of 
their associates and the nature of their trade. With this money, all 
the transactions of society will be effected.
The money issued would always keep within the 
limits of the actual effective capital existing; 
and it would, like blood within the living body, 
flow equably throughout society at large, and 
infuse universal health and vigour. 2.
All the fixed capital of the country required for the functioning 
of the joint-stock companies outlined, might be purchased, Bray
proposes, by notes issued by a council of delegates. Production would,
3 'as Noel Thompson argues, be socialised by purchase.
Two obvious problems present themselves. Firstly, the title the 
capitalist holds in relation to his property, though based only upon 
conventional privilege, and not upon right, is still protected by the 
laws of justice and secondly, the capitalists as a class are likely to 
be reluctant to sell their property, constituting,as it does, the basis 
of their power and privilege.
Balanced against this is the general interest of society. When the 
property of an individual or class interfaces with the welfare of the 
body politic - as in the case of the construction of railways, and roads - 
such property is usually "equitably valued, and paying its owners the 
price fixed upon, (society) take(s) the property independent of their consent."^ 1
(1) Labours Wrongs, p.172.
(2) ibid., p .180.
(3) Thompson, N.W., op.cit., p.98; Cf., Gray, Alexander, op,cit., p.-288; 
Lowenthal, op.cit., p.97; and Lloyd-Prichard, M.F., Introduction to 
Bray, J.F., A Voyage from Utopia.(1842). first published by Lawrence 
and Wishart Ltd., in 1957 (London), pp.12-14.
(4) Labour’s Wrongs, p.174.
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Thus, whilst the consent of the capitalist to submit to such a 
purchase may be waived, the terms of that purchase must be equitably 
grounded. Since the labouring classes do not at present own sufficient 
funds to purchase the requisite capital - at its just value - Bray 
proposes that the notes or bonds offered to the capitalist should 
represent a kind of promissory note of future intent to pay.* Thus:
If a workman pay gold to a capitalist, or 
one capitalist pay gold to another, he merely 
gives a representative of the things which 
labour has produced - if he gives a bond to 
pay at a future time, he merely promises to 
pay what labour will produce. 2.
Once the entire produce of labour is secured to the producers of 
it, they will have the financial potential to pay off their debts, ' 
with the requisite funds being either obtained at source, via a direct
3tax on labour, or through the imposition of a percentage upon commodities, 
until such time, presumably, as the institution of community of 
possessions.
The ramifications of the establishment of the joint-stock modifi­
cation of society extend beyond the simple reunion of labour with its 
product, and the issue of equitable exchange, to cover the development 
of a collective social responsibility for the care, upbringing and
4
education of children, and the physical, moral and intellectual emanci­
pation of w o m a n . I n  addition to this the Productive resources of society 
will be such as to support the old, the infirm and the impotent, as a 
matter of right, not charity,^ and to guarantee employment to all. 1
(1) Payment could, as it were, be by instalment.
(2) Labour's Wrongs, p.173 (original emphasis).
(3) ibid., p.180; c£., also p.214.
(A) cf., ibid., pp.165-7. cf., Gray, Alexander, op.cit., p.288. Bray 
fails to outline the reforms necessary to accomplish this end.
(5) ibid., pp.167-8.
(6) ibid., p.168.
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Finally, all losses to individuals, and companies, by fire, shipwreck 
or bad harvest will be spread throughout society at large.
There would be one great gainer and one great 
loser - the nation - for society would form,as 
it were, one vast insurance company, in which 
the profits only would be known, and the losses 
be unfelt or unseen. 1.
Only with the establishment of this joint-stock system could the 
conditions requisite to the foundation of the "social system of 
community of possessions" be fostered, for only under the joint-stock 
modification would man be nurtured in the spirit of cooperation and 
equality necessary to the efficient functioning of the communitarian 
scheme. 1
(1) ibid., p.168.
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Section 3: The Question of the Monetary System
Another problem that perplexed the anti-Ricardians in their 
analysis of the iniquitous workings of the capitalist system was the 
way in which the monetary system actually contrived to deny the 
labourer both employment, and the full fruits of his endeavour. Our 
focus in this section concerns the scheme devised by one of the anti- 
Ricardians - John Gray - to reform the monetary system along conventions 
consonant with the just principles of appropriation and valuation, 
and which included the establishment of a labour-based currency. The 
section will begin with a review of Robert Owen's contribution to the 
money supply debate, before moving on to an examination of Gray's 
plan for currency reform. >
(t) The Influence of Robert Owen(ll): Currency Reform.
In Section 2(i) we noted that Owen was influential in providing 
some of the anti-Ricardians with a ready-made scheme, suitable for the 
implementation of the just principles of appropriation and distribution. 
In this part of this section, we propose to illuminate, briefly, Owen's 
views on currency reform and the labour standard of value, for as 
we shall in the rest of the section, this also provided inspiration 
for some of the anti-Ricardians in their endeavour to discover the 
optimum means of reconciling labour with its product.
The "NATURAL STANDARD OF VALUE", Owen declared in the "Report 
to the County of Lanark", is "HUMAN LABOUR".* Since such labour is 
capable of quantification, through something akin to the means employed 
to measure human or equine physical power, and since, "its exchangeable 
value, with all other values, (may be) fixed accordingly", it ought 1
(1) Owen, op,cit., in Cole, G.D.H. (ed.) A New View of Society and
Other Writings, (London, Dent, 1927), p^50.
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naturally to form the basis of both exchange and distribution, as 
it is utilised universally in the production of commodities.*
The "prime cost" of every article is regulated, he declares, by 
the "net value of the whole labour contained in any article ... (together
with) the material contained in or consumed by the manufacture of the
2article forming part of the whole labour". Although the meaning 
attributed by Owen to the phrase "whole labour" is never specified 
explicitly, it appears from the context to resemble the assertion of 
the classical economists, that the value of anv article comprised 
both the immediate and accumulated labour embodied in its production.
In other words, prime cost is determined by the quantity of immediate
t
human labour expended in production, plus an amortisation charge on
the capital wasted in production - with profit, as interest, excluded
from the equation (presumably on the grounds of the illegitimacy of
the capitalist's return). In order, therefore, that labour be remunerated
according to its intrinsic value, commodities must exchange according to 
3total labour cost.
Until the advent of a monetised economv, labour, as the natural 
purchase price of commodities, had determined their ratio of exchange.
The intervention of money, however, led to an abrogation of this 
principle, and to the development of an artificial standard of value.
The medium for the easy, and advantageous, and 
just exchange of wealth, as long as any medium 
shall be required, must possess the quality of 
expansion and contraction to a fractional accuracy 
as wealth for exchange expands or contracts. 4. *V,
(1) ibid., p.262.
(2) ibid. , p.251. cf..Thompson, The People's Science, p.75.
(3) ibid., p.261.-
(4) Owen, Book of the New Moral World, Book II, p.26. cjf also, Book
V, ch .TiT] pp. 25-27 (My emphasis), -c f., B rav. John Francis, Labour's 
Wrongs and Labour's Remedy, o p .137ffand Gray, John.e.g., An Efficient
o^r t i^c DisCre8V ° f  Nations, on.6-7; and Lectures on the Nature
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This flexibility in the supply of money is absent in a currency 
based on gold and silver, since both as commodities are potentially 
limited resources, and necessitate labour in their procurement.
Their supply cannot be extended or contracted freely as the goods
it represents vary in supply; and, in consequence;the value of goods 
reflects, not labour time, but the quantity of gold and silver in 
existence at any one time. The exchangeable value of commodities can 
only be restored to their natural level through the erection of a 
currency founded upon labour expenditure; that is by "forming arrange­
ments by which the natural standard of value shall become the practical 
standard of v a l u e . O w e n  devised, thus, a scheme of "labour notes", 
each representing an amount of labour time, to be issued by a National 
Bank. In this way, any individual depositing a product created by his 
own labour in a community warehouse, would receive a labour note to the 
value of the amount of time invested in that product, with which he
could purchase other items.  ^ The exchange of commodities would, therefore, 
be equitable, the labourer would be remunerated according to
endeavour, and the money supply tied to the supply of wealth.
In fact, Owen not only devised such a scheme, but he also endeavoured 
to put it into operation, with the establishment, in 1832, of the 
National Equitable Labour Exchange, a bazaar-like organisation where 
workers swapped their produce for labour-notes, functioning as outlined 
above 1
(1) Owen, "Report to the County of Lanark", p 262 (original emphasis).
(2) cf., The Life and Times of Robert Owen, voi 1A, p. xix.
(3) £f. , "Report to the Countv of Lanark", p. 262; and The Life of 
Robert Owen, voi 1A, p. xiv.
(4) c f ., Taylor, op■cit. , d . 86 and Hovel, op.cit., pp.46-7. The 
scheme was beset by difficulties, not least those created by 
the problem of operating within a competitive svstem.
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The issue of money along the lines described above is, Owen
observes, necessary to "set industry free and at work over the world",
and thus to prevent "the complaint of a single individual for want of
useful and profitable employment",  ^ for at present unemployment is
founded upon a deficiency in the quantity of money compared to capital.
Although capital abounds, the lack of a sufficient medium of exchange
forces many into idleness and social misery, thus both derive from, and
2are exacerbated by, an artificial and deficient currencv; however,
once the money (labour) is based on the natural standard of value, and
its supply is in a state of parity with the available wealth of the
nation, employment will be available for all, and men will be recompensed 
3according to justice. This notion that unemployment (or the deficient 
demand for labour relative to supply) derives from an inegalitarian 
system of exchange, and the existence of a currency founded upon 
incorrect principles, receives, as we shall see in the next part of 
this section, a much more comprehensive treatment at the hands of John 
Gray. Having outlined sufficientlv for our purposes Owen's ideas on 
this topic, it is to Gray's examination of the currency question that 
we now turn. 1
(1) Book of the Mew Moral World, Book II, p. 27.
(2) £ f ., Beer, M., A History of British Socialism, (London, George 
Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1948 repr.), p. 178.
(3) c_f. , Book of the New MoraL World, Book II, pn. 25-29.
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(ii) John Gray: Monetary Reformer
Although Che assertion ChaC ''¡ray is an Owenite, in his early works 
ac lease, is largely unexceptionable, to regard him as a communitarian
would however be a mistake. inlrr , , _ .rtP*rc from his appendage,to the Lecture
on Human Happiness, of the articles of agreement for the formation of
a community on principles of mutual co-operation drafted by the London
Co-operative Society, his theoretical interest in communitarianism
is very limited,* though his oractical involvement was apparently 
2greater.
The Lecture is devised partly as a defence of Owen's faith in 
co-operation, and partly as a critique of the economic structure of
society, the main theme of which is that competition represents an '
3unnatural fetter to production. Owen's scheme of communities of 
mutual co-operation is acceptable to Gray on the specific grounds that 
"it abolishes the circumstance which now limits production, and gives
4to the producers the wealth that thev create". Ouite simplv, the 
employment of men on the principles of co-operation will dissolve 
the system of competition, and reunite the labourer with his product. 1
(1) The American edition has an appendix containing the Preamble
and Constitution of the Friendly Association for Mutual Interests, 
located at Valley Forge, (Philadelphia, J. Coates Jr., 1826).
Cray also composed a short critical tract about the management 
of the Orbistonian community established upon communitarian 
principles in 1825. cf., A Word of Advice to the Orbistonians. 
n.p., 1826.
(2) He was involved in the management of Orbiston (c.1815), for
example.ef., Lowcnthal, The Ricardian Socialists, p.48. 1815
is her date - though 1825 seems more likely.
(3) Lecture on Hu.Happ., pp.48 ff.
(4) ibid., p .46 (original emphasis).
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What Gray derives from Robert Owen is not, however, a plan for 
the establishment of co-operative communities, but a belief in the 
power of co-operation as the only antidote to the ills of competition. 
Indeed, Gray expressly declares at the end of the Lecture that:
In a Future Lecture we shall endeavour to 
explain another set of arrangements on the 
basis of a national capital, by the intro­
duction of which, the only limits to our 
wealth would be the exhaustion of our 
productive powers, and the satisfaction of 
our wants. 1.
The plans to which we allude are altogether
different from those proposed by Mr. Owen ...
but we entertain a hope that they will be
useful in proving to the world, that unity
of interest is in every wav consistent with
individuality and distinction of property. 2 >
The intimation at the end of this quotation that "unity of 
interest", is reconcileable with "distinctions of property" suggests 
that Gray, although favouring the nationalisation of capital, is 
still an individualist, believing in the right of the individual 
to own, and use, whatever he can produce himself.
Basic to his critique of competition in the Lecture is an
embryonic theory of underconsumption. Competition, he alleges,
. 3renders production contingent on demand. Effective demand is 
determined by disposable income, and at present:
the income of every individual and conse­
quently of the WHOLE COMMUNITY, except those 
persons who have fixed money incomes, is LIMITED 
BY COMPETITION ... each obtains the LEAST 
that his labour, his services, or the use of 
his property CAN POSSIBLY BE OBTAINED FOR. 4. 1
(1) That is, the natural limits to production identified earlier 
in the Lecture.
(2) Lecture on Hu. Happ., p.59 (my emphasis).
(3) ,chapter 7, section 3, pp.452-477 of this thesis.
(4) Lecture on Hu. Happ.. p.54.
So, whilst "our power of creating wealth increases", the
competition amongst labourers for employment means that "it will
be obtained with increased difficulty".^ And so, overproduction
results from the increasing immiseration of the labouring classes
2due to increased competition.
In the Lecture Gray fails to formulate a specific policy 
for the reconstitution of society upon equitable, non-competitive 
grounds, merely hinting that the abolition of competition would so 
suffice.
However, his implicit identification of the insufficiency 
of purchasing power as fundamental to overproduction suggests, as
*
Alexander Gray notes, a monetary remedy. In his later works, there­
fore, the emphasis shifts to the speculation that it is in fact the
actual under production of currency that is responsible for the
4aggregate over-production of commodities". In this his philosophy 
is close to both that of Robert Owen, and John Francis Bray. They both 
perceived the lack of correlation between the money supply and the 
magnitude of production as responsible for unemployment, and poverty. 
Owen observes in his Address to All Classes in the State,'’ for instance, 
that such unemployment and povertv arise "solelv because there are 
not sufficient quantities of certain metals ... to circulate as 
artificial money". Likewise Bray comments that "Thousands are now 1
(1) ibid.. p.54 (original emphasis) cf., p.55 also; King, art.cit.. 
p.248; Thompson, N.W., The people's science. Dp*174 ff; 
Lowenthal, The Ricardian Socialists, pp.58-60.
(2 ) £_f. , King art. cit. , p, 214.
(3) Gray, Alexander, The Socialist Tradition, p.295.
(4) Gray, John, Lectures on the Nature and Use of Money, (Edinburgh 
and London, 18^8), p.77; cf., King, art.cit., p.251.
(5) (London, 1823), p.7. Cited in Thompson, N.W., op.cit.. p.175.
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idle and poor because no person can set them to work - they cannot be
set to work simply because themselves and others are destitute of the
1 2 requisite money". The foundation of Gray's later works, therefore,
is provided by a scheme of monetary reform based on the rendering
commensurate of the money supply, and the supply of products, causing
"the production of goods to become the unfailing cause of a demand
for them".'*
What was required therefore was the implementation of a scheme
whereby each unit of output necessarily generated an equivalent
• A • •quantity of money, and whereby the consumption of each unit of
output would necessarily occasion the destruction of an equivalent
quantity of currency.^
Gray's plan comprises the restoration of a labour standard of 
exchange, the establishment of a National Bank and associated National 
Chamber of Commerce, and the institution of a system of factories, 
warehouses and wholesale depots.
Rationalisation of exchange first requires the foundation of 
currency upon an invariable standard of value. "Only by the adoption 
of an immutable standard of value ... (can) goods continuing to cost 
the same labour in their production ... continue to maintain the same 
price in the market".^ The problem with gold and silver is that they
(1) Bray, Labour *s Wrongs, p.145.
(2) Gray, John, The Social System; A Treatise on the Principles of 
Exchange, (Edinburgh, 1831); An Efficient Remedy For the Distress 
of Nations, (Edinburgh and London, 1842);' The Currency Question.
A rejected Letter to The Times, (Edinburgh and London, 1847), 
Lectures on the Nature and Use of Money.
(3) Soc, Syst., p.xvii, (original emphasis).
(4) cf., Thompson, N.W., op.cit., p.174; Lowenthal, op.cit., p.59.
(5) Gray, Efficient Remedy, p.83.
(6) Soc. Syst., p.85. cf., Thompson, op.cit., p.175.

are commodities liable to great fluctuation in their value due to 
the difficulty of their reproducibility. As such, price comes to 
reflect the proportion between the quantity of gold and wilver in the 
market and the quantity of goods to be represented by that money.
Money should, however, simply act as a "transferable represen­
tative of wealth, increasing and diminishing in quantity in exact and 
in variable proportion" with that wealth.^ It should,therefore,
compromise a substance destitute of value, and capable of speedy,
2and practically unlimited reproduction. Bearing this in mind, Gray 
chooses paper as the material for his standard currency based on a 
labour standard of value.
t
Each note issued by the National Bank represents, therefore, a
. . 3definite quantity of labour and skill. Its issue is contingent upon 
the prior production of property of a particular value. Thus:
Money — standard bank-notes — would be 
merely so many transferable certificates 
of the existence, in the standard market 
of equivalent produce, actually for sale 
in exchange for standard notes ... Every 
holder of a standard note being by its 
possession constituted a proprietor of 
that portion of the standard wealth which 
the note should represent and would command. 4
It is important to note that the annual issues of the National 
Bank, represent only the productions and importations of a country - 
not all its business transactions, much of which is conducted upon 
the basis of transferring already existent property, not creating new 
property. 1
(1) Efficient Remedy, pp. 5-6 (original emphasis).
(2) ibid., pp.5-6; Nat. & Use of Money, pp-291, 216, 227.
(3) Efficient Remedy, pp.105-6.
(4) Nat.S Use of Money, p.117 (original emphasis); Efficient Remedy,
C T ----------------------
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The inauguration of Gray’s scheme not only required the 
establishment of a National Bank "and a rational species of money",* 
but also the concurrent establishment of a National Chamber of Commerce.
Where the National Bank was concerned with the rationalisation of
exchange, the Chamber of Commerce was principally concerned with the
rationalisation of production. The main function of the latter was
the establishment and control of an ever-increasing number of large-
scale manufactories specialising in one particular area of production -
2usually of a non-speculative nature. The Chamber of Commerce, adminis­
tered by a board of salaried managers, was to form the principal
3"controlling and directing power" of Gray's scheme, responsible for
t
regulating both the scale and direction of all production, and capital 
investment, determining "where production should proceed more rapidly, 
where at its usual pace, and where also it should be retarded."^
Each master manufacturer, or "agent", would receive directives therefore, 
concerning the manner in which he was to employ his talents. To each 
manufactory would be appointed a commissioner responsible for the 
implementation of chamber policy, the superintendence of production, 
and the employment of labour.'*
On the completion of production, items would be removed to 
national depots or warehouses where they could be stamped with a 
standard insignia - in order to differentiate them from those items 
still under production in the commercial system - and where they could 
be offered for sale, wholesale. 1
(1) ibid., p.25.
(2) That is, principally with the production of necessaries and 
conveniences, rather than luxuries.
(3) Soc. Syst., p,232. _cf., Efficient Remedy p 146.
(4) Efficient Remedy, p.145. c.f., Review of Gray's Social System, in 
the Edinburgh Spectator. FeE". 18, 1832; cited in fetlicient Remedy, 
pp.144-151.
cf., Lowenthal. on.cit., n.59.(5)
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In receipt for such goods, the agent or commissioner would 
obtain an equivalent amount of standard currency, signifying a 
"check or order upon the standard depots for the value of each man's 
contribution, in labour or service."*
Hitherto, Gray has concentrated on the issue of equitable, 
labour-based exchange. However,
The influence of the standard rules and 
regulations, the object of which is to 
fix the value of the currency, and to 
render production the cause of demand, 
terminates in the wholesale warehouses; 
once out of which the standard goods become 
the property of whomsoever may be pleased 
to buy them, and they may be used or 
appropriated in any manner whatsover. 2.
•
Once goods leave the standard warehouses, their cost is no 
longer regulated by labour and raw materials exclusively. Rather a 
percentage is added "sufficient to ensure a gradual and sufficiently
rapid increase of capital", and to disburse the cost of a number of
. . . 3incidentals and salaries.
There is a certain amount of ambiguity surrounding this aspect
of Gray's scheme, exacerbated by his somewhat peculiar explication of
the normative basis for wage payment. It appears that Gray, whilst
discounting the present monetary foundation of commercial society, is
not opposed to its competitive element - provided currency is based 
. . 4on just foundations. For example, the competitive retailing of goods 
lodged in the national depots is perfectly permissible, with the 
retailer "entitled" to whatever profit he can acquire. 1
(1) Efficient Remedy, p. 9.
(2) ibid., pp. 45-46.
(3) Soc. Syst. , p.33. cf., also Efficient Remedy, pp.94-5.
(4) Gray had, of course, initially condemned the operations of the 
capitalist system, precisely for this competitive element, cf., 
chapter 7 above, pp.
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Likewise, a competitive bias is integrated into his wage 
scheme. The parameters for his wage theory were first set out in 
The Social System, in 1831. Gray is concerned to secure to the labourer 
the produce of his own labour.^ The basic postulate of his entire 
thesis is that the supply of money must be commensurate with, and 
contingent upon, the volume of production. The major problem for his 
explication of wages revolves around the remuneration of the so-called 
non-producer.
The producer recognisable by his creation of a tangible and 
exchangeable corporeal product could quite simply be remunerated 
according to the value of his product. In this way, money wages
might be rendered as "an.order on the property which he has contributed
2to bring into existence, for the value of his own contribution".
The non-producer, however, is identifiable by the very fact that
he "does not, by his own hands, assist in the production of any 
3
commodity". Clearly, if his services are indispensable, he naturally 
requires remuneration for them. The question is, according to what 
criteria is such remuneration determined?
The natural wage rate, far from consisting in the subsistence 
. 4wage of the classical economists, is reckoned as "the whole that is 
produced by labour",^ subject to certain stipulated deductions, namely 
that portion of it which it must be ever necessary to take from them,
for the purpose of remunerating a number of unproductive members of
. _ „6society. 1
(1) Soc. Syst., p.236.
(2) Efficient Remedy, p.61 (original emphasis).
(3) Soc.Syst., p.242. The non-producer may still be a useful or 
necessary participant in the Social System, cf., Gray's position 
in the Lecture on Hu. Happ., however pp-llff.
(4) See chapter 4, section 2(i) pp.256-268.
(5) Soc.Svst.. pp.248-9. (Original emphasis)
(6) ibid., pp,169-70.
Thus, Gray calls for the establishment by government of a fixed
and immutable minimum wage throughout the system of standard works. 
This minimum wage represents what Gray denotes the "starting-point in 
the race of competition".* Thus, each individual employed in the
standard works will receive "so much money per week for a certain
2number of hours' work", on top of which he will be able to negotiate 
a contracted wage with his employer.
In this way, therefore:
A well-considered Act of Parliament
constituting labour the legal, as it is,
and must ever continue to b e , the one
and only possible standard of value,
would not interfere, in the slightest
degree, with the principle of individual <
competition between man and man:
professional, mechanical, or laborious. 3.
Labourers in standard factories would be remunerated out of the 
standard money received on deposit of their product in the national 
depot or warehouse. Each would receive the basic wage, plus whatever 
he had negotiated with his employer, the master manufacturer, who would 
presumably be eligible to keep whatever money remained after payment 
of the wage-bill. Professional and service people would be remunerated 
out of the incomes of those engaging them.
In the first case, additional wealth (qua property) has been 
generated; in the second, merely transferred.
One purpose of this minimum wage, aside from ensuring reason­
able remuneration to all engaged in labour, is to provide Gray with
. . . Aa yardstick against which the "value of the pound standard may be
fixed with mathematical precision and accuracy.""’ Gray has, as it 1
(1) Hat. & Use of Money, p,260.
(2) ibid., p.261 (original emphasis).
(3) ibid., p.251 (original emphasis).
(4) The pound representing the basic unit of currency. 
(SI Nat. A Use of Money, n.262 (original emphasis)•
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were, erected an artificially constant standard. A certain quantity 
of labour, calculated in man hours, will always denominate a specific, 
immutable value, on the basis of which the national currency is 
established.
For the Classical Economists the minimum acceptable wage varied 
according to the cost of producing subsistence upon differentially 
fertile soils. For Gray cost of production is entirely peripheral 
to the issue of a minimum wage.
Every invention which should enable a man
to do today double the work he did yesterday,
would halve the price of the thing produced,
and - the wages of labour being fixed and
immutable - consequently double its access- >
ibility to all; 1.
One final aspect of Gray's policy should be considered briefly, 
and that concerns the issue of the implementation of his scheme and 
the question of capital.
Gray envisages the foundation of the National Bank and National
Chamber of Commerce as issuing from an Act of Parliament, with
similar legislation responsible for the construction of a labour
2standard of value, and rational system of money.
In order to generate sufficient interest in the standard scheme, 
Gray believed that, as a preliminary to the foundation of this system, 
the public press should be encouraged to bring the problem of the 
defective exchange system to public attention, and to encourage the 
submission of proposals to deal with that problem. With public 
interest sufficiently awakened, government would be compelled to 
appoint a committee to investigate the problem and to consider the 1
(1) Efficient Remedy, p.12.
(2) Nat. & Use of Money, pp. 2A5ff.
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various remedies oroposed, including the Social System advocated
by Gray. If this committee, acting as a kind of jury, found the
Social System principles worthy of greater consideration, a select
committee could be established to examine the details (Gray even
offered to answer queries himself on the system^) . Assuming that the
scheme was approved,the next step would be the formation, by private
individuals, of a nucleus of national commercial associations founded
upon the principles of the Social System. The formation of this
nucleus of associations is necessary on two counts: (i) to attract
2the optimum number of subscribers necessary to set up a Chamber of 
Commerce to investigate the diffusion of the social system throughout 
the nation at large; and (ii) to attract sufficient people of capital 
to have sufficient funds to start up the scheme. Once both of these 
conditions were fulfilled, Government itself could be petitioned for 
a constitution. Gradually and inevitably through the efficient 
functioning of this nucleus of communites, the system would spread 
throughout the nation at large, and the standard capital required to 
set this diffusion of the system would, Gray argues, be provided by 
government.^
Gradually this capital - useable . by all subscribers completely
gratuitously - would be supplemented by an additional sum deducted from
Athe excess of production over consumption needs. "As fast as the 
associated capital should increase, either by the acquisition of new 
associates, or by accumulation, additional persons would be called 1
(1) Soc.Syst., p,322-323.
(2) Subscribers were not necessarily men or women with capital income, 
merely those wishing to join this scheme - presumably, the working 
classes.
cf., Lowenthal, op.cit., p-60.(3)
(A) Soc. Syst., pp.169-170.
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into operation under its auspices",^ until all the labourers - and 
capital - of the nation were enveloped by the standard system.
Standard capital would ultimately represent national capital - in the
sense of both the entire capital of the nation, and as an asset
. . 2belonging to the entire nation.
Initially, therefore, Gray's system would be inaugurated with 
the involvement of a number of "associates", less than the entire 
population of the nation, but would ultimately extend to cover the 
entire population as the capital available for production accumulated 
sufficiently to set all to work.
Gray's mature system relies,more than any of the alternative
*
schemes of his contemporaries, upon the rationalisation of exchange
through the inauguration of an alternative, flexible labour-based
currency. Whilst John Francis Bray reiterates to some degree this
scheme of monetary reform, his principal interst is in creating the
optimum conditions for the generation of communities of co-operation.
Gray, however, is not interested in communitarianism, but rather with
3what appears to be a system of state socialism. Based on the assumption 
that once production becomes the effective cause of demand employment 
will be provided for all, and the labourer will be reconciled with 
the maximum permissible portion of his product (with deductions for 
governmental expenditure, capital accumulation, and wages for non­
productive workers), Gray develops a system that operates on a 
national level, with central control of industry and economic planning, 
and with a money supply tied strictly to the quantity of national 
produce. 1
(1) ibid., p.325.
(2) Efficient Remedy, p.94.
(3) Lowenthal, op.cit., p-60.
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Conclusion
Central to this chapter was an examination of the various schemes 
for the reform of society developed, by the anti-Ricardians, in tandem 
with their theories of the just qrounds of appropriation. All of the 
schemes discussed shared the same objective - to reconcile labour with 
its product. The plans outlined to foster such a reconciliation, however, 
were many and varied.
In section 1 we began with Hodgskin's "model" of an Independent, 
artisanal society. Hodgskln was decidedly reticent about ad vancinq blueprints 
for the reorganisation of societv, and so we have no definitive picture of 
how Hodgskin conceived societv would develop. However, after an analysis 
of the writings of the author, we concluded that he favoured a system 
based upon the existence of independent producers'. In addition we noted 
that Hodgskln and Spencer, from similar natural rights positions, prefer 
different approaches to the guestlon of the establishment of equal rights 
to the land, with Hodoskin advocating limited, though individual, use-rights, 
and Spencer, the nationalisation of land. We also concluded that Hodgskin 
believed in the inevitabilitv of the appearance of such a system through 
the subversion of the artificial bv the natural right of property. Finally, 
we noted that Hodgskin favoured the removal of all obstacles to the free 
functioning of the natural rlqht of property.
In section 2, we moved on to communitarian schemes for the reconciliation 
of labour with its product. We observed that Robert Owen had been largely 
Influential in setting the parameters for communitarian theory, and that 
it was his basic model of a community that formed the prototype for the 
development of alternative schemes in the works of Thompson and Bray. In
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section (li), we examined Thompson's variation on the theme of coooerative 
communities. We beqan by considering Thompson's understanding of the 
individualist/competitive svstem founded on security. We then demonstrated 
how Thompson had effectivelv deflated the purported advantaqes of this 
system by examinlnq its inherent evils. We then analysed Thompson's 
scheme of mutual cooperation, hiqhliqhtinq the role of persuasion, 
education, and the trade union movement in the inauquration of that scheme.
In section 2 (ill) we contemplated the 1olnt-stock modification of 
the community system advanced by John Francis Bray. We beqan with an 
examination of Bray's scheme for community of possession, illustratinq 
Bray’s contention that this scheme would be incapable of implementation 
until such a point in time as men had fully internalized the ethos of
t
cooperation and community. We then focused on Brav's joint-stock scheme, 
pointing out the similarities between that scheme and the later idea of 
Guild Socialism. Our final observation in that section concerned Bray's 
argument that the deficiency of currency compared to capital necessarily 
required the reconstruction of the monetary system upon a labour standard 
of value.
In section 3, we continued with this theme of currency reform and 
the money supply, treatinq the works of Owen and John Gray. Owen, we 
observed, believed that labour formed the only legitimate basis for value, 
and as such ought to form the foundation of the currency system. Thus, 
we observed, that he favoured a currency of labour-notes as the only 
means capable of rendering commensurate the money supply and the supply 
of capital/wealth.
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In section 3 (ii), we concentrated on the monetary reform scheme 
of John Gray. We demonstrated that underlying both his early and 
later works was a theory of underconsumption. We concluded that it 
was the problems posed by Gray's early encounter with under-consumptionist 
thought that formed the basic framework for the development of his more 
mature theory. We noted that Gray - like Owen, and Bray - favoured the 
restoration of a labour standard of exchange as the basis for a flexible 
and responsive money supply. Finally, we concluded that the reconciliation 
of labour with its product was contingent upon the rationalisation not 
only of exchange, through the inauguration of a labour-based monetarv 
system, but also on the rationalisation of production and distribution
through the development of Gray's scheme of national factories, ware-
*
houses, and boards of trade.
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Conclusion.
As C.B.Macpherson observes in "Property As Means or End", the 
opening essay in Anthony Parel and Thomas Flanagan's edited work.
Theories of Property: Aristotle to the Present,1 it is Dossible to
2isolate three approaches to the study of prooertv in political theory.
One can examine property from the Derspective of the history of ideas,
focusing on the treatment of property as an idea, as developed in the
work of various authors throughout time; from the perspective of political
philosophy, endeavouring to identify the essential characteristics of
the concept of property; or, from the perspective of an analysis of the
historical specificity of any conception of property as either an idea
or an institution.1 23 45 The first approach is exemplified, Macpherson declares,
in Richard Schlatter's work. Private Property: The History of an Idea;
the second in Lawrence C . Becker's book, Property Rights; The Philosophic 
4Foundations ; and, the third approach in Macpherson's own composition,
"A Political Theory of Property"."’ Since this dissertation is structured 
around a discussion of the ideas about property present in British political 
theory between 1750-1850, it is quite obvious that it falls squarely 
within the first of Macpherson's categories.
The main focus of our discussion has been on ideas about property, 
therefore. As we observed in the Introduction, the word "ideas" repre­
sented a deliberate choice. Some of the theorists considered in this
(1) Macpherson, C.B, art, clt., in Parel and Flanagan eds., op. cit., pp.3-9
(2) Macpherson suggests a fourth approach, namely, the consideration of 
property as a means to an ethical end, or as an end in itself.
However this approach appears to be covered by the first of the 
perspectives outlined above - the political theory variant - and 
represents the idea that various oast accounts of property were 
underwritten by the idea of property as means or end.
(3) Macpherson, art, clt., p.3.
(4) Becker, op. clt., (Boston, Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1977).
(5) Macpherson, art, clt., in Democratic Theory, Essays in Retrieval.
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1973).
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study do not develop fully-articulated or systematic accounts of property, 
but employ assumptions about a particular kind of property right - 
private or communal - or, about the nature of the orevailing system 
to underwrite their discussion of other tooics - such as economic growth, 
or the conditions most conducive to production.
For those who develop "theories" of property, there is no unity as to 
their nature or thrust. Some, such as Hodgskin's natural rights theory, 
represent justificatory theories of property directed at the question of 
the specification of the legitimate grounds of appropriation. Some, such 
as the Utilitarian accounts of property, develop more teleological 
explanations about the nature of the property system. They endeavour 
to explain how a particular property structure conduces to a particular 
end. They are not concerned with justifying the institution of 
property, per se, but with demonstrating how it functions in respect of a 
particular objective. William ThomDson's account of the principles of 
security and equality as the necessary conditions for a system of property 
designed to promote both maximum utility and maximum wealth, is an example 
of that species of theory. Similarly, James Mill's concern with the 
conditions necessary to secure that supply of effort and capital commen­
surate with the needs of subsistence, led him to argue that the property 
system most likely to promote that end was a system founded on labour- 
incentive. Still others develop historical accounts of the origin 
and evolution of property rights. Again the theory is mainly explan­
atory. Smith's account of the nature, origin, and development of property 
within the framework of a conjectural Dicture of history constructed about
the four-stages theorem represents the best example of this species of 
theory.
It is interesting to observe that during the period under study, all 
those theses concerned to criticise the prevailing socio-political and 
economic structure of societv were largely, though not exclusively, 
justificatory theories; whilst those concerned to defend the status quo 
were primarily explanatory. One explanation for this apparent bifurcation 
of the material is that those propounding system-critical material needed 
to establish that the existing basis of property distribution was, in fact, 
illegitimate. Clearly, the best way to do this is to demonstrate how property 
arises legitimately, that is, to adumbrate the just principles of appropriation, 
and then to employ this "justificatory" theory as a yardstick against which to 
assess the workings of the prevailing system. Similarly, those prepared to 
countenance the prevailing property system have no real motive to demonstrate 
that the foundations of the system are legitimate. They can simply assume 
legitimacy and work therefrom, as the classical economists do (par excellence) 
in their empirical theory of distribution. Obviously it is possible to find 
theories providing justificatory accounts of propertv formation which are 
system-supportive, vide Locke's Two Treatises, and explanatory accounts 
employed to critical ends, vide Thompson's Inquiry.
In this dissertation we have not only been concerned with illuminating 
the kind of ideas about property current during the period in question, but, 
more particularly, the relationship of those ideas to a number of themes, 
namely, la tour and value theories, and the distribution of wealth between 
classes. The links that may be established between "labour" and property 
are many and varied. Traditionally, accounts of this relationship have been
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viewed in either "Instrumental" or "expressivist" terms (or a combination 
of both). Out study has focused - more by accident than design - upon 
"instrumental" theses - that is, theses which regard the activity of 
labouring as fundamental to the satisfaction of human needs, with labouring 
viewed most normally as a disutility. Expressivist theories - theories 
purporting that the activity of labouring is basic to self-expression or 
self-development, such as Hegel’s view of property as the objectification of 
the self - were largely absent from the British literature of the period.
The main contribution of this thesis to the current debate on the history 
of the idea of property resides not, however, in its examination of the
connections between labour and property, but in its endeavour to explicate
*
the links between (labour) value and distribution. Most accounts of property 
pay only cursory reference, if at all, to the classical economists. 
Distribution theory is largely excluded from studies dealing with ideas about 
property. Although it has to be acknowledged that a theory purporting to 
explain the way in which the returns to economic factors are determined may 
not satisfy the basic criteria of a justificatory account of property, 
consideration of such a theory cannot be discounted out of hand. Firstly, 
distribution theory focuses on how the wealth of a nation is shared out 
amongst the population. Given that most property theorists frequently 
identify property with wealth (although not exclusively), this per se, 
does not Invalidate the claim that distribution theory should be included in 
studies of the idea of property. Secondly, whilst a theory of distribution 
is a largely emoirical concern, dealing with how the rates of factorial 
return are calculated, it is also, ipso facto, a theory based on certain
assumptions about the property system. As we observed in our Introduction
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an explanation of the workinqs of Industrial caoitallsm (at this time) 
presupposes a certain conception of the nature and function of property 
rights. The system Is viewed as grounded in an Individualistic, and 
exclusive right of private property. The idea that the rioht of prooertv 
includes the right to use that property as one sees fit, implies the right 
to use property to earn profit or rent. Tooether these notions suqgest the 
legitimacy of inequality of wealth. In one way, therefore, a theory of 
distribution may be viewed as an explanatory theory of oropertv.
A prevalent claim has been that from Adam Smith on, the classical 
economists developed the embryonic theory of value postulated by John Locke, 
and assumed, as data, the basic proprietary assumption of Locke that labour 
creates a title to property. However, it was our intention, in this 
dissertation, to show that such an hypothesis was, in fact, mistaken, 
rather, we argued, it was the value theory of Smith that gave impetus to the 
theory of value of the classical economists and the Utilitarian concern with 
security and equality that underwrote the classical economists' theory of 
distribution (and growth). Thus, in chapter 1 we established that Smith's 
account of property was not a justi^actory account a la Locke, but an 
historical account deployed within the analytical framework of the four-stages 
thesis, formulated not as Ronald Meek claimed as a theorv of development, but 
as a typological model. The universally legitimising feature within 
Smith's account was not the fact of labour-expenditure, but the theory of the 
impartial spectator and the concept of svmpathy. Property was validated then, 
only when the svmpathy of the spectator could be aroused, with the conditions 
upon which that sympathy was founded varying (potentially) from stage to stage. 
Smith does not posit a universally operative paradigm of appropriation.
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In chapter 2 we continued our analysis of the ideas of Smith in 
relation to his "economics” focusinq on both value and distribution. We 
observed that Smith advanced three "theories" of value: a simple "labour- 
cost" account of value formation in primitive societies» an ”addinq-up" 
hypothesis of value requlation after the accumulation of capital, and 
the appropriation of land had taken place; and a "labour-command" theory 
of value measurement. In addition, vis-a-vis Smith's account of distribution 
we noted that Smith's theory of waqes represented simply a diqest of various 
(potentially) incompatible approaches, includinq elements from productive 
theory, bargaining theory, subsistence theory, the wage-fund theory, and 
the idea of wages as the residue remaining after the deduction of profit 
and rent. We also observed that7 his account of profit was dominated by
f
two ideas, profit as "addition" and profit as "deduction" - which ideas had 
interesting ramifications both for the Ricardian theory of profit, and 
the anti-Ricardian's account of exploitation. Finally, we noted that a 
dichotomy existed in Smith's theory of rent, between rent as price-determined, 
and rent as price-determining.
As we noted earlier, it has been conjectured that the embryonic theory 
of value presented by Locke provided the startinq point for the classical 
economists. In chapter 3, we concluded that the Lockean account of value was 
a causal account of value formation, concerned with the source of value, and 
not an explanatory account of value regulation, concerned with the principles 
determining the exchange rate. It was noted that the labour theory advanced 
by the classics was, by contrast, an explanatory theory. We also demonstrated 
in this chapter that it was the inconsistencies and ambiguities within
Smithian value theory that promoted the classical economists (on our restricted
i
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definition) to formulate their own explanations of value determination.
Thus, Ricardo denies the historical specificity of Smith's labour-cost 
model, unlversalising it into an account of value regulation throughout 
time, whilst Malthus (for example) develops the labour command explication 
of value measurement.
In chapter 4 we turned to the classical account of distribution. Here 
it was shown, firstly, that it was the account of distribution adumbrated 
by Smith that provided that starting-point (and basic material in many 
instances) for the classical theory of distribution. Thus, for example, 
the classics built on and developed the subsistence theory and wage-fund 
theory suggested by Smith's plethora of approaches. Similarly, it was
t
Smith's definition of profit that was employed by the classical economists. 
Although Smith was Influential in this sphere, however, we also noted the 
innovative aspects of classical distribution theory.
in chapter 5, following our exposition of the Utilitarian accounts of 
property enunciated by Jeremy Bentham and James Mill, we considered the 
ideas about property underlying the works of the political economists, 
represented in this instance by <?.R. McCulloch and Thomas Malthus. We 
concluded that with the one exception of the Lockean idea that a man has 
a property in his person, recast as the argument that everv individual has the 
right to direct his own labour (Smith's "patrimony of the poor mem"), the 
basic proprietary notion o^ the classics was the notion of "security of 
property" as a pre-requisite to both continued production, and growth. In 
other words, the biggest incentive to labour (both of the worker and the 
capitalist) was security of property. This echoes directly the pronouncements
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of both Bentham • the "disappointment-prevention principle" - and James 
Mill - "insuring to every man the greatest possible quantity of the produce 
of his labour".^-
Further support for this claim that Lockean notions of property do not 
inform the classical political economists' conception - of property, can 
be found in the argument presented in chanter 3, that McCulloch (and later 
Mill), by denying to human labour any special status - throuqh the extension 
of the concept of labour to cover all species of productive activity - 
effectively divest it of the appropriatlve concent Implied in the Lockean 
scheme. For it was central to the labour theory of entitlement developed 
by Locke (and later rehearsed by Hodgskin) that the human activity of 
labouring was regarded as distinctive - not only since labour was alone
t
seen to generate a title to property, but also since labour alone could 
bestow value on objects. Thus, in the case of maturing wine, the classical 
economists ascribe the additional value to the capitalist, whereas a
proponent of the labour theory of individuation would normally want to
2ascribe that value to the labourer.
In the final three chapters of this study we examined the works of the 
anti-Rlcardians. Our justification for denominating these authors anti- 
Ricardians was founded upon two claims: first, that to call them "Ricardian 
Socialists" was to place the main emphasis in the derivation of their ideas 
upon Ricardo, which we argued was mistaken. Rather the genealogy of anti- 
Ricardian ideas suggests Smith as a more likely candidate. Secondly, to 1
(1) Mill, 'Essay on Government', p.57.
(2) Difficulties often arise for the labour theory of property when division 
of labour, and different economic classes emerge.
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label all the writers normally classified as "Ricardian Socialists” as 
"Socialists", we concluded, was also erroneous, since that suggested a 
potential uniformity in approach belied in practice.
We observed earlier that the links between labour and property have 
been differently posited by different theorists, and this is nowhere 
better exemplified than in the works of the anti-Rlcardians. Hodgskin, as 
we demonstrated in chapter 6, formulates a natural rights account of property 
a la Locke; both John Gray and John Francis Brav enunciate (as observed in 
chapter 7) theories of property based on an instrumental argument from 
equality (or equal rights) ; whilst William Thompson espouses an egalitarian 
version of the argument from equality. All of them, however, argue that 
property should be secured to labour - by which they mean exclusively the 
labour of the producer. These theories, once formulated, provided the 
anti-Ricardians with a critical tool with which to assess the workings of 
the prevailing system of property. This, they concluded, defrauded the 
labourer. The labourer was, it appeared, being exploited. Whilst some 
authors have attempted to identify pre-Marxian notions of surplus value in the 
writings of the anti-Ricardians, it was our conclusion that "exploitation"
(in the simple sense of denial to the labourer of the fruits of his industry) 
was located in the sphere of exchange. Thus, the anti-Ricardians not 
only identified the prevailing property structure as responsible for 
exploiting labour, but also the exchange mechanism. This contrasts with the 
view of the classical economists that the prevailing system of both property 
and exchange was actually securing the harmonisation of labour with capital.
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The final chapter of this thesis was,in many ways, the most 
descriptive, concentrating uoon the plans devised bv the anti-Ricardians 
for the reconciliation of labour with its product and to restore the 
labour standard of value. These ranged from the individualistic artisanal 
account of Hodgskin, throuqh the communitarian schemes of Owen, Thompson 
and Bray, to the monetary reform schemes of Owen and Grav. Whilst the 
schemes vary, the main purpose is the same - to ensure that those who do 
not labour 1 are not entitled to a share in the national product. In other 
words, to establish distribution on a lust and egalitarian basis. The question 
of ensuring to labour its just desert, and the problem of how the prevailing 
system actually militated against that was a recurrent theme in the period 
after 1850. Thus Marx and Engels saw the abolition of private property, and 
the destruction of capitalism as fundamental to the claims of labour, whilst 
Herbert Spencer, regarded land nationalisation as basic to the individual 
right of private property.
Throughout this dissertation we have encountered a number of different 
hypotheses about property, some fully-deveioped theories, such as the 
Utilitarianism of Bentham, Mill and Thompson, the equal rights theses of 
Gray and Bray, and the natural rights theory of Hodgskin; others, simply 
assumptions about the validity of the prevailing system. In all these concerns, 
whether individually, in pairs, or all three in combination , the themes of 
labour, value, and distribution have recurred.
(1) With the exception of the old, young and disabled
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